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Introductory Note
The present special issue of Disputatio brings together some of the 
best work recently done in Brazil and Portugal in the tradition of 
analytic philosophy (broadly conceived). Over the past ten years or 
so we have witnessed an impressive growth of analytic philosophy in 
both countries, either in terms of quantity or in terms of quality of 
the produced philosophy. We hope that this volume capture, at least 
partly, the dynamics and strength of such development. The range of 
philosophical problems and topics covered by the contributed essays 
is vast, cutting across several philosophical disciplines. Indeed, one 
can find therein issues in philosophical logic, meta-philosophy, ethics, 
aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy 
of mathematics and metaphysics. Such variety of subject-matter is 
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1 Introdução
Segundo uma concepção bastante em voga atualmente, a ontologia 
com a qual devemos nos comprometer deve de algum modo ser ‘in-
ferida’ de nossas melhores teorias científicas, ou seja, dito de modo 
resumido, se desejamos saber o que há, devemos indagar às nossas 
melhores teorias. Esta posição, que é uma forma de naturalismo em 
ontologia, encontra algumas dificuldades no caso da mecânica quân-
tica não-relativista. Segundo certas interpretações, o formalismo 
desta teoria é compatível com pelo menos dois tipos bastante distin-
tos de ontologias: uma ontologia ‘clássica’ na qual as entidades tra-
tadas por esta teoria são vistas como indivíduos em alguma acepção,1 
ou alternativamente, também é possível defender que a teoria nos 
1 Porém, podendo ser indiscerníveis, alguma versão do Princípio da Identidade 
dos Indiscerníveis (PII), de Leibniz, seria supostamente violado por estas partícu-
las, pelo menos segundo alguns autores (algumas referências sobre este tópico são 
apontadas em Muller & Seevinck [2009], embora esses autores não concordem 
com a violação do PII pela mecânica quântica). O princípio nos garante que se 
objetos são numericamente distintos então deve existir alguma propriedade ou re-
lação que os diferencie. Neste caso, se assumimos que as partículas quânticas são 
indivíduos, então o princípio de individualidade para elas não pode se basear em 
PII. Recentemente, no entanto, alguns autores tentaram estabelecer a validade de 
uma forma do PII neste contexto (ver Saunders [2006], Saunders e Muller [2008], 
Muller e Seevinck [2009]). No entanto, em nenhum desses trabalhos o conceito de 
“propriedade” é dado de forma rigorosa.
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compromete com uma ontologia de não-indivíduos,2 objetos para os 
quais as leis da identidade, conforme formuladas na lógica clássica, 
não se aplicam irrestritamente (ver French e Krause [2006] cap. 4 
e 6). O problema é que a contraparte matemática da teoria não nos 
dá indicações que permitam favorecer uma destas interpretações em 
detrimento da outra. Assim, aparentemente, no caso desta teoria, a 
disputa terá que ser travada no campo da argumentação filosófica.
Adotemos uma terminologia provisória e informal. Um indivíduo 
será aqui (redundantemente) entendido como uma entidade (por falta 
de um termo melhor) que possa pelo menos em princípio ser identi-
ficado de modo inequívoco em qualquer contexto, em especial, sen-
do diferente de todas as demais entidades que forem dele distintas. 
Por exemplo, se supusermos a teoria de conjuntos Zermelo-Fraenkel 
com o axioma da escolha (ZFC), então todo conjunto pode ser bem-
-ordenado,3 em particular o conjunto ℜ dos números reais é bem 
ordenado. O que acontece é que, como se sabe, não podemos expri-
mir essa boa ordem por uma fórmula da linguagem de ZFC. Em par-
ticular, como (0,1) ⊆ ℜ, este subconjunto terá um menor elemento, 
que, no entanto, não pode ser expresso na linguagem (por exemplo, 
dando-lhe um nome). Porém, mesmo assim ele é um indivíduo na 
nossa acepção, sendo distinto de qualquer outro número real, como 
implica a lógica clássica, que subjaz à teoria usual dos números reais. 
Por um não-indivíduo, entenderemos qualquer entidade que não 
obedece as condições acima. Não-indivíduos podem ser de diferen-
tes ‘espécies’, e quando são indiscerníveis, ainda que possam ser co-
2 O termo não-indivíduo, apesar de não muito adequado, é o padrão nestas dis-
cussões. É utilizado para designar objetos que violam alguma forma do princípio 
de individuação, em particular, para objetos que violam as chamadas leis da iden-
tidade, e mais especificamente a propriedade reflexiva da identidade, ou seja, para 
qualquer objeto x, x=x. Isso se deveria não ao fato de haver objetos que não são 
idênticos a eles mesmos, mas à circunstância de que a noção de identidade não 
poderia ser aplicada. Ver French & Krause [2006] para uma discussão pormenoriza-
da.  Outro conceito importante e não muito claro nessas discussões é o de “lógica 
clássica”. Voltaremos a essa questão mais abaixo.
3 Uma boa ordem sobre um dado conjunto é uma ordem parcial (reflexiva, 
anti-simétrica e transitiva) relativamente à qual todo subconjunto do conjunto 
dado tem menor elemento (um elemento do subconjunto que é menor—na or-
dem dada—que todos os outros elementos do subconjunto).
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ligidos em coleções da vários deles, por definição não poderão ser 
discernidos por quaisquer critérios que se imagine, nem mesmo em 
princípio. Um não-indivíduo pode aparecer em um contexto e, se de 
algum modo for substituído por algum outro de mesma espécie, o 
contexto não se altera. Obviamente, uma coleção de não-indivíduos 
não satisfaria o axioma da extensionalidade de uma teoria de con-
juntos como ZFC. Claro que essas caracterizações são imprecisas, e 
suas definições rigorosas dependerão da linguagem e da lógica em-
pregadas. Deste modo, não há uma única definição de indivíduo, e 
o mesmo se dá para a de não-indivíduo, mas isso não impede que 
busquemos tornar estes conceitos mais precisos utilizando algum 
aparato lógico.
Com efeito, um modo de concebermos um pouco mais rigorosa-
mente o que são indivíduos, ainda que haja dificuldade de se carac-
terizar precisamente o que é a lógica clássica,4 seria sustentarmos 
que um indivíduo obedece as regras da teoria clássica da identidade, 
de primeira ordem ou de ordem superior (ou de alguma teoria de 
conjuntos calcada na lógica clássica). Assim, em especial, um não-
-indivíduo não obedece a auto-identidade, isto é, a lei fundamental 
a=a. Isso no entanto, segundo nossa caracterização, não implica que 
a≠a, mas que a noção de identidade não se aplica aos não-indivíduos (o 
que está de acordo com a posição de Erwin Schrödinger, por exem-
plo, em Schrödinger [1952], pp.17-18; ver French & Krause [2006]). 
Esta hipótese parece essencial para podermos caracterizar não-indi-
víduos. Com efeito, admitamos que eles podem estar relacionados 
por uma relação mais fraca de `indiscernibilidade’, que representa-
remos por ‘≡’. Assim, se supusermos, como parece razoável, que 
se x≡y então eles são inter-substituíveis salva veritate, ou seja, vale 
algo como o axioma da substitutividade da igualdade da lógica de 
primeira ordem (a saber, algo como x≡y → (α(x) → α(y)) --ver mais 
à frente), se assumirmos além disso que ∀x(x≡x), restituiríamos os 
4 De modo geral, podemos dizer que por lógica clássica entendemos o cálculo 
usual de predicados de primeira ordem com ou sem igualdade (conforme axioma-
tizado, por exemplo, em Mendelson [1987]), ou alguns de seus subsistemas, como 
o cálculo proposicional clássico, ou mesmo sistemas de ‘grande lógica’ como as 
lógicas usuais de ordem superior ou as teorias usuais de conjuntos, como ZFC e 
mesmo a teoria de categorias como usualmente concebida.
axiomas da igualdade da lógica elementar clássica, e então em nada 
estaríamos contribuindo efetivamente, mas apenas mudando a nota-
ção da igualdade para ‘≡’. Portanto, tendo-se em vista a discussão 
sobre a ontologia associada à MQ não-relativista, resulta que uma das 
dificuldades que surgem é que a lógica clássica, que é a lógica sub-
jacente à mecânica quântica não-relativista, não parece compatível 
com uma ontologia de não-indivíduos, entendidos no sentido acima, 
pois a identidade sempre faz sentido para todas as entidades tratadas 
pela lógica clássica. Assim, se desejamos sustentar que uma ontologia 
de não-indivíduos é plausível, pelo menos no caso desta teoria em 
particular, parece razoável buscarmos por sistemas de lógica que nos 
permitam tratar de objetos para os quais a identidade e diferença não 
façam sentido.
Este tipo de investigação é importante filosoficamente, como 
atestam muitos autores, que sustentam que esta ontologia, a de não-
-indivíduos, é a mais natural para uma possível interpretação da me-
cânica quântica, principalmente se levarmos em conta determinadas 
interpretações de seus aspectos experimentais (ver a discussão his-
tórica em French e Krause [2006] cap. 3). Isto torna imperiosa uma 
busca por mais rigor nos termos nos quais se expressam os conceitos 
de tal ontologia. Não entraremos aqui nas discussões sobre qual on-
tologia é mais adequada neste caso, nos restringindo aos problemas 
dos fundamentos lógicos da ontologia de não-indivíduos, que carac-
terizaremos abaixo.
Neste trabalho, apresentaremos uma linguagem formal de pri-
meira ordem cujo objetivo principal é permitir o tratamento rigo-
roso de objetos para os quais a identidade e a diferença não se apli-
quem, ou seja, linguagens que possam tratar de não-indivíduos nesta 
acepção do termo. Este tipo de lógica é conhecido na literatura como 
não-relexiva ou para-relexiva (por exemplo, da Costa e Krause [1994], 
[1997] da Costa e Bueno [2009]). Vamos também considerar alguns 
problemas que surgem quando desejamos, ao mesmo tempo em que 
adotamos uma ontologia de não-indivíduos fazendo uso das lingua-
gens por nós propostas, utilizar alguma das teorias de conjuntos clás-
sicas5 como metalinguagem para se estabelecer a semântica destas 
5 Grosso modo, estamos considerando como clássica uma teoria de conjuntos 
cuja lógica subjacente é a lógica clássica.
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linguagens. Aqui, estamos supondo que a ontologia com a qual nos 
compromete uma teoria é determinada pelas entidades que devem 
existir no domínio de quantificação para que as sentenças da teoria 
sejam verdadeiras, no sentido tarskiano. Como veremos, se o domí-
nio de quantificação dado por uma estrutura na qual interpretamos 
uma teoria formulada utilizando-se o sistema de lógica aqui proposto 
for um conjunto no sentido clássico, então as entidades com a qual 
trata a teoria serão indivíduos, violando, de certo modo, a motivação 
para se utilizar a lógica proposta neste trabalho.
A linguagem que apresentaremos é uma pequena modificação de 
uma proposta feita primeiramente por Newton C. A. da Costa em 
seu livro Ensaio sobre os Fundamentos da Lógica, (da Costa [2008] pp. 
138-141), e constitui-se basicamente de uma linguagem bissortida 
de primeira ordem com certas restrições que comentaremos adian-
te, dando origem a um sistema que foi por ele batizado de lógica 
de Schrödinger. O objetivo que tinha em mente ao apresentar esta 
lógica era mostrar que o princípio de identidade, conforme forma-
lizado por certa formulação6, pode ser derrogado, ou seja, pode-se 
conceber um sistema de lógica, a lógica de Schrödinger, no qual a 
identidade ou diferença não se aplique a todas as entidades com as 
quais se pretende tratar. Este sistema de lógica era também motiva-
do pelas dificuldades em se tratar da identidade e diferença quando 
falamos de partículas elementares, e deveria refletir certas intuições 
de E. Schrödinger quem, como dito acima, ao falar sobre partícu-
las elementares da física quântica, insistia em que a questão sobre 
sua identidade ou diferença, em certos contextos, não faria sentido. 
Ou seja, (apesar de nem Schrödinger nem da Costa utilizarem esta 
terminologia), estes objetos são certo tipo de não-indivíduos: “Está 
além da dúvida que a questão da ‘igualdade’, da identidade [no que 
concerne as partículas elementares], real e verdadeiramente não tem 
sentido.” (Schrödinger [1952] p. 18).
6 da Costa utilizava a propriedade reflexiva da identidade da lógica clássica de 
primeira ordem, ou seja, ∀x(x=x), como uma forma de representar o princípio 
da identidade.
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2 Uma lógica para a indistinguibilidade
Adotaremos em nossa exposição a idéia original de da Costa para 
restringir a identidade de modo que faça sentido apenas para alguns 
objetos do domínio do discurso. Para fazer com que a identidade no 
sentido usual não se aplique a certas entidades, da Costa empregou 
uma linguagem bissortida, com duas espécies de termos individu-
ais, e uma mudança na definição de fórmulas. Uma das espécies de 
termos, que podemos supor que seja a primeira, denotaria objetos 
microscópicos, e a outra, a segunda, denotaria as entidades macros-
cópicas. A restrição feita na definição de fórmula é a de impedir que 
o símbolo de identidade seja uma fórmula quando ladeado por pelo 
menos um termo de primeira espécie. Os axiomas da lógica clássi-
ca, observadas as diferenças de termos, completavam a apresentação. 
Em nosso caso, para formularmos uma lógica da indistinguibilidade, 
acrescentaremos ainda a esta linguagem uma relação binária de indis-
tinguibilidade com postulados adequados para os objetos de primeira 
espécie. Os objetos de segunda espécie também poderão relacionar-
-se pela relação de indistinguibilidade, mas neste caso esta relação 
colapsará na identidade para estes objetos.
Para vermos como esta idéia funciona, apresentaremos agora uma 
linguagem de primeira ordem para uma lógica da Indistinguibilidade, 
que chamaremos abreviadamente L. Nosso sistema é baseado na ló-
gica de Schrödinger, proposta por da Costa (da Costa [2008]) e ge-
neralizado para linguagens de ordem superior, como em da Costa e 
Krause [1994], [1997], e no sistema de lógica da Indiscernibilidade 
apresentado por Krause [2007] cap. 3. Utilizaremos os seguintes 
símbolos primitivos:
(a) Conectivos: → (implicação) e ¬ (negação);
(b) Quantificador universal: ∀ (para todo);
(c) Pontuação: ), (, , (parênteses e vírgula);







,..., e uma coleção qualquer de constan-






,...; claro que 
este modo de falar pode ser tornado adequadamente preciso 
e independente de noções como ‘enumerável’.  Por exem-
plo, para variáveis de primeira espécie poderíamos usar os 
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símbolos x e |, de forma que as variáveis de primeira espécie 
seriam expressões (sequencias finitas de símbolos) da forma 
x, x|, x||, etc. O mesmo pode ser dito das demais situações 
similares aqui apresentadas.







,..., e uma coleção qualquer de constan-







(f) O símbolo de predicado binário ‘=’ para a identidade e o sím-
bolo de predicado binário ‘≡’ para indistinguibilidade;
(g) Para cada número natural n > 0, uma coleção eventualmente 
vazia de símbolos de predicados de peso n.
Os outros conectivos, disjunção, conjunção e bi-implicação podem 
ser definidos da maneira usual, assim como o quantificador existen-
cial. Um termo é uma variável ou uma constante individual. Os ter-
mos podem ser divididos, de modo evidente, em termos de primeira 







como meta-variáveis para termos de qualquer das duas espécies, e 
x, y e z sem índices como meta-variáveis para variáveis de qualquer 
das duas espécies. Outra convenção que passaremos a utilizar será 
denotar por ‘m-termos’ os termos de primeira espécie e ‘M-termos’ 
os termos de segunda espécie.
Intuitivamente, os m-termos representarão as entidades básicas 
da microfísica, tal como descritas por alguma versão da mecânica 
quântica não-relativística, e os M-termos representarão os objetos 
macroscópicos. O objetivo, como comentamos acima, é fazer com 
que a identidade se aplique apenas a M-termos, e não a m-termos, 
pois para estes não faria sentido falar em identidade ou em diversi-
dade, e que a indistinguibilidade se aplique a todos os objetos, desde 
que sejam da mesma espécie. Formalmente, isso se obtém ao se im-


















 seja bem formada. Com exceção destas restrições, a 
definição de fórmula também segue a usual, e como se pode notar a 
partir dos postulados que daremos, a lógica clássica se aplica de ma-
neira usual aos M-termos. Mais especificamente, temos:
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 é fórmula atômica. Se P é um símbolo de predicados 









 é fórmula atômica.
Definição [Fórmulas] As fórmulas de L são: (i) As fórmulas atômi-
cas; (ii) Se α é fórmula, ¬α é fórmula; (iii) Se α e β são fórmulas, en-
tão α→β é fórmula; (iv) Se α é uma fórmula e x é uma variável, então ∀xα é uma fórmula; (v) Apenas são fórmulas as expressões dadas pelas 
cláusulas anteriores.




 será fórmula apenas se ti e tj forem 
ambos termos de segunda espécie. Nossa definição de fórmula proíbe 













sejam bem formadas. No entanto, como dissemos anteriormente, a 
relação de indistinguibilidade vai se manter entre os dois tipos de 




 sempre será uma fórmula bem formada, 




 sejam de mesma espé-














O seguinte conjunto de postulados pode ser utilizado para L (ou-
tra formulação de uma lógica de primeira ordem com uma relação de 
indistinguibilidade pode ser encontrada nos postulados para a lógica 
da Indiscernibilidade, proposta em Krause [2007] cap. 3):
1.	 α → (β → α)2.	 α → (β → γ) → ((α → β) → (α→ γ)) 
3. ((¬α → ¬β) → ((¬α → β) → α))4.	 α→β, α/ β (MP)5.	 ∀xα(x) → α(t), com x e t da mesma espécie, e t livre para 
x em α(x).6.	 β → α(x) / β→ ∀xα(x), onde x não ocorre livre em β.
7. t=v → (α(t) → α(v)), com t e v termos de segunda espécie, 
além das restrições usuais.8.	 ∀x(x≡x).9.	 ∀x∀y(x≡y → y≡x).10.	∀x∀y∀z(x≡y ∧ y≡z → x≡z).11.	∀X∀Y(X≡Y → X=Y).
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É importante perceber que os postulados que envolvem a relação de 
identidade estão formulados para termos de segunda espécie, prin-
cipalmente o postulado 11, que intuitivamente significa que se dois 
macro-objetos são indiscerníveis, então eles são idênticos. Em breve 
veremos que a recíproca é teorema de L.
Conceitos sintáticos como os de demonstração, dedução a partir 
de um conjunto de fórmulas, teorema, ocorrências livres e ligadas de 
variáveis entre outros também são definidos da maneira usual. O Te-
orema da Dedução também pode ser demonstrado da maneira usual.
Temos agora o prometido teorema de que, para M-objetos, a 
igualdade implica a indistinguibilidade.
Teorema. X=Y → X≡Y
Demonstração:
1. X=Y (hipótese) 
2. X=Y → (X≡X → X≡Y) (postulado 7) 
3. (X≡X → X≡Y) (1,2 Modus Ponens) 4.	 ∀X(X≡X) (postulado 8)5.	 ∀X(X≡X) → X≡X (postulado 5)
6. X≡X (4, 5 Modus Ponens)
7. X≡Y (3, 6 Modus Ponens)
8. X=Y → X≡Y (1-7 Teorema da Dedução)
Assim, com este teorema e o postulado 11, temos que para M-ob-
jetos, X=Y ↔ X≡Y, conforme prometemos anteriormente. No en-
tanto, para m-objetos, este bicondicional não pode ser demonstrado. 
Ainda, neste caso, a relação de indistinguibilidade é caracterizada 
apenas como uma relação de equivalência, sem valer necessariamen-
te o esquema da substituição dado pelo postulado 7. Isto a caracteriza 
sintaticamente como uma relação mais fraca do que a identidade. No 
entanto, como ainda não especificamos como devemos interpretar 
estes símbolos, nada impede, certamente, que ao se fazer uma se-
mântica para L se interprete a relação de indistinguibilidade também 
como a relação de identidade, que satisfaz os axiomas de L dados para 
o símbolo de indistinguibilidade.
Também temos como teorema de L a reflexividade da identidade, 
que não precisa ser postulada. Com isto, a relação de identidade pos-
sui em L as duas propriedades que são usualmente utilizadas como 
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axiomas para a relação de identidade na lógica clássica de primeira 
ordem: reflexividade e substituição. Com estas propriedades, como 
se sabe, é possível demonstrar, por exemplo, que a relação de identi-
dade é simétrica e transitiva.
Teorema. X = X
Demonstração:
1.	 ∀X(X≡X) (postulado 8)2.	 ∀X(X≡X) → (X≡X) (postulado 5)
3. X≡X (1,2 Modus Ponens)4.	 ∀X(X≡X → X=X) (postulado 11)5.	 ∀X(X≡X → X=X) → (X≡X → X=X) (postulado 5)
6. (X≡X → X=X) (4,5 Modus Ponens)
7. X=X (3, 6 Modus Ponens)
Não faremos a demonstração da simetria e transitividade da identi-
dade para M-objetos aqui, pois o procedimento é o mesmo que na 
lógica clássica. Uma demonstração alternativa para estes fatos pode 
ser fornecida utilizando-se a equivalência para M-objetos entre iden-
tidade e indistinguibilidade e os postulados 8 e 9.
É interessante notar também que a lógica clássica de primeira or-
dem está de certo modo ‘contida’ na lógica L. Isto ocorre pelo fato 
de que, intuitivamente, os postulados de L, quando restritos aos M-
-termos, podem ser tomados como um conjunto de postulados para a 
lógica clássica. Falando mais rigorosamente, é possível se estabelecer 
uma tradução da lógica clássica em L, mostrando que os postulados 
da lógica clássica, quando traduzidos em L, são teoremas de L.
Sem dificuldade, podemos estender nossa lógica a uma lógica de 
ordem superior (teoria simples de tipos) e a uma teoria de conjuntos, 
que será em muito semelhante à teoria de quase-conjuntos Q (French 
e Krause [2006], cap.7).
3 Semântica clássica para L e seus problemas
Ao apresentar seu sistema de lógica, da Costa discutia uma interpre-
tação pretendida, que deveria ser erigida de modo que as intuições 
básicas que serviram de base para se formular esta lógica fossem pre-
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servadas. As variáveis individuais de segunda espécie percorreriam 
um conjunto no sentido usual, e as constantes individuais de segunda 
espécie nomeariam elementos deste conjunto. Por outro lado, as va-
riáveis de primeira espécie deveriam percorrer uma coleção de não-
-indivíduos, e as constantes de primeira espécie deveriam nomear 
tais elementos. Os símbolos de relação de peso n, como usual, deno-
tariam coleções de n-uplas de elementos destas coleções, e o símbolo 
de relação de indistinguibilidade, em nosso caso, deve denotar uma 
relação que simule a indistinguibilidade.
Este procedimento, no entanto, se conduzido da maneira usual, 
utilizando uma teoria de conjuntos ao estilo de ZFC como metalin-
guagem, suscita vários problemas filosóficos, caso queiramos preser-
var as intuições que deram origem à lógica de Schrödinger e a lógica 
da Indistinguibilidade, pois parece inviabilizar nosso comprometi-
mento com uma ontologia de não-indivíduos relativamente aos ob-
jetos denotados pelos termos de primeira espécie. Isto ocorre, entre 
outros motivos, porque, como veremos com mais detalhe abaixo, nas 
teorias de conjuntos usuais, nas quais usualmente fundamentamos a 
semântica para linguagens formais como as que estamos discutindo, 
a identidade sempre faz sentido para todos os elementos do conjun-
to, e assim acabamos re-introduzindo a identidade para estes objetos 
através da metalinguagem.
Para discutirmos com mais rigor estes problemas, apresentamos 
a partir de agora um esboço de uma semântica clássica para L, onde 
o termo ‘clássica’ refere-se ao fato de que esta semântica é formulada 
na teoria de conjuntos ZFC. Como este modo de proceder é bastante 
conhecido, não seremos rigorosos e faremos apenas o suficiente para 
que possamos apresentar adiante, com mais detalhes, os problemas 
ocasionados por esta semântica quando desejamos tratar alguns ele-
mentos do domínio como não-indivíduos. Devemos enfatizar que as 
dificuldades aqui apresentadas não são uma exclusividade da lógica 
L e da lógica de Schrödinger, mas sim uma dificuldade que qualquer 
sistema de lógica para-reflexiva deve enfrentar. Em geral, como estes 
sistemas violam alguma forma do princípio de identidade, a semân-
tica formal feita para eles deveria ser tal que os objetos do domínio 
da estrutura na qual interpretamos a linguagem preservassem esta 
característica. No entanto, como veremos no caso particular que es-
tamos tratando, dificuldades surgem quando desejamos estabelecer 
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uma semântica para estes sistemas utilizando uma teoria de conjun-
tos clássica (ver também as discussões em da Costa e Bueno [2009]).
Procedendo da maneira conhecida, e seguindo as sugestões de 
da Costa ([2008] pp. 140, 141), queremos interpretar os símbolos 
não-lógicos da linguagem de L em uma estrutura e = <D, I>, onde:
1. D é um conjunto não-vazio que vai fazer o papel de  domínio 









 = ∅. Assumimos que as variáveis de 
primeira espécie tomam valores em D
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2. Quanto a I, ela será a função denotação, e atribui às relações 
de identidade e indistinguibilidade e aos símbolos não-lógicos 
da linguagem elementos de D da seguinte forma:
2.1. Aos símbolos de predicados de peso n da linguagem de L, out-
ros que a identidade e a indistinguibilidade, a função I associa 
da maneira usual um subconjunto de  Dn.




, ou seja, às constantes de primeira es-






, ou seja, às 
constantes de segunda espécie associam-se elementos de D
2
.




2.4. Ao símbolo de indistinguibilidade ≡ atribuímos uma relação 
R em D tal que R é relação de equivalência.
Com a semântica acima esboçada, é possível obter resultados como a 
correção e completude de L com relação a esta semântica, da manei-
ra usual, com as convenientes adaptações para a linguagem bissortida 
(Mendelson [1987] Cap. 2). No entanto, do ponto de vista filosófico, 
há uma série de problemas com esta semântica, problemas esses que 
surgem quando interpretamos os termos de primeira espécie como 
denotando entidades quânticas, tendo-se em vista que queremos sus-
tentar, seguindo nossa leitura de Schrödinger e de outros autores, 
que elas são certo tipo de não-indivíduos. Alguns destes problemas 
já foram apontados por da Costa (da Costa [2008] pp. 140, 141), e 
outros ainda podem ser encontrados em Krause [2002].
Passamos agora a apresentar alguns destes problemas. Com eles, 
desejamos sugerir que é relevante buscar-se uma semântica mais ade-
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quada para L do ponto de vista de suas motivações, ou seja, uma 
semântica na qual estes problemas possam ser superados. Uma das 
alternativas propostas na literatura é que se empregue como meta-
linguagem a Teoria de Quase-Conjuntos, uma teoria que permite 
formar coleções de objetos indistinguíveis mas não idênticos, mas 
não entraremos nestes detalhes neste trabalho (ver French e Krause 
[2006], cap. 7 e 8).
Do ponto de vista das motivações que deram origem à lógica da 
indistinguibilidade, o primeiro problema com essa semântica clássica 
começa com a escolha do domínio: nosso conjunto D
1
 não poderia 
ser um conjunto no sentido comum das teorias de conjuntos usuais, 
em particular, não poderia ser um conjunto de ZF, a teoria de con-
juntos que se utiliza usualmente como metalinguagem. Isto já havia 
sido apontado por da Costa ([2008], p. 140), e se deve ao fato de 
que essas teorias estão comprometidas com uma noção cantoriana de 
conjunto, no sentido de que conjuntos são coleções de objetos dis-
tintos uns dos outros, o que pressupõe a validade irrestrita da teoria 
da identidade para estes objetos e para seus elementos. Isto pode ser 
visto também como resultando do fato de que a lógica subjacente à 
teoria de conjuntos ZFC e todas as outras teorias de conjuntos clássi-
cas é a lógica clássica, na qual a identidade se aplica sem restrições a 
todos os objetos, impedindo que para alguns deles, que deveriam re-
presentar os não-indivíduos, a identidade ou diferença não se aplique.
Ainda, é importante perceber que de acordo com o princípio de 
extensionalidade, dois conjuntos são idênticos se e somente se tive-
rem os mesmos elementos, o que depende, como se vê, de um conceito 
sensato de identidade. Além disso, os axiomas da teoria de conjuntos 
utilizada implicam que sempre é possível formar o conjunto unitá-
rio de um elemento dado, que será diferente do conjunto unitário 
de qualquer outro elemento (distinto do primeiro) por extensiona-
lidade. Ou seja, um ‘conjunto clássico’ é um conjunto de indivíduos 
(no sentido por nós definido anteriormente), distinguíveis uns dos 
outros, para os quais a identidade sempre faz sentido. Para expressar 
este ponto com mais rigor, pode-se dizer que <V, ∈>, o ‘mode-
lo’ pretendido para ZF, se visto como uma estrutura matemática,7 
7 Este ponto, no entanto, é sutil. Não podemos elaborar um modelo de ZF na 
própria ZF (suposta consistente), como atesta o segundo teorema de incomple-
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é uma estrutura rígida, mas não entraremos em detalhes aqui (ver 
Krause e Coelho [2005]).
Caso adotemos em nosso domínio o conjunto D
1
 como um ‘con-
junto clássico’, estaremos claramente reintroduzindo a identidade 
para estes elementos via metamatemática, ainda que queiramos im-
pedir esse fato em nossa linguagem objeto. Desta forma, como sa-
lientou da Costa, estaremos abandonando a motivação inicial segun-
do a qual a identidade não deveria fazer sentido para certas entidades 
(que seriam os elementos de D
1
). É importante enfatizar isto: uma 
das motivações para se propor L era possibilitar que se tratasse sensa-
tamente com não-indivíduos, e se esta motivação não for observada 
na metalinguagem, aparentemente, não se terá restringido nada com 
as mudanças sintáticas da linguagem de L (para discussões ainda mais 
gerais sobre este tópico, ver da Costa, Bueno e Béziau [1995]).8
Outro aspecto no qual a maneira usual de fazer semântica entra 
em conflito com as motivações de L diz respeito à interpretação das 
constantes. Se quisermos que a identidade não tenha sentido para os 
elementos de D
1
, não é possível que a função interpretação atribua 
a cada constante de primeira espécie um único e bem determinado 
elemento de D
1
. Isto ocorre porque se os elementos de D
1
 forem ima-
ginados como denotando os quanta, de acordo com a interpretação 
que estamos supondo, não faz sentido nomeá-los desta maneira, pois 
se forem indistinguíveis, a princípio não podemos identificá-los nem 
distingui-los. Explicando um pouco mais este ponto, o problema é 
que podemos dar um ‘nome’ para uma partícula, por exemplo, cha-
tude de Gödel. Os modelos de ZF, caso existam, devem ser buscados em teorias 
mais fortes. Para certos conjuntos de axiomas, no entanto, podemos encontrar 
‘modelos internos’ (no sentido de Gödel), mas não discutiremos este ponto aqui.
8 Este tipo de situação ocorre freqüentemente quando se propõe um sistema 
de lógica que viole alguma das chamadas leis da lógica usual. Em geral, a meta-
linguagem utilizada para se fazer a semântica para estes sistemas pode ser consi-
derada como sendo ZF, que pressupõe a validade da lei que se pretende derrogar, 
e acaba por nos comprometer com esta lei na metalinguagem. Por exemplo, na 
lógica intuicionista, desejamos entre outras coisas, que a lei do terceiro excluído 
não tenha validade geral, mas, se fizermos semântica para esta lógica em ZF, es-
taremos nos comprometendo, na metalinguagem, com a validade irrestrita desta 
lei, o que não é intuicionisticamente aceitável. Assim, semânticas distintas, que 
sejam aceitáveis de um ponto de vista intuicionista devem ser buscadas.
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mando Eddy (nome bastante usado na literatura, bem como Priscilla 
e Astrid) a um elétron aprisionado em um aparato laboratorial. No 
entanto, esse ‘nome’ não resiste a uma eventual permutação de par-
tículas, por exemplo, desfazendo e refazendo o experimento.9 Neste 
caso a questão sobre se o Eddy preso no segundo experimento é ou 
não o mesmo que estava aprisionado no aparato quando fizemos o 
experimento pela primeira vez simplesmente não faz sentido, pois 
neste contexto os nomes não podem operar como designadores rígi-
dos. (Isso também é salientado em Dalla Chiara1985; ver French e 
Krause op.cit., p.225).
Insistindo um pouco neste ponto, o problema não é simplesmente 
que se fizermos a suposição de que seja possível atribuir nomes no 
sentido usual para os quanta, haveria um problema em saber qual, 
dentre vários elementos indistinguíveis, é o portador de determinado 
nome, pois isso denotaria unicamente uma limitação epistemológica. 
O problema, no caso dos não-indivíduos, é ainda mais sério do que 
este; é que para eles, segundo a interpretação que estamos adotando, 
esta questão deixa de ser significativa, pois quando seguimos a inter-
pretação acima apontada de Schrödinger, não faz sentido perguntar 
nem mesmo qual dentre várias entidades indistinguíveis recebeu o 
nome, e então a questão torna-se um problema de indeterminação 
ontológica, e insistir na rotulação através de nomes seria desistir da 
suposição de que estas entidades são realmente não-indivíduos se-
gundo a nossa caracterização.
O problema com os nomes, mencionado acima, gera ainda ou-
tro grande inconveniente quando se pretende dar seqüência às de-
finições anteriores. Usualmente, dois caminhos se apresentam. Por 
um lado, podemos definir a verdade para sentenças através do uso 
da linguagem diagrama relativamente ao domínio de interpretação, 
ampliando-se a linguagem ao acrescentar novos nomes, um para cada 
elemento do domínio, e então fornecer as cláusulas usuais por in-
dução ou, por outro lado, podemos fazer esta definição através da 
noção de satisfatibilidade de uma fórmula por seqüências infinitas 
de elementos do domínio. Ambas alternativas são problemáticas do 
ponto de vista de nossos objetivos.
Com relação ao primeiro caminho apresentado, se não podemos 
9 Para mais discussões sobre este ponto, ver Krause [2006].
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nomear os elementos de D
1
, como já apontamos acima, também não 
é possível ampliar a linguagem de L com constantes individuais que 
sejam cada uma delas um nome para um elemento determinado do 
domínio, pois em particular, pelo mesmo argumento acima, não faz 
sentido dar um nome para cada elemento de D
1
. Deste modo, caso 
decidamos nos manter fielmente de acordo com as motivações de L, 
caso adotemos uma postura ‘schrödingeriana’ com respeito às partí-
culas, que por motivos de argumentação supomos que pertencem a 
D
1
, então nos parece não ser possível formar a linguagem diagrama 
de L.
A situação descrita no parágrafo anterior não melhora caso se 
opte pelo segundo caminho apresentado acima, qual seja, definir a 
verdade para sentenças através da relação de satisfatibilidade de uma 
fórmula por seqüências de objetos do domínio. Na verdade, seria 
possível, seguindo-se este caminho, ter uma atitude ainda mais radi-
cal, optando-se por abandonar completamente qualquer referência a 
nomes, eliminando-se da linguagem todas as constantes de primeira 
espécie (e também de segunda), tendo-se em vista alguns dos argu-
mentos acima. No entanto, como dissemos, caso resolva-se prosse-
guir desta maneira para definir a relação de satisfatibilidade, utilizan-
do-se seqüências infinitas de objetos do domínio, tal como pode ser 
feito no caso usual (ver Mendelson [1987] cap. 2), os problemas com 
relação às motivações subjacentes a L não desaparecem.
Neste caso, o problema é que não se podem formar as seqüências 
de objetos sem especificar quais são os objetos, sem rotulá-los, uma 
vez que devemos ter claro em qualquer seqüência, para fins da defi-
nição de satisfação, qual é o seu n-ésimo elemento para qualquer n, 
ou seja, é preciso identificá-lo rotulando-o, e novamente voltamos 
ao problema mencionado acima de que os não-indivíduos não são 
rotuláveis deste modo. Ainda, no mesmo sentido, como uma seqüên-
cia é uma função do conjunto dos naturais no conjunto domínio, é 
preciso que para cada n natural se atribua um único elemento de D, 
em particular, de D
1
, e isto significa que para cada natural esteja bem 
especificado o elemento de D que lhe corresponde, dadas as caracte-
rísticas de uma função em ZF, e que tenhamos critérios, novamente, 
de identificação para os elementos de D
1
.
Um terceiro inconveniente com o qual nos deparamos diz res-
peito à atribuição de símbolos de predicados a subconjuntos de D, 
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ou seja, à especificação de extensões dos predicados da linguagem 
que se está interpretando. Novamente trata-se de conflito entre as 
motivações para a lógica L e a maneira usual de se fazer semântica. 
O problema é que não podemos dizer que certo predicado que verse 
sobre entidades quânticas determina um único conjunto com, diga-
mos, n elementos. Na semântica usual todos os predicados são pre-
cisos (“sharp”, para contrastá-los com predicados vagos), no sentido 
de que atribuímos a cada símbolo de predicados da linguagem um 
subconjunto de Dn (a extensão do predicado), de modo que qualquer 
n-upla de elementos do domínio pertence à extensão de um predica-
do n-ário ou não pertence (dado que o princípio do terceiro excluído 
vale na semântica calcada na lógica usual). No entanto, “...na física 
quântica, existem certos predicados que são sharp no sentido de que 
os físicos sabem muito bem quais condições um indivíduo deve obe-
decer para ter a propriedade associada pelo predicado, mas [aparen-
temente] existem objetos vagos, que nos induzem a considerar um 
tipo de ‘ignorância ontológica’ neste caso. Isto mostra que a relação 
entre os predicados (que estão pelas intensões de certos conceitos) e as 
suas correspondentes extensões (o conjunto dos indivíduos que tem a 
propriedade atribuída pelo predicado) se torna distinta da semântica 
standard.” (Krause [2002] p. 78).
Assim, a situação da extensão de predicados, no caso da semânti-
ca que visa tratar de objetos da física quântica, é tal que não podemos 
determinar um conjunto bem definido de n-uplas para cada símbolo 
de predicados. Ainda temos, como no caso clássico que, dada uma 
n-upla de elementos do domínio, ela satisfaz ou não um predicado 
deste tipo. No entanto, para qualquer n-upla que pertence à extensão 
do predicado, outras n-uplas, indistinguíveis da primeira mas que 
podem não pertencer à coleção que determina a extensão também 
satisfarão o predicado. A satisfação de um predicado por uma n-upla 
depende mais do tipo de objetos que compõe a n-upla do que do fato 
de eles pertencerem ou não à extensão do predicado, pois todas as 
n-uplas de um certo tipo satisfarão um predicado, caso alguma delas 
satisfaça, ou seja, se uma n-upla de elementos do domínio satisfaz o 
predicado, então, qualquer n-upla indistinguível dela também satis-
fará.
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4 Conclusão
Tendo em vista problemas como os mencionados acima, que se origi-
nam quando tentamos estabelecer uma semântica clássica para L de 
forma a manter as intuições que deram origem a esta lógica, segundo 
a qual os objetos com os quais trata a mecânica quântica não-relati-
vista são certo tipo de não-indivíduos, aparentemente duas alterna-
tivas se sugerem, e que nos possibilitam superar estas dificuldades: 
abandonar o comprometimento com a ontologia de não-indivíduos 
e aceitar as dificuldades que surgem quando se adota esta posição 
relativamente à mecânica quântica, ou mudar a metalinguagem na 
qual se estabelece a semântica para linguagens como a de L. Newton 
da Costa sugeriu que, tendo em vista estas dificuldades, se criasse 
uma teoria de Quase-Conjuntos (da Costa [2008] p. 140), na qual 
fosse possível tratar de coleções de objetos indistinguíveis. Esta teo-
ria pode ser vista em French e Krause [2006], cap. 7. Nela é possível 
erigir uma semântica para L que permite manter suas motivações 
metafísicas, mas a apresentação desta teoria e sua discussão estão 
fora do escopo deste trabalho. Este modo de proceder, apesar de nos 
permitir superar algumas das dificuldades apresentadas aqui e dar 
rigor aos termos nos quais uma ontologia de não-indivíduos pode ser 
formulada, ainda assim não encerra o debate filosófico sobre qual 
ontologia é a mais adequada para a Mecânica Quântica. No entanto, 
acreditamos que sistemas de lógica como o proposto, e outros, como 
a lógica de Schrödinger e a teoria de Quase-Conjuntos, contribuem 
para que a opção por uma ontologia de não-indivíduos se torne cada 
vez mais razoável, e para que formalismos que estejam mais de acor-
do com esta ontologia sejam erigidos para contribuir na discussão 
metafísica.
J.R. Arenhart
Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
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1 Introduction
This paper has a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is 
that the Frege-Russell account of existence as a higher-order predi-
cate is mistaken and should be abandoned, even with respect to gen-
eral statements of existence such as “Flying mammals exist” (where 
statements of this sort are supposed to be best accommodated by 
the account). The Frege-Russell view seems to be supported by two 
ideas. First, the idea that existence is entirely expressed by the ex-
istential quantifier of standard predicate logic. Second, the idea that 
the existential quantifier is a higher-order predicate, a predicate of 
predicates, not of individuals. I think that both ideas are wrong but 
will focus on the latter. By construing prima facie first-order state-
ments such as “Flying Mammals exist” as higher-order predications 
such as “The Fregean Concept Flying Mammal maps at least one indi-
vidual onto the True”, the Frege-Russell view commits one - merely 
on the basis of the meaning it assigns to the existence predicate – to 
abstract objects such as concepts (Gottlob Frege), or propositional 
functions (Bertrand Russell), or classes (Rudolf Carnap), or proper-
ties, kinds, and so on. This cannot be right, I think.
The positive claim of the present paper is that, at least in the 
context of first-order discourse, the existence predicate is just what 
it seems to be: a bona fide first-order predicate (pace Kant, Hume, 
Frege, Russell and others).  Three important ideas about existence 
are shared with the Frege-Russell conception of existence, though. 
1 I have been strongly influenced in this paper by the views advanced by Na-
than Salmon, mainly in Salmon 1987 and Salmon 1998. The views endorsed here 
are similar to his views, but my motivation is different.
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(1) Being and existence are one and the same thing: there is no dif-
ference between “Unicorns are not”, or “There are no unicorns”, and 
“Unicorns do not exist”, or “There exist no unicorns”. (2) To be is to 
be the value of a bound variable, to belong to a domain of quantifica-
tion (Willard Quine). (3) Anti-Meinongianism, the idea that there 
are no non-existent objects (Russell). However, we diverge from 
the Frege-Russell tradition with respect to the following  claim. (4) 
The best concept of existence, in the sense of the one that is best 
understood and best enables us to formulate ontological disputes, 
is a purely logical first-level concept defined in terms of existential 
quantification and identity. First-order statements of existence and 
non-existence like “Flying Mammals exist” and “Unicorns do not 
exist” are accordingly taken at face value and analyzed in terms of a 
logical first-order predicate of existence, the predicate “is (identical 
to) something”. Reasons are given to prefer this notion of existence 
to other first-order non-logical notions that have been proposed in 
the literature, notions characterized in terms of predicates such as 
“is in space-time”, “is concrete”, “is causally efficacious”, “is actual”, 
“is real”, etc.
We will also reflect upon the concept of existence by studying 
the logical form of statements of existence and non-existence, state-
ments such as
Flying mammals exist
Unicorns do not exist
Venus (the planet) exists
Vulcan (the planet) doesn’t exist
We are particularly interested in the logical and semantic status of 
the existence predicate involved therein. We want to determine 
what existence predicate we should have at the level of logical form 
that would correspond to the grammatical predicate “exist(s)” at the 
surface level.
The issue about the logical form of existence statements is a vexed 
issue in contemporary philosophical semantics, an issue that is far 
from having received a satisfactory treatment. On the other hand, 
I think that the search for an adequate existence predicate can only 
be correctly carried out if we first provide answers to a salient set of 
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general questions about existence. In what follows I introduce three 
such questions and three theses I want to endorse in answering them, 
such theses  shaping the subsequent adoption of an appropriate exis-
tence predicate.
Availing ourselves of an appropriate existence predicate is highly 
important for purposes of meta-ontology, for it allows us to describe 
ontological disagreements, disagreements about what exists, as they 
should be viewed (at least sometimes): genuine disagreements, not 
merely verbal or terminological ones.
2 Existence and quantification
Here is the first of our three questions concerning existence. 
Question 1 - Existence and Quantification
Is there any relation between the concept of existence and the 
concept of quantification, especially existential quantification?
The answer to this question that I would like to favor is this.
Thesis 1: Existence is not entirely expressed by the existential 
quantifier $, but there is an important connection between the 
two concepts: the concept of existential quantification should be 
seen as playing a central role in a correct characterization of the 
concept of existence (details later)
Of course, several philosophers have rejected Thesis 1. On one side 
of the opposition is the Frege-Russell view, also famously endorsed by 
Quine (Quine 1980: 12-13), on which existence is fully represented 
by the existential quantifier. We will come back to the Frege-Russell 
view later on. On the other side of the opposition is Meinongianism, 
defined in general as the view that some objects do not exist.
Meinongianism comes in a variety of versions, including the 
original views of Russel in Principles of Mathematics (Russell 1903), 
Terence Parsons’s views in Non-Existent Objects (Parsons 1980), and 
more recent versions developed by Richard Routley (Routley 1980) 
and Graham Priest (Priest 2005), known as Noneism (David Lewis 
coined this term in Lewis 1990). However, all brands of Meinon-
gianism have in common the rejection of any sort of explanatory link 
between the concepts of existence and quantification.
On the latter side of the opposition to Thesis 1 is also the ap-
parently anti-Meinongian position recently advanced by Kit Fine 
(Fine 2009). Fine develops a set of interesting considerations with a 
view to rejecting any account of existence in terms of quantification. 
However, we believe it is wrong to separate in limine, from the point 
of view of explanation, these concepts. After all, there seems to be a 
strong intuitive sense in which the existential quantifier carries ex-
istential force, has ontological import. We regard as implausible the 
reading of  as a merely “particular” quantifier (Priest), deprived of 
the ontological role of introducing at least one object of a domain of 
quantification. We prefer a moderate view, on which the existence 
predicate is still a logical predicate, but one only partially defined in 
terms of existential quantification (Thesis 1).
3 Is existence a first-level concept?
We turn now to our second question about existence.
Question 2 - Is existence a (first-order) predicate?
This is the old question of whether existence is, or can be a “real” 
predicate, a predicate like the others, a predicate of familiar things, 
a predicate like “flies”, “is a mammal”, “is famous”, etc.
There are two extreme positions concerning this question, which 
I label the Old School and the Very Old School. We want to endorse 
the Very Old School, but let us take the Old School first.
(a) The Old School
This is basically the Frege-Russel conception of existence (See Rus-
sell 1988: 211 and Frege 1950: 64-65). It consists in giving a negative 
answer to Question 2 on the basis of two premises.
Premise 1:  is a higher-order predicate, a predicate of predi-
cates, never applicable to entities of level 0 or individuals.
Roughly speaking, individuals are those entities that, in spite of be-
ing able to belong to classes, to instantiate properties, to be mem-
bers of species and kinds, to be subsumed by Fregean concepts, to 
João Branquinho578
be arguments of Russellian propositional functions, and so on, are 
not themselves classes, properties, species, kinds, Fregean concepts, 
propositional functions, and so on.
Premise 2: The already mentioned claim that the concept of ex-
istence is entirely expressed by .
These two premises entail the following claim, a claim also endorsed 
(at least in its negative version) by Kant and Hume.
Conclusion: Existence is invariably a higher-order predicate, 
never a predicate of individuals.
Before critically examining the Old School, let us introduce the Very 
Old one.
(b) The Very Old School
This position gives an affirmative answer to Question 2 and consists 
in the following thesis.
Thesis 2: Existence is a first-order predicate.
(As we shall soon see, we must be careful here and take Thesis 2 as 
presupposing a restriction of the universe of discourse to individu-
als.)
The claim that existence is, or can be, a first-order predicate is 
endorsed in all varieties of Meinongianism. It is also endorsed on the 
already mentioned, non- Meinongian, account proposed by Fine. It 
is further endorsed on the present view, which is not Meinongian 
either (see below). It is therefore a mistake to think that rejecting 
the claim that existence is a higher-order predicate entails embracing 
Meinongianism.
As noted, Thesis 2 has to be subjected to the important qualifica-
tion that, in the context of our discussion of Question 2, we are deal-
ing only with first-order discourse, with statements about individu-
als. Thus, the following statements would presumably be excluded 
from our discussion, for they are higher-order (or so we assume for 
the sake of argument):
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Wolf and dog inter-breed.
There are animal species on the verge of extinction.
Humility is rare, cowardice despicable.
The class of prime numbers is infinite.
In contrast, the following statements would presumably be admitted 
(or so we assume for the sake of argument):
The wolf is more aggressive than the dog.
The dog has warm blood.
There are flying mammals.
Humility is a virtue.
Now if the above qualification were not made, Thesis 2 would be 
promptly refuted on the basis of statements such as
Primary colors exist.
The Dodo bird no longer exists.
Indeed, the existence predicate is clearly second-order here.
It is crucial to note that, even under the restriction to a domain of 
individuals, existence is still a higher-order predicate on the Frege-
Russell view. Let us check this by considering seemingly first-order 
statements such as
(1) Flying mammals exist.
(2) Unicorns do not exist.
The Frege-Russell analysis is carried out in two steps. First, in the 
light of the Frege-Russell claim that existence is fully expressed by 
the existential quantifier, such statements are analyzed as
(1)’ Something is a flying mammal
(1)’ x Flying Mammal x
(2)’ Nothing is a unicorn
(2)’ x Unicorn x
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Second, the latter statements are in turn paraphrased into second-
order statements such as (these are only examples)
(1)’’ The class of flying mammals is not empty
(1)’’ The property of being a flying mammal is instantiated
(1)’’ The Fregean concept Flying Mammal maps at least one indi-
vidual onto the True
(1)’’ The propositional function Flying Mammal is possible
(2)’’ The class of unicorns is empty
(2)’’ The property of being a unicorn has no instances
(2)’’ The Fregean concept Unicorn maps no individual onto the 
True
(2)’’ The propositional function Unicorn is impossible
We believe that the second step of the Frege-Russell analysis is pro-
foundly mistaken, that the proposed paraphrase in terms of higher-
order predications is wrong.
Here are four objections to the Frege-Russell view.
Objection 1: Expressive Power
The Frege-Russell account does not seem to have the means to ex-
press, in the language of the theory, some existence and non-exis-
tence claims to which it is manifestly committed. In particular, it 
does not seem to have the means to express the anti-Meinongian 
statement “Everything exists” or “There are no non-existent ob-
jects”. It is hard to see how these statements could be analyzed in the 
Frege-Russell style, how the existential quantifier could here give 
way to an appropriate higher-order predicate.
Objection 2: Ontological Inflation
The Frege-Russell treatment of the existential quantifier as a high-
er-order predicate has immediate anti-nominalist consequences, or 
(if you prefer) immediate Platonist or Realist consequences, which 
cannot be right in my view. A true statement of existence like “Fly-
ing mammals exist” ontologically commits us not only to things that 
are mammals and fly (these are individuals and concrete items), but 
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also to abstract objects such as classes, Fregean concepts, properties, 
propositional functions, etc. And even true statements of non-exis-
tence, such as “Unicorns do not exist”, ontologically commit us to 
the very same sort of abstract objects (although they do not commit 
us to unicorns).
Note that we might have good reasons to introduce abstract ob-
jects, even of all the types in question, into our best ontology. But 
not merely on those grounds, not merely on the basis of a proposal 
about the meaning and logical form of statements of existence and 
non-existence.
Objection 3: Slippery Slope
This is an argument in the style of Frank Ramsey (see Ramsey 1925).
If a true predication of existence like “Flying mammals exist” 
were to be paraphrased into something like “The Fregean concept 
Flying Mammal maps at least one individual onto the True”, then noth-
ing would prevent us from paraphrasing in the same way virtually 
any predication, including common predications such as “Mammals 
have warm blood” and “Rover is a dog”. The result would be some-
thing like “The Fregean concept Having Warm Blood maps onto the 
True any individual mapped onto the True by the Fregean concept 
Mammal” and “The Fregean concept Dog maps the individual Rover 
onto the True”.
The same would go for paraphrases in terms of classes, proper-
ties, propositional functions, and so on. Any prima facie first-order 
predication would turn out to be, at bottom, higher-order in nature. 
I take it that this is a highly implausible consequence of the Frege-
Russell account of the existence predicate.
Objection 4: The Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts
This Fregean principle, as formulated by Gareth Evans (see Evans 
1982: 21), states that thoughts or contents p and q are distinct if it is 
rationally possible to take conflicting propositional attitudes towards 
them, say believing p while not believing q or disbelieving q, believ-
ing p while doubting q, etc. Now it seems perfectly possible for a 
rational subject to accept “Flying mammals exist” and “Unicorns do 
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not exist” but at the same time to be in doubt about, or even reject, 
their Fregean paraphrases “The Fregean concept Flying Mammal maps 
at least one individual onto the True” and “The Fregean concept Uni-
corn maps no individual onto the True”. The subject might so proceed 
on the basis of strong nominalist convictions, or because she is just 
skeptical about entities such as Fregean concepts. And it does not mat-
ter at all if the subject is right or wrong in doing so. The same would 
go for paraphrases in terms of classes, properties, propositional func-
tions, and so on.
4 Existence and being
We turn now to our third question about existence.
Question 3 - Being and Existence
What is the relation between being, in the sense of being some-
thing, being an object, and existing, or having existence? Does 
being transcend in any sense existence? Should we claim that 
something does not exist, that some objects do not exist? Or 
should we rather claim that everything exists, that every object 
exists?
On the most usual versions of Meinongianism, there are objects that 
do not exist: the realm of being, of what can be quantified over or re-
ferred to (roughly speaking), is broader than the realm of existence, 
of objects in space-time (roughly speaking). On other versions of 
Meinongianism, we have only the weaker claim that some objects do 
not exist (the so-called particular quantifier “some” having no onto-
logical or existential import). This is the case of the original views of 
Meinong, since he posits objects that do not have any form of being, 
such as chimeras and impossible objects. And is also the case of the 
Noneist views of Routley and Priest (for the same reason).
Noneism has the advantage of keeping Meinongianism immune to 
what is often seen as a serious objection to the position, namely that 
the distinction it often makes between being and existence makes 
little sense. As Quine remarks (Quine 1980: 3; Quine 1969: 100), 
there is no discernible difference between statements such as “There 
are prime numbers” and statements such as “There exist prime num-
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bers”. David Lewis (Lewis 1990) and Peter van Inwagen (van Inwa-
gen 2008) argue in the same direction.
But there is another serious objection to Meinongianism, and this 
one also applies to the Noneist variety. The objection is that Mei-
nongianism obliterates a distinction that should be made in any case 
between genuine reference, e.g. “The American who lives upstairs” 
(where the description has a referential use), and merely apparent 
reference, e.g. “The average American” or (perhaps) “My shadow”. 
Meinongianism also obliterates, in the same vein, a distinction that 
should be made in any case between genuine quantification, e.g. 
(perhaps) “There are prime numbers”, and merely apparent quantifi-
cation, e.g. (perhaps) “There are intolerable fluctuations in the stock 
market”. Such distinctions are obliterated on the Meinongian view 
because this view seems to be committed to the idea that any term 
that appears to denote something actually denotes something, and 
that any expression that appears to quantify over something actually 
quantifies over something. We find this idea unacceptable as it goes 
against basic Russelian wisdom. So we endorse the following anti-
Meinongian thesis with respect to Question 3:
Thesis 3: Everything exists, there are no non-existent objects
We introduce below further reasons for rejecting Meinongianism 
and accepting Thesis 3.
5 The existence predicate
We note now that the existence predicate we are looking for will 
have to conform to Thesis 3, which means that it has to be an exis-
tence predicate E that satisfies the following principle
(E) xEx
In other words, we need an existence predicate that is true of every 
object and false of no object. That is to say, we want the extension of 
E to be the entire domain of quantification.
On the other hand, by Thesis 2, E has to be a first-order predicate 
(assuming a universe of discourse containing only individuals). Also, 
by Thesis 1, E has to be a predicate partially definable in terms of 
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existential quantification.
Finally, having our initial methodological remarks in mind, our 
existence predicate E should be conceptually clear and apt to cor-
rectly describe a wide variety of ontological disputes, disputes about 
what there is or exists, as they at least sometimes are, viz. as substan-
tive disputes.
Now, the existence predicate E we are looking for, one that sat-
isfies the set of Theses 1,2,3 and meets the above methodological 
requirements, is simply the familiar predicate _is something,  _is 
identical to at least one object (See Quine 1969: 97; also Kripke 
2011: 55, Footnote 6 and Salmon 1987:20-2). (Of course, I assume 
that our language contains the identity predicate among its logical 
constants.)
Ex = (df) y x=y 
Let us check this. If one is dealing with first-order discourse and our 
domain is a domain of individuals, then our existence predicate will 
invariably be a first-order predicate, a predicate of individuals, vin-
dicating thus Thesis 2. On the other hand, our existence predicate is 
not primitive, since it is defined in terms of quantification and iden-
tity, vindicating thus Thesis 1. Also, it is a purely logical predicate, 
as it is characterized in terms of logical concepts only. Finally, it is a 
predicate that is entirely in order from the point of view of concep-
tual clarity, at least to the extent that logical concepts are entirely in 
order from that point of view.
Notice that “Everything exists”, in symbols xEx or x y x=y, 
is a logical truth and thus (in some sense) a trivial truth. Our exis-
tence predicate is a tautologous predicate and therefore also a trivial 
predicate (in some sense). However, such triviality can be somehow 
mitigated if we notice that ontological disputes are not automatically 
solved on that basis (Quine 1980:1). To exist, or to be, is to belong 
to a domain of quantification, and everything belongs to a domain of 
quantification, but that does not by itself tell us what to include in the 
domain of quantification, it does not by itself tell us what we should 
put among everything. We might still want or not want to include 
mere possibilia, fictional objects, chimeras and other intentional ob-
jects, universals, numbers, material objects, arbitrary fusions of ma-
585What is Existence?
terial objects, temporal parts, etc.
We go back to the Meinongian view now. What other choices 
would be available for a first-order existence predicate E? Here is a 
list of some of the usual proposals, most of them having a clear Mei-
nongian motivation.
(a) Ex = x is causally efficacious (Priest)
(b) Ex = x is actual (in the modal sense)
(c) Ex = x is concrete
(c)’ Ex = x is in space-time (Russell)
(d) Ex = x is real, where “real” is a primitive predicate (Fine 
2009: 168-9)
(e) Ex = x is a non-intencional object (MGinn 2000: 15-51)
The main problem with the Meinongian proposals (a)-(c)’, and also 
with the quasi-Meninongian proposal (e), is a problem of meta-on-
tological inadequacy. Indeed, the characterizations proposed for the 
existence predicate E have the undesirable feature of entailing a re-
jection from the outset of a certain range of ontological positions, 
which would thus be counted as conceptually false, i.e. false merely 
in virtue of the concept of existence employed. Here are examples 
of such positions: “Universals exist”, “Mere possibilia exist”, “Classes 
exist”, “Numbers exist”. It might be replied that on the most usual 
versions of Meinongianism we could still have truths like “There are 
universals”, “There are mere possibilia”, “There are classes”, “There 
are numbers”, etc. But, as noted, the problem with those views is 
that they rely on a distinction between being and existence that it is 
hard to make sense of.
So the Meinongian view underlying proposals (a)-(c)’ has imme-
diate nominalist implications. On the other side, as we have seen, 
the Frege-Russell view has immediate anti-nominalist implications. 
Both are thus wrong for the same kind of reason.
The problem with proposal (d) is that it is not completely clear 
what “real” means; or, to be more cautious, one should at least say 
that its meaning is less clear than the meaning of our existence predi-
cate.
I finish with a few brief remarks on logical form. How statements 
of existence and non-existence of central kinds should be analyzed 
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on the present view?
With respect to statements of singular existence and non-exis-
tence, the answer is readily available.
Singular Existence: a exists
Ea, y a=y
Singular Non-existence: a does not exist
Ea, y a=y
With respect to statements of general existence and non-existence, 
we need to be more careful. Take the former ones, first.
General Existence: Fs exist
This is a more complicated case, but for reasons given below we go 
for
x (Fx  yx=y)
A statement like “Ostriches are fast” is ambiguous between a univer-
sal quantification, “All ostriches are fast”, an existential quantifica-
tion, “Some ostriches are fast”, and a generic, “Ostriches are typical-
ly fast”. By analogy, a statement like “Flying mammals exist” admits 
two reading (excluding the generic reading for obvious reasons).
Reading 1: Every flying mammals exist
x(MVx  y x=y)
Fine reads this way and objects that if the existence predicate is our 
tautologous predicate, then the statement “Flying mammals exist” 
would turn out to be trivially true, as it would be a logical truth. 
Yet, there are some doubts about this. If one adopts a free logic that 
restricts the rule of introduction of existential quantification in the 
familiar way, and there are independent reasons to do it, then it is not 
clear that the statement is a logical truth.
At any rate, another, more serious, objection to reading 1 is that 
a statement like “Unicorns exist” would turn out to be true – vacu-
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ously true, assuming that the domain of quantification does not con-
tain unicorns.
One way of replying to this objection would be to replace the 
usual quantifiers of classical first-order predicate logic with general-
ized quantifiers, being thus able to block such undesirable assign-
ments of truth-value; but we will leave the issue at this point.
Reading 2: Some flying mammals exist
x (MVx  yx=y)
We prefer this reading, which is clearly not a logical truth. The ex-
istence predicate is indeed in a sense tautological: nothing is added 
by it if the domain of quantification already contains at least one fly-
ing mammal. But that is what should be expected given the logical 
nature of our existence predicate.
Given the analysis proposed for general existence, general non-
existence has a straightforward rendering.
General Non-existence: Fs do not exist
x(Fx  yx=y) 
We close with an interesting observation. Take the symbolizations 
proposed for general existence and non-existence.
Fs exist
x (Fx  yx=y)
Fs do not exist
x(Fx  yx=y)
It turns out that they are logically equivalent to the simpler symbol-
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Where philosophy was, there science shall be.
robert nozick
My intention in this paper is to investigate the structural and dy-
namic relationships between philosophy and science, particularly the 
view that philosophy anticipates and leads into science. This investi-
gation shades some light on the nature of both, philosophy and sci-
ence, and on their mutual relations.
1 The philosophy in its Greek origins as a case study
When in search of an explanation for the nature of philosophy, a 
good starting point is to inquire as to its origins. As is commonly 
known, Occidental philosophy originated in Ancient Greece as a 
substitute for mythological and religious explanations. Instead of ac-
cepting explanations of the foundations and origins of reality based 
on the anthropomorphic projections of mythology, the early Greek 
philosophers realized that reality could also be explained specula-
tively, by appealing to impersonal (or nearly impersonal) principles, 
for example, water (Thales), air (Anaximenes), the infinite (Anaxi-
mander) and being (Parmenides), or living forces like love and hate 
(Empedocles)....1 Questions that could help us to understand the na-
1 In the history of philosophy, equivalents to these principles have continually 
been proposed: Plato’s ideas, Aristotle’s substance, Aquinas’ God, Kant’s thing in 
itself, Fichte’s I, Hegel’s absolute, Shopenhauer’s will, Heidegger’s Being and Witt-
genstein’s unsayable, played a similar foundational role.
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ture of philosophy are in this case: What is the reason for this change 
in explanatory approach? What is the nature of this change?
A good reason for the shift from mythological to philosophi-
cal thought has been proposed by historians of philosophy such as 
W.K.C. Guthrie2. According to this author, Greek thinkers, having 
borrowed scientific knowledge (astronomical, physical, geometrical, 
arithmetic, etc.) from other cultures, were the first to consider such 
knowledge in abstraction from practical applications, namely, in the form 
of theoretical generalizations. We can see the best example of this at-
titude in Euclid’s Elements, with its axiomatic-deductive method of 
proving theorems. It was this awareness of the explanatory power of 
theoretical generalization that presumably suggested to early Greek 
thinkers the possibility that questions once answered by means of 
the anthropomorphic metaphors of mythology and religion could in-
stead be addressed in terms of abstract speculative generalizations, 
that is, in philosophical terms.
Although persuasive, this last explanation remains incomplete. 
Admittedly, the Greeks were the first to consider scientific gener-
alization apart from its application. They were the first to axioma-
tize geometry, and they were able to produce physical and astro-
nomical generalizations (such as, respectively, the measurement of 
specific gravity by Archimedes and the heliocentric hypothesis of 
Aristarchus). However, in order to explain the emergence of philo-
sophical thought it is not enough to consider the emergence of ex-
plicit generalizations independently of their practical applications, 
for this is not a privilege of scientific explanation. Commonsensical 
explanation, for example, is also based on empirical generalizations, 
like those conveyed by sentences such as ‘The sun always rises’, ‘Wa-
ter quenches the thirst’, ‘Fire burns’, etc., which are not scientific 
but have always been accepted as conveying obvious truths. More-
over, people were certainly always able to consider such trivial gen-
eralizations apart from practical concerns.
A more complete explanation for the emergence of philosophy 
in Greece seems to me the following. When they succeed in creat-
ing abstract scientific knowledge, Greek thinkers also achieved an 
intuitive understanding of the nature of the generalizations and ex-
2 See Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 36 ff.
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planations of science, as much for the formal sciences (geometric 
theorems) as for the empirical ones (physical and astronomical laws). 
Though at the very beginning they didn’t have a philosophy of sci-
ence (the first steps in this direction were taken later by Aristotle in 
his Organon), they certainly had an idea of the kind of hypothetical, 
predictive and explanatory procedures that are common to science 
in general – empirical as much as formal – what we could call an 
idea of science. Now, it seems that Greek philosophy was born from 
the speculative application of this idea of science to questions earlier 
approached exclusively by means of religion, like the question of the 
ultimate nature of the world and of our place in it. Provided with 
this new notional attitude, the first Greek philosophers attempted to 
proceed rationally, first by seeking to establish true generalizations 
based on some kinds of data (empirical or formal), and then by try-
ing to explain some kinds of facts, whatever their nature, using these 
generalizations3. The first Greek philosophers pursued this aim by 
introducing vague principles (like water, air, infinitude, being) or 
forces (like heat and cold, love and hate), which might be interpreted 
as a first attempt to replace explanation relying on the actions and 
intentions of divinities with explanation based on the constitutive 
elements of reality and the impersonal laws regulating their transfor-
mations, often hovering midway between the two kinds of explana-
tion.4 It is not without reason that Thales, the first philosopher of the 
Occidental tradition, was also a scientist and a competent astrono-
mer, who once accurately predicted a solar eclipse.
3 A similar procedure applies even to philosophy understood as conceptual 
analysis: philosophers usually consider certain data, as they appear in examples, 
paradigmatic cases, thought-experiments, etc. in an effort to reach some kind of 
conceptual generalization, by means of which they attempt to explain a large set 
of conceptual applications.
4 This phenomenon was already noted by Auguste Comte as he considered the 
passage from mythological to metaphysical thought. For a discussion, see C.F. 
Costa: The Philosophical Inquiry: Towards a Global Account, chap. 4.
2 Philosophy as a conjectural inquiry lacking consensual 
foundations
Assuming that Occidental philosophy arose from the speculative 
application of the idea of science to questions inherited from my-
thology and religion, how should we distinguish the activities of 
philosophers from those of scientists? – for, though there are some 
suggestions to the contrary,5 there seems to be a considerable dif-
ference! The answer to this question brings us to what I regard as a 
central insight into the nature of philosophy. Even if philosophical 
activity resembles the general procedure of scientific inquiry, there 
is a fundamental difference in that philosophical explanation remains 
merely conjectural and, to this extent, speculative.6
But what do the words ‘conjectural’ and ‘speculative’ mean when 
we say that philosophical investigation remains conjectural or spec-
ulative? One answer is that an investigation is conjectural when it 
achieves only hypothetical results, and that this is the case when there 
is no possibility of consensual agreement about the truth of their results.  In-
deed, while in the sciences it is fairly easy to obtain consensual agree-
ment on results, this kind of consensus is impossible in the muddy 
waters of philosophical inquiry. Consider the difference: The expla-
nation of how levers work using the laws of levers, as conceived by 
the Greek scientist Archimedes, was one that everyone could verify 
practically and agree to. In contrast, the explanation of the genera-
tion and destruction of things through the action of the living forces 
5 See, for example, W.v.O. Quine: ‘A Letter to Mr. Osterman’. Quine sug-
gests that the boundaries between philosophy and science are arbitrary, like the 
boundaries between different districts on a map. But if this were true, agreement 
about new achievements as belonging to philosophy or to science would need to 
be conventionally settled; however, this is not the case. Such agreements seem to 
us natural and immediate.
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein defended the view that philosophy is not constituted 
by argumentative theoretical conjectures, but is a therapeutic activity of describ-
ing how language really works (L. Wittgenstein: Philosophische Untersuchungen, 
sec. 109). Nevertheless, as many have remarked, neither Wittgenstein nor his 
followers have come remotely close to achieving this aim; the obscurity and elu-
siveness of Wittgenstein’s arguments don’t turn them into descriptions (see, for 
example, A.J. Ayer: Wittgenstein, p. 137).
Cláudio F. Costa594
of love (philía) and hate (neíkos) on the four elements (water, air, earth 
and fire), as the pre-Socratic philosopher Empedocles proposed, was 
an inevitably vague and obscure speculative dream. It was developed 
in a way and in a domain of inquiry in which researchers were not 
able to find a path to consensual agreement.
The conjectural character of philosophical thought – as the result 
of a lack of consensual agreement on fundamental matters – reveals 
itself as a necessary property, which is able to explain its typically ar-
gumentative and aporetic character. For when thinking cannot be other 
than conjectural, there is no alternative except to embark on hypo-
thetical reasoning: We begin by accepting certain non-consensual 
assumptions and then apply our best knowledge and skills to discover 
all the implications of this acceptance. Then we (usually other phi-
losophers do this) vary the assumptions and proceed in a similar way. 
And then we try to compare critically the different results and the 
procedures that lead to them, in a process that can be repeated again 
and again. In this way, philosophers are always beginning: they are 
always pondering new ideas in ways that usually generate aporetic 
argumentative discussion.
Moreover, in the conjectural character of philosophical inquiry 
we also find an explanation for the lack of progress in philosophy: 
since philosophers cannot achieve agreement on the truth of their 
ideas, inter-theoretical comparisons must remain inconclusive. (To 
give some examples: scientists would generally agree that Einstein’s 
relativistic mechanics is superior to Newtonian mechanics, since the 
explanatory power of the former is greater – this is a matter of sci-
entific conclusions. On the other hand, philosophers remain divided 
when the question is, e.g. whether the nominalism of the British 
empiricists might give a more suitable explanation for the problem of 
generality and predication than does some sort of Platonic-Aristote-
lian realism, for this is a matter of philosophical doctrine.)
Still, why can’t we achieve consensual agreement about the re-
sults of the philosophical work? The answer is that consensual agree-
ment about the results of an investigation is only possible when there is suf-
icient agreement about the main presuppositions underlying the investigation. 
A previous agreement about these things is always absent from philo-
sophical inquiry. Philosophy lacks:
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(i) agreement about the adequacy of its data, principles and the 
questions based on them (philosophical ‘data’ and principles are 
uncertain and many philosophical questions, we suspect, are 
pseudo-problems resulting from linguistic-conceptual confu-
sions);
and philosophy also lacks
(ii) agreement about the adequacy of its methodological procedures for 
evaluating the truth of answers proposed to philosophical questions 
(an argument or a set of arguments can appear conclusive to 
one philosopher and irrelevant to another).
In opposition to this, conditions (i) and (ii) are always sufficiently 
satisfied in cases of scientific endeavours. For in science the questions 
and problems are uncontroversial, and the correct solutions, when 
finally found, can be clearly identified. Indeed, where fundamental 
conditions like these cannot be met, there is no way to achieve con-
sensual agreement, and we remain doomed to the aporetic discus-
sions typical of philosophy.
3 Philosophy as a protoscience
The foregoing remarks suggest that by investigating the similarities 
and contrasts between philosophy and science we may achieve a bet-
ter explanation of some central features of philosophical inquiry. 
Moreover, it invites us to ask if our present philosophical inquiries 
will someday yield to science, by achieving a degree of maturity that 
allows its practitioners to reach consensual conclusions. In other 
words: could philosophy be seen as a conjectural inquiry anticipating 
science – as a protoscience? Could all philosophical inquiry be seen in 
this way?
A positive answer to this question is suggested by the historical 
fact that every new science was born in the cradle of philosophy. 
Consider some few examples from several scientific fields:
1. According to Karl Popper, the now obvious astronomical 
consideration that the earth is a body moving in empty space, 
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impelled by inertial and gravitational forces, was already an-
ticipated by Anaximander, who suggested that the earth was a 
stationary cylinder, suspended in the void because it is equally 
distant from all things, it being impossible for it to move si-
multaneously in opposite directions7.
2. The scientific investigation of subatomic particles by contem-
porary physics had as forerunner the speculative hypothesis 
of atomistic philosophers, from Democritus to Epicurus, that 
visible things are formed by the aggregation of invisible (be-
cause extremely small) and physically indivisible particles.
3. Biological theories of evolution seem to be dimly anticipated 
by Anaximander’s insight that since man is helpless as a child, 
he would have perished in primeval times if he had not devel-
oped from more primitive animals…
4. The Platonic theory of the tripartite soul has a modern equiv-
alent in Freud’s structural theory of mind, which divides the 
mind into the ego, the id and the superego, although psycho-
analysis still strongly resembles philosophy, insofar as its prac-
titioners remain unable to reach consensual agreement.
5. Wittgenstein’s therapeutic view of language as a nebula of 
language games working as unities of meaning anticipated the 
more scientific theory of speech acts of J.L. Austin and J.R. 
Searle, which nowadays belongs more to linguistics than to 
philosophy.
These are only a few examples. The process is going on in the present 
days. Many believe, for example, that as soon as we really understand 
how the brain works, most of the riddles of our present philosophy of 
mind will yield to consensual (and in this sense scientific) solutions. 
All these facts lead us to ask whether science might not someday 
replace the remaining central philosophical fields, such as epistemol-
ogy, metaphysics and ethics.
Nevertheless, there are philosophers who resist the view of phi-
losophy as a protoscience. Echoing Wittgenstein, Anthony Kenny 
holds that philosophy, unlike science, deals with knowledge as a 
7 This remark is made by K. R. Popper in ‘Back to the Pre-Socratics’, in his 
Conjectures and Refutations, p. 138.
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whole, since it aims to organize the already known, providing an 
overview of our knowledge. This kind of comprehensiveness, he argues, 
is lacking in the individual sciences; central areas like metaphysics, 
epistemology, the theory of meaning and ethics, at least, will remain 
forever philosophical8.
Nonetheless, an overview and comprehensiveness can be achieved 
by scientific inquiries too. Therefore, I suspect that the main reason 
for this resistance lies less in the nature of things than in outdated 
views of the nature of science still uncritically accepted by many phi-
losophers. For these views, which have their roots in the philosophy 
of natural science developed by the positivists (and also in the main 
reactions against them), are often too restrictive to assure our central 
philosophical interests a deserved place in future scientific inquiry. 
Consider, for example, Popper’s view of science as an inquiry that 
aims to create theories able to resist falsification by decisive experi-
ments.9 This view is too restrictive, even in the ‘hard’ domains of 
natural science: it excludes the theory of biological evolution from 
the domain of science, because it is not decisively falsifiable. How 
would we conceive an experiment capable of falsifying a hypothesis 
about a process that occurred in the past? Since we have this prob-
lem, how could such a restrictive standard as falsifiability (which 
may arguably only be applicable in certain fields of physics) ever be 
applied to the central subject matters of philosophical inquiry, like 
those of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, other than in a crassly 
reductive or even eliminative way?
Indeed, were views like that the only available attempt to iden-
tify philosophy with a protoscience, our questioning could stop here. 
The reason for this is that from the investigation of a well-established 
particular science we are led almost perforce to restrictive general-
izations about the character of still unknown areas of science. What 
we are looking for is a concept of science so general and inclusive that 
any new science that should chance to emerge can satisfy it, since 
this would be precisely the concept of science that we could properly 
contrast with that of philosophy.
8 Antony Kenny: Aquinas on Mind, p. 9.
9 See K.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, ibid. pp. 339-340.
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4 The right contrasting view of science
To arrive at this more balanced view of science we must follow the 
contrasting direction initially proposed and begin with questions 
like: what does the scientific community as a whole understand under 
the word ‘science’? How would scientists recognize any new theory 
or field of investigation as belonging to science? I find such a balanced 
view of science in the work of John Ziman, who regarded science in 
general as ‘consensualizable public knowledge’, that is, as any kind 
of knowledge susceptible to consensual agreement concerning its re-
sults.10 According to this view, science is constituted by generaliza-
tions consensually accepted as true by the members of a community 
of ideas. As Ziman shows, this notion has the advantage of being 
commonsensical: it is in perfect accord with what informed laymen 
and scientists understand as science. When we talk about science, we 
are thinking of new knowledge that the community of specialists can 
surely and precisely evaluate. This view of science is also sufficiently 
general and flexible to include everything we usually accept or could 
accept as belonging to the sciences, both the empirical and the for-
mal. Moreover, placing the concept of consensual agreement at the 
center, Ziman’s view of science seems to provide the perfect contrast 
between philosophy and science, since, as we have seen, the latter is 
an inquiry identifiable by a lack of consensual agreement concerning 
its results. Accordingly, even if philosophy might be a comprehensive 
inquiry aiming to achieve an overview, as Kenny thought, it might 
also be protoscientific, insofar as the possibility of becoming a sort of 
consensualizable public knowledge is not excluded in advance.
However, isn’t the definition of science as ‘consensualizable public 
knowledge’ too inclusive? It seems to be so because there are political, 
religious and other communities in which a ‘consensus’ is imposed 
from above, excluding the possibility of critical evaluation. A notori-
ous example of this is the role played by political ideologies in defin-
ing legitimate science in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Yet, 
following the above characterization, such ideological impositions do 
10 This is the general thesis on the nature of science defended by J. M. Ziman 
in Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science, chapter 2. For 
current serious discussion of the social dimensions of science, see J. M. Ziman, 
Real Science; see also H. L. Longino: The Fate of Knowledge.
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seem to pertain to science, since a community of ideas consensually 
accept them. Thus, Ziman’s characterization of science seems unable 
to distinguish science from a by-product of ideology.
Nonetheless, we see that this difficulty is only apparent, when we 
distinguish between authentic and inauthentic consensus, specifying 
what we understand as a community of ideas able to produce science 
in a way that excludes inauthentic consensus. Keeping the contrast 
with philosophy in mind, I suggest we call a community able to war-
rant authentic consensus a critical community of ideas, understanding it 
as a community which satisfies constitutive conditions approximating 
those specified by Jürgen Habermas for what he calls an ideal speech 
situation (ideale Sprachsituation)11. This means that we must define a 
critical community of ideas as something that satisfies constitutive 
conditions warranting authentic consensus. Without trying to be ei-
ther systematic or exhaustive, I propose that we can generally char-
acterize the main constitutive conditions for a critical community of 
ideas as requiring:
(a) Truth-seeking commitment: the members of the community 
should try to find the truth along the whole process of inquiry 
and evaluation of ideas.
(b) Freedom of discussion: there must be an equitable potential for 
free critical discussion among members of the critical com-
munity of ideas; they should not be subject to any intellectual 
constraints, except those of the best arguments.
(c) Full access to information: all members of the community must 
have full access to information and equal chances for the eval-
uation and exchange of ideas.
(d) Shared competence: all members must have suitable training in 
order to be able to make adequate evaluations.
Only the minimal satisfaction of constitutive conditions like these, 
assuring the freedom and the rationality of the evaluation of the re-
sults of the investigation, can produce a truly scientific consensus. 
11 See Jürgen Habermas: ‘Wahrheitstheorien’ in Vorstudien und Ergänzungen 
zur Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, p. 174 ff. See also H.L. Longino, ibid., 
p. 128 ff.
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In fact, when we evaluate reports of a new scientific discovery, we 
always do so on the assumption that the scientific community has sat-
isfied the conditions of truth-seeking commitment, free discussion, 
full access to information, and shared competence, if not ideally, at 
least to a suficient degree.
Another important objection that could be opposed to such a 
consensualist view of science is that it would compromise its objec-
tivity. It seems at first glance that whatever the scientific community 
decides to call science will be science, arbitrarily disregarding ob-
jective criteria. However, this is not how things really are. For the 
critical community of ideas aims at a consensus about truth, and it can-
not achieve this without sharing appropriated objectivity-conditions 
for the considered epistemic domain. In other words:  it turns out 
to be an unavoidable fact of experience concerning the working of 
any community of ideas that consensus about truth is only attainable 
after the fulfilment of appropriate conditions for objective consensus. 
Therefore, without attempting to be neither systematic nor exhaus-
tive, we can make a list of conditions that altogether must be satisfied 
by any object of evaluation by a critical community of ideas in order 
to warrant claiming the presence of the consensual objectivity neces-
sary for the achievement of consensus about truth. This list requires 
that for the achievement of consensus about truth there must be at 
least previous agreement about:
(f) what can be counted as the (empirical or formal) elementary 
data, constituting the epistemic domains to which scientific 
theories are applied;
(g) what can be accepted as adequately formulated questions to be 
asked concerning the epistemic domain (theories must an-
swer meaningful questions);
(h) what can be accepted as an adequately constructed theory relative 
to the epistemic domain (in its internal as well as in its exter-
nal coherence within a wider conceptual framework); and 
(i) what are accepted as the procedures of truth-evaluation relative 
to the epistemic domain of a theory (which involves some 
kind of correspondence between a theory and the facts the the-
ory should explain, some kind of veriication procedure for the 
achievement of this correspondence, etc).
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The satisfaction of conditions like these is necessary for the objec-
tivity of the scientific endeavour, coinciding in many ways with the 
kinds of things that philosophers of science often investigate in a de-
tailed way. The difference is that although these philosophers have 
often regarded only such conditions, ignoring the social role of the 
critical community of ideas, we consider these conditions subsidiary 
to the appropriated functioning of a critical community of ideas. It is 
not an a priori matter, but an unavoidable matter of fact, seen by any 
critical community of ideas, that the members of will only achieve 
consensus about what is true insofar as these conditions are satisfied.
With the aid of these notions, we can improve Ziman’s general 
characterization of science as ‘consensualizable public knowledge’. 
Here is my proposal:
THE SCIENCE = a body of non-trivial generalizations obtained 
by  the members of a critical community of  ideas,  these gener-
alizations being consensually held to be true by this community.
This seems to be a better view of science, regardless of what some 
philosophers might think. It is better because it fits well enough with 
what all people, from scientists to educated laypersons, understand 
by science in general. To apply the concept of science to any inqui-
ry, our first requirement is the achievement of agreement about the 
truth of non-trivial generalizations among the members of a critical 
community of scientists. Only with this in hand can scientific prog-
ress take place.
5 The right contrasting view of philosophy
The above outlined consensualist-but-objectivist view of science al-
lows us to establish an adequate contrast with philosophy, for now 
we can characterize the conjectural inquiry of philosophy by similar-
ity and contrast with scientific investigation, as follows:
THE PHILOSOPHY = a conjectural body of investigations aim-
ing at the achievement of true generalizations by the members of 
a critical community of  ideas (the community of philosophers), 
without this community being able to achieve any consensual 
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agreement on the truth of these generalizations.
Following this characterization, any conjectural inquiry in any do-
main of thought in which it is impossible to achieve a consensual 
body of truths can be regarded as of a philosophical nature. Its philo-
sophical nature derives from the lack of satisfaction of the conditions 
(f)-(i) warranting consensual objectivity in a critical community of 
ideas. Indeed, in those difficult domains where science, understood 
as ‘consensualizable public knowledge’, remains impossible, only the 
conjectural inquiry of philosophy remains available. In this way, we 
can explain why philosophy, in conformity to the etymology of the 
word, is the love (phylo) of knowledge and wisdom (sophia) and not 
its attainment. In the words of Bertrand Russell: ‘Science is what 
we know; philosophy is what we don’t know’… ‘Science is what we 
can prove to be true; philosophy is what we can’t prove to be false’.12 
Indeed, when philosophy achieves consensual truth, it ceases to be 
philosophy and becomes science. Even the metaphilosophical view I 
am sketching in this paper can yield to science if the critical com-
munity of ideas achieves agreement on its truth.
Another point we should note is that the practice of philosophy 
always presupposes a critical community of ideas, even if in some 
cases (like those of Vico, Peirce and Nietzsche) in a contrafactual 
manner. A well-known charge against medieval philosophy is that 
by accepting Christian dogmatism as above criticism it fell short of 
satisfying this condition.
Finally, it could be objected that as a typically ‘higher-order’ 
form of inquiry, philosophical inquiry is by its own nature incapable 
of objective verification and, consequently, of the kind of objectively 
grounded consensus achieved by science. My response is that this 
view may well be overly pessimistic. The main reason to think so 
is that support for a theory is not only directly empirical – through 
verification – but also inter-theoretical. This kind of support can also 
be found in the sciences. Take, for example, the Darwinian theory 
of evolution. Darwin and his contemporaries developed this theory 
without recourse to genetics, since Mendel’s work was unknown to 
early evolutionary theorists. Nevertheless, the subsequent rediscov-
12 Quotes taken from Allan Wood’s postscript to Bertrand Russell’s My Philo-
sophical Development.
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ery of genetic theory by the scientific community provided extremely 
important inter-theoretical support for evolutionary theory. Some-
thing similar can also occur within ‘higher-order’ philosophical in-
quiry. In an exaggerated way it has already been suggested that the 
problems of philosophy are so intertwined that any problem will be 
only solved when all others have already been solved (Wittgenstein). 
Far from being pessimistic, this remark points to inter-theoretic sup-
port. Insofar as related fields of knowledge approach science, new 
inter-theoretical support for philosophical insights will be provided, 
paving the way for consensual scientific knowledge.
6 Protoscientific versus analytic-conceptual view
Once we accept the suggested views, we see that the supposedly es-
sential differences in subject matter or even in method between phi-
losophy and science are illusory. Take, for example, the still widely 
accepted view of the nature of philosophy which holds that it is a 
non-empirical, higher-order activity of conceptual analysis (its meth-
od), intended to make explicit the structure of our most central concepts and 
the relations holding between them (its subject matter)13. This view arose 
due to the prominence of the philosophy of language in the first half 
of the Twentieth Century. But it was factually refuted when the phi-
losophy of language, as the most productive philosophical field, was 
superseded by the philosophy of mind in the second half of the Twen-
tieth Century, since the latter philosophical field consists largely of 
empirical speculation. Moreover, the fact that a given philosophical 
inquiry has a linguistic-conceptual character does not mean it cannot 
develop into a science. This is exemplified by J. L. Austin’s theory 
of illocutionary forces. As he himself foresaw, this theory belongs 
today, in the form of the theory of speech acts, more to the scientific 
field of pragmatics than to philosophy. And the reason for this is that 
it has achieved enough consensual agreement to lose its plastic role 
13 The persistence of this view can be exemplified in the essays of Robert 
Brandom, Barry Stroud, Allen Wood and Karl-Otto Apel, recently published by 
C.P. Ragland & S. Reidt in What is Philosophy? For standard presentations of the 
view see Michael Dummett: ‘Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic and Ought 
it to Be?’ and Ernst Tugendhat ‘Überlegungen über die Methode der Philosophie 
aus Analytischer Sicht’.
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in the domain of conjectural thought. Hence, there seems to be no 
contradiction between the view of philosophy as a protoscience and 
the view of philosophy as conceptual analysis, since the latter can be 
regarded as belonging to the former14.
Finally, we can offer a metaphilosophical refutation of the thesis 
that the proper object of philosophy is conceptual. As W. v. O. Quine 
saw, philosophers often need the resource of what he called a seman-
tic accent.15 A semantic accent is what we could also call a semantic 
metalanguage. A semantic metalanguage is something different from 
a syntactic metalanguage: while the latter has as its objects signs and 
their relationships, the former has as its objects as well the mean-
ings and with them, indirectly, the world as we mean it. (For example, 
instead of saying, ‘Five is not a thing but a number’, one would say, 
‘’Five’ is not a thing-word, but a number-word’). This need not lead 
us astray, for it is nothing more than a propaedeutic resource aiming 
at the achievement of the kind of conceptual transparency usually 
demanded by philosophical arguments. Even when philosophers like 
Rudolph Carnap have seen here a proof that the object of philosophy 
should be purely linguistic-conceptual, this cannot be true, as Quine 
also noted, because every sentence of the empirical sciences can also 
be metalinguistically represented in this way. As he noted:
There are wombats in Tasmania’ might be paraphrased as ‘‘Wombats’ 
is true to some creatures of Tasmania’ if there were any point in it; 
but it does happen that semantic accent is more useful in philosophical 
connections.16
The upshot of this is that philosophy does not have concepts (like 
those of meaning or knowledge or consciousness or substance) as 
its proper subject matter, any more than science (with concepts like 
those of genes, molecules and superstrings), and no more than any-
14 J.L. Austin also saw no contradiction between philosophy as protoscience 
and philosophical analysis, since on the one hand he championed philosophy as 
conceptual analysis and on the other hand he was an inspired defender of the 
here-developed view (see the much quoted passage of ‘A Plea for Excuses’, in his 
Philosophical Papers, p. 232).
15 W.v.O. Quine, Word and Object, p. 270 ss. See also my The Philosophical 
Inquiry, pp. 15 ff.
16 W.v.O. Quine: Word and Object, pp. 271-272.
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thing else, except for reasons of semantic accent. A theoretical physi-
cist and a philosopher of mind, for example, can be seen as analyzing 
and combining concepts as much as dealing with empirical questions. 
Hence, all that we can intend by saying that philosophy is conceptual 
analysis is to point to some methodological resources, and not to an 
indispensable approach, and still less to its proper subject matter.
To the question of whether all philosophy might be an anticipa-
tion of science, assuming the concept of science that we have sug-
gested, the only answer is that we have no reason to think otherwise. 
In fact, the only chance we have to make real progress is by holding 
this view as a normative assumption.17
7 The more complete framework
While I have limited myself here, for methodological reasons, to the 
relationship between philosophy and science, I believe that this is 
only one aspect of the more complete framework that places phi-
losophy within a broader perspective. In my book on the nature of 
philosophy.18 I attempted to achieve this broader perspective con-
ceiving traditional philosophy as a derivative cultural activity that 
can be seen as an amalgam of three other cultural activities: art, 
religion, and science. These activities could be represented as form-
ing the edges of a triangle inside of which different philosophical 
activities can be placed. The scientific edge of the triangle is suc-
cess and truth-oriented, the mystical-religious edge is responsible 
for the transcendental element, and the characteristic breadth of 
the philosophical quest, the aesthetic-artistic edge, is responsible 
for the metaphorical aspects of the philosophical discourse. Inside 
the triangle, in its centre, can be found philosophies that have in 
17 There are many further problems that cannot be touched on here. For ex-
ample, how to include certain non-central domains, like those of the philosophy 
of existence, philosophy of life, or critique of culture – which have changeable 
subjects – in our schema? (Probably in ways similar to those in which the histori-
cal sciences can be consensualizable). Another point is that the development of 
science can itself create a space for new and previously unexpected philosophical 
fields. The philosophy of computational science is an example.
18 C.F. Costa: The Philosophical Inquiry: Towards a Global Account.
Cláudio F. Costa606
sufficient measure artistic (metaphorical), religious (transcendental) 
and scientific (truth-oriented) aspects (examples are Platon’s Repub-
lic, Descartes’ Meditations, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus). However, there 
are forms of philosophy that are located near the artistic edge (like 
Nietzsche’s Zaratustra and Novalis’ Hymns to the Night), near to the 
mystical-religious edge (like John Scott’s The Divisions of Nature and 
Meister Eckhart’s Sermones, near to the scientific edge (like Searle’s 
Speech Acts and Carnap’s Logical Grammar of Language). There are even 
cultural traditions linking philosophy with an edge, like the French 
literature oriented tradition, the German mystically oriented tradi-
tion and the English scientifically oriented tradition. And it is pos-
sible to perceive in the sub-domains a broad slow movement from 
the artistic-mystical side of the triangle to the scientific edge as an 
inevitable consequence of the speeding progress of science.
Cláudio F. Costa
Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte
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1 Introduction
The most general notion of object has its modern home in the first-
order classical logic with identity. In this paper, we argue that the ap-
paratus for speaking of objects finds its proper place among a wider 
logical setting. The purpose of this paper is to explain and defend 
this thesis. One of the benefits of our analysis is that it makes possible 
to isolate the logical principles that are characteristic of the notion 
of object.
The wider apparatus of logic is brought about in virtue of two 
contentions. The first one is that hypothetical and general statements 
are the fundamental and primitive notions that make reasoning pos-
sible. In section 5, we briefly try to argue for this claim. Our ar-
gument relies on a fastened view between logic and inference. The 
second contention is that concept quantification is a coherent and 
admissible form of logical expression. Concept quantification has 
been famously attacked, either for being incoherent, or as a form of 
(extensional) second-order quantification lying outside the province 
of logic. After a brief discussion of conventionalism in logic in sec-
tion 2, we discuss some theses of Willard Quine that are pertinent to 
our discussion. This is done in section 3 and, forthwith, a defense of 
a form of second-order logic is mounted. In the following section 4, 
we make a small digression on the principle of induction and on the 
benefits of its enunciation with concept quantification.
In sections 6 and 7, we finally describe the logical principles that 
articulate the notion of object. A small concluding section closes the 
paper.
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2 Conventionalism in logic
There is an interesting, albeit failed, account of logic. It is the view 
that explicates logic as the adoption of certain linguistic conventions. 
For instance, adopting (or not) tertium non datur would be a matter 
of convention within a particular linguistic framework. The conven-
tionalist strategy can be compared to the discovery of non-Euclidean 
geometries. Denying the parallel postulate is not a contradiction 
in terms or a failure to describe correctly some reality, but rather 
adopting another kind of geometry. If mathematicians came to ac-
cept different geometries side by side, why shouldn’t philosophers 
accept also different logics side by side? Why can’t we be free to 
adopt different logics, different ways of reasoning, in order to pursue 
more efficiently some inquiries?
A conventionalist view of logic would, in one single sweep, ex-
plain why the truths of logic are of a different kind from empirical 
truths, and why they are analytic and a priori. Of course, this would 
be an important step in the enterprise of logical positivism. A logic 
would merely be an adopted calculus where, by conventional stipu-
lation, some inferences are permitted and some principles are as-
serted. The stipulations would be seen as implicit definitions of the 
terms of the calculus.
Conventionalism in logic was refuted by Quine more than sev-
enty years ago. The difficulty lies in that logic itself is presupposed in 
establishing non-trivial conventions.1 Suppose that we want to estab-
lish conventions for the if-idiom. We may start by laying down the 
following convention:
If x and z are true sentences, y is a sentence and z is the result of substitut-
ing the letter ‘p’ for x and the letter ‘q’ for y in ‘If p then q’, then y is true.
Note, however, that the convention uses the if-idiom itself, as well as 
the and-idiom and, implicitly, the all-idiom. If we do not understand 
these idioms beforehand and know how to operate with them, the 
above convention does not get off the ground. I include this Quinean 
analysis here because, later in the paper, I will argue that both the if-
1 See specially part III of Quine 76. Cf. also the short and witty article by 
Carroll 1895.
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idiom (the idiom of hypothetical claims) and the all-idiom (the idiom 
of general claims) are the fundamental and primitive notions which 
make logic possible.
3 Concept quantification
The above argument of Quine was one of his first attacks on logical 
positivism, an attack which culminated in the famous Two Dogmas 
of Empiricism paper (see Quine 1953b) and its attendant rejection of 
the analytic-synthetic distinction. However, and this is important to 
notice, the paper is actually only an attack on a certain class of ana-
lytic statements, viz. the ones that can be turned into a logical truth 
by putting synonyms for synonyms. The class of logical truths is not 
itself subjected to attack in Quine’s paper. Quine’s real target is the 
reification of the notion of meaning, an attack mounted through the 
notion of synonymy. Presumably, if the notion of synonymy were 
acceptable, meanings could be reified: indeed, they could be defined 
as equivalent classes of terms under the relation of synonymy. The 
attack on synonymy had great success but, as we will see, combined 
with another thesis of Quine, had an unfortunate and important col-
lateral damage.
There are many problems with the notion of reified proposi-
tion (as meanings of sentences) but Quine is famous for rejecting 
an ontology of propositions on the basis that it is hard to account 
for their identity conditions. It is part and parcel of the notion of 
object that the same object can be referred to by means of different 
descriptions or from different perspectives. Identity, as stressed by 
Gottlob Frege, is an important part of the apparatus of linguistic 
reference to objects. Quine also stresses quantification. At any rate, 
the most general notion of object finds its modern home in first-
order classical calculus with identity. If one takes seriously the view 
that the notion of object is a quintessential metaphysical notion, then 
first-order classical logic with identity must be deeply ingrained with 
metaphysical presuppositions. I will recount a ‘logico/metaphysical 
story’ on how the notion of object is brought into logic. The aim is to 
make explicit, via inferential articulations, the metaphysical presup-
positions of this notion.
Speaking of objects, as it is remarked in Parsons (2008: 10), just 
is using the linguistic devices of singular terms, predication, identity 
and quantification to make serious statements. Meanings and propo-
sitions do not qualify as objects. According to Quine, they do not so 
qualify because they miss at least one of the requirements, the one 
on identity. However, as Quine 1953a is careful to point out, he does 
not deny that words and statements are meaningful. He just denies 
that they have a meaning, if this ‘having’ is interpreted as more than 
a mere figure of speech. We, humans, use meaningful statements all 
the time. The point is that using them is not the same thing as nam-
ing them, nor does it presuppose that we can name them (i.e., that 
propositions can be treated as objects).
However, Quine goes a step too far when he defends that quan-
tification is not only a necessary condition for speaking of objects but 
that it is also a suficient condition. To be is to be the value of a bound 
variable, in Quine’s famous, but ill-conceived, dictum. Quine argues 
for this thesis in On what there is? (Quine 1953a: 15) where he also 
lays down his doctrine of ontological commitment. The argument of 
Quine proceeds via an analysis of complex descriptive names which 
do not refer. He analyzes these names via Russell’s theory of de-
scriptions and points out that the ontological commitment is carried 
out by the bound variables. Notice, however, that Russell’s theory 
relies on the full apparatus of first-order classical logic with identity: 
it needs predication, quantification and identity. Therefore, what is 
argued by Quine is that in the presence of this linguistic apparatus 
(the apparatus for speaking of objects), ontological commitment is 
carried out by the bound variables. So far, so good. However, to 
conclude from this argument that bound variables carry ontological 
commitments in the absence of the full apparatus is a non sequitur.
Quine’s emphasis on quantification is right in one direction - 
speaking of objects presupposes the availability of the apparatus of 
quantification (with ontological commitment) - but wrong-headed in 
the other - that the mere use of the apparatus of quantification signals 
ontological commitments. The collateral damage is, of course, that 
quantifying over propositions (or, in general, over concepts) does not 
make sense. As I said above, I will present a ‘logico-metaphysical’ 
story on how the notion of object is brought into logic. In this story, 
the notion of generality is primitive and conceptually prior to the 
notion of object and, by itself, does not signal ontological commit-
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ments. It is merely a means of expression.
Before I tell my story, let me make a few remarks. I start with 
an example: ‘ ’, where ‘P’ is a second-order propositional 
bound variable. This expression, I submit, makes perfectly good 
sense.2 On our view of propositional generality, an instantiation of a 
universal (second-order) propositional quantification is not obtained 
by converting each occurrence of the quantified variable into an ex-
pression that names, but rather into an expression that propounds (i.e., 
a meaningful sentence). That which can be propounded is essentially 
open-ended and unfinishable, depending on linguistic and concep-
tual resources of whose limits we have no real conception. It is im-
possible to survey all propositions or concepts because ‘the attempt 
to survey reason itself fails: reason can transcend whatever it can 
survey’ (Putnam 1998: 119).
It is important to point out that the role given to meaningful sen-
tences in the conclusion of the elimination rule for universal propo-
sitional quantification is one in which they appear in positions of use. 
Let me give an example: ‘Bustopher is a fat cat  Bustopher is a fat 
cat’ is an instantiation of ‘ ’. Do notice that the expression 
‘Bustopher is a fat cat’ appears in positions of use in the sentence 
‘Bustopher is a fat cat  Bustopher is a fat cat’. Even though the no-
tion of proposition does not have the right content to allow proposi-
2 During a presentation of this work, I mentioned that it makes perfectly 
good sense to say that every proposition implies itself. With his customary polite-
ness, Ricardo Santos pointed to me that I probably did not want to use the word 
‘implies’ here. Implication is reserved for inference, as when one says that the 
sentence ‘The cat is on the mat and the dog is in the garden’ implies the sentence 
‘The dog is in the garden’. The word ‘implies’ is part of the metalanguage and 
cannot function as a sentential operator. For this function, one should use instead 
the conditional ‘if … then …’ as in ‘If the cat is on the mat and the dog is in the 
garden then the dog is in the garden’. Of course, this gives rise to a grammatical 
problem: to say ‘every so is such that if so then so’ is not proper English. Locu-
tions like ‘every’ or ‘for all’ demand to be followed by noun phrases. Grammar 
pushes us to say something like ‘every proposition is such that if it holds, then it 
holds’. In a nutshell, in our example, grammar demands ordinary language to 
treat propositions as objects (and truth as a property thereof). This grammatical 
objection is taken very seriously by some authors. See, for instance, the critique 
of Burgess (2005: 211ff). Grammar and ‘common usage’ do not have, however, a 
good repute as a guide to philosophical or scientific inquiry (see the caustic Rus-
sell 1953).
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tions to function as objects in the range of a quantification, I am argu-
ing that it has a content which permits their use within the all-idiom 
in the manner which I have just described. In actual instantiations, 
the question of whether a sequence of symbols counts as express-
ing a proposition can only be answered by way of interpretation and 
public agreement. It is, irredeemably, a matter of interpretation. It 
is certainly right to say that, in meaningful exchange, interpretation 
always lurks.3
4 Digression on the natural numbers
Given the coherence of propositional and concept quantification, a 
refusal to accept this kind of quantification is tantamount to a prohi-
bition to engage in concept building and expression. It is an unwill-
ingness to go on in the direction of a greater linguistic expressive-
ness. Let me make a brief digression and discuss an example from 
mathematics: the principle of mathematical induction:
The use of this principle is, directly or indirectly, behind almost all 
of the mathematics that is indispensable for science. In the light of 
the discussion of the last section, I purposely enunciate the principle 
with a (second-order) concept quantification because this is a way to 
express its universality, in the sense that the properties to which the 
principle of induction applies are not parochial to a fixed language. 
The principle rather applies to properties whose expression is part of 
3 The notion of propositional quantification has some superficial affinities 
with substitutional quantification. There are two crucial differences, however. 
The instantiations of a universal propositional quantification are not obtained 
from sentences of a given fixed formal language. As a consequence, propositional 
quantification is not amenable to semantic ascent and cannot be reformulated as 
quantification over a certain fixed domain of sentences together with the concur-
rence of a truth (or satisfaction) predicate. Moreover, in our notion of quantifica-
tion, sentences formed using the very apparatus of propositional quantification 
can themselves be used as instantiations of universal quantifications. In other 
words, contrary to substitutional quantification, propositional quantification ac-
cepts impredicativity and, when generalized to concept quantification, it allows 
for the formation of impredicative concepts.
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an open-ended process.
The expert reader knows that the mathematics indispensable for 
science only requires enunciations of the principle of induction with-
in particular formal languages.4 We can certainly opt for this kind 
of parochialism with respect to science as it is currently practiced. 
Nevertheless, the principle as enunciated above not only has a regula-
tive force - in the sense that the evidence for the truth of its formal 
(schematic) enunciations are best seen as coming from the general 
principle5 - but it also sheds light on the relationships between prov-
ability and truth in mathematics.
Arithmetic, when developed in a formal language, is subjected to 
Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. According to this theorem, 
under mild technical conditions, a consistent theory of arithmetic is 
necessarily incomplete, i.e., there are always sentences of the formal 
language which are neither provable nor refutable (their negations 
are not provable). If we further see the system of arithmetic as aim-
ing at proving true arithmetical sentences, we can say that there are 
always true sentences of arithmetic which are not provable in the 
given formal system.
The proof of Gödel’s theorem relies essentially on the complete 
formalization of the arithmetical theory. If the principle of induction 
is formulated as above, with concept quantification, Gödel’s theo-
rem simply does not apply. This state of affairs should not come as 
a surprise because in any formal deductive system the statement of 
the principle of induction is, by necessity, restricted.6 Not only is this 
4 For instance, in the language of set theory. Mathematical logicians have 
studied in detail what exactly is necessary - in terms of induction or set com-
prehension - for proving ordinary theorems of mathematics (for a reference, see 
Simpson 1999). For the connection of this kind of work with science and the 
indispensability arguments, I recommend Feferman 1998.
5 This simple point was given its due weight by Kreisel (1967: 148).
6 The observation about the open-endedness of concept formation is quite 
plain. Ditto for the observation that the principle of induction is open-ended. 
However, the following question and (especially) its answer are rather deep. Let 
be given a formal language of arithmetic. It has a delimited apparatus of concept 
formation and, therefore, a restricted amount of induction. Would it nevertheless 
be possible to set up a (consistent) theory in the formal language that would either 
prove or refute each sentence of that very same formal (and, hence, restricted) 
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observation in line with the open-endness of concept formation, but 
it also finds rigorous mathematical support in the theorem that the 
truth predicate for a formal language of arithmetic cannot be defined 
within the language itself.7
Wherein is exactly located the presumed gap between truth and 
provability intimated by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem? I sug-
gest that the gap, if it is a gap, lies in the open-endness of concept 
formation and, in our case, in the open-endness of numerical con-
cept formation.
5 The centrality of hypothetical and general statements
Inference is central to logic and reason. Without being able to move 
from premises to a conclusion, there is no reasoning. Logical truth 
is a particular case (or a degenerate case, as when we say that a point 
is a degenerate circle) of inference: one without premises. The de-
generate case is no substitute for the general case since logical truth 
alone does not account for the moves from statements to statements 
which characterize logic. It is an obvious point that it is impossible to 
set up a logical system without at least one inference rule. Without 
inference, there are only isolated proclamations.8
Suppose that the primitive man concludes that he is in danger 
from the information that there is a lion in the vicinity. A reflection 
on what he does, i.e., the move of concluding that he is danger from 
the knowledge that there is a lion in the vicinity, and the will (and ca-
pability) to express this movement, takes him to say ‘if there is a lion 
in the vicinity then I am in danger’. Hypothetical (or conditional) 
statements express, within language, the sanction of the linguistic act 
of drawing a conclusion under certain conditions. They are a fun-
damental form of logical expression and make possible a linguistic 
ascent, from linguistic act into linguistic expression, without which 
language? Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem says that this is impossible.
7 This is Tarski’s undefinability of truth theorem.
8 Such proclamatory discourse would marry well with the notion of language 
as consisting only of descriptions of reality. Interestingly, in Sellars 1997 it is argued 
that even perceptual statements can only count  as assertions insofar as they are 
inferentially articulated.
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there is no explicit reasoning.9,10
In the example above, a measure of generality is implicit. The con-
ditional sentence ‘if there is a lion in the vicinity then I am in dan-
ger’ operates like an inference ticket which can be cashed in all the 
appropriate situations.11 In the complete absence of generality, even 
though there is more in discourse than mere isolated proclamations, 
we are - in a sense - only a finite number of steps away from inferring 
all that can be concluded. Let us advance an argument for this thesis. 
Arguably, the main role of the elimination rules of a connective is to 
make possible the use of premises in which this connective occurs as 
the principal connective. It is plain that if the conditional is the only 
logical connective present in the premises of an argument, we would 
be only a finite number of steps away from inferring all that could be 
inferred via the elimination rule (i.e., via modus ponens).12,13 On the 
9 The content of hypothetical statements results from some distinguished 
roles in inference. More precisely, these are the roles carried out by the introduc-
tion and elimination rules of the natural deduction calculus. This calculus was 
invented by Gerhard Gentzen in 1935, and subsequently studied and expanded 
in Prawitz 1965.
10 The attentive reader can point that there are inferences with more than 
one premise, and that this fact calls for the notion of conjunction as well. This is 
correct, but not terribly interesting. There is a further factor that explains our 
simplified account: technically, as it will be pointed out, conjunctive claims can 
be expressed using hypothetical and general claims.
11 This point was made a long time ago by Ryle 1950.
12 The above argument is not as strong as the argument for the centrality of 
hypothetical statements. The caveat ‘in a sense’ is needed because the introdu-
tion rule for implication does allow the inference of infinitely many sentences 
(uninteresting as they may be). Nevertheless, we believe that it carries a certain 
weight. It would be nice to advance stronger and more perspicuous arguments for 
the centrality of general statements.
13 Frege 1984 also assigns a central role in logic to generality. Frege speaks 
of the scientific need to express laws and says that ‘in point of fact the distinction 
between law and particular fact cuts very deep’. Frege, on the other hand, does 
not accord a centrality to hypothetical statements. He sees them as truth func-
tional and, therefore, replaceable by the combination of negation and conjunction 
(cf. Frege 1980). Of course, Frege is right: truth-functional conditionals (as any 
truth functional connective) can even be written with the Sheffer stroke only. 
However, our analysis of truth-functionality is not yet in place. Our rendition of 
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other hand, generality releases reasoning from a pre-fixed enclosure 
into a boundlessness of inferential moves.
The sentence ‘ ’ is an example of a (true) general sen-
tence. Notice that the number of immediate inferences which can 
be drawn from it (via the elimination rule) is unbounded. General 
claims, as hypothetical claims, are also a primitive and unexplained 
notion, fundamental to logical expression. These claims can be made 
not only with respect to predicate positions, but also with respect to 
name positions. However, it is methodologically interesting to start 
with propositional generalities - as we did - because doing so only re-
quires the notion of proposition (i.e., of a meaningful sentence) and 
does not rely yet on any particular analysis of this notion.
At this juncture, it is worth remarking that the familiar propo-
sitional connectives can be introduced with the apparatus of hypo-
thetical and general propositional claims:14
These are the expressive definitions of the above connectives.15 It is 
known that the attendant notion of consequence gives rise to intu-
itionistic logic.16
logic is still on a prior and more general footing.
14 The definitions appear informally in sections 18 and 19 of Russell 1996. 
The formal definitions are due to Prawitz 1965.
15 For the reader unfamiliar with these definitions, let us discuss the defini-
tion of disjunction. In natural deduction, the elimination rule of disjunction is the 
following: If ‘P’ can be inferred from ‘A’ and if ‘P’ can be inferred from ‘B’, then 
‘P’ is a consequence of ‘A B’ (this is also known as discussion by cases). Given that 
concept quantification is allowed in our language, the definition of disjunction 
above mirrors the elimination rule just described. Mutatis mutandis for the other 
connectives. The introduction rules of the natural deduction calculus follow from 
the definitions.
16 The notion of consequence is the one originating from the rules of intro-
duction and elimination (for the conditional and the universal quantifier) of the 
natural deduction calculus (cf. footnote 9). It is a mathematical observation that 
these rules give rise to intuitionistic logic.
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6 The alethic ingredient
The previous section recounts the first part of our ‘logico/metaphys-
ical story’. The subsequent story narrates the appearance of the no-
tion of object and, in general, of the descriptive component of logic. 
We have already introduced the expressive ingredient of logic.17 Let 
us now introduce two other ingredients: firstly, the alethic ingredient 
(i.e., the logical apparatus for the notion of bivalent truth) and, in the 
next section, the ontic ingredient (i.e., the logical apparatus for the 
notion of object).
The alethic ingredient of logic only comes into play when we are 
dealing with a linguistic base whose semantics is taken to be unprob-
lematically bivalent. We start with a initial bit of language whose 
propositions are true or false, but not both (the principle of biva-
lence). For convenience, let us call them atomic propositions.18 We 
take that atomic propositions come in pairs, one called the opposite of 
the other (with switched truth values). The opposite of an opposite 
is the original atomic proposition. This is our rendition of bivalence. 
The inferential explication of bivalence can be done through the fol-
lowing laws:
where the letter ‘A’ stands for a sentence that expresses an atomic 
proposition (an atomic sentence), and ‘A’ stands for its opposite. The 
first law is a form of tertium non datur and can be elucidated by saying 
that an atomic proposition and its opposite exhaust the space of logi-
cal possibilities in the following sense: Whenever we want to infer a 
given proposition, it is enough to infer it from an atomic proposition 
17  Generalizations with respect to name positions (which will be discussed be-
low) are also part of the apparatus of the expressive component of logic, but they 
presuppose a previous analysis of the structure of predicative statements. For the 
record, the expressive definition of is the formula .
18 This is just a convenient way of speaking. There are no metaphysical con-
notations in the use of this terminology (not, for instance, connotations to Trac-
tarian Elementarsätze or semantical atomism) beyond what we have said: atomic 
propositions are either true or false, but not both.
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and to infer it from its opposite. The second principle is a form of ex 
falso quodlibet.19
If ‘A’ stands for an atomic sentence, it is easy to prove both that 
 and that .20 In other words, for atomic proposi-
tions, expressive negation is equivalent to (bivalent) opposition. Fur-
thermore, if we consider the sentences of the language built up from 
atomic sentences by means of propositional connectives (the con-
ditional, and negation, conjunction, disjunction, as defined above) 
- originating propositional sentences - it is easy to argue by induction on 
the build up of sentences, that the statements of the form
where ‘A’ now stands for a propositional sentence, are provable. Note 
that the above says that . It is now clear that the propositional 
fragment of the language obeys the laws of classical logic.
Our definitions of the propositional connectives are done in 
terms of propositional quantifications. It may cause some uneasiness 
the fact that the apparatus of propositional quantification is present 
in the propositional calculus (via the very definitions of the propo-
sitional connectives). The uneasiness is, however, uncalled for. In a 
sense, the apparatus of propositional quantification present in the 
midst of the propositional fragment is trumped by the alethic prin-
ciples. The familiar (self-enclosed) set up of the propositional calcu-
lus via truth tables may, on this view, be considered an ‘in your face’ 
manner of displaying the result of this trumping.
In the same vein, it is worth remarking explicitly that the alethic 
trumping mentioned above explains the compositional nature of the 
classical propositional calculus. The like-minded reader must have 
noticed that the semantics of propositional quantification cannot be 
fully compositional. The reason for this lies in the impredicativity of 
concept quantification and the attendant consequence that one must 
19 With the definitions of the propositional connectives above, the sentence 
in (ALE)
1-
 is equivalent to , and the sentence in (ALE)
2-
 is equivalent to 
.
20 The claim that  should be understood as an abbreviation for the pair 
of claims that  and that .
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deny that the sense of a second-order generalization is intelligible 
only if its instantiations are intelligible in advance of the generaliza-
tion itself.21 This observation effectively precludes a compositional 
semantics in general. However, in the presence of the alethic prin-
ciples, the restricted area of the propositional calculus is fully rooted 
in its bivalent beginnings, disarming - as it were - the role of the 
concept quantifications in its midst and, therefore, making it possible 
to cohere with a (compositional) truth-functional semantics.
7 The ontic ingredient
In the previous section, we brought into discussion a linguistic base 
whose semantics was taken to be unproblematically bivalent. For 
convenience, we called the elements of this linguistic base ‘atomic 
propositions’. The expressive devices of hypothetical and generality 
claims create their own cargo by permitting the expression of new 
propositions which, themselves, can be subjected to the expressive 
devices again. And so on. A quite diverse cargo is created. Even if the 
atomic base has an unproblematic bivalent semantics, the applica-
tion of these devices need not maintain language within such bivalent 
confines. What we have argued in the previous section is that they do 
if we restrict ourselves to the propositional calculus.
In this section, we further suppose that these atomic propositions 
have a predicative structure. For instance, we may say that Busto-
pher is a fat cat or that Mungojerrie and Rumpelteazer are twin cats. 
Proper names and predicate symbols mark places in sentences which 
are suitable for generalizations. They indeed mark different sorts of 
places, since proper names do not fit into predicate places nor vice 
versa. A sentence of the form ‘ , is a generalization 
of the sentence ‘Bustopher is a fat cat  Bustopher is a fat cat’, where 
‘β’ denotes Bustopher. It is a generalization with respect to the pred-
icate place (a concept quantification). We could further generalize in 
21 A second-order generalization may have instantiations which are not sim-
pler than the generalization itself since the bound second-order variable may be 
instantiated by formulas of arbitrary complexity. In this essay we are not discuss-
ing the semantics of concept quantification but it is clear that it must rely on a spe-
cies of a rule-following semantics. The reader can find an entertaining discussion 
of impredicativity in Ferreira 2006.
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the name place and write ‘ ’. First-order quanti-
fication is also a device for the expression of generalizations, through 
which a new manner of formation of concepts is allowed.
In order to deal with the first-order classical predicate calculus, 
we must extend our analysis of the atomic case to atomic formulas. 
In analogy with the last section, if the letter ‘A’ stands for a predica-
tive symbol (unary: to simplify), then ‘A’ stands for its opposite. The 
extended alethic principles take the form:
Disregarding the identity axioms, the inferential explication of the no-
tion of object can completed through the following principle:
Here is an elucidation of this principle: If for each object x, reasoning 
from the fact that x falls under M and from the fact that x falls un-
der K exhausts the space of logical possibilities, then reasoning from 
 and from a generic example falling under K also exhausts 
the space of logical possibilities.
Arguably, the principle (ONT) is a bit opaque on a first reading,22 
but we can frame it in a more familiar terminology: With the defi-
nitions of the propositional connectives and of the existential first-
order quantifier in footnote 17, (ONT) is equivalent to
It is also worth remarking that if there are only finitely many objects 
in the range of x, (ONT) is provable. For instance, if there are only 
two objects α and β, the principle takes the form
22 There is, however, no reason why the inferential explication of the notion 
of object must be prosaic.
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The rendition of the notion of object is given by the inferential rules 
which regulate the use of the ‘linguistic devices of singular terms, 
predication, identity and quantification’. (ONT) is part of this rendi-
tion. If I were pressed to elucidate its particular role in the notion of 
object, I would say that (ONT) conveys the notion of quantification 
over a closed totality.23
It is a simple exercise (via an inductive argument on the complex-
ity of formulas) to show that (ONT), together with the alethic prin-
ciples, entails that first-order formulas satisfy tertium non datur.24 The 
principles of classical logic for the first-order fragment follow suit.
8 Coda
Discourse about objects finds its modern home in first-order classical 
logic with identity. The main thesis of this paper is that logic is not a 
uniform terrain where all truths lie on a par. We have analyzed first-
order classical logic and showed that it decomposes into two main 
ingredients: a deeper and wider expressive component and, on top of 
it, a narrower descriptive component. We argued that hypothetical 
and general claims are fundamental to logic and part of its expressive 
component. In a sense, our argument is transcendental: these types 
of claims are what make logic possible. Another face of logic, formed 
by the alethic and ontic ingredients, flattens - so to speak - the ter-
rain on top of the expressive component giving us the descriptive 
language of first-order classical logic with identity. It is an important 
region in the landscape of language, lying among and on top of the 
larger and original expressive foundation.25
23 As we have noticed, (ONT) is provable if there is only a fixed finite num-
ber of objects in the range of ‘x’. In this case, the notion of quantification over 
a closed totality is given automatically by stating that the domain of quantifica-
tion has the given finite number of elements. For instance, if there are only two 
objects, we can write ‘ ’. It is only when the domain is 
limitless that (ONT) is needed.
24 Note that a particular case of (ONT) is that 
.
25 Versions of this paper were read at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Univer-
sidade do Porto (on the occasion of the conference The Logical Alien at 20) and at 




Burgess, John. 2005. Fixing Frege. Princeton University Press.
Carroll, Lewis. 1895. What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4: 278-280.
Feferman, Solomon. 1998. Why a Little Bit Goes a Long Way: Logical Founda-
tions of Scientifically Applicable Mathematics. In In the Light of Logic. Oxford 
University Press.
Ferreira, Fernando. 2006. To Catch One’s Own Shadow. In Actas do Segundo En-
contro Nacional de Filosoia Analítica, ed. by Sofia Miguens et al. Faculdade de 
Letras da Universidade do Porto.
Frege, Gottlob. 1980. Logical Investigations, III: Compound Thoughts. Posthu-
mous Works. Blackwell.
Frege, Gottlob. 1984. Logical Investigations, IV: Logical Generality. In Collected 
Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy. Blackwell.
Kreisel, Georg. 1967. Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs. In Problems in 
the Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. by Imre Lakatos. North-Holland.
Parsons, Charles. 2008. Mathematical Thought and its Objects. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Prawitz, Dag. 1965. Natural Deduction: a Proof-theoretical Study. Dover Publica-
tions.
Putnam, Hilary. 1998. Representation and Reality. The MIT Press.
Quine, Willard. 1953a. On What There Is? In From a Logical Point of View. Harvard 
University Press.
Quine, Willard. 1953b. Two Dogmas of Empiricism. In From a Logical Point of 
View. Harvard University Press.
Quine, Willard. 1976. Truth by Convention. In The Ways of Paradox and Other Es-
says. Harvard University Press. (First published in 1935.)
Russell, Bertrand. 1903. Principles of Mathematics. W.W. Norton & Company., 
1996.
Russell, Bertrand. 1953. The cult of the ‘common usage’. The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 3: 303-307.
Ryle, Gilbert. 1950. ‘If’, ‘so’ and ‘because’. In Philosophical Analysis, ed. by Max 
Black. Prentice Hall.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University 
Press.
Simpson, Stephen. 1999. Subsystems of Second-order Arithmetic. Springer-Verlag.
Universidade de Lisboa. I would like to thank Nuno Venturinha, Sofia Miguens 
and João Branquinho for giving me the opportunity to present my work, to Con-
cha Martínez for commenting on it in Oporto and, in general, for the comments 
and criticism of the audiences. This article was partially supported by the FCT 
– Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under the project grant [PTDC/FIL-
FCI/109991/2009].
Fernando Ferreira624
Disputatio, Vol. IV, No. 34, December 2012
Será o Contratualismo Reconciliável 
com o Consequencialismo?
Pedro Galvão
Universidade de Lisboa e Grupo LanCog
BIBLID [0873-626X (2012) 34; pp. 625-634]
Será que o contratualismo e o consequencialismo poderão convergir 
na prática? Admitir que sim é julgar que estas perspectivas, apesar de 
oferecerem fundamentos diferentes para a obrigação moral, poderão 
implicar exactamente o mesmo quanto à permissividade de todo e 
qualquer acto, de tal forma que os actos permissíveis de acordo com 
um contratualista serão permissíveis de acordo com um consequen-
cialista, sendo o mesmo verdade a respeito dos actos impermissíveis.
Este tipo de convergência, vou sustentar, só poderá verificar-se 
entre versões indefensáveis de contratualismo ou de consequencia-
lismo. Portanto, se alguém argumentar que uma certa perspectiva 
contratualista converge com uma certa perspectiva consequencialis-
ta, teremos de dizer o seguinte: não há realmente convergência entre 
essas perspectivas ou, se há, pelo menos uma delas será indefensável, 
o que torna a convergência desinteressante.
O meu argumento contra a possibilidade de uma convergência 
interessante entre o contratualismo e o consequencialismo baseia-
se numa questão acerca da qual vários contratualistas têm divergi-
do efectivamente de vários consequencialistas: a questão das nossas 
obrigações para com os animais não-humanos. (Por uma questão de 
concisão, usarei simplesmente o termo «animais» para me referir aos 
animais das outras espécies.) Vou defender que esta divergência é 
insanável, argumentando a favor das seguintes teses:
1. Qualquer consequencialismo defensável implica que alguns 
animais têm estatuto moral.
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2. Qualquer contratualismo defensável implica que nenhum ani-
mal tem estatuto moral.
Nas próximas duas secções justificarei, respectivamente, 1 e 2. Des-
tas teses segue-se que nenhum consequencialismo defensável conver-
ge com um contratualismo defensável.
Afirmar que há animais com estatuto moral, importa esclarecer 
desde já, é dizer que temos obrigações para com alguns animais. Por 
outras palavras, é pensar que temos deveres directos em relação a al-
guns animais. Se temos estes deveres, um deles será seguramente 
o de não infligir dor ou sofrimento a animais — concebido apenas 
como um dever prima facie, note-se. Quem considera que este dever 
é directo entende que não devemos fazer sofrer animais porque o 
sofrimento é mau para eles, vai contra os seus interesses, e não sim-
plesmente porque infligir-lhes sofrimento seja mau, de alguma for-
ma, para os seres humanos ou vá contra os nossos interesses. O con-
sequencialista não poderá deixar de aceitar um dever como este; o 
contratualista, pelo contrário, não poderá admiti-lo.
John C. Harsanyi, embora nunca se tivesse descrito como «con-
tratualista», conta-se entre os autores que argumentaram a favor de 
uma convergência do contratualismo com o consequencialismo. A 
última secção deste artigo centra-se no argumento de Harsanyi. Ins-
peccionando-o, veremos melhor como o esforço de reconciliação pa-
rece condenado ao fracasso.
1
Podemos seriar estados de coisas alternativos segundo o seu valor 
impessoal, adoptando um ponto de vista estritamente imparcial e 
maximamente abrangente. Directa ou indirectamente, o consequen-
cialista baseia a sua atribuição de permissividade a actos neste tipo de 
seriação de estados de coisas. No primeiro caso será um consequen-
cialista de actos, sendo de esperar que defenda o seguinte:
Um acto é permissível se e somente se não há um acto alternativo 
que resultasse num estado de coisas melhor.
Se optar antes por uma abordagem indirecta, poderá ser um conse-
quencialista de regras e sustentar o seguinte:
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Um acto é permissível se e somente se está em conformidade com 
um código moral óptimo.
Um código moral é óptimo se e somente se não há um código 
moral alternativo que resultasse num estado de coisas melhor (se 
colhesse a aceitação geral).
Há outras versões de consequencialismo, tanto directas como indi-
rectas, mas na presente discussão aquilo que as distingue entre si não 
é importante.
Alguns consequencialistas são hedonistas. Pensam que só o pra-
zer é intrínseca e fundamentalmente bom, e que só o sofrimento é 
intrínseca e fundamentalmente mau. Para estes consequencialistas, 
dados quaisquer dois estados de coisas alternativos, o melhor será 
sempre aquele em que houver mais prazer, descontado o sofrimento.
O hedonismo é seguramente uma perspectiva muito controversa 
e bastante impopular nos tempos que correm. Muitos consequencia-
listas — a maioria, na verdade — recusar-se-iam a seriar estados de 
coisas unicamente segundo o critério do «saldo hedónico». Defende-
riam que outros critérios — por exemplo, o exercício da autonomia, 
a satisfação de desejos, a compensação pelo mérito, a igualdade na 
distribuição do bem-estar ou a integridade dos ecossistemas — são 
importantes para efectuar as seriações. Como esta lista permite en-
trever, há muitas questões interessantes a discutir quanto ao modo 
correcto de avaliar estados de coisas em termos do seu valor impes-
soal. Mas saber se o sofrimento será um dos factores importantes a 
atender nesse tipo de avaliação não é uma dessas questões. Qualquer 
consequencialista razoável, por maior que seja a sua aversão ao he-
donismo, aceitará o seguinte: ceteris paribus, um estado de coisas é 
melhor do que outro se nele houver menos sofrimento — ou, talvez, 
menos sofrimento imerecido. Uma perspectiva consequencialista em 
que os estados de coisas fossem seriados sem se atribuir um peso ne-
gativo considerável ao sofrimento resultaria em conclusões práticas 
extremamente contra-intuitivas, para dizer o mínimo.
Ora, nem só os seres humanos têm a capacidade de sofrer. Ainda 
que só os membros da nossa espécie estejam sujeitos a certas formas 
particularmente intensas de sofrimento, partilhamos com muitos 
outros animais capacidades semelhantes para experienciar dor física, 
bem como para ter sentimentos de angústia, medo e tédio. De um 
ponto de vista estritamente imparcial e maximamente abrangente, o 
sofrimento dos animais não só não pode ser ignorado como deve ter a 
mesma importância que o sofrimento semelhante dos seres humanos. 
Avaliar estados de coisas sem atender ao sofrimento dos membros das 
outras espécies seria tão arbitrário como fazê-lo sem considerar, por 
exemplo, o sofrimento dos seres humanos de algumas raças ou de 
um dos sexos.1
Admitamos, então, que o consequencialista tem de basear a sua 
perspectiva numa concepção do valor em que o sofrimento dos ani-
mais conte como algo intrinsecamente mau ou desvalioso. Se ele for 
um consequencialista de actos, incluirá esse sofrimento entre as con-
sequências dos actos que contribuem invariavelmente — ainda que 
nem sempre de forma decisiva — para os tornar errados. E, se ele 
for antes um consequencialista de regras, também admitirá um dever 
prima facie de não maltratar animais, já que a aceitação geral de um 
código moral que sancione este dever teria seguramente melhores 
consequências do que a aceitação geral de um código moral que con-
sentisse a indiferença total em relação ao bem-estar dos animais.
Qualquer consequencialista, portanto, deverá aprovar uma preo-
cupação directa com os animais, tomando sempre o facto de um acto 
resultar em sofrimento para um animal como uma razão para não o 
realizar. Não é assim de estranhar que, de Bentham a Singer, os re-
presentantes mais destacados da tradição consequencialista tenham 
figurado entre os defensores de uma maior consideração pelos in-
teresses dos animais. À luz de qualquer versão defensável de con-
sequencialismo, práticas como a criação intensiva de animais, ou o 
seu uso em laboratórios para fins triviais, deverão ser abolidas em 
virtude de envolverem uma enorme desproporção entre os males in-
fligidos aos animais e os benefícios que os seres humanos obtêm.
2
Examinemos agora a perspectiva contratualista, que admite a seguin-
te formulação concisa:
1 Peter Singer, na sua célebre crítica ao «especismo», defendeu pormenori-
zadamente que a discriminação baseada na espécie é análoga às discriminações 
baseadas na raça ou no sexo. Veja-se Singer 1974.
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Um acto é permissível se e somente se está em conformidade com 
os princípios que os agentes racionais acordariam entre si para 
governarem a sua interacção.
Os contratualistas baseiam a ética num acordo hipotético, realizado 
em circunstâncias ideais, mediante o qual os agentes racionais defi-
nem os termos da sua coexistência em sociedade. Ora, os animais, 
mesmo os mais inteligentes, são manifestamente incapazes de par-
ticipar num acordo — e muito menos num acordo desta natureza, 
centrado na escolha de princípios morais. Deste modo, parece que 
as partes contratantes não terão razões para aceitar um código moral 
em que os interesses dos animais sejam considerados directamente. 
Peter Carruthers (1992), o contratualista que melhor explorou esta 
questão, defendeu isto mesmo: que o contratualismo não deixa es-
paço para a atribuição de estatuto moral aos animais. Os animais, 
em seu entender, importam apenas indirectamente de um ponto de 
vista ético. Não devemos tratá-los de certas formas, mas isso apenas 
devido aos direitos e aos interesses dos seres humanos. Por exemplo, 
matar certos animais será errado em virtude de violar os direitos dos 
seus proprietários, e maltratar animais em público poderá ser errado 
em virtude de ferir a sensibilidade de algumas pessoas.
Há dois tipos principais de contratualismo, que diferem na con-
cepção das circunstâncias ideais do contrato ético.2 No contratua-
lismo rawlsiano, os agentes desconhecem as suas características e 
interesses pessoais. Têm conhecimento de factos gerais de natureza 
psicológica e sociológica, mas, como estão sob um véu de ignorância, 
ignoram o seu sexo, raça, classe social, bem como os seus talentos 
naturais e os seus projectos individuais. Por isso, os agentes efec-
tuarão a sua escolha de princípios desconhecendo o lugar que irão 
ocupar na sociedade (Rawls 1971). No contratualismo scanloniano, 
pelo contrário, não há qualquer véu de ignorância. Todos os agentes 
conhecem a sua posição na sociedade e as suas características pes-
soais. Contudo, partilham o objectivo de encontrar princípios que 
«ninguém possa rejeitar razoavelmente enquanto base para um acor-
do geral, livre e informado» (Scanlon 1998: 153).
Consideremos o contratualismo rawlsiano. Dado que os agentes, 
2 Ignoro aqui o contratualismo hobbesiano, cuja incompatibilidade com a atri-
buição de estatuto moral aos animais é perfeitamente evidente.
629Será o Contratualismo reconciliável com o Consequencialismo?
sob o véu de ignorância, ignoram a sua raça e o seu sexo, não esco-
lherão princípios que neguem estatuto moral aos seres humanos de 
algumas raças ou de um dos sexos. Mas, por muito espesso que seja 
esse véu, os agentes saberão que não se incluem entre os animais, 
dado que estes são incapazes de participar numa escolha de princípios 
morais. Deste modo, não admitirão quaisquer obrigações para com 
os membros das outras espécies.
Uma forma de resistir a este resultado consiste em introduzir a 
suposição de que, entre as partes contratantes, figuram agentes ra-
cionais cuja função é representar os animais e defender os seus in-
teresses. Muito plausivelmente, a participação desses agentes no 
contrato ético resultaria na escolha de princípios que concedessem 
estatuto moral aos animais. Esta versão de contratualismo rawlsiano, 
no entanto, é indefensável: a suposição indicada, sendo destituída de 
uma justificação independente e servindo apenas conferir estatuto 
moral aos animais, é puramente ad hoc (Carruthers 1992: 99-100).
O contratualismo scanloniano é igualmente adverso à perspectiva 
de que os animais têm estatuto moral. É verdade, sem dúvida, que 
muitos dos agentes racionais envolvidos no contrato poderão impor-
tar-se com os animais, ter uma preocupação com o seu bem-estar. 
Mas esta preocupação, como sustenta Carruthers, não oferece uma 
razão adequada para rejeitar um código moral sem obrigações para 
com os animais:
[N]ão será razoável uma pessoa rejeitar uma regra se outras pessoas te-
riam um fundamento igual para rejeitar qualquer regra proposta. Pois, 
nesse caso, não conseguiríamos atingir o nosso objectivo partilhado 
de chegar a um acordo geral, livre e sem coacção. Não poderá ser ra-
zoável, portanto, rejeitar uma regra simplesmente por esta estar em 
conflito com um dos meus interesses ou preocupações. Pois qualquer 
regra (se não for completamente trivial) estará em conflito com as 
preocupações de alguém. Talvez eu me importe profundamente com 
o bem-estar dos animais. Mas outros preocupam-se profundamente 
com padrões de vestuário e aparência, modos de actividade sexual e 
a adoração do seu deus. Se eu puder rejeitar razoavelmente regras que 
não atribuem qualquer peso aos interesses dos animais, outros poderão 
rejeitar de forma igualmente razoável regras que nos permitam vestir 
e fazer amor como desejarmos, e adorar ou não adorar como bem en-
tendermos. (1992: 104)
Para nos restringirmos ao tema em discussão, suponhamos que o 
contrato ético envolve, além de agentes que se preocupam com bem
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-estar dos animais, agentes que se preocupam de forma igualmente 
intensa com a manutenção de actividades incompatíveis com a atri-
buição de estatuto moral aos animais. Numa versão de contratualis-
mo scanloniano em que se considerasse que os primeiros, apelando 
à sua preocupação, poderiam rejeitar razoavelmente princípios que 
negassem estatuto moral aos animais, teríamos de admitir que os se-
gundos, apelando à sua preocupação, também poderiam rejeitar ra-
zoavelmente princípios que atribuíssem estatuto moral aos animais. 
E assim, a respeito do tratamento dos animais, não haveria quaisquer 
princípios que não pudessem ser razoavelmente rejeitados. Esta ver-
são de contratualismo, portanto, seria indefensável: não permitiria 
que as partes contratantes chegassem alguma vez a um acordo. Sob a 
perspectiva scanloniana, o facto de algumas pessoas se importarem 
com bem-estar dos animais não poderá contar como uma razão para 
escolher princípios que lhes confiram estatuto moral.
Em suma, ao passo que os agentes rawlsianos serão indiferentes 
aos interesses dos animais, os agentes scanlonianos, ainda que possam 
importar-se com esses interesses, não poderão apelar à sua preocu-
pação para rejeitar um código moral que os ignore. Num enquadra-
mento contratualista, a perspectiva de que os animais têm estatuto 
moral não encontra o menor apoio. À luz de qualquer versão defen-
sável de contratualismo, como Carruthers (1992: 107-108, 159-160) 
sublinha, não há razões para reprovar práticas como a criação intensi-
va de animais ou o seu uso em laboratórios, mesmo para fins triviais.
3
John Harsanyi defendeu uma ética consequencialista, mais precisa-
mente um utilitarismo de média: grosso modo, a perspectiva de que os 
princípios morais correctos são aqueles cuja adopção maximizaria o 
bem-estar médio. O seu argumento principal a favor desta perspecti-
va, embora tenha precedido a teoria da justiça de Rawls, é facilmente 
enquadrável no contratualismo rawlsiano.3 Pois Harsanyi, à seme-
lhança de Rawls, alega que os princípios correctos são aqueles que 
os agentes racionais escolheriam se estivessem sob um véu de igno-
3 Harsanyi apresentou este argumento em várias ocasiões. Mas veja-se sobre-
tudo Harsanyi 1977.
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rância, desconhecendo a posição que irão ocupar no mundo em que 
os princípios serão implementados. Porém, enquanto Rawls sustenta 
que os agentes repudiariam princípios utilitaristas, Harsanyi defende 
o contrário, sugerindo assim uma convergência entre o consequen-
cialismo e o contratualismo — um contratualismo diferente do de 
Rawls, mas que, em virtude do recurso ao véu de ignorância, não 
deixa de ser rawlsiano.
O desacordo entre Rawls e Harsanyi respeita sobretudo ao proce-
dimento de escolha apropriado para os agentes racionais. Rawls ad-
voga o maximin, um procedimento de escolha extremamente pruden-
te que se deixa traduzir na seguinte perspectiva: os agentes deverão 
avaliar os princípios como se tivessem a certeza de que vão ficar na 
posição de um dos indivíduos mais desfavorecidos. Harsanyi sugere 
antes que os agentes deverão efectuar essa avaliação supondo que a 
probabilidade de ficarem em cada uma das posições possíveis é rigo-
rosamente a mesma. Ora, estando motivados pelo interesse pessoal, 
os agentes escolherão assim os princípios que resultem num maior 
bem-estar médio — em detrimento, por exemplo, dos princípios 
que resultem num maior bem-estar para os mais desfavorecidos.4 
Deste modo, um contratualismo rawlsiano gera uma perspectiva 
consequencialista.
Importa agora perguntar se o consequencialismo resultante será 
defensável. E a resposta, pelas razões indicadas, tem de ser negativa. 
Dado que os agentes rawlsianos sabem que em caso algum ficarão 
na posição de um animal, irão ignorar o bem-estar dos animais ao 
seleccionar os princípios que governarão a sua interacção. Escolhe-
rão assim os princípios, se adoptarem o procedimento de escolha 
que Harsanyi recomenda, cuja adopção resulte num maior bem-estar 
médio para os seres humanos,5 deixando de fora o bem-estar dos mem-
bros de todas as outras espécie. Mas, como vimos, de uma perspec-
tiva consequencialista é arbitrário excluir os interesses dos animais. 
Portanto, o argumento rawlsiano de Harsanyi conduz a uma versão 
indefensável de consequencialismo.
4 Para uma apresentação mais pormenorizada do argumento, veja-se Galvão 
2007: 100–102.
5 Ou, pior ainda, talvez apenas para alguns seres humanos, já que nem todos os 
membros da nossa espécie são agentes racionais.
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É verdade que podemos tentar remediar esta falha do argumento. 
Para que os princípios escolhidos pelos agentes racionais sejam aque-
les cuja adopção resultasse num maior bem-estar médio verdadeira-
mente geral, podemos redescrever apropriadamente as circunstâncias 
ideais em que esses agentes efectuam a escolha. Uma possibilidade, 
que sugeri noutra ocasião (Galvão 2007: 111-112), consiste em tor-
nar o véu de ignorância um pouco mais espesso, introduzindo uma 
«condição de amnésia»: antes de efectuarem a escolha, os agentes 
ficam privados do conhecimento da identidade de todos aqueles cujo 
bem-estar será afectado. Inicialmente, os agentes poderão saber (1) 
quem são todos os indivíduos afectados — incluindo os animais — e 
(2) que nível de bem-estar cada indivíduo obterá se os diversos prin-
cípios em consideração forem adoptados. Antes de escolherem os 
princípios, no entanto, os agentes «esquecem» 1, ainda que retenham 
a informação correspondente a 2. Desta forma, deixam de saber se os 
indivíduos em questão são animais ou humanos, mas saberão em que 
medida o seu bem-estar será afectado com a adopção de cada conjun-
to de princípios. E assim efectuarão a escolha como se pudessem vir a 
ocupar a posição dos animais, o que os levará a preferir os princípios 
cuja adopção resulte no maior bem-estar médio, considerados todos 
os seres sencientes.
Esta nova versão de contratualismo rawlsiano tem, portanto, a 
vantagem de conduzir a um consequencialismo que não deixa de fora 
os interesses dos animais — e que por isso seria indefensável. Contu-
do, a «condição da amnésia» afigura-se puramente ad hoc, pelo torna 
indefensável qualquer perspectiva que a inclua.
Em suma, o argumento inicial de Harsanyi gera um consequen-
cialismo indefensável. Ao repararmos a sua falha, acabamos com um 
contratualismo indefensável. Depois da discussão realizada nas duas 
secções anteriores, este resultado não deve surpreender-nos: se qual-
quer consequencialismo defensável diverge de qualquer contratua-
lismo defensável no que respeita ao estatuto moral dos animais, a 
convergência entre estas posições só se realiza quando pelo menos 
uma delas se apresenta numa versão manifestamente indefensável. Se 
o argumento aqui apresentado é sólido, a questão de saber se havere-
mos de ser consequencialistas ou contratualistas mantém, pois, uma 
633Será o Contratualismo reconciliável com o Consequencialismo?
importância prática muito significativa.6
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In the history of philosophy very few thinkers opposed metaphysics 
in such a radical way as Otto Neurath (1882-1945), a member of 
the so called First Vienna Circle (1907-12), and an active participant 
in the Moritz Schlick’s privatissimum that regularly met for fifteen 
years from October 1923 onwards. Neurath was a fertile thinker, 
as he wrote over five hundred different works comprehending areas 
like philosophy, economics, sociology, and education. He was also 
a restless social organiser and editor of scientific publications. It is 
true that mostly of his essays are rather short and full of repetitions, 
but his thought was in continuous transformation from his very first 
work on (1909). In the present article we will concentrate on the 
ideas developed by Neurath on physicalism in the late 1920 and in 
the first half of the 1930s. In that period Schlick’s privatissimum was 
termed Vienna Circle thank to the publication of the well known 
manifesto, which was actually written by Neurath with some opin-
ion by other fellow-members especially Carnap. Philosophically the 
manifesto was a compromise between some intellectual tendencies 
within the Circle, which is a reason why it is not the best reference 
for someone who wants to understand Neurath’s anti-philosophy. In 
these lines we will present the Neurathian view of physicalism. Our 
effort will be to show that early behaviourist psychology was intro-
duced in it as a crucial element to complete what Neurath believed to 
be a radical version of materialism.
In a review of Carnap’s Aufbau written in a political newspaper in 
1928 Neurath speaks favourably about the anti-metaphysical tenden-
cy of the book but he clearly expresses his objections relative to the 
limits of some Carnapian claims to sharp logical order and theoreti-
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cal exactness. (Neurath 1981/1928: 295-7) Accordingly to Neurath 
a sociologist knows that ambiguity is unavoidable to a certain extent, 
which gives rise to problems that only explicit ideological choices 
may solve. He was indeed a materialist deeply engaged in the pro-
ject of a Marxian sort of society. Science for him is a revolutionary 
power, capable of forecasting what is going to happen. This wonder-
ful ability of science makes it possible for mankind to find reliable 
guidance about individual and especially about collective decisions. 
Philosophy in general and metaphysics in special are for him empty 
and dangerous forms of talk produced by enemies of the working 
class. As Neurath repeats ad nauseam, an essential task of the Vienna 
Circle is the full elimination of metaphysics and philosophy, which 
entails a thorough cleansing of all philosophic-speculative remains 
within scientific language. (To quote only a few examples: Neur-
ath 1981/29B, 1981/31A, B, C and D, 1981/1932A, 1981/1933A) 
About the language of physics Neurath is optimistic for he believes 
its received metaphysical nonsense is cleared away for good. But he is 
rather critical about languages of sociology and psychology that wrap 
up a great deal of speculative pseudo-concepts. In sociology Neur-
ath’s main target is Max Weber whose social thought is taken by him 
as a privileged example of an unacceptable view of society. (Neurath, 
1981/1931B: 415 and D: 462-5) Speaking about his contemporary 
psychology, Neurath considers Watson’s behaviourism, the gestalt, 
Freudian psychoanalysis and individual therapy. He has minor criti-
cisms against psychoanalysis, but he is rather stern about the other 
tendencies. Watson’s discussions on ethics are plainly dropped as 
metaphysics. (Neurath 1981/1933: 601-8)
In 1931 Neurath popularises his views on physicalism in two 
short but enlightening articles. One of them was published in Eng-
lish in the USA (Neurath, 1981/1931B), while the other was written 
in German and published in Italy. (Neurath, 1981/1931C) In both of 
these works, besides his usual criticisms against metaphysics and phi-
losophy, he explains very clearly his theses on language and unified 
science. For him, language is present from the very beginning in any 
sort of intelligent activity. Therefore, it would be meaningless to try 
to validate language through pre-linguistic resources like comparing 
it with the world, in order to make sure that it is really adequate. 
Even a simple language is about bodies, their properties and rela-
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tions, which expands to every meaningful kind of human linguistic 
expression. Science develops within language and cannot be severed 
from it. But the alpha and the omega of science are its forecasts. The 
business of science has nothing to do with any sort of description 
of the world nor with speculation, for science is public knowledge, 
whose sentences are due to be submitted to public tests. Eventually 
science produces forecasts useful to society in its activities of decid-
ing and planning.
In these 1931 articles Neurath emphasizes the importance of be-
havioural psychology, despite his rejection of its specific theses. Al-
most two decades before, in 1913, John Watson had published in the 
USA his well-known manifesto termed Psychology as the Behaviorist Views 
It. (Watson, 1913) Watson’s programme was to build a psychology 
concerned with observable behaviour, in order to put it on the path 
of sciences like physics, chemistry and biology. But Neurath surpris-
ingly inverts this order, saying that sciences are concerned with the 
behaviour of nature: mineralogy for instance studies the behaviour 
of stones. (Neurath, 1981/31B: 413-4). In this sense every science 
is behavioural, because it deals with the observable conduct of ob-
jects that are in space and time. Watson was engaged in a form of 
psychology that, generally speaking, gets rid of concepts like mind, 
consciousness and the like. Introspection in particular is strongly 
rejected by Watsonian psychology. This is precisely the frame that 
Neurath includes in his version of physicalism, especially in relation 
to sociology. In a book published also in 1931, he describes sociology 
as ‘social physics’ (an expression originally by Quételet) or ‘social 
behaviourism’. (Neurath 1981/31D: 500-26) Sociology has nothing 
to do with empty ideas like Volksgeist for instance, which are popu-
lar among social scientists, despite their character of metaphysical 
remains waiting to be cleared away. The true business of sociology 
is the study of human beings, who are stimulated by other human 
beings and by their environment. They work, they play, they are 
consumers, or, briefly, they behave.
Neurath extends this behavioural view to the statements of an 
individual person. If someone says, for example, ‘I see something 
blue’ this statement will be taken as an empirical sentence (Realsatz) 
if outside of the person’s body some space-temporal things of the 
correspondent kind happen. The statement will be considered to be 
a hallucination if everything that happens is some change in the per-
son’s brain. Finally the statement will be taken as a lie if only the per-
son’s language-centre and its expression are changed. Thank to this 
type of scheme, Neurath is able of comprehend human expressions in 
purely behavioural terms. (Neurath 1981/1931C: 420)
In his two popular articles of 1931 Neurath presents the process 
of constitution of the unified science (Einheitswissenschaft), which is 
the sequence of space-temporal sentences together with their ramifi-
cations. The unified science includes logics and its tautologies, which 
are only rules for the transformation of sentences. Proper science 
starts with observational statements (Beobachtungssätze). Induction 
has no theoretical justification, but it is actually used based upon 
some methodological decision. Scientific laws obtain inductively 
from singular sentences. Such laws are not proper universal sentenc-
es, but they are only rules for the inference of statements related to 
singular forecasts, which have to be submitted to empirical tests. 
Neurath emphatically sustains the thesis that sentences cannot be 
compared with the world, but only with other sentences. Without 
any detail, he says that sentences are submitted to empirical tests 
within contexts where light, sounds and the like are present. De-
spite this, light and sounds are not elements of the unified science, 
whose only constituents are sentences. The test of a sentence pro-
duces other sentences. If a single sentence can be consistently added 
to the unified science, it is considered to be “true.” If not, it is taken 
as “false.” It is not comfortable for Neurath to use philosophical lan-
guage, which is the reason why he writes words like these with in-
verted commas. For him, there is no other way of speaking about 
“truth.” (Neurath 1981/1931C: 418-9) He refused the accusation of 
being a coherentist.
In 1931 Carnap publishes an article on the physicalist language 
as the universal language of science, where he partially preserves 
some phenomenalist elements of the Aufbau. The test of sentences 
of an empirical system, Carnap says, leads eventually to protocol or 
observation statements (Protokollsätze), which deal directly with ba-
sic experiences. Such elementary statements need no further tests. 
(Carnap 1931: 437-41)
In German “Protokoll” means something like a register or record. 
In this sense, protocol-statements are reliable registers of what a sci-
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entist verifies within a single experiment, under particular space-
temporal conditions. For instance, if he describes what happened in 
his experiment the scientist writes down records of a day, of an hour, 
of a place and other conditions. Eventually he may write something 
like “A noise was heard followed by a smell of ozone”. This sentence 
is phenomenic, because it describes what was individually perceived 
by the scientist. Accordingly to Carnap, the test is complete when 
protocol-statements obtain.
A strong behaviourist and physicalist like Neurath could not accept 
Carnap’s thesis, which caused him to publish one of his most elabo-
rate and artful works: his essay on protocol-statements, originally 
published in the journal Erkenntnis, in1932. (Neurath 1981/1932B) 
In this article Neurath reaffirms his idea of a physicalist language 
as something that human beings have from their early life, as trivial 
historic language is taught to everyone since childhood. On the other 
extremity, sophisticated scientific language include highly complex 
space-temporal co-ordinates. Neurath persists in his programme to-
wards the actual constitution of this kind of physicalist language, 
which for him would be the only possible task for the Vienna Cir-
cle. The programme should firstly involve a complete cleansing of 
all metaphysical remains within natural language. After this Neur-
ath’s language for the unified science would be woven like a seamless 
piece of cloth. As Neurath remarks, trivial colloquial language al-
lows nonsensical expressions like ‘a neighbour without a neighbour’ 
for instance, which may be the root of speculative pseudo-problems. 
But the language for unified science is not supposed to be absolutely 
clean and transparent, because it is impossible to eliminate all sorts 
of ambiguities in it. Such a language cannot get rid of the so-called 
“agglomerations” (Ballungen), which are imprecise terms that cannot 
be replaced by sharply defined ones. (Neurath 1981/1935) If an “ag-
glomeration” is eliminated somewhere, it will reappear in another 
point. As a matter of fact, Neurath vividly opposed any idea of a 
flawless language. But imprecision is not a logical mistake.
In addition to this, Neurath also opposed any sort of metalan-
guage for his unified language, because one part of the latter may 
speak about another of its parts. The unified language does not need 
a second language to deal with it.
The original point in Neurath’s main article on protocol-state-
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ments is his formulation of what is a protocol. He drops his former 
speech about observational sentences in favour of Carnapian proto-
cols, but his meaning is totally different. Neurath illustrates his idea 
with a famous example:
“Otto’s protocol at 9:17 a.m.: [At 9:16 a.m. Otto’s linguistic thought 
was like this: (At 9:15 a.m. there was in the room one table perceived 
by Otto.)]” (Neurath 1981/1932B: 580)
By elimination of square and round parentheses in this example, em-
pirical sentences obtain, which are not protocols. A protocol must 
contain a person’s name and a term relative to perception.
At first sight this characterisation looks rather weird, but it tries 
to capture the idea of a register written by someone who identifies 
himself and his perception. Nevertheless Neurath does not intend 
to admit irreducible psychological concepts. On the contrary: he 
insists that everything in a protocol-statement may be translatable 
into a space-temporal language, i.e. into a behavioural language. The 
important item is that the name and the perception-term indicate 
reference-points for the test of a protocol. If changes outside Otto’s 
body happen, his statement will be empirical; if changes are limited 
to areas of his brain, the statement will be a hallucination; if only 
his language-centre is involved, the statement will be a lie. Anyway 
a protocol-statement has to be submitted to tests. Independently of 
this, and contrarily to Carnap’s thesis, a protocol may be dropped, 
whenever it fails to be consistently included in the unified science.
Under Neurath’s view there is one physicalist language and one 
unified science where protocol-statements are included. In science 
no sentence is privileged or untouchable. Any sentence is discharge-
able and so is the set of sentences where they are supposed to be 
included. If there is a contradiction between a protocol-statement 
of mine and a protocol by someone else, I may prefer the latter to 
the former. What is not admissible is a contradiction within the set 
of scientific sentences. If this happens, it is theoretically possible to 
keep one protocol-statement and to drop the set, which we hardly 
ever do. In science nothing is immune to revision.
Each individual person may test protocol-statements formulated 
by others, and he may do the same with his own protocols, where-
by the procedures are the same. Unified science is social and it is 
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changing all the time. Robinson Crusoe and Friday share the same 
language, a reason why they can mutually test their protocol-state-
ments. In this context, Neurath repeats his famous metaphor, that 
we are like sailors, forced to rebuild our ships in high sea. Science is 
unstable but crucial for us, because of its ability to forecast. If an al-
ien protocol-statement is useful to a better prediction, we may prefer 
it to our own formulations.
The idea of behaviourism Neurath borrows from Watson clearly 
plays an essential role as far as it makes possible, at least in princi-
ple, the reduction of all human conduct to space-temporal elements, 
which eliminates the Carnapian phenomenalism and even the dis-
tinction between two kinds of psychical contexts present in the Auf-
bau. Thanks to the overall behavioural frame, physicalism can avoid 
talking about mind, consciousness, introspection and the like. This 
eliminates traditional psychology and allows Neurath’s programme 
to be complete. Scientific sentences and protocols are not submitted 
to tests by means of procedures that lead to what one meets only in 
his own self. On the contrary: within the context of the same lan-
guage, a test involves resources to the same physical and behavioural 
course of action. Behaviourism is the touch-stone of Neurathian 
physicalism.
Surprisingly enough Neurath speaks rather little about Watson’s 
behaviourism, whose most general attitude he accepts, but whose 
specific theories he considered vague or even nonsensical. In order 
to distance himself from that early behaviourism, Neurath proposed 
new German words: Behaviorist is a representative of Watson’s behav-
iourism; Behavioristiker is someone committed with the programme 
of a physicalistic language for the unified science. This programme 
extends very naturally into a social behaviourism (Sozialbehavioristik), 
that Neurath brings near to Marxism. (Neurath 1981/1933: 600-4)
It is true that Neurath speaks about behaviourism and about phys-
icalism as programmes or tasks to be developed, because they actu-
ally do not exist yet. His characterisation of the language of unified 
science is a remarkable effort that ought not to conceal a considerable 
degree of imprecision and even of arbitrariness. For instance Neur-
ath’s thesis about the relation (or lack of relation) between sentences 
and the world is not explained in any detail by him. His concern to 
rule out metaphysics takes up an important part of his writings, in 
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disfavour of some interesting contributions he gives. It is true that 
Neurath plainly did not want to make any sort of philosophy, but 
this does not justify any theoretical arbitrariness. He was always pre-
pared to apply a sharp Neurathian razor to every statement he con-
sidered to be metaphysical, without establishing criteria for this sort 
of judgement.
In contemporary terms, Neurath can be classified as a naturalist 
and anti-realist. Neurath is a naturalist because he doesn’t admit the 
existence of any level of knowledge superior to science, able to evalu-
ate science itself. Anti-realist because his view of science is that of 
the boat to be kept afloat, insofar as it forecasts future events, which 
has nothing to do with any description of reality. In other words, the 
set of scientific sentences is a socio-linguistic fact, whose nature is 
pragmatic. 
Neurath’s pragmatism is very present in his objections against 
metalanguage and semantics. For him both are metaphysics. His the-
ses on the subject and his controversies with other physicalists are 
by themselves a chapter in the history of the later Vienna Circle. 
Independently of this and within a different context, Michael Dum-
mett writes in 2010, that a semantic theory has a link with metaphys-
ics. (Dummett 2010: 130) If Dummett is right, Neurath’s criticisms 
against semantics are not based on misunderstanding, at least from 
the point of view of his particular brand of physicalism.
Neurath has been classified as a post-modernist as well, for he rep-
resents the view that the promise of Enlightenment has to be recon-
ceptualised. (Cartwright et al. 1996: 254) Naturalist, anti-realist, 
post-modernist: all these descriptions prove that Neurath’s thought 
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Conceptual explication is an art having approximately the same im-
portance for philosophy that logical deduction has for mathematics. 
To be sure, conceptual explication is important, not only for philoso-
phy, but also for any other science. For all sciences are committed 
to clarify their own concepts. But philosophy is tied to conceptual 
explication in a special way, because the philosopher’s work con-
sists in large part in explicating concepts, just as the mathematician’s 
work consists in large part in deriving theorems. For this reason, 
philosophy has closer ties with conceptual explication than does any 
other science.
With regard to logical deduction, we already have elaborate theo-
ries at our disposal that explain the rules we follow implicitly when 
we are making logical deductions. Unfortunately, this does not ap-
ply also to the explication of concepts. On the contrary, it seems 
that Carnap’s diagnosis of the state of the art from 1950 is still valid, 
according to which “(p)hilosophers, scientists and mathematicians 
make explications very frequently”, but “they do not often discuss 
the general rules which they follow implicitly” (Carnap 1950, p. 7).
In what follows, my aim is to make some steps toward the con-
struction of a theory of conceptual explication whose tasks are ba-
sically the following four: (i) the explication of “explication”; (ii) 
the distinction of the main types of explication; (iii) the formula-
tion and justification of criteria of adequacy for each type; (iv) the 
construction of a system of rules for each type whose observation 
guarantees the adequacy of the corresponding conceptual explica-
tions. Such a theory would not only contribute to the methodological 
self-awareness of philosophy, but it may also help to resolve some of 
Dirk Greimann646
the confusions that have already crept into the practice of conceptual 
explication. Thus, Richard Kirkham has persuasively shown that the 
current debate about the concept of truth suffers from a “multidi-
mensional” confusion that results from mixing up different projects 
of explication with different goals and different criteria of adequacy.1 
The clear distinction of these projects and the corresponding types 
of explication is perhaps the most important desideratum of the cur-
rent theory of truth.
For this reason, I shall focus in this paper on the distinction of 
the various types of conceptual explications.2 The main goal is to set 
up a typology (or “taxonomy”) of conceptual explications. The pa-
per is structured as follows. In section 1, the concept of “conceptual 
explication” is briefly explicated. Section 2 is devoted to the task of 
explaining the criteria of classification for conceptual explications 
on which the typology is based. In sections 3 to 7, the main types 
of conceptual explication are distinguished and the corresponding 
criteria of adequacy are sketched. Finally, in section 8, the adequacy 
of the proposed typology is briefly discussed.
1 Explication of “explication”
In the history of philosophy, conceptual explications have been made 
partly with a descriptive and partly with a revisionary intention.3 
The aim of a descriptive explication is to describe the content and 
function of a given concept as faithfully as possible. A revisionary 
explication, on the other hand, aims to transform a concept that is 
useful but somehow defective from a scientific point of view into a 
scientifically more respectable concept. Such defects may be, e.g., 
the vagueness of a given concept, its inconsistency or the lack of a 
proper principle of individuation for it. The linguistic theories of 
truth such as the disquotation theory and the minimalist theory are 
examples of descriptive explications, and the epistemological theo-
1 Cf. Kirkham 1995, chapter 1. 
2 In Geimann (2007), I concentrate on the methodological rules for the cor-
rect explication of concepts.
3 This distinction is analogous to Strawson’s well-known distinction between 
descriptive and revisionary metaphysics.
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ries like the consensus and the verification theory are examples of 
revisionary ones.
Following Quine, it has become common practice in large 
parts of Analytic Philosophy to call descriptive explications “con-
ceptual analyses” and revisionary explications simply “conceptual 
explications”.4 This terminology may be legitimate, but it is certainly 
not appropriate with regard to our ends. Since we want to construct 
a classification of conceptual explications, we need a more general 
notion of explication that allows us to consider descriptive and revi-
sionary explications as special cases. To take this into account, I shall 
follow here the traditional approach to conceive of an explication 
as an answer to a question of the form, “What is X?” like “What is 
truth?” and “What is knowledge?” A descriptive explication of truth, 
for instance, explains what is actually understood by “truth” in natu-
ral language, and a revisionary one what should be understood by 
“truth” in science.
According to Quine, the essence of conceptual explication con-
sists in the elimination of the explicandum, that is, its substitution 
by a similar but scientifically more respectable concept. He in fact 
defines: explicare est eliminare (1960, § 53). Even when we restrict this 
explication of “explication” to the revisionary case, it does not appear 
to be satisfactory. For, in order to transform a defective concept into 
a scientifically more respectable one, it is neither possible nor neces-
sary in all cases to replace it by another one. Take, for instance, the 
pretheoretic concept of set. From the point of view of set theory, this 
concept is vague and ambiguous. But, to overcome these defects, it 
is not possible to substitute the explicandum by another concept, 
because the concept of set is primitive. Nor is this necessary, because 
the defects can be overcome by means of an axiomatic characteriza-
tion or kindred methods.
Moreover, Quine’s explication of “explication” does not seem 
to be materially adequate, for two reasons. First, the explicandum 
and the explicans are not sufficiently similar: to “explicate” does not 
mean to “eliminate”, but to make something explicit. Second, this 
explication does not take into account that the majority of the philo-
sophical concepts are “primitive”. It is true that in set theory and 
4 Cf. Quine 1960, §§ 39, 53.
other formal disciplines the conceptual explications actually given 
consist in the elimination of the explicanda, that is, more precisely, 
in their reduction to a few basic concepts. But the same does not ap-
ply to philosophy, because the main philosophical concepts (such as 
existence, truth, meaning, freedom and morality) cannot be reduced 
to more fundamental concepts.5 The elimination of the explicanda is 
hence a wrong ideal in philosophy.
What we have called here “conceptual explication” is frequently 
called “definition” in the literature.6 Unfortunately, the term “defi-
nition” is extremely vague and ill-defined. A definition in Frege’s 
sense consists in the logical decomposition of a complex sense into 
its constituents or in a stipulation to the effect that the definiendum 
has the same sense as the definiendum.7 His thesis of the indefin-
ability of truth says that truth is a logically simple (atomic) concept. 
A definition in Tarski’s sense is something quite different. To define 
X in his sense means to formulate an open sentence whose extension 
is X, where X may be an individual or a set. His theorem of the in-
definability of truth says that in theories whose language is semanti-
cally closed it is impossible to construct in a consistent way an open 
sentence whose extension is the set of all true sentences. To say that 
truth is indefinable in this sense is to say that truth is inexpressible.8 
Other authors mean by “definition” the reduction of the definiens to 
more fundamental concepts. When, for instance, Davidson speaks 
of the “folly of trying to define truth”, what he has in mind is the 
reduction of truth to more fundamental concepts.9 In order not to 
complicate things unnecessarily, I shall not try to define “definition” 
here, but to avoid using this term.
5 This is confirmed by the fact that no philosophical concept that has been 
successfully reduced to other concepts until now.
6 See, for instance, Gupta 2008.
7 Cf. Frege 1914, pp. 226-228.
8 Cf. Tarski 1933.
9 Cf. Davidson 1996.
Dirk Greimann648
2 Criteria for distinguishing types of conceptual explica-
tion
When we want to construe a typology of conceptual explications, 
we need criteria of classification that enable us to distinguish be-
tween different types of conceptual explications. Such criteria may 
refer either to the purpose of an explication, or to the method used 
to realize the explication, or to the kind of its explicandum, or to its 
criteria of adequacy.
In the literature it is common to distinguish between three ba-
sic types of explications with regard to their criteria of material ad-
equacy: descriptive, revisionary and stipulative explications. A de-
scriptive explication is materially adequate only if it is faithful to the 
original meaning of the explicandum, i.e., the explicandum and the 
explicans must have the same meaning. In the case of revisionary 
explications, by contrast, the explicans and the explicandum are not 
supposed to have the same meaning, because otherwise the expli-
cans could not be transformed into a scientifically more respectable 
concept; you cannot wash the fur without making it wet. Neverthe-
less, in the revisionary case the explicandum and the explicans are 
supposed to have similar meanings, because otherwise the explicans 
could not substitute the explicandum. Finally, in the case of stipula-
tive explications, the explicandum and the explicans need not even 
have similar meanings, because everyone is free to stipulate what he 
wants to understand by the explicandum.
A second classification refers to the method used in explications. 
In this respect, we may distinguish between explicit and implicit 
definitions, ostensive and lexical definitions, operative and contex-
tual definitions, axiomatic characterizations, Fregean elucidations, 
ramseyfications etc.
The third criterion of classification refers to the kind of the object 
of explication, that is, the type of the explicandum. In this respect 
we may distinguish between extensional and intensional explica-
tions, and between nominal and real explications.
Finally, the fourth criterion of classification refers to the purpose 
of explications. Thus, descriptive and revisionary explications differ, 
in the first place, with regard to their purposes. The same applies to 
the distinction between stipulative and descriptive explications.
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It is clear that among the four criteria mentioned the last two are 
the most important ones. For, the methods of explications and their 
criteria of adequacy depend on their objects and their purposes. It 
can, moreover, be shown that a larger part of the confusions to be 
found in the literature about the explication of truth refer to the 
objects and the purposes of explications. For these reasons, I shall 
concentrate in what follows on the classification of explications with 
regard to their objects and their purposes.
3 Real and nominal explications
When we want to answer the question “What is water?”, we may 
consult either a linguist or a chemist. The linguist will explicate the 
linguistic meaning of “water”, that is, the criteria of the correct ap-
plication of the word “water”. Part of his explication may be that 
“water” applies to those entities that are liquid, colourless, odour-
less, can be used to satisfy one’s thirst, and so on.10 The explicandum 
is in this case the descriptive content of “water”, its Fregean sense. 
When, on the other hand, the chemist answers the question “What is 
water”, he does not explicate the semantic structure of “water”, but 
the chemical structure of water.
What is traditionally called a “nominal definition” is an explica-
tion whose object is a given term (“nomen”). By contrast, the object 
of a “real definition” is the thing (“res”) denoted by that term. More 
precisely, the object of a nominal explication is the meaning of a given 
term, and the object of a real explication the nature or essence of the 
thing denoted by that term. The lexical explications of “water” to be 
found in dictionaries are examples of nominal explications, and the 
definition of water to be found in chemistry textbooks, “Water is 
H
2
O”, is an example of a real explication.
In the current debate about truth, the distinction between nomi-
nal and real explications is largely ignored. The reason probably is 
that, for most authors, this distinction is a “distinction without a 
10 I am presupposing here that “x is water” means “x is something having the 
same phenotype as water”. In some contexts, “x is water” may mean “x is some-
thing having the same microphysical (chemical) structure as water (on earth)”. 
For simplicity’s sake, I shall ignore this problem.
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difference”. They identify the essence of a thing with the sense of the 
corresponding term. An exception is William Alston, who accounts 
for the distinction in an indirect way, by distinguishing between 
concepts and properties. In his seminal article “Truth: Concept and 
Property”, he argues that “a property might have various features 
not reflected in our concept of that property” (2002, p. 12). Thus, 
the property of heat is revealed by physics to be the average kinetic 
energy of constituent molecules, even though our ordinary, pretheo-
retic concept of heat involves no such component. This concept con-
sists of the set of features that any competent speaker associates with 
the word “heat”, the “criteria” all speakers use when they apply that 
term. Obviously, ordinary speakers do not associate “heat” with the 
average kinetic energy of constituent molecules. For this reason, this 
feature does not belong to the ordinary concept of heat, though it 
may be a feature of the corresponding property.
According to Alston, the same applies to the concept and the 
property of truth: the property involves features that are not reflect-
ed in the concept. He argues that the minimalist account of truth, 
according to which the concept of truth is exhaustively explicated by 
the instances of Tarski’s truth-scheme, is adequate when it is consid-
ered to be an explication of the concept of truth. The features of the 
property of truth that are not contained in the concept of truth and 
that are not captured by the minimalist account are made explicit by 
the correspondence theory of truth. Examples are the features that 
a true sentence is a sentence that corresponds to a fact and that true 
sentences are made true by facts. Just as the explication “Water is 
H
2
O” correctly explicates the property of being water, but not the 
concept of water, so too the explication “A true sentence is a sen-
tence that corresponds to a fact” explicates correctly the property of 
truth, but not the concept of truth.11
Frege’s theory of sense and reference may also be regarded as an 
explication of the property of being true. According to it, the truth 
of a sentence depends on the sense and the reference of the words 
that occur in it. An elementary sentence of the form “a is F” is true 
11 This means, in Kantian terms, that this explication is not an analytical sen-
tence, but a synthetic one. To arrive at it, it does not suffice to analyze concepts; 
it is necessary to analyze the structure of the world.
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if and only if the object determined by the sense of “a” possesses the 
property determined by the sense of “is F”. This explication is not 
meant as an explication of our concept of truth, which Frege con-
siders to be primitive, but as an analysis of the semantic factors on 
which the truth of a sentence depends.
Elaborating Alston’s distinction, we could say that concepts are 
constituents of thoughts and properties are constituents of facts. Just 
as two different senses expressed by proper names (such as the senses 
of “the evening star” and “the morning star”) may refer to the same 
object, so too two different senses expressed by two one-place predi-
cates (concepts) may refer to the same property, and two different 
thoughts may refer to the same fact.
A second possibility to account for the distinction between nomi-
nal and real definitions is based on the distinction between two senses 
of identity sentences such as “Water is H
2
O”, “Pain is C-fibre firing” 
and “Truth is correspondence with a fact”. On the first reading, “is” 
means identity and on the second reading constitution.12 Suppose, 
for instance, that properties are identical when the corresponding 
concepts are identical, that is, when the corresponding terms have 
the same Fregean meaning, the same criteria of application. In this 
case being water and being H
2
O are different properties. Even in 
this case we can maintain that water is H
2
O, in the sense that the 
property of being water is ontologically constituted (or “realized”) 
by the property of being H
2
O. Similarly, we may defend the thesis 
that truth is the correspondence with a fact, even when we admit 
that truth and correspondence with a fact are different properties.
On this approach, a real explication of a given property aims to 
make its ontological structure explicit – how the property is consti-
tuted. A nominal explication, on the other hand, seeks to make its 
semantic structure of the explicit – what the features are of which it 
is composed.
The distinction between nominal and real explications is impor-
tant for at least three reasons. First, it shows that conceptual ex-
plications that are commonly considered to be incompatible might 
actually be complementary. Thus, if Alston is right, the minimalist 
12 This paragraph is inspired by the distinctions made in Brink 1989, pp. 156-
163.
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account of truth can be made compatible with the correspondence 
theory when the first is construed as an explication of the concept of 
truth and the second as an explication of the property of truth (in his 
sense of “concept” and “property”).
Second, the distinction is important for the evaluation of Moorean 
arguments against some projects of conceptual explication.13 To see 
this, consider the following example from metaethics. According 
to Moore’s argument, a definition of morality in terms of “natural” 
terms like “A morally right action is an action maximizing human 
welfare” cannot be materially adequate, because the definiens and 
the definiendum have the same meaning. His argument is that sen-
tence-pairs like “A morally right action is a morally right action” and 
“A morally right action is an action that maximizes human welfare” 
have different meanings: whereas the first sentence is analytic and 
trivial, the second is synthetic and informative.
This argument implies that the sentence “A morally right action is 
an action that maximizes human welfare” cannot be considered as an 
adequate explication of the meaning of “is a morally right action”. But 
this does not rule out that it correctly explains the reference of “is a 
morally right action”, what moral rightness is and in what it consists. 
The argument implies, in other words, that the project of giving a 
nominal explication of morality must be abandoned, but it does not 
imply that the project of giving a real explication of morality must 
also be abandoned.
Thirdly, the distinction between nominal and real explications is 
important for the discussion of deflationist arguments against philo-
sophical theories of truth and non-cognitivist arguments against nor-
mative ethics. It is commonly assumed that a radically deflationist 
account of truth like the redundancy theory has devastating implica-
tions for those accounts which consider truth to be a property. For, 
if sentence pairs like “Snow is white” and “The thought that snow is 
white is true” express the same meaning, then there is no property 
of truth.14 This consequence seems to imply that the endeavour of 
philosophical theories of truth to uncover the nature of the prop-
erty of truth is doomed to failure right from the start. Similarly, the 
13 For more details, see Brink 1989, Chapter 6.
14 This consequence is drawn, for instance, in Brandom 1998.
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non-cognitivist accounts of morality, according to which “is morally 
right” is not used to ascribe a property, but to indicate the perfor-
mance of an expressive or directive speech act, seems to undermine 
the possibility of normative ethics.
In fact, however, the consequences of the deflationist accounts of 
truth and the non-cognitivist accounts of morality are less dramatic, 
because the meanings of terms in natural language are relevant only 
for the adequacy of nominal explications, and not also of real explica-
tions. Suppose, for instance, that the redundancy account of truth is 
correct. In this case, there is no property to which the term “true” 
refers. But this does not imply that the property analyzed by the cor-
respondence theory does not exist. If the correspondence theorist 
considers his account of truth as a real explication, he can argue that 
he is not interested in the semantics of “true”, but only in the prop-
erty to which he refers in his theory by means of “true”. He may ad-
mit that, in natural language, “true” does not refer to any property, 
and to take this into account, he may replace this word in his theory 
by a similar one, say “frue”, as Tarski suggested in a parallel case.15 
Natural language does not decide which properties exist. Similarly, 
the non-cognitivist account of morality does not imply that there are 
no ethical properties, but only, that these properties are not denoted 
by the corresponding terms of naturally language.
The distinction between intensional and extensional explications 
also refers to the objects of explications. In the case of intensional 
explications, the object is the meaning of the explicandum, and in 
the case of extensional explications, its extension. An example of 
an extensional explication is Tarski’s definition of truth; its goal is 
to define the set of true sentences of the language of the class cal-
culus.16 His theorem of the undefinability of truth does not say that 
the meaning of the truth-predicate or the features of the property 
denoted by it cannot be made explicit, but only that in a semantically 
closed language it is impossible to construe in a consistent way an 
open sentence whose extension is the set of true sentences of that 
language.
We have seen that an important criterion of classification for 
15 Cf. Tarski 1944, p. 356.
16 Cf. the definition of truth in Tarski 1933.
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conceptual explications concerns the type of the explicandum. The 
explicandum can be either the meaning of a given term, or the prop-
erty to which it refers, or the extension of this property. A second 
important criterion of classification concerns the purposes for which 
explications serve. In this regard, we must distinguish between de-
scriptive, revisionary, reductive and stipulative explications.
4 Descriptive explications
A major part of the explications to be found in the history of philoso-
phy are devoted to the task to make the content of a given concept 
explicit and to distinguish it from other concepts with which it is 
easily confused. Such explications may be called “descriptive” ex-
plications. The larger philosophical programs into which they are 
embedded pursue either a propaedeutic or a therapeutic goal. The 
descriptive explications can accordingly be subdivided into “propae-
deutic” and “therapeutic” ones.
4.1 Propaedeutic explications
The context in which propaedeutic explications are typically made 
are the programs of the “metaphilosophical” disciplines such as me-
ta-ethics, meta-logic, meta-metaphysics, meta-mathematics and so 
on. Their purpose is to prepare the construction of the correspond-
ing philosophical discipline by making its central concepts clear and 
distinct.
Kant’s explication of moral goodness is an example of an explica-
tion of this type. He distinguishes between good and evil on the one 
hand, and well-being and ill-being on the other, and then goes on 
to show that these pairs of concepts, which are easily confused, are 
independent of each other: it is not a contradiction that an evil man 
is doing well. According to Kant, this conceptual distinction is basic 
for the correct conception of ethics. An ethical theory that is con-
cerned with well and ill-being is not an ethical theory in the proper 
sense, but a mere theory of prudence telling us how to act in order 
to have a pleasant life. An ethical theory in the proper sense tells us, 
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by contrast, what the difference is between good and evil actions.17
A second example is Frege’s distinction between the concepts of 
being true and being taken to be true in his critique of the idealis-
tic (or “psychologistic”) foundation of logic.18 These concepts, which 
are identified by the idealist logicians of his time, are independent 
according to Frege. What is taken to be true need not therefore be 
true. And it is not a contradiction that something which is taken to 
be true is actually false, he argues. In order to clarify the nature and 
the proper task of logic, it is essential, in his view, to distinguish 
clearly between these concepts. Thus, to discover the laws of truth is 
a task of logic, while to discover the laws of being taken to be true is 
not a task of logic, but of psychology.
The classical method to make the content of a given concept ex-
plicit is the decomposition of a concept into its conceptual constitu-
ents. Frege compares this method with the chemist’s procedure to 
decompose a given substance into its molecular and atomic constitu-
ents. Just as the chemist analyses the chemical structure of substanc-
es, so too the philosopher analyses the logical structure of concepts. 
To display the logical structure of a given concept by means of an ex-
plication, the explicans must be syntactically more complex than the 
explicandum. Normally, the explicandum is syntactically simple and 
the explicans is composed of several predicates that are connected 
by logical signs. The meanings of the predicates occurring in the 
explicans are the conceptual constituents of which the explicandum 
is composed, and the manner in which the predicates are connected 
by logical signs represents the logical structure of the explicandum.
We may call explications whose method consists in the decom-
position of concepts “analytic” explications. Obviously, this type of 
explication is applicable only to complex concepts. In order to make 
the content of an atomic (simple) concept explicit, we need an alter-
native method such as, for instance, the “holistic” method to deter-
mine the place of a given concept in our conceptual scheme. In this 
case the concept is not decomposed, but its conceptual connections 
with other concepts are made explicit. This procedure may be cir-
cular, i.e., it allows for the mutual explication of concepts. Thus, 
17 See Kant, 1788, p. 70.
18 See the preface of Frege 1893.
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Frege explicates the concept of judgment in terms of the concept of 
truth and vice versa: to judge is to acknowledge the truth of a given 
thought, and truth is the standard that we use to evaluate judgments 
in science. 
If Donald Davidson is right, the attempt to decompose philosoph-
ical concepts into more fundamental concepts is a misguided proj-
ect, because these concepts already belong to the most fundamental 
concepts we have. But this does not mean that these concepts cannot 
be explicated at all. In order, for instance, to explicate the concept 
of truth, which is considered by him to be primitive, we can adopt 
the holistic method to make its connections with other concepts like 
belief and linguistic meaning explicit.19
Quine also takes a critical stance on the conceptual program of 
traditional philosophy, but for another reason. In his view, it is im-
possible to distinguish objectively between “meaning and theory”, 
between “analytic” and “synthetic sentences” and hence between con-
ceptual analyses and empirical hypotheses.20 Consider, for instance, 
the “folk theory of truth”, which consists of the beliefs about truth 
shared by all competent speakers. This theory probably includes the 
beliefs that a sentence is either true or false, and that true sentences 
correspond to the facts. The problem posed by Quine’s critique is 
that we do not have any method at our disposal that allows us to de-
cide whether such a belief is analytic or synthetic. Since a conceptual 
analysis consists of analytic sentences, we consequently do not know 
how to decide whether an explication like “A true sentence corre-
sponds to the facts” is to be considered as a conceptual explication or 
not. Applying the Moorean test, we might argue that this sentence 
is synthetic, because it is informative, in contrast to the tautological 
sentence “A true sentence is true”. But this argument is not really 
conclusive because analytic sentences may also be informative. This 
is the case, for instance, when the components or the logical struc-
ture of the concept to be analysed are not obvious. Any explication 
revealing “hidden meanings” or “hidden semantic structure” is infor-
mative in some sense.
19 Cf. Davidson 1996.
20 Cf. Quine 1951 and Quine 1960, §§ 39 and 53.
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4.2 Therapeutic explications
The second species of descriptive explications consists of the “thera-
peutic” explications, as we might call them alluding to Wittgenstein. 
These explications are also designed to make the content of concepts 
clear and distinct. However, in contrast to propaedeutic explica-
tions, their purpose is not to prepare the construction of a scientific 
discipline, but to show, on the contrary, that the endeavour to con-
struct such a discipline is based on a linguistic misunderstanding.
An example of this type of explication is the minimalist account 
of truth advocated by Paul Horwich.21 It falls into two parts. The 
first consists of an explication of the content and function of the 
word “true” according to which truth is a thoroughly formal, trivial 
and hence philosophically uninteresting concept that does not have 
any explanatory function in theories, but serves only certain techni-
cal needs that could also be achieved by quantifying over sentential 
variables. From this explication the consequence is drawn, in the 
second part of the account, that we do not really need a philosophical 
theory of truth.
Further examples of therapeutic explications are the non-cogni-
tivist accounts of morality. Their purpose is to show that the endeav-
our to construct a moral theory is based on the linguistic misunder-
standing that the predicate “is morally right” and its cognates are 
used to ascribe a property.
5 Revisionary explications
The context in which revisionary explications are made is the revi-
sion of theories. Their purpose is not to make the content of given 
concepts explicit, but to transform defective concepts into scientifi-
cally respectable ones. The defective concepts cannot simply be ig-
nored because the play an important explanatory or expressive role 
in science. But they cannot be introduced directly into science be-
cause they are somehow defective. The aim of a revisionary explica-
tion is to revise the concept in such a way that, firstly, its explana-
tory or expressive function is preserved, and secondly, its defects are 
21 Cf. Horwich 1990.
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eliminated.
Tarski’s definition of truth is an example of this type of explica-
tion. According to him, the concept of truth is, on the one hand, 
indispensible for the construction of semantics and kindred disci-
plines, but, on the other hand, its direct introduction into science 
is illegitimate because of its inconsistency. The main purpose of his 
definition of truth is to transform the concept of truth into a concept 
that is both consistent and fruitful, that is, can be used to define the 
main concepts of logic and semantics like, for instance, the concept 
of logical consequence.22
The anti-realist explications of truth such as Dummett’s verifica-
tion theory are also of the revisionary type. They proceed from the 
assumption that the ordinary, realist concept of truth is scientifically 
not acceptable because it is potentially “recognition transcendent”. 
If the truth of a sentence consists in its correspondence with reality, 
then there might be true sentences whose truth cannot be recog-
nized, as, for instance, some undecidable sentences of set theory. To 
overcome this defect, the ordinary concept of truth must be replaced 
by a similar but epistemologically more adequate concept that can 
equally well “do the work” of the original concept, that is, that can 
be used to explicate the main concepts of logic and semantics (like 
logical consequence and linguistic meaning). The aim of the anti-
realist explications of truth is to construct such a concept.
This example already shows that the realist- and anti-realist con-
ceptions of truth are not necessarily incompatible. We may, for in-
stance, accept the correspondence theory as a descriptive explication 
of truth, and the verificationist theory as a revisionary one.
In contrast to descriptive explications, a revisionary explication 
need not preserve the original meaning of the explicandum. To be 
materially adequate, it suffices that the meanings of the explicandum 
and the explanans are similar. To make this more precise, we need to 
explain what the conditions are for the explicandum and the expli-
cans to be sufficiently similar with regard to their meanings.
To answer this question, some authors have proposed criteria re-
22 The classical example of a revisionary explication is Kuratowski’s definition 
of the concept of ordered pair in terms of the concept of set, which is considered 
by Quine as a “philosophical paradigm” (cf. Quine 1960, § 53).
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ferring to the extension of the explicandum and the explanans. Car-
nap, for instance, adopted in the Aufbau the criterion of extensional 
identity. Goodman proposed the more liberal criterion of extension-
al homomorphism, and Quine the even more liberal criterion of ex-
tensional homomorphism.23 These proposals ignore, however, what 
is essential for revisionary explications, namely, the preservation of 
the explanatory or expressive function of the explicandum. Hence, a 
revisionary explication should be considered as materially adequate if 
and only if the explicans can be used to perform this function.
Suppose, to illustrate this point, that the explicandum, say, the 
concept of truth, serves exclusively to refer to the members of its ex-
tension (true sentences) in a given theory. In this case the explicans 
must have, in order to fulfil this function, the same extension as the 
explicandum. If, on the other hand, the explicans is used also to re-
fer to the concept of truth, then the explicans and the explicandum 
must have the same meaning.
The concept of number is a special case; its function is to count 
things. To fulfil this function, it suffices that the explicandum and 
the explicans are extensionally isomorphic. The reason is that every 
progression can be used to count things.
There are, however, cases in which even this liberal criterion is 
too narrow. The extension of the ordinary concept of existence is the 
set of existing objects. When this concept is explicated, as usual, as 
a concept of second order, the extension of the explicandum and the 
extension of the explicans do not even have any common member. 
The explicans does not apply to any object of which the explicandum 
is typically predicated. Nevertheless, this explication is materially 
adequate, at least when it is considered as a revisionary one. The 
defect of the explicandum is in this case that the truth-conditions of 
negative existence-statements like “Pegasus does not exist” are para-
doxical, when existence is considered to be a concept of first order.24
 These examples show clearly that the criteria of material adequa-
cy for revisionary explications must be construed in a more flexible 
and differentiated way. Our criterion that a revisionary explication 
23 Cf.Carnap 1928, §§ 43-45, Goodman 1978, pp. 99-102, Quine 1964 and 
Quine 1969, pp. 55.
24 Cf. Quine 1948.
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must preserve the function of the explicandum takes this into ac-
count. Examples of explications that are not materially adequate on 
this criterion are the traditional explications of truth from the point 
of view of the disquotation theory. For, these explications are based 
on the assumption that the truth-predicate serves to ascribe a prop-
erty. But, according to the disquotation theory, the truth-predicate 
cannot be used to this end, because it has a very special function, 
namely, to disquote quoted sentences.
A second shortcoming of the current debate about the adequacy 
of revisionary explications is that the criteria of adequacy discussed 
are incomplete. Thus, the adequacy of such explications depends 
also on the adequacy of the norms of scientific respectability that 
the explicans is supposed to satisfy. Some examples may illustrate 
this point. 
The supreme norm in Frege’s Grundgesetze for the methodologi-
cally sound introduction of new expressions into science proper is 
this: we have to “explain each expression with respect to its refer-
ence completely” (Frege 1903, §§ 57, 65). According to this norm, 
the use of an expression in science proper is legitimate only when 
its referential indeterminacy has been removed. This restriction is 
motivated by Frege’s quest of ensuring the validity of the logical laws 
in rigorous science, in particular the validity of tertium non datur.25
A second norm due to Frege is the demand for a proper criterion 
of identity for abstract singular terms. “If we are to use the symbol a 
to signify an object”, he writes, “we must have a criterion for decid-
ing in all cases whether b is the same as a” (1884, § 62). This norm, 
which was later adopted by Quine, has come to be known as the 
norm “No Entity without Identity”.26
Obviously, a revisionary explication that aims to adapt the expli-
candum to these norms is adequate only insofar as these norms are 
adequate. With regard to Frege’s norm of referential determinacy, 
this is highly questionable, however, because it is impossible to de-
termine the reference of all terms completely.
Secondly, the adequacy of a revisionary explication depends also 
on the adequacy of the method of explication it employs. This “meth-
25 Cf. Frege 1903, §§ 55 ff.
26 For a reconstruction of this norm, see Greimann 2000.
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odological adequacy” of an explication depends, in the first place, on 
the norms of scientific respectability that are adopted. Suppose, for 
instance, that we want to transform the inconsistent ordinary con-
cept of truth into a consistent concept. To ensure the consistency of 
the explicans, we must replace the explicandum by concepts whose 
consistency is beyond question. To this end, we may, for instance, 
follow Tarski’s strategy to reduce the concept of truth to physical 
concepts.27 Consequently, an explication seeking to transform truth 
into a consistent concept is methodologically adequate only if the 
method employed achieves a reduction (or “elimination”) of the ex-
plicandum. The explicit definition of the explicandum is an example 
of a method satisfying this constraint, and the axiomatic character-
ization of the explicandum is an example of a method that does not 
satisfy it.   
Thirdly, the adequacy of a revisionary explications depends also 
on the adequacy of the order of explication on which it is based. Such 
an order tells us which kind of concepts is to be explicated in terms 
of which other kind of concepts. Its task is to ensure that the scien-
tifically defective concepts are explicated in terms of more respect-
able concepts, and not vice versa. Frege’s explication of the concept 
of number in terms of logical concepts, for instance, is based on an 
order of explication according to which logical concepts are scientifi-
cally more respectable than arithmetical ones. To explicate logical 
concepts in terms of arithmetical ones would be a case of clarum per 
obscurum, from his point of view.
Finally, the adequacy of a revisionary explication depends also on 
its form, its structure. To be formally adequate, the explication must 
include all measures that are necessary to explicate the explicandum 
in a satisfactory way. Moreover, these measures must be taken in the 
correct order. The first step must be to determine the explicandum 
of the explication. Secondly, it must be shown that the explicandum 
is defective. Thirdly, the function to be preserved must be made ex-
plicit. Fourthly, a list of norms of scientific respectability must be set 
up and justified. Fifthly, an order of explication must be established 
that fixes the range of the possible explanantia. Sixthly, a method 
of explication must be selected by means of which the explicandum 
27 For more details, see Etchemendy 1988.
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can be adapted to the norms of scientific respectability. Seventh, this 
method must be applied to the explicandum. Eighthly, it must be 
shown that the explicans satisfies the norms of scientific respectabili-
ty.28 As far as I can see, there is only one explication to be found in 
the literature that is formally correct in this extensive sense, namely, 
Tarski’s definition of truth, which can therefore be considered as a 
paradigm of a revisionary explication.
6 Reductive explications
There are many programs in philosophy who are not concerned with 
the explication of a single concept, but with the explication of whole 
families of concepts. Examples of this type of explication are the 
reductive programs in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of sci-
ence and the philosophy of mathematics, like (analytic) behaviour-
ism, phenomenalism, physicalism, and logicism. These programs 
do not aim to describe the structure of a single concept, but the 
structure of our overall conceptual scheme. According to (analytic) 
physicalism, for instance, our conceptual scheme has the hierarchi-
cal structure of a building whose fundament consists of the physical 
concepts.29 All other families of concepts such as the psychological, 
sociological and semantic concepts occur at higher levels, and they 
can be reduced to the fundamental concepts via chains of explicit 
definitions.
The main purpose of a reductive explication of a given concept is 
neither to make its content explicit nor to transform it into a more 
respectable concept, but to show that it is in principle superluous, 
in the sense that it can always be substituted by the explicans. An 
explication of this type may be considered as a rule for the transla-
tion of a formulation of a given theory that contains the explicandum 
into a formulation of the same theory that contains the explicans, 
but not the explicandum. Such a rule shows how the explicandum 
can be “eliminated”, by showing how every sentence containing the 
28 In Greimann 2007, the formal adequacy of explications is described in 
more detail.
29 There are weaker versions of physicalism that do not involve this thesis. 
They are not relevant in the current context.
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explicandum can be translated into a sentence that does not contain 
it. In the case of logicism, for instance, the source language is the 
arithmetical language and the target language the language of logic.
To show that the explicandum is superfluous, it suffices to show 
that the function it performs in the theory can be performed equally 
well by the explicans. The criterion of material adequacy for reduc-
tive explications is therefore identical with criterion for revisionary 
explication: the function of the explicandum must be preserved.
The redundancy theory of truth can be considered as a reduc-
tive explication of the concept of truth. As already indicated by its 
name, the core of this theory is the doctrine that the word “true” is 
superfluous. The rule of translation it suggests for the translation of 
sentences in which “true” occurs is this: a sentence of the form It is 
true that p or “p” is true is to be translated simply as p.30
Tarski’s definition of satisfaction and truth in terms of physical 
concepts (including set-theoretical ones) is a second example of a 
reductive explication. Unfortunately, this explication is not materi-
ally adequate because it does not preserve the intended function of 
the explicandum. For, the explicans is supposed to play an important 
explanatory function in the foundation of semantics, viz. the defini-
tion of the concept of logical consequence and kindred notions. This 
presupposes that the explicans can be used to explain the semantic 
truth-conditions of sentences. Actually, however, it cannot be used 
to this end, because the explication implies that a semantic explana-
tion like “The sentence “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is 
white” says the same as the tautological explanation “Snow is white if 
and only if snow is white”.31
A second criterion of adequacy for reductive explications is that 
the translation rule must be general. In particular, the translation 
rule should be applicable to “new cases”. To see this, suppose that 
the source language consists of exactly the following four sentences:
30 To translate the quantified occurrences of “true”, as in “All beliefs of Plato 
are true”, we need to quantify over sentential variables. Thus, we can translate 
“All beliefs of Plato are true” as “For all p: if Plato believes that p, then p”.
31 For a more thorough discussion of this problem, see Etchemendy 1988.
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 Snow is white,
 Snow is black,
 “Snow is white” is true,
 “Snow is black” is true”.
In this case, we may translate the sentences containing “true” into a 
target language that does not contain this word by means of the fol-
lowing list-like explication:
x is true if and only if x = “Snow is white” and snow is white, or x = 
“Snow is black” and snow is black.
Though this explication does enable us to eliminate the truth-predi-
cate, it is unsatisfactory because it does not show us how to eliminate 
the truth-predicate when it is applied to new sentences that we may 
introduce into the source language.32 To overcome this difficulty, we 
need a more general rule of translation that accounts for such new 
cases.
7 Stipulative explications
Roughly speaking, a descriptive explication informs us about what 
the explicandum means in natural language, and a revisionary ex-
plication tells us what the explicandum should mean in science. The 
characteristic of a stipulative explication is that it informs us about 
how the author or speaker wishes the explicandum to be understood 
when she or he uses it.
Suppose, for instance, that an author wants to explicate the clas-
sical, Aristotelian concept of truth. In order to make clear that his 
explication refers to this concept of truth and not to another, he may 
stipulate that by “truth” he means “truth in the classical, Aristotelian 
sense”. This stipulation is an example of a stipulative explication. A 
second example is Tarski’s proposal to denote the classical, Aristote-
lian concept of truth by the artificial term “frue”, if the majority of 
the theoreticians of truth should decide that the word “true” should 
be reserved to denote a different concept of truth.
Generally speaking, the purpose of a stipulative explication is to 
32 This criterion is suggested by Hartry Field’s criticism of Tarski’s definition 
of truth in Field 1972.
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fix the intended meaning of the explicandum in order to use it as a 
technical term. The explications of this type divide into two species. 
7.1 Explications of laziness
The main purpose of an explication of laziness is to abbreviate a 
longer expression. Thus, the stipulation to understand by “truth” 
the classical, Aristotelian concept of truth allows us to abbreviate 
the longer expression “truth in the classical, Aristotelian sense” by 
“truth”.
From a theoretical point of view, explications of laziness are 
superfluous. They are relevant only for the linguistic quality of a 
theory formulation. This quality depends, for instance, on the read-
ability and the elegance of the formulation. The criteria of adequacy 
for explications of laziness refer correspondingly to pragmatic and 
aesthetic qualities such as brevity and elegance of expression.
7.2 Metaphorical explications
The second species of stipulative explications consists of the “met-
aphorical” ones. Their purpose is to attach a new meaning to the 
explicandum that cannot be expressed by means of the expressions 
that are available in the language. In contrast to explications of lazi-
ness, metaphorical explications extend the expressive power of the 
language in an essential way.
An example of this type is Frege’s explication of the concept of 
a “truth-value”. According to it, the truth-value of a sentence is the 
circumstance of its truth or its falsity.33  Its purpose is to inform the 
reader about what Frege wishes to understand by the “truth-value” of 
a given sentence or thought.
Syntactically, “the truth-value of x” is a functional expression. 
Applied to a proper name, it forms a more complex proper name. 
Semantically, it attributes to a given argument its truth-value, just 
as “the colour of x” attributes to a given argument its colour and 
“the temperature of x” attributes to a given argument its tempera-
ture. In natural language, we can express that the colour of snow is 
33 Cf. Frege 1892.
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whiteness, but we cannot express that the truth-value of “Snow is 
white” is truth. The problem is that there is no expression of natural 
language that expresses the intended meaning of “truth-value”. The 
purpose of a metaphorical explication is to fill such gaps. It does not 
abbreviate a longer expression, but provides a new meaning for an 
old expression.
Since the new meanings cannot be expressed by means of the 
expressions that are already at our disposal, it is strictly speaking im-
possible to fix the intended meaning of the explicandum. The only 
resources we have to explain what a truth-value is supposed to be are 
the expressions of natural language.34
For this reason, the success of a metaphorical explication depends 
on the imagination and the empathy of the hearer or reader. He or 
she must in a certain sense guess the intended meaning of the expli-
candum. The method we commonly use to overcome this difficulty 
is the metaphorical use of natural language terms. Thus, the desig-
nation of the truth-values as “truth-values” is supposed to give hints 
to the reader that enable him to guess or to infer in some sense the 
intended meaning of the explicandum. This metaphorical method is 
also used in the formation of concepts like “logical decomposition”, 
“concept of second order”, “analytic explication”, “ontological com-
mitment”, “hypothetical imperative”, and so on.
Since the majority of the technical terms used in philosophy are 
introduced in this way, the metaphorical explication is perhaps the 
most important type of explication in philosophy. Only very few con-
cepts are formed by Quine’s method of elimination (or reduction).35 
For this reason, the current debate about explication should pay 
more attention to this type.
Although metaphorical explications are based on stipulations, 
they are not arbitrary. In contrast to explications of laziness, a meta-
phorical explication can be successful only when the metaphorical 
meaning of the explicandum can somehow be derived from its literal 
meaning. Consequently, an explication of this type is materially ade-
34 The application of ostensive definition and kindred methods is impossible 
in this case, because truth-values are abstract objects.
35 In Greimann 2009, I have tried to show that Quine’s ontological reductions 
by means of contextual definitions do not really work.
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quate only when the intended meaning of the explicandum is similar 
or analogous to its literal meaning. Otherwise the explication would 
not contain any hints that the hearer or speaker needs in order to 
guess what the intended meaning is supposed to be.
Since the success of a metaphorical explication depends strongly 
on the imagination, the empathy and the scientific socialization of 
the hearer or reader, its material adequacy must be relativized to 
linguistic communities. An explication that is materially adequate 
for one community, say, the readers of Frege, may be inadequate for 
another community, say, the readers of Heidegger.
8 The adequacy of the suggested typology
I have tried to determine the main types of conceptual explications. 
The main criteria of classification I used to this end refer to the ob-
jects and the purposes of explications. With regard to the objects, 
we must distinguish between nominal and real explications, and be-
tween intensional and extensional ones. With regard to their purpos-
es, conceptual explications divide into five main groups: descriptive, 
revisionary, reductive and stipulative definitions. The descriptive 
explications can be subdivided into propaedeutic and therapeutic 
ones, and the stipulative explications into explications of laziness and 
metaphorical explications. In order to refine this typology, we could 
classify explications with regard to their methods and their form.
The adequacy of the suggested typology is not a question of its 
truth or falsity, but of its utility. It may be useful mainly with regard 
to the following three ends.
First, it enables us to evaluate the adequacy of a given explication 
in a more sophisticated way. Consider, for instance, Tarski’s defini-
tion of truth. It does not consist of a single explication, but of various 
different explications that serve different purposes and have different 
criteria of adequacy. The first step of Tarski’s explication consists of 
a stipulative explication by means of which the intended meaning of 
the definiendum is fixed. With regard to its purpose, the definition 
involves a descriptive explication of truth that is supposed to “cap-
ture” this meaning, the classical concept of truth. At the same time, 
the definition contains a revisionary explication that is supposed to 
replace the ordinary concept of truth by more respectable concepts. 
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With regard to its object, the definition must be considered as an 
extensional explication whose object is the set of true sentences of 
the object language. Nevertheless, it can also be considered as an 
intensional explication designed to explain the meaning of “true” 
from the classical point of view. Finally, the definition can also be 
considered as a real definition telling us on which language-world 
relations the property of truth depends. In order to evaluate Tar-
ski’s definition adequately, we must take into account that it contains 
various explications of very different types and with different crite-
ria of adequacy. It might turn out that some of these explications are 
satisfactory and some not.
Second, our typology may contribute to the task tackled by 
Kirkham to resolve some of the confusions to be found in the current 
debate about truth. The typology shows, for instance, that the realist 
and the anti-realist theories of truth must not necessarily be seen as 
competitors, because they may also be regarded as complementary 
explications with different goals and different criteria of adequacy.
Finally, and most importantly, the typology may also contribute 
to the project envisaged by Carnap to construct an explicit theory of 
conceptual explications in which the rules for the correct explica-
tion of concepts are discussed.36 To discuss these rules, we need to 
know the criteria of adequacy for explications. And to explain these 
criteria in an adequate way, we must distinguish between different 
types of conceptual explications, because the criteria of adequacy of 
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The first aim of this paper is to sketch an account both of the process 
of identifying and of identifications, the results of the process. I treat 
identifications as sorts of files of information, or identiication iles. 
The role of identification files as devices for use in reidentification is 
central to my account. The process of identifying x is explained in 
terms of the perception of x and the formation of an identification 
file that has x as its topic. The topic is the entity the identification 
file is about.
My proposal does not aspire to capture every aspect of the usage 
of ‘identification’ in ordinary philosophical discourse. ‘Identifica-
tion’ is a theoretical term, as noted by G. Evans1. My proposal should 
be judged by its theoretical consequences.
The second aim of this paper is to outline the way how the cog-
nitive system (or mind) yields two remarkable kinds of correlation 
between identifications and topics: equivocal identifications (identi-
fications with two or more topics) and, in addition, different identi-
fications of the same topic. To illuminate the issue, I introduce the 
distinction between vertical and horizontal information connecting. I 
propose the notion of supermap as a useful metaphor for explaining 
the nature of information connecting by mind.
Let me make a concise observation about thought and reference. I 
am providing an account of identification that aims to be serviceable 
for theories of thought and reference. It is plausible that a full theory 
of how a thought is about something rather than anything else needs 
some account of identification. What makes a thought be about a cer-
1 Evans (1982: 145).
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tain entity x? This seems to be a job for the notion of identification. 
It seems prima facie plausible that having an identification of an item 
x is a necessary condition for an agent A to be able to think about x. 
In addition, if in order to refer to an entity we need to think about 
it, theories of reference need to include identification in some way 
in their accounts. The arguments advanced here will not depend on 
such assumptions about thought and reference.
This paper will be deliberately silent on whether identifications 
are concepts or devices working associated to concepts (sometimes 
called ‘conceptions’).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 introduces 
my proposal about identifying and identification. My account treats 
identification in terms of perception and information. Section 2 ex-
amines the notion of information. Section 3 deals with perception. 
Sections 4-6 discuss the nature of identification and its connection 
to reidentification. Section 7 presents two facts which any adequate 
theory of identification must respect. Finally, section 8 presents the 
distinction between vertical and horizontal information connecting. 
The notion of supermap is introduced.
1 Identification: process and result
‘Identification’, like many terms, is ambiguous between meaning a 
process and meaning the product of that process. My proposal con-
cerns the two meanings of ‘identification’: the process of identifying 
and the results of the process, the identiications.
The results from the process of identifying can be treated as files. 
I shall call them ‘identification files’. The topic is the entity (in the 
most general sense of the word ‘entity’) which the identification file 
is about2.
2 The term ‘topic’ is used in the same sense by Woodfield 1991. The nature of 
the relation between identification file and topic is not the theme of this paper. I 
limit myself to point out that there are different particular relations linking iden-
tifications and topics. Identification files triggered by perception present their 
topics due to an informational relation – the received information is information 
about the topic. Identification files formed by imagination present their topics 
due to some kind of fit between the conditions included in the identification and 
the topic. It is plausible that the relation between identification files created by 
673On Identifying and Identiication
What are identification files? How may the metaphorical notion of 
a file help us in understanding the nature of identifications? Let me 
use the notion of information to sketch an answer. Human beings, 
like other kinds of organisms, capture information about the world 
through perception. This information is inserted into and stored in 
our cognitive system. Identification files are cognitive unities consti-
tuted by pieces of information that the cognitive system treats as de-
vices for tracking something in reality. I develop this idea in a greater 
depth in section 4.
I shall classify a process as an identifying process if it begins with 
the perception of a certain entity and leads in an appropriate way to 
the formation of an identification file of the same entity. In my pro-
posal, an agent A identifies an entity x iff:
1. A perceives x;
2. The process of A perceiving x results in an appropriate way in 
the formation of an identification file of x.
The condition (1) excludes from the extension of ‘identifying’ any 
process of formation of an identification file that does not begin with 
the perception of the topic of the identification. The formation of the 
identification file must be triggered by the perception of the entity 
which is its topic. The relation between the perceived entity that 
triggers the identification file and its topic is the relation of identity.
The process of identifying is not the only way of producing iden-
tification files. I shall call identification files acquired by the iden-
tifying process perceptual identiication iles. Besides them, we have 
identification files of entities not perceived and so not identified. We 
may imagine an object by positing something that combines proper-
ties – for example, the man with the property of being the fastest 
cyclist in the world and the property of being the best mathematician 
of the world. As a result, we have formed an identification file but 
it does not seem correct to say that we identify its topic. It is a case 
in which we form the identification file without identifying its topic. 
The same happens in communication episodes. We can acquire iden-
suspicion and topics is informational as happens with perceptual identifications. 
Cf. section 5 about identifications created by suspicion.
tification of some entity only by hearsay. However, the hearer does 
not identify something merely by hearing about it3. Section 5 will 
expand on the theme of formation of identification files without any 
identifying process.
My account treats ‘to identify’ as a success verb. I propose that it is 
correct to say that we identify x uniquely if x exists and we perceive 
x. The verb ‘to identify’ should be treated as a success verb because 
of the connection between the identification act and the reidentifica-
tion act. After all, the verb ‘to reidentify’ is a success verb.  It seems 
appropriate to speak in terms of reidentifying only in cases when we 
meet the entity again. This involves the satisfaction of two external 
conditions: (i) the entity can exist independently of our meetings 
and (ii) be met in different episodes. Our alternatives to treating ‘to 
identify’ as a success verb would be severing the connection between 
identification and reidentification (which I claim is a non-starter) or 
depriving the reidentification notion of success conditions. The last 
alternative would trivialize the notion of reidentification. The notion 
of reidentification has an important role in a description of the in-
teraction between agent and world because of its success conditions.
Given the connection between identification and reidentification, 
only the treatment of ‘to identify’ as a success verb allows us to en-
sure the non-triviality of the use of the notion of reidentification. If 
to identify were merely a cognitive act without conditions of success, 
what point would there be in talking about reidentifying something? 
If, for example, merely thinking about Pegasus were an act of iden-
tifying Pegasus, then when were I in the future to think again about 
Pegasus, would I be reidentifying Pegasus?
I propose treating the notion of meeting something in terms of 
perceptual meeting. The inclusion of the condition of perception in 
my account restricts the conditions for something to be identified: 
3 In a theory of perception that claims that the formation of an identification 
file is a condition for a successful process of perception, the condition (2) would 
be involved in the condition (1). According to such a theory, the formation of an 
identification would not be triggered by perception but it would be part of the 
process called ‘perception’. I believe that the problem of such a theory is that it 
incorrectly fuses perception and registration of information acquired by percep-
tion.
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besides existing, the entity shall be perceived4.
The notions of perception and identification file can be defined in 
terms of the notion of information. To perceive is to gather informa-
tion about the environment. Identification files are clusters of pieces 
of information that the cognitive system treats as cognitive modules 
about something. I shall briefly discuss the notions of information 
and perception and then return to discussing the nature of identifica-
tion files.
In what follows, I shall use the term ‘identification’ as short for 
‘identification file’.
2 Information
I believe that the treatment of the notion of information provided by 
Fred Dretske is correct in its essential features5. This treatment is 
nicely captured in John Perry’s formulation: ‘Information is basically 
what one part or aspect of the universe (the signal) shows about some 
other part or aspect (the subject matter)’ (Perry 2002: 175). One as-
pect of the universe is capable of carrying information about another 
because both are related by some constraint, law or principle. If the 
aspects of the world were not interrelated by constraints, nothing 
would be able to carry information. I take constraints as necessary or 
probabilistic relations among types of states of affairs.
A signal contains information about what has to be the case for it 
to happen. If there is a non accidental connection between being F 
and being G such that, for example, being F is a necessary condition 
for something being G, then the fact that x is G carries information 
that x is F. If it were merely coincidence that what is G is F too, then 
the fact of x being G would not carry information that x is F.
For example, every grade of expansion of the volume of a portion 
of mercury is a type of state of affairs that depends on another type 
of states of affairs, the degree of temperature of the mercury (and its 
4 One might object that my account is excessively restrictive because the 
meetings could be non perceptual ones. Any meeting with an entity in which the 
agent receives information about it and forms an identification file for detecting 
it in future meetings will count as perceptual in my sense. Cf. sections 2 and 3.
5 Cf. Dretske 1981.
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pressure). If the temperature were not raised, the mercury’s volume 
would not expand (at constant pressure). Due to this connection, the 
degrees of expansion of the mercury’s volume embody information 
about its temperature.
A state of affairs carries information about another state of affairs 
only if it is not merely a case of correlation or co-occurrence but 
involves dependence. A certain state of affairs carries information 
about the state of affairs on which it depends.
Besides nomological or logical dependence, three other features 
of information are essential to my treatment of identification:
(a) Agent-independence: information is independent of agents 
that collect it. The world is full of information because infor-
mation depends only on the existence of constraints between 
types of states of affairs.
(b) Portability: information can be acquired, stored and transmit-
ted. This makes the flow of information possible. Additionally, 
the process of capturing information does not change it.
(c) Aboutness: information is about its source independently of 
being captured by our senses. For example, the pattern of the 
rays of the light reflected from the situation that a is F car-
ries the information that a is F6. As reflection patterns depend 
nomically on surfaces, this pattern carries information about 
that situation7.
3 Perception and uniformities
I shall take three things for granted.
First, there are individuals in the world having properties, stand-
ing in relations and occupying spatiotemporal locations.
Second, individuals, properties, relations and locations can occur 
in different combinations. In this manner, individuals, properties, 
6 The example is from Adams 1999.
7 Cf. the Dretske’s discussion of intentionality as a feature of the physical 
world in Dretske (2000: 209-12).
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relations and locations can be treated as uniformities8. Every possible 
combination is a state of affairs. Situations are the actual states of af-
fairs.
Individuals are uniformities recurring in different situations be-
cause they persist at least for some time holding properties and re-
lations. Properties and relations are uniformities because they are 
exemplified by different individuals in different locations. Locations 
are uniformities because they can be occupied by different entities. 
A place can be occupied by different individuals at different times. 
Different individuals can be in different places at the same time.
Third, human beings are able to perceive some uniformities of 
the environment. It is plausible that different kinds of biological or-
ganisms are able to perceive different uniformities. Surely, the uni-
formities perceived by every kind of organism are in accordance with 
their members’ need to survive. Likewise, it is highly plausible that 
different kinds of organisms are able to detect a large amount of the 
same uniformities.
I outline in this paper a proposal on identification capable of cop-
ing with the three points above by appropriately connecting identifi-
cation and perception.
I think that a correct account of identification needs to capture 
the following fact: the entities that we identify and reidentify are the 
uniformities that we perceive. Thus, in my view, a correct account 
of identification needs to be supported by a theory of perception ca-
pable of selecting environmental uniformities as perceptual objects. 
Informational theories of perception like Dretske’s are what we need 
here9.
Note that someone can accept my proposal that the topics of iden-
tification are the perceptual objects and, even so, not consider that 
informational theories are capable of correctly determining the per-
ceptual objects. I shall not argue in favor of informational theories 
but I shall just point out that their outcomes are taylor-made for a 
theory of identification.
One fundamental feature of Dretske’s theory of perception is that 
8 I am using the notion of uniformity of Barwise and Perry (1999: 8).
9 Dretske (1981: chapter 6). Dretske talks about invariants. For the present 
purposes, I take ‘invariants’ and ‘uniformities’ as applying to the same items.
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it enables us to explain why we perceive human beings, trees and 
stones without perceiving the changing retinal images that are causal 
links in the delivery of information. For Dretske, perception carries 
information about, for example, the situation that a is F and not about 
the perceptual events which operate as information-carrying causal 
links because the situation that a is F has a higher order of invariance 
in contrast to variant perceptual events10. Thus, perception carries 
information about its constant source without carrying informa-
tion about the more proximal and variable events of the causal chain 
through which the information is carried.
Another advantage of adopting an informational account of per-
ception such as Dretske’s is to acquire protection against the relativist 
consequences of conceiving identification as theory-laden or belief-
laden. The class of views that subscribe to the thesis that identifica-
tion is theory-laden is committed to the claim that if you exchange 
the theory adopted by the agent for another theory, then – voilà! – 
the agent identifies a different kind of entities. Thus, oddly enough, 
identification would be relative to the agent’s theory. In accordance 
to Dretske’s theory, the perceptual object is selected independently 
of the beliefs and theories of the perceiver. To perceive trees does 
not depend on our theories and beliefs. We perceive such entities be-
cause we receive information about them. The adoption of this view 
of perception in combination with the thesis that what is perceived is 
what is identified can block the claim that every act of identification 
is theory-laden or belief-laden11.
4 Identification and uniformities
In section 1, I advanced the proposal that identifying x consists of 
perceiving x and forming an identification file which has x as its top-
ic. Now it is time to characterize what an identification file is.
The metaphor of identification files is a logical one. The infor-
10 Dretske (1981: 145).
11 I really think that this sort of relativist theories relies upon theories of 
perception which adopt the thesis that the beliefs of the agent (or his theories) 
determine the perceptual object. For a refutation of this class of theories, cf. 
Dretske (2000: 105-7).
Breno Hax, Jr.678
mation an identification file contains is not physically separated in 
a module. For example, my identification file of a friend of mine is 
composed of pieces of information that are physically registered in 
different parts of my brain. The cognitive system (or mind) treats 
them as forming a kind of cognitive unity. I will not try to account 
for how the cognitive system establishes this unity. I think that the 
mere phenomenon of this unity is a clear sign that the cognitive sys-
tem is intentional. It works to unify pieces of information in terms 
of the item or items they are about. Thus, an identification is a clus-
ter of pieces of information that the cognitive system treats as being 
about a certain entity.
The workings of the mind to unify pieces of information about 
the same entity are not always successful. One thing is the aboutness 
of a piece of information, the ‘informational aboutness’. Another 
one is the aboutness ascribed by the mind, the ‘conferred aboutness’. 
This last one determines which pieces of information are inserted in 
an identification. I take as basic the mind’s capacity to treat some-
thing as being about something else.
Individuals, properties, relations and locations are recurring. The 
primary function of identifying is to insert information (received by 
the senses) about recurring uniformities (the location of food, the 
appearance of a dangerous kind of animal, etc.) in the cognitive sys-
tem to use in future meetings with them.
The point of having identifications is to make it possible to track 
their topics. If there were no reidentification, the memory faculty 
would merely store pieces of information of no future use. These 
pieces of information would be taken as pieces of information about 
entities encountered only once.
Given that identification files are used to detect and track the 
uniformities of the world, we shall not conceive of them as sums of 
pieces of information, but as flexible devices of integrated informa-
tion presenting the topic so as to enable the organism to detect it. In 
section 8, I discuss the way the cognitive system deploys networks of 
identification files to detect and reidentify items.
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5 Identifications without identifying, ur-identifications, 
and derivative identifications
We also form identifications without the identifying process. My ob-
jective in this section is to sketch how my account accommodates 
this kind of identifications.
I follow Evans in proposing that perception, memory and com-
munication compose the ‘informational system’12. The information 
about x captured by identifying x flows across the community of 
speakers by communication. Communication allows the transmis-
sion and acquisition of identifications formed by another agent. If 
the identification transmission is successful, the receiver acquires an 
identification of the same topic.
One speaker can acquire his identification from another speaker 
in a communication process as a user of a language. Identifications 
can take two distinct positions in a communicative net. Derivative 
identiications are the identifications derived from identifications 
formed by another speaker. A non-derivative identification is an ur-
identiication.
The producer is the agent who forms the ur-identification of a cer-
tain topic. In the communication process, the producer transmits in-
formation of his identification to other speakers. Consumers are speak-
ers who acquire the identification by communication13.
Identification files acquired by communication appropriately 
linked to perceptual ur-identifications preserve the same link to the 
entity the information is about. That is, they have the same topic as 
the ur-identification. Transmissions of identifications in a communi-
cative net are topic preserving.
Consumers’ identifications are informationally dependent on 
producers’ identifications. Typically, consumers use their identifi-
cations for representing the same topic of the ur-identification on 
which it depends.
Concerning the origin of identifications, a perceptual identiication 
12 Evans (1982: 122).
13 The distinction between producer and consumer is inspired by Evans’s dis-
tinction between introducers of a name and users who acquire it as mere partici-
pants in the linguistic community. Cf. Evans (1982: chapter 11).
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is one formed by the activity of identifying its topic. According to my 
account, perceiving the entity which the identification is about is a 
necessary condition for identifying it. Identifications of topics unper-
ceived by anyone are non perceptual identiications14. Ur-identifications 
can be perceptual identifications or non perceptual identifications. A 
derivative identification is perceptual if and only if the ur-identifica-
tion from which it originates is perceptual.
In my view, identifications formed in episodes of illusion are per-
ceptual ones. After all, there is something perceived albeit with in-
terference from distorting factors. The resulting identification is of 
the perceived item.
Non perceptual identifications can be brought about by imagina-
tion, suspicion or hallucination.
Imagination cases are cases of formation of an identification by 
a combination of characteristics of entities. The topic in this case, 
if any, is what fits the discriminating information. Identifications of 
fictional personages are examples of such a process.
The suspicion case is that in which the producer has clues, evi-
dence or reasons for positing that something exists although unper-
ceived.
For example, a man sees (what he takes as) footprints and comes 
to suspect that they are caused by a certain entity. This suspicion 
triggers the formation of an identification for tracking the entity, if 
any, that made the footprints. One real example was the postulation 
by Urbain Jean J. Leverrier of the existence of Neptune on the basis 
of the observed orbit of Uranus. Leverrier suspected, given his ob-
servations, that a celestial body was causing the perturbations in the 
orbit of Uranus. He formed an identification of the celestial body and 
associated it to the name ‘Neptune’. In such cases, the ur-identifica-
tion’s topic is merely posited, rather than perceived.
In hallucination, there is no perceived item, but the agent assumes 
that there is one due to the abnormal working of the sensory and 
cognitive faculties. The resultant identification is non perceptual be-
14 According to my proposal of including perception as a necessary condition 
for identifying, the class of identifications acquired by the identification process 
and the class of perceptual identifications are co-extensives. In accounts which do 
not include perception as a necessary ingredient for the identification process, the 
two classes can differ in extension.
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cause there was no perception at all.
6 Reidentification
Whereas ‘identification’ has a process/product ambiguity, ‘reiden-
tification’ designates only a process, the activity of reidentifying15. 
Such activity presupposes a successful occurrence of a previous ac-
tivity of identifying.
The act of reidentification does not produce special types of 
identification files. It only sophisticates and increases the amount of 
information gathered in the identification files previously acquired. 
The formation of a new identification file would be a new act of 
identifying and not an act of reidentifying. This avoids the usage of 
‘reidentification’ to signify a product and thus eliminates any ambi-
guity between process and product.
There are two relevant conditions for the correct application of 
the verb ‘to reidentify’, one internal and another external.
The internal condition is that the agent shall previously have a 
perceptual ur-identification of x to be capable of reidentifying x. 
This avoids the possibility that the first perceptual meeting of an 
agent with x counts as a reidentification of x. If Marco Ruffino ac-
quires an identification of Nathan Salmon exclusively by communica-
tion and by reading books about philosophy, it is not correct to say 
that he has identified Nathan Salmon. For the same reason, it is not 
correct to say that when Marco Ruffino subsequently is presented by 
a friend to Nathan Salmon himself, he reidentifies Nathan Salmon.
The external condition for there to be reidentification is a strin-
gent ontological condition. There is only reidentification if there is 
numerical identity between the entity previously identified and the 
entity encountered now. In other words, the activity of reidentifica-
tion can be successful only if we have different meetings with the 
same entity.




Any correct account of identification has to respect two general 
facts: what I refer to as the ‘externalist fact’ and the ‘opacity fact’. In 
this section I present and discuss these facts. I suggest an explanation 
for the first fact. The sketch of a proposal to explain the second fact 
is made in the next section.
The externalist fact. The perceptual identification is of the entity 
that is the source of its information16.
I treat the externalist fact as a consequence of the nature of the in-
formation. The intentional nature of the information explains the 
connection between perceptual identification and its topic. The ex-
planation can be presented as follows:
1. Every piece of information is about its source.
2. Identifications are composed of pieces of information.
3. Perceptual identifications inherit their aboutness from the 
aboutness of the pieces of information that compose them.
4. Perceptual identifications are identifications of the entity that 
is the source of its pieces of information.
Information that a is F is information about a. Consider the identifi-
cation composed only of the information that a is F and the informa-
tion that a is G. Both pieces of information are about a. As a result, 
the identification composed of these pieces has a as its topic. Thus, 
the link between identification and topic is not forged by any kind of 
cognitive item. An identification can be of x (because x is its source) 
and yet not contain information sufficient for distinguishing x from 
y.
The externalist fact applies only to perceptual identifications. In 
the case of a non-perceptual identification, the link between identifi-
cation and topic is forged by means of fit or satisfaction of conditions. 
In such a case, the topic is the entity, if any, which fits the descriptive 
conditions stipulated by the body of information of the identification.
16 The externalist fact can be rewritten in a number of different ways  accord-
ing to the theory to which one subscribes. For example, purely causal theories 
can propose that perceptual identification is of the entity that causes it.
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If the resulting perceptual identification is composed exclusively 
of pieces of information about x, the identification has x as topic. It 
is a univocal identification. However, the bundling of pieces of in-
formation about x with pieces of information about y results in an 
identification that has x and y as topics. This results in an equivocal 
identification. Thus, I consider that aboutness of information is suf-
ficient to explain what makes identifications univocal or equivocal.
The opacity fact. Pieces of information about different things can 
be treated by the mind as being about the same thing and, fur-
ther, different pieces of information about the same thing can be 
treated as being about different things.
Notice that the mere presentation of the opacity fact involves appeal-
ing to the externalist fact. The cognitive system is able to take pieces 
of information about distinct things as being about the same thing. 
Moreover, the cognitive system is able to treat pieces of informa-
tion about the same thing as being about distinct things. As a result, 
the cognitive system is liable to insert information into inappropriate 
units of identification.
Let me recapitulate. Aboutness of information explains why the 
identification D is about x and not about y. Identification D is about 
x because D is composed exclusively of information about x. But the 
appeal to aboutness of information will not work for explaining how 
the mind is capable of treating pieces of information about the same 
thing as being about different things.
The opacity fact is due not to information but to the use of in-
formation by the cognitive system. This is the subject of the next 
section.
8 Supermaps
The connecting of pieces of information by the cognitive system can 
be classified into two types. Vertical connecting is the integration by 
the cognitive system of the pieces of information received in each 
particular episode of perception. In vertical connecting, the cogni-
tive system uses only perceptually received information. Typically, 
perceptual identifications are the results of vertical connecting. Hori-
zontal connectings are the different processes of interrelating stored 
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pieces of information which result in higher organization and inte-
gration of the informational body. In horizontal connecting, the de-
cision as to whether information should be grouped as being about 
the same thing depends not only on perceptual clues but also on rea-
sons, hypotheses and theories. In this case, the mind unifies pieces of 
information in terms of conferred aboutness. Reasons, hypotheses, 
and theories guide a lot of our inward working in conferring about-
ness to pieces of information.
Vertical and horizontal connectings can happen in combination. 
In reidentification, for example, there is a combination of vertical 
and horizontal connectings.
What is horizontal connecting good for?  What is its result?
We can say that the cognitive system has a subsystem – the sys-
tem of identiication – dedicated to identification and reidentification. 
The system of identification has as its ultimate goal the generation by 
means of vertical and horizontal connectings of a network of identi-
fications capable of tracking the relevant uniformities of the world. 
In other words, the system of identification has as its aim the genera-
tion of the most complete picture of the world possible. I shall call 
it ‘Supermap’17. The formation of the supermap compels received in-
formation to fit together in appropriate ways to specify the relevant 
uniformities of the world.
We are detectors of information. But not only that - we are su-
permappers. Every piece of information throws light on its source 
and thus on fragments of situations of the world. We go beyond 
these registers of information. We integrate the parts into a coher-
ent whole, filling the gaps, building hypothetical explanatory hierar-
chies, and so on. Supermaps are like representations of the physical 
and cultural world in which information is integrated and organized. 
Identifications are the dots in supermaps.
We can say, with some idealization, that the following principle 
rules over the cognitive system:
Cartographic Principle (CP): The cognitive system works in or-
der to form one identification for every relevant uniformity.
17 The notion of supermap is inspired in the knowledge-map of Strawson 
(1974, 45-6).
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There are three classes of cartographical correlations linking identi-
fications and the entities tracked by them:
(a) Type 1-1 (univocal) – one identification for tracking x in its 
course in the environment;
(b) Type 2-1 (univocal but duplicate) – two (or more) identifica-
tions for tracking the same topic;
(c) Type 1-2 (equivocal) – one identification for tracking two (or 
more) entities.
The ideal shape for the  supermap is the 1-1 type. 2-1 cases are cas-
es of entries which seemingly are routes to different things and 1-2 
cases are cases of equivocity. I shall call ‘correct’ the identifications 
which are in correlations of type 1-1.
Supermaps overwhelmingly constituted by correlations 2-1 and 
1-2 are quite unfit to allow the agent to cope with the world because 
their dots do not match real divisions of the world.
The capacity to form horizontal connections is a good thing. It 
gives us supermaps. However, some errors are errors of horizontal 
connecting. In horizontal connecting, the agent can erroneously take 
a meeting with an unknown man as a reidentification of a friend or 
take his friend as another person. Further, the agent can take differ-
ent properties or places as the same. In addition, the agent can take 
two occurrences of the same property as occurrences of different 
ones.
The cognitive system has the function of providing correct per-
ceptual identifications by means of vertical integration of informa-
tion received by the senses. This is part of the cognitive system’s 
overall function of representing the environment by experience. 
When the cognitive system operates in a sound way, it is capable of 
forming correct perceptual clusters. Not to make the correct per-
ceptual identifications is to dramatically lack fitness to the world.
Horizontal connectings are a different business. Such processes 
are more liable to produce equivocal or duplicate identifications even 
though they tend to yield identifications in cartographical correla-
tions of type 1-1. The reason is that they are based not only on per-
ceptually received information but also on beliefs, theories, hypoth-
eses, and assumptions in order to establish the identity of the topics 
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of the identifications. The interference of beliefs and theories ex-
pands the possibilities of connecting items of information received in 
perceptually discontinuous episodes which really are about the same 
thing. However, this same fact exposes the cognitive system to the 
risk of formation of identifications in correlations of type 2-1 or 1-2.
The capacity to build horizontal connections increases our fitness 
to the world by making our provisions of information about unifor-
mities more integrated and organized. The price for the use of this 
capacity is the increasing risk of error and formation of equivocal 
identifications. It is worthwhile.18
Breno Hax, Jr.
Federal University of Paraná
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In A Theory of Universals (1978) Armstrong regretted that the interest 
around the dispute on internal and external relations had died away 
with the decline of Absolute Idealism. Further, in consequence of 
this, advances in the ontology of relations have not been comparable 
with the great advances in the topic of the logic of relations. Since 
Armstrong wrote this, some time has passed by, but the situation is 
essentially unchanged. Some investigation concerning relations has 
been done, but I think that many of them were contaminated by old 
prejudices.
This paper is intended as a contribution to minimize this gap. 
I will defend and argue in favour of some positive claims concern-
ing the ontological status of relations. The main topics – and corre-
sponding sections – of this paper are (1) irreducibility, (2) external-
ity and (3) reality of relations. Thus, my topics exactly coincide with 
Russell’s main topics in the theory of relations. But my purpose here 
is not an exegetical investigation of the controversy between classi-
cal authors like Russell, Bradley and Leibniz.1 I will just offer some 
cursorily historical remarks in order to introduce the questions, but 
then I will propose some (I hope) original theses and arguments.
1 The irreducibility of relations
Aristotle was the first to defend the reducibility of relations. He said 
in his Categories that, whenever two (or more) substances are related, 
this is to be explained by means of certain monadic properties or 
1 Many scholars did such an analysis; see e.g. Clautenbaugh (1973), Mugnai 
(1992) and my own (2006).
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accidents inhering in the relata.2 Many scholastic and modern phi-
losophers followed him in this. But, like Russell (and some medieval 
thinkers, in particular Albert the Great and John Duns Scotus), I 
believe this old tradition to be wrong. Some relations are reducible, 
some irreducible – that is my first thesis.
The topic of reducibility of relations has been usually treated as 
a semantical issue concerning relational propositions. Russell pro-
posed its standard formulation: can all aRb propositions be reduced 
to S-P propositions? But the term “reduction” can also be interpreted 
in an (more original) ontological sense. And since my interest here 
does not concern semantics, I propose an ontological reformulation: 
do all relational facts supervene upon monadic facts? Actually, the 
semantical and the ontological questions must be not only distin-
guished, but clearly separated. Ontology does not always have to 
follow semantics. Indeed, after proposing a test for deciding which 
relations are ontologically reducible and which not, we will see that 
propositional reducibility does not imply ontological reducibility, 
nor the other way round.
Let us first see a misguided route. Many contemporary authors 
(e.g. Mugnai 1992: 96, Horstmann 1984) have suggested that rela-
tions are reducible if and only if they are symmetric. They are clearly 
influenced by Russell’s argument3: if R in aRb were symmetric, than 
R{a,b} would be a correct analysis (the predicate “R” is applied to the 
set {a,b}). In this case we do not need the ordered pair (a,b) – the 
simple set {a,b} would do. A pair, insofar as it is ordered, is “implic-
itly relational”, i.e. it entails a hidden relationality (something like “a 
comes before b”) – so thought Russell and his followers.
Now, I think that this kind of reduction is a merely curious “logi-
cal” feature of symmetric relations. This might be relevant for a 
propositional reduction, but has no ontological relevance. (Actually, 
2 In Metaphysics Aristotle seems to relativize this doctrine claiming that “there 
are relational situations (such as Simmias’s thinking about Socrates) in which sub-
stances are related not in virtue of a pair of accidents, but rather in virtue of a 
single accident possessed by just one of the substances.” See Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations-medieval.
3 Russell used this argument many times, see e.g. Principles of Mathematics § 
426, The Philosophy of Leibniz § 10, Logical Atomism p. 335, My Philosophical Develop-
ment p.67.
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I tend to think that this is more a notational than a real “logical” 
feature.) Take the case of Peter and his son Paul. Peter was first, say 
at t
1
, taller than Paul. Along the years, Paul grew and became, say at 
t
3
, taller than Peter. Since is taller than is an asymmetric relation, it 
must be irreducible according to Russell’s criterion. But there is cer-
tainly a moment, say t
2
, in which Peter and Paul had exactly the same 
height. Now, is as tall as is a symmetric relation, and, according to 
this criterion, it must be reducible. The consequence of this kind of 
reasoning would be that the particular height-relation between these 
two men changes its status through time: it is sometimes reducible 
(and so, according to Russell, internal and unreal) and sometimes ir-
reducible (and so external and real)4. But this certainly sounds very 
odd for any philosopher with a robust sense of ontology. Paul’s height 
relative to Peter (or any other object) can change through time, but 
the relation cannot change its ontological status (reducibility, reality 
or externality). This reasoning becomes even more absurd when we 
interpret – as usually is done – “internality” by means of “essential-
ity”: Paul was at t
1
 essentially (internally) smaller than Peter, then, 
at t
2
, Paul became accidentally (externally) as tall as Peter, and, fi-
nally, at t
3
 Paul became essentially taller than Peter. This is simply 
metaphysical non-sense. There cannot be diachronic change in the 
essential properties of things. Thus, I conclude that symmetry is not 
an adequate criterion for deciding the question of ontological reduc-
ibility.
Nevertheless, I think that Russell was right in defending that 
some relations are reducible, and others not. But the reason for this 
difference is not a curious logical feature like symmetry, but an on-
tological one. Rescher (1967:72) proposed a general and very useful 
test for deciding the question on the propositional reducibility of re-
lations. In a simplified formulation, the semantical reducibility test 
(SRT) says:
(SRT) The relation R, which subsists between two particulars a 
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(b) determine completely the truth established 
4 For Russell, reducibility, externality and reality are (at least extensionally) 
equivalent.
by aRb.5









in the SRT should obviously not be explicitly or implicitly relational 
like “[…Rb]” (i.e. something like “to be taller than b”). When one 
accepts this kind of relational predicate the reduction of every re-
lation becomes trivially possible. Thus, impure monadic predicates 
(predicates with an implicit reference to some particular) must be 
excluded. Second, ST is clearly dependent on the language we use: 
the “existence of predicates” is at stake. And the existence of monad-
ic predicates depends, of course, on our arbitrary act of introducing 
such predicates in our language. But in this case our ontology would 
be trivially dependent on linguistic decisions. Thus, following the 
general device proposed above for separating ontological and seman-
tical reduction, I suggest a purely ontological version of the reduc-
ibility test (ORT):
(ORT) The relation R, which subsists between two particulars a 
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(b)  ...  Q
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(b) completely 
determines the fact aRb, i.e. aRb supervenes the conjunctive fact 
with monadic properties.6
The basic insight of my ORT is the – I hope: reasonable – suppo-
sition that reducibility can be defined by means of supervenience. 
But note: I define reducibility by means of supervenience, but I do 
not identify reducibility with supervenience simpliciter. As we will 
see below, not all supervenient relations are also reducible. Again, 
two remarks are important here: First, similarly to our first remark 
5 Parkinson (1965: 45) suggest a stronger (and implausible) variant of this 




(a)  ...  
P
n
(a) – could sustain completely the truth established by aRb.
6 I am not committed to – and will not argue for – the existence of complex 




(a)  ...” could 
simply be paraphrased by “the fact that P
1
(a) and the fact that P
2
(a) and the fact 
that...”. Further, since this criterion also holds for not actually obtaining facts, 
the phrase “states of affairs” would probably be more adequate, but I will simply 
use “fact” for the sake of simplicity.
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above concerning impure predicates, in the ORT impure monadic 
properties (implicitly relational properties) must be excluded in or-
der to avoid trivial reduction. Second, in ORT I deliberately avoid 
talking in terms of “existence” or “non-existence” of properties, as 
was the case in SRT. The question on the existence of properties 
is connected with some more difficult metaphysical questions like 
the realism versus nominalism dispute, criteria for deciding which 
properties really exist (quantification over properties – by Quine – 
or their occurrence in natural laws – by Armstrong, etc.) that are to 
be avoided in this section. I will come back to this later. Therefore, 
I will simply take all ordinary properties to be genuine properties in 
the following discussion.
In general, we say that an entity B supervenes upon an entity A if 
and only if it is impossible that A should exist and B not exist, where 
A is possible7 (this last restriction, of course, is introduced in order 
to avoid trivialization – for the rest of this paper I suppose it implic-
itly). For the particular case of relations, we can formulate:
The relation R in aRb is supervenient when the relational fact aRb 









 obtain and aRb does not obtain.
In this formulation, I say R “in” aRb is supervenient because we can-
not suppose without more arguments that, given that the fact aRb is 
supervenient in our sense, the relation R is supervenient simpliciter, 
i.e. in all other facts where it occurs (it could be not supervenient 
in another fact cRd). Alternative standard formulations for super-









-worlds are aRb-worlds”, etc. 
Now, how can we decide when a relation is supervenient in this 
sense? The first step here is the recognition of the huge variety of 
kinds of relations. Actually, I think that the recognition and obser-
vance of this variety is the most urgent methodological imperative in 
ontology of relations today. I am convinced that some philosophical 
theses about relations are misguided because of the failure in observ-
ing this variety. To put it in Wittgenstein’s words “A main cause of 
philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s think-
7 This definition was proposed by Armstrong in (1997: 11)
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ing with only one kind of example” (PI § 593). This kind of “one-sid-
ed diet” is specially striking when we compare the fanciless examples 
used in analyses of relations with the rich variety of examples used in 
analysis concerning particulars and monadic properties.
Relations vary in many different ways. For deciding the test of re-
ducibility it is helpful to point out the variety of ontological “orders” 
(still in an ambiguous sense) of relations and introduce a notation for 
codifying these orders:
R0-0  relations that obtain between objects 
 (e.g. a loves b, a sees b, a is bigger than b)
R1-1 relations that obtain between 1-order properties of objects
 (e.g. the wisdom of a is greater than the wisdom of b)
R0-1  relations that obtain between an object and a 1-order prop-
erty of an object
 (e.g. a admires the wisdom of b)8
R1-0  relations that obtain between a 1-order property of an object 
and an object
 (e.g. the weight of this box surprised me)
R2-2  relations that obtain between 2-order properties or 2-order 
relations of objects (e.g. the beauty of the colour of a is greater than 
the beauty of the colour of b).
R0-2  relations that obtain between an object and a 2-order prop-
erty or relation of objects (e.g. a admires the beauty of the colour of 
b).
and so on...
This classification is ambiguous: it allows a semantical and an on-
tological interpretation. I think that not all R0-0 relations in a seman-
tical sense are also first-order R0-0 relations in a full ontological sense. 
Take e.g. “a is bigger than b”: in a semantical sense, this is a R0-0 rela-
tion: R has entities of type 0 as relata; “a” and “b” are singular terms. 
But, ontologically, the fact that a is bigger than b supervenes upon 
the fact that a has the height S1, and b has the height S2 (and S1>S2). 
8 We must distinguish between R0-1 and R1-0 because relations are not always 
symmetrical.  Thus R0-1 is a relation from an object to a property and R1-0 a rela-
tion from a property to an object.
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Again, language is not always a good guide to ontology. (There is a 
second ambiguity: my distinction of orders should not be confused 
with the Aristotelian distinction of orders – I will come back to this 
later.) In any case, the relevant interpretation for deciding reducibil-
ity is the ontological one. My point concerning reducibility is this: 
some relations supervene upon monadic properties of related things, 
others do not. Supervenient relations are ontologically dependent on 
the properties of things, and their holding or not is fully determined 
by the things having properties. Examples of supervenient relations 
are:
 a is taller than b
 a is as tall as b
 a is taller than b
 a is more beautiful than b
 a is more famous than b
Note that, from a semantical point of view, these are all R0-0 rela-
tions – but, and this is my point, not from an ontological point of 
view. These relations do not hold “directly” between particulars, but 
between properties of particulars. Take the first example again: the 
fact that a is taller than b. An ontological analysis of the correspond-
ing fact should be something like: a has height S1  b has height S2  
S1>S2. Thus, ontologically speaking, is taller is an R1-1 relation. The 
fact that a is taller than b is entailed in the conjunctive fact that a is 
S1  b is S2 (e.g. there is no possible world in which a is 2m tall, b is 
1m tall and the relational fact that a is taller than b does not hold).9
Of course, not all properties are objectively measurable. But this 
does not imply that, in these cases, the relation cannot supervene 
upon properties. Take e.g. beauty: if a is beautiful and b is ugly, then 
a is more beautiful than b. In such cases, objective analysis becomes 
difficult, but this does not undermine supervenience.
In all these cases, the particulars hold the corresponding relation 
9 Russell would certainly say, contrary to me, that this analysis shows that 
the relation is taller than is not reducible: in the analysans another relation (S1>S2) 
occurs, thus the relation did not “disappear”. This makes it clear that my sense of 
“reducibility” does not correspond to Russell’s sense.
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just because they instantiate certain properties. The properties in-
stantiated by the particulars necessitate the relation. The properties 
can be essential or accidental to the particulars, but they are a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the holding of the relation.
On the other hand, examples of non-supervenient relations are:
 a loves b
 a is married to b
 a is the father of b
 a kills b
 a kisses b
These are R0-0 relations from both semantical and ontological points 
of view. There is no property of a or b that entails the love of a for b. 
Maybe a loves some property of b, but this is a different fact from a 
loves b (in that case, we would have R0-1 instead of R0-0). Maybe a loves 
b because of some property of b, but this is, again, another (I suppose 
complex) fact: it is a fact that explains why a loves b. Maybe a is mar-
ried to b only because b has the property of being rich, but this does 
not mean that it is no property of a which is married to any property 
of b, but a is married to b. Note that some relations are dependent on 
some properties: a is father of b only if a instantiates the property to 
be male, a can kill b only if b instantiates the property to be alive, etc. 
In these cases, the properties are necessary conditions for the rela-
tions, but they do not necessitate the relation. A male does not have 
to be father, a living organism does not have to be killed, and so on. 
The same is valid for all levels of relations. Take the R0-1 relation
 a admires the wisdom of b
 a envies the wealth of b
These are clearly non-supervenient relations: there is neither a prop-
erty of a nor a property of b that necessitates the relation of admira-
tion (not even b’s wisdom). Similarly, there is neither a property of a 
nor a property of b that necessitates the relation of envy ( not even b’s 
wealth). A relation is reducible if and only if both sides are grounded 
in properties of the terms, i.e. the relation must be “both-sided” su-
pervenient.
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All this sound as if reducibility of relations were identified with 
supervenience simpliciter, but this is not the case. In the proposed test 
for reducibility, it is required that aRb supervene upon the complex 
fact with monadic properties, while in the definition of supervenience 




 must be monadic. 
This is so because it seems possible that a given relational fact F
1
 su-




, such that one of them (or both) is 
relational and irreducible. Take e.g. the relation is-brother-of. I think 
the relational fact a is brother of b supervenes other relational facts (a is 
a child of x with y  b is a child of x with y), and these last relational 
facts are not supervenient and irreducible. If this is correct, is brother 
of is a case of a supervenient but irreducible relation, i.e. it is not re-
ducible to exclusively monadic facts. Therefore, reducibility and su-
pervenience, at least for relations, are not equivalent. One might ask: 
if this is true, how should we decide that a relation is reducible or 
irreducible until the “whole analysis” to ultimate basic facts is done?
Indeed, the question on a complete analysis (of facts, of proposi-
tions, or whatever) seems to lead us into deep trouble. How can we 
decide whether at a given moment we achieved the terminal level of 
the most basic facts? The proposed criterion for deciding reducibility 
of relations seems to be committed to the assumption that facts are 
not infinitely analysable. Actually, I believe this to be a plausible as-
sumption. The possibility of an infinite analysis displeases most phi-
losophers. Of course, there is, insofar as I can see, no knock-down 
argument against it. Thus, it seems that a relational fact F
1
 can be 





, but that some (at least one) of these facts, in their turn, 
supervene on even more basic relational facts, and so on. In this case, 
a conclusive decision about reducibility of relations seems unachiev-
able. But even if there were such infinite complex facts, my ORT 
offers a conclusive criterion at least for the positive cases, i.e. that a 
certain relational fact is reducible. Note that ORT does not require 











(b)  ...  Q
n
(b), that necessitate the fact aRb, must be ulti-
mate. For a given relation R to be reducible, it suffices that at “some” 
level a full eliminative conjunction of monadic facts is achievable. 
In this case, we can conclude that R is reducible. What we cannot 
conclude, of course, is that all relations are reducible (in a linguistic 
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formulation: we cannot conclude that a complete monadic “world-
description” is possible). But, again, by the plausible assumption that 
analysis is not infinite, we have a definitive criterion for both cases of 
reducibility and irreducibility.
It is important to stress that this ontological distinction between 
reducible and irreducible relations does not coincide with the Aristo-
telian distinction between first order and second order attributes.10 
To say that a relation is grounded on the properties of things does not 
imply that this relation is, in the Aristotelian sense, a second-order 
relation. When Socrates and Plato are white, the fact that Socrates 
and Plato have the same colour entails the reducible relation to have 
the same colour. But I think Aristotle would (correctly) consider to 
have the same colour (different from is the same colour as!) a relation 
between things (and not between properties of things). Reducible 
relations in my sense are, first, ontologically dependent on proper-
ties of things, i.e. the properties are a necessary condition for the 
supervenient relation. Second, the relations are always present when 
the corresponding properties are instantiated in the relata, i.e. the 
instantiation of the relevant properties is a sufficient condition for 
the subsistence of the supervenient relation. These relations are, to 
use Armstrong’s terminology (1997: 12), an “ontological free lunch” 
– they are not an addition of Being.
Of course, it is not easy to decide for every relation whether it is 
supervenient to other facts or not: is the relation is-20m-distant-from 
a non-supervenient relation or a relation that supervenes upon the 
monadic properties position-of-x and position-of-y? This depends, of 
course, on our conception of space. Suitable ontological analyses are 
required in many particular cases; in particular, spatial and temporal 
relations deserve a special examination.
The very natural thesis defended here has been overlooked by 
many authors simply because they restrict their analysis to a too 
small set of examples of relations, instead of analysing their great 
variety. Mugnai e.g. (1992: 22) comes very near to my criterion. He 
tells us that for Leibniz veritates relationum videntur esse relexivae, i.e.
truths corresponding to relations are properly speaking ‘second-order 
10 This could be one reason why Aristotle was unable to recognize different 
degrees of reality of relations.
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truths’, which, so to say, supervene other truths. The relationship of 
similarity between Socrates and Plato, for example, happens at the 
movement when Socrates and Plato are both white, but this simply 
means that the truth of the proposition: ‘Socrates is similar to Plato’ 
is based on the truth of the two assertions: ‘Socrates is white’ and 
‘Plato is white’, and the whole proposition comes into being when one 
reflects on these assertions.
Of course, the truth of “Socrates is similar to Plato” is grounded on 
the truth of “Socrates is white” and “Plato is white”. Thus, this rela-
tion can be considered reducible. But on which monadic propositions 
is the truth of “Socrates loves Plato” based? I cannot see any monadic 
propositions and no distribution of monadic properties in the world 
that could ground its truth.
2 On the internality of relations
One classical dispute between the pioneers of analytic philosophy 
and the absolute idealists concerned the internality vs. externality 
of relations. Absolute idealists, at least according to the standard 
interpretation, defended that all relations are internal (e.g. F. H. 
Bradley in 1897), while analytic philosophers (in particular Russell) 
defended that some relations are external. But it is not clear what 
these authors mean by the phrases “internal” and “external”. In My 
Philosophical Development (1959) Russell gave us some hints about how 
he understood the thesis of internalism of relations:
He [Leibniz] says that, if a man living in Europe has a wife in India and 
the wife dies without his knowing it, the man undergoes an intrinsic 
change at the moment of her death. This is the kind of doctrine that I 
was combating. (MPD: 42)
But it is also not clear how we should interpret the vague word “in-
trinsic” in this passage. Russell could hardly be combating the prin-
ciple of identity according to which entities with different properties 
are different. If x is a husband (and not a widow), and y is a widow 
(and not a husband), then it is necessarily true that x is different from 
y. It seems very plausible to suppose that the poor man of the story 
changed a property with the death of his wife. And Russell would 
certainly not deny that the wife in the story undergoes an intrinsic 
change at the moment of her death. In contemporary theory of prop-
erties, it is usual to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic prop-
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erties. Intrinsic properties are non-extrinsic, and extrinsic proper-
ties are properties that a thing has in virtue of its relation to another 
(at least one other) thing, i.e. they are implicitly relational – in the 
example, to be a husband and to be a widow are certainly extrinsic. 
But this distinction was not explicitly made by Russell. And if this 
were what Russell meant, his claim would be trivial – of course, the 
change of the man was a change in virtue of something else, namely 
the death of his wife. Thus, his intuition must be based on a distinc-
tion between “somehow” more relevant and less relevant properties 
and relations. The most obvious distinction of this sort is the classical 
distinction between essential and accidental properties. Actually, in 
some passages Russell explicitly introduced the notion of “essence”:
“If A and B are related in a certain way”, it may be said, “you must 
admit that if they were not so related they would be other than they 
are, and that consequently there must be something in them which is 
essential to their being related as they are.” (MDP: 46, my emphasis)
In any case, I will discuss in this section the status of relations con-
cerning their essentiality. Since Russell was not a friend of the notion 
of substance and essentialism, I suppose he would not be happy about 
this decision. His usage of “essential” in this passage is probably only 
a façon de parler. But this should not worry us – our aim is systematic 
and not exegetical. After all, this was certainly Moore’s original us-
age. In his “External and Internal Relations” (1919) he characterized 
internal relations modally: internal relations are essential to their 
relata.
I will defend two theses in this section:
(i) there are some (at least “impure” or “supervenient”) essential 
relations, and
(ii) the question of essentiality (internality) is independent of the 
question on reducibility or irreducibility of relations (at least 
in the case that origin essentialism is correct).
Thesis (i) is, once one accepted essential properties, in some sense 
trivial. If there are essential properties at all, this is a difficult ques-
tion I cannot investigate here. I will simply presuppose some kind 
of orthodox (Kripkean) essentialism in the following. Thesis (ii) is a 
more substantive thesis. It is intended as a criticism of Russell’s (and 
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others’) supposition that reducibility is equivalent to internality (as 
well irreducibility to externality).
The overwhelming majority of examples of essential properties 
discussed in literature are monadic and not polyadic. As far as I can 
see, the most relevant case of an essential relation is the origin essen-
tialism suggested by Kripke (1972: 112f), according to which if a is 
the mother of b, b is essentially son of a (no person could have anoth-
er mother than he or she actually has). And it is not surprising that 
this example of an essential feature is much more controversial than 
its monadic rivals. It is more intuitive to suppose that the existence 
of an entity depends on one of its monadic “constitutive” proper-
ties, than on something “external” as a relation that this entity holds 
with another entity. A “free floating” Socrates in an empty universe 
without any relations to other things (even without his mother) may 
sound strange, but less strange than a non-human Socrates. Con-
cerning origin essentialism Robertson (1998) points out that both 
the origin essentialist of an artefact (that this table should be made of 
this very hunk of matter) and the origin essentialist of living organ-
isms (that this organism must be developed from this very collec-
tion of propagules) are in trouble for they cannot respect their own 
essentialist intuition that a limited variation of the origin of a given 
thing is possible. It both cases, origin essentialism seems to be based 
on mereological intuitions: one thing cannot be construed of com-
pletely different constituent parts. The egg and the sperm are built 
into the new organism as essential parts of it. In the following I will 
suppose origin essentialism to be correct.
Now, when one is willing to assume a more tolerant view about 
what relations exist –i.e. not denying that “impure” or supervenient 
relations are genuine relations – we obtain an easy strategy for de-
fending the existence of essential relations. We could simply con-
struct essential relations from essential (monadic) properties: when 
to be a human being is an essential property of both Socrates and Plato, 
as most think they are, then to belong to the same species as is an “im-
pure” essential relation between them. I call this relation “impure” 
because it entails an implicit reference to a monadic property. Actu-
ally, the essential character of this relation is only derived from a 
monadic property. One may object that this relation is not really es-
sential, since one of them, say, Plato, could have not existed. In this 
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case, Socrates would not belong to the same natural kind as Plato. I 
think this to be clearly wrong, because Plato is essentially a human 
being – independent of his existence. On the contrary, his very ex-
istence depends on being human. In all possible worlds in which he 
exists, he is human, and in all possible worlds in which he does not 
exist, he is, in some sense, human too. It is not the case that, in these 
possible worlds in which he does not exist, he is something else, say 
a worm. Thus, independent of his existence or not, independent of 
which possible world we take, Socrates always belongs to the same 
natural kind as Plato.
Whether such artificially constructed relations are respectable 
entities depends on how tolerant we are in our ontology. Of course, 
these relations are, according to my own criterion reducible, inso-
far as they are simply grounded in monadic properties. Just as most 
philosophers are not willing to accept that every predicate express a 
genuine property, so many may reject such relations as to belong to the 
same natural kind as. But at least (i) can be so far concluded: there are 
impure reducible essential relations. 
Let us now think about the relation between essentiality and ir-
reducibility. Some contemporary authors are already persuaded by 
Russell and think that internality (here: essentiality) is the same as 
(at least coextensive with) reducibility. See for example this passage 
by Heil (2009: 315):
Following the medieval thinkers, we could say that internal relations 
are “founded” on monadic (non-relational) features of their relata: 
when an internal relation holds, it holds in virtue of non-relational fea-
tures of whatever it relates.
And, concerning external relations, he continues
An external relation, R, holds between objects a and b, in virtue of a’s 
being F and b’s being G (F and G being non-relational properties of a 
and b). [...] Further, the initial breezy characterization of internal rela-
tions, can now be seen to apply quite generally: if you have the relata, 
you have the relations. (Heil 2009: 317)
I think this (in particular the general form “quite generally”) to be 
clearly wrong: there is neither a necessary connection between in-
ternality (essentiality) and irreducibility nor between reducibility (to 
be “founded” on monadic properties) and externality of relations. 
Heil’s failure to see the independence of both aspects lies probably 
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in the meagre diet of examples he took, namely the internality of 
six being greater than five and the external monadic founded fact 
of Simmias being taller than Socrates. I am convinced that is greater 
than in six is greater than ive is internal not because it is grounded in 
monadic properties of five and six, but simply because pure arith-
metical properties and relations are always essential (or internal). 
And the relation is taller than in Simmias is taller than Socrates is exter-
nal not because it is not founded on monadic properties, but because 
these monadic properties (the height of Simmias and the height of 
Socrates) are not essential. Thus, I propose that, when a is essentially 
F and b is essentially G and the relation R supervenes F and G, then R 
is internal to a and b (this was e.g. the case of belong to the same species). 
When a is not essentially F or b is not essentially G (or both), then the 
relation R that supervenes F and G is external to a and b.
Of course, first one has to obtain clarity about which relations are 
really essential (if any). Let us, for the sake of the argument, suppose 
that origin essentialism is correct. Thus, a is son of b is an internal 
relation (to a, not to b). Remember that thesis (ii) has a hypothetical 
form: when origin essentialism is correct, the question of essential-
ity (internality) is independent of the question on reducibility or ir-
reducibility of relations.
The easier strategy for arguing for the independency of reducibil-
ity and internality is to give some counter-examples. A very plausible 
example of an accidental relation is to love. It can be hardly denied 
that although a actually loves b, a could not simply love b without 
damage to its existence or identity. Nevertheless, to love is, according 
to our ORT, an irreducible relation. When a loves b, this relation is 
not supervenient to any property of a or b. Thus, there are irreduc-
ible accidental relations. Irreducibility does not imply internality.
Take now the relation is heavier than in a is heavier than b (where 
a and b are, say, human beings). It is clear that this relation can be 
reduced to monadic properties in the sense of ORT (a weighs x Kg  
b weighs y Kg  x>y). Weight is not an essential property of a person, 
except, or course, for super-essentialism, for which every property 
is trivially essential. This is an example of a reducible accidental rela-
tion; thus, reducibility does not imply internality.
According to ORT, the relation to be son of is irreducible, for if a 
is son of b, this is so not in virtue of some monadic properties of a and 
703On the Ontology of Relations
b. Now, the relation is son of (to have these very parents) is considered 
an essential property of a person. Thus, there are internal irreducible 
relations; internality does not imply reducibility.
Take, on the other hand, another example of Kripke’s (1972: 113-
114) for an essential property, namely to be made of. According to 
him, if this table is made of wood, we cannot say that this very table 
could, instead of wood, simply be made of ice water taken from the 
River Thames. A table made of ice from the river would not be this 
table. If this is correct, then the relation is made of the same substance 
as is an essential relation for two objects a and b (suppose, made from 
wood). Nevertheless, given our ORT, is made of the same substance as 
is a reducible relation, since the fact that table a is made of the same 
substance as table b supervenes upon the monadic facts that a is made 
of wood and b is made of wood. Thus, there are relations that are both 
internal and reducible; internality does not imply irreducibility. To 
sum up, as (ii) claims: internality/externality and reducibility/irre-
ducibility are independent ontological aspects of relations.
3 Reality of relations
In contrast to “existence”, “subsistence” and “actuality”, no defini-
tions have been offered for the notions of “reality” and “unreality”. 
It seems unclear what we mean when we say that something is real 
or unreal. In most cases, we use this notion in ontology in a more or 
less intuitive sense. Further, these terms seem not to qualify some-
thing in a positive, interesting way: Are there real and unreal things? 
I propose in this section two different approaches to the problem of 
reality, the traditional and the contemporary a posteriori one.
3.1 The traditional approach
According to this approach, reality is conceived by means of ontolog-
ical independence. The more an entity is ontologically dependent on 
others, the more it is unreal. This approach has a long tradition. In 
scholaticism God was considered the ens realissimum just because He 
is absolutely independent of any other entity; Aristotelian substances 
were considered real (even if not “as” real as God) because they were 
independent of their attributes; these attributes, in their turn, were 
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less real than substances because they were dependent on them, and 
so on. Fictions are ontologically weak because they are dependent on 
human creative thought. Following this reasoning, some scholastics 
conclude that relations have a very low ontological status, for their 
existence relies on the existence of many other entities: on the re-
lata, on the properties of these relata and, worse, on a recognizing 
mind. Thus, when Plato and Socrates are similar (both are white), this 
similarity depends on Plato, Socrates, the whiteness of Plato, the 
whiteness of Socrates, and even on a mind that compares both.11
But some medieval thinkers tried to see a little bit more reality in 
relations. Ockham for example made a distinction between relatio-
nes reales and relationes rationis. While relationes rationis are dependent 
on an arbitrary decision of our intellect, like the relation between a 
word-sign and its meaning, relationes reales depend on the recognition 
of an intellect, but not on our arbitrary decision, like the relation 
between a mother and her son. Thus, Ockham did certainly not in-
tend to reject the objective nature of the relationes reales. And when 
Leibniz says that relations are entia rationis, he neither intends them 
to be arbitrary creations of our intellect, like Ockham’s entia ratio-
nis, nor to be mere fictional entities. Leibniz distinguished between 
entia rationis sine fundamento in re, like Pegasus, and entia rationis cum 
fundamento in re, like relations that subsist in actual facts. If David is 
father of Solomon, then the relation of paternity between David and 
Solomon is not a mere fiction in the sense that Pegasus is one.
But to say that relations have a fundamentum in re can still be 
considered a sign of ontological weakness: relations do not subsist 
in themselves. They need the relata in order to subsist—they are 
grounded in re. Indeed, in his letter to Des Bosses (17 fev 1711) Leib-
niz says that a relation without fundamentum is a self-contradictory 
notion. Relations are not ontologically independent and do not have 
independent “capacity of movement”. They begin to subsist and end 
subsisting, but only insofar as their “ontological basis”—objects or 
properties of objects—allow or determine this. Thus, the thesis of 
11 In De Potentia, q.8 ar. 1, ra 4 Thomas writes: “Relatio habet esse debilis-
simum, quod est eius tantum” and very similarly, so does Scotus in Super Prae-
dicamenta (q. 25, 10): “Relatio inter omnia entia est debilissimum ens, cum est 
sola habitudo duorum, et ita minime est cognoscibilis in se” (quoted by Mugnai 
1992:27)
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unreality of relations should be understood in the sense that relations 
are ontologically dependent, and not that they lack an objective na-
ture.12 This insight seems to be present in natural intuition: Imagine 
a collection of many particulars organized in a hierarchical order by 
the ordering relation R. Now what would remain if we subtract all 
the particular things? An “empty order”, an ordered structure with-
out ordered things, is non-sense.
Now, what should we conclude? I do not think that all relations 
are mind-dependent. Most late scholars defended the objective na-
ture of some relations, and this seems a plausible thesis. A knock-
down argument against mind-dependence of any kind of entity can-
not be given, nor for the particular case of relations. The best we 
can do, I suppose, is to follow contemporary metaphysicians and 
take natural science with all its relational concepts (causality, cross 
fertilization, chemical reactions, etc.) in order to see how objective 
relational descriptions of reality are. If we also take mathematics, the 
question seems even more evident: relations are not eliminable and, 
thus, objective. Of course, a radical idealist would not be impressed 
by this argument, but I suppose him to be unimpressed by any realist 
argument at all. The need of relational predicates does not imply the 
existence of an ontological correlate.
In any case, when my argument in the first section is sound, there 
are relations that are irreducible to monadic properties. When aRb 
is a relational fact that does not supervene upon more basic monadic 
facts, then we should conclude that R is not ontologically dependent 
on monadic properties. At least these relations are not an “ontologi-
cal free lunch”. Therefore, at least irreducible relations must have 
the same ontological status as their monadic rivals, the properties. 
Of course, one could even suppose that relations are independent 
of concrete instantiations, like Platonists suggest for monadic prop-
erties, but this would led us to a too fundamental problem of phi-
losophy – the debate between Platonism and nominalism – which I 
12 Another classical argument against the reality of relations is Bradley’s fa-
mous argument of regress. If the relation R which holds between a and b were 
real, we would need another relation, say R*, which holds between this real en-
tity R and a, such as a relation between R and b. But if R* is a very real entity 
again, R* need also a new relation, say R**, which holds between R* and a, like 
as between R* and R, and so on ad ininitum.
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prefer to avoid here.
One could suggest a further tentative argument for reality of rela-
tions. As we said above, entities are more real the more independent 
they are. In addition, one could also plausibly argue that an entity is 
more real, the more entities depend on it. Thus, God would be an ens 
realissimum not only because He is independent, but also because all 
other entities depend on Him. Now, when origin essentialism is cor-
rect, one could conclude that, when a is the son of b, a could not exist 
without the relation is son of b. Thus, ex hypothesis, a is ontologi-
cally dependent on this relation. In this case, of course, dependence 
would be symmetric, and both entities (a and its relation to b) to the 
same degree real.
Many, including Russell, thought that supervenience is a criterion 
for unreality. But this seems to be a prejudice. To say that heat is 
nothing else than motion of molecules does indeed commit one to 
say that heat is ontologically dependent on molecules, but not to say 
that heat is unreal. It is interesting to note that we tend naturally to 
think this relation of dependence as asymmetrical (heat depends on 
molecules, but not conversely), although the existence of tempera-
ture is coextensive with the existence of molecules: there cannot 
be molecules without some motion nor molecules without any tem-
perature (repose is a case of motion just as 0°K is also a tempera-
ture). Similarly, as soon as things exist, so do relations exist, too: at 
least relations like self-identity or difference, but also relations like 
as heavy as, as great as. When the objects are qualitatively different 
( which is required by the Leibnizian principle of identity), there 
must also be some asymmetrical relations (is heavier than, is smaller 
than, ...). Thus, the set of all possible worlds in which things exist, 
coincides with the set of all possible worlds in which relations exist. 
Thus, in the modal interpretation of the notion of dependence, rela-
tions and things are mutually dependent and so must have the same 
degree of reality.
3.2 The a posteriori approach of ontological commitment
With the expression “ a posteriori approach” I do not mean a single 
doctrine, but a family of approaches that have in common the con-
temporary gloss of delegating to total science a central role for de-
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ciding questions of existence. The two most prominent theories are, 
insofar as I can see, Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment 
and Armstrong’s (and Schoemaker’s) a posteriori Realism.
With this approach, we learned to discuss questions of existence 
instead of reality of things. After all, existence is nearly a techni-
cal term. Of course, there is no agreement about it: is it a first or a 
second order predicate? Is there a difference between existence and 
subsistence? Is ontological existence nothing more than what is ex-
pressed by the quantifier? In any case, with this more technical term, 
philosophers now have the feeling they are making some progress on 
these questions.
According to Quine’s famous suggestion, ontological questions 
should be decided by means of the ontological commitment test. The 
test consists on a simple procedure: to translate the sentences of our 
best theories into canonical logic, determine the domain of quanti-
fication required to render this translation true, and read the entity 
commitments of the elements of the required domain. Of course, 
some paraphrasing is allowed during the translation – and here lies 
the clue of the story. Oriented by these rules, many philosophers 
engaged themselves in the Quinean ontological game: (1) search-
ing for sentences of natural science containing quantification over 
predicates (the Platonists), (2) trying to paraphrase these sentences 
without quantification over predicates (the nominalists), (3) showing 
that these paraphrases were not correct (the Platonists again), and 
so on. Thus, when we are willing to engage in this game for decid-
ing the existence of relations, we should simply search within our 
best theories for sentences containing quantification over relational 
predicates. 
The second contemporary criterion for “existence” or “reality” 
was proposed by Armstrong (1978). According to his “a posteriori 
Realism”, total science has to decide about what universals there are. 
Like Quine, he thinks that the mere existence of predicates is not 
sufficient to support the conclusion that a corresponding universal 
must exist. And, again like Quine, science plays a decisive role in 
deciding the existence of (monadic or dyadic) properties. But Arm-
strong’s criterion is not based on the determination of the domain 
of quantification of theories, but the question of what properties are 
linked in natural laws. Thus, for the particular case of relations, the 
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question would simply be: are there non-monadic properties linked 
by natural laws?
I think that the observance of some very simple examples would 
suffice to show the necessity of the commitment to relations for both 
criteria, the Quinean and the Armstrongian. Take, e.g.:
(1) Some physical interactions between spatially distant bodies 
are only attractive (gravity), others both attractive and repel-
ling (electromagnetism).
(2) Some causal connections in medicine (substances over physi-
ological processes) are explained, others unexplained. 
(3) Some alloying of metals can generate a material that is stron-
ger than their primary elements. (e.g. steel is stronger than 
iron)
(4) There is probabilistic (non-deterministic) causality in quan-
tum mechanics.
(5) Some matrimonies are recognized only in some, but not in all 
countries (e.g. homosexual matrimony). 
(6) Some killing is morally and legally justified (e.g. in case of 
self-defense)
I think all these sentences to be good candidates for supporting the 
existence of relations. They are considered true by our total world 
description and (some) are linked by natural laws (others by social 
sciences). Moreover, they all involve quantification over a relational 
predicate, and no paraphrase without quantification over the relation 
seems available. Of course, in each case, a detailed logical analysis 
would be required. But even if there were such a paraphrase, a search 
in the field of science would yield many others candidates.
Take (1) for instance. By existence generalization we can derive 
that there are physical interactions between spatially distant bodies, 
and interaction is essentially a relation. Take (5). The marriage of 
two men a and b conducted in a country where homosexual matri-
monies are legal is not recognized in another country. This does not 
mean that the particulars a or b are not officially recognized, but that 
a is married to b (the relation between a and b) is not recognized. 
Similar analysis could be offered for the other examples. In any 
case, I think by observing our normal world descriptions we obtain 
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enough grounds for supposing that relations are both constituents of 
natural laws (as Armstrong requires) and values of bounded variables 
of true sentences (as Quine requests).
4 Conclusion and open questions
At first sight, this paper could be seen as a defense of Russell’s posi-
tion, when I argued for irreducibility, externality and reality of—not 
of all, but of any—relations. Nevertheless, my ontological approach 
contrasts radically with Russell’s logical approach. For Russell, rela-
tions are external and real because they are irreducible, i.e. irreduc-
ibility, reality and externality are equivalent features of relations. I 
argued here, in contrast, in favour of the thesis that relations can be 
external and real independently of being irreducible.
One important methodological conclusion I think we should 
draw from this analysis is that philosophers are all too fast in con-
cluding general claims based on too few examples. In Wittgenstein’s 
words “A main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one 
nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example” (PI § 593). 
When I am right, some philosophers (including Leibniz, Mugnai and 
Heil) failed to correctly understand relations due to nourishing their 
thinking with only one kind of examples.
Guido Imaguire
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and LanCog Group 
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Let me try to explain from the outset what I mean by “spontaneous 
linguistic understanding” (SLU).  As a first approximation, it is the 
non-reflexive, fluent, direct and mostly non-inferential process by 
which a speaker-hearer dynamically, by considering usually stretches 
of discourse rather than isolated sentences, determines the intuitive 
truth conditions (or, in general, the satisfaction conditions) of the ut-
terances performed in a specific context of use. Most people on Earth 
enjoy that kind of experience all the time in their mother tongue. 
The view of SLU I shall try to develop here takes actions and plans 
as a starting point, that is, utterances usually performed as part of 
bigger plans. Rarely do we perform isolated actions; our actions, as 
a rule, are parts of plans, steps towards the achievement of a project. 
This, of course, holds for sequences of speech acts in a discourse 
or conversation. As there are always different ways to perform the 
same act-type, it is no surprise that there may be different ways to 
perform any speech act-type. 1 Utterances are actions, and SLU, as 
we shall see, is tied to occurrent understanding of utterances. SLU 
is also a dynamic process that considers a topic that can be devel-
oped in different ways. However, it is obvious that what has been 
said in a discourse or a conversation smoothly restricts what can be 
relevantly said soon afterwards.  In this process, truth conditions 
are grasped, especially those actually grasped and considered by the 
1 An act-type is denoted by an infinitive verb or a gerund; speech acts types 
denoted by illocutionary verbs share the same property: their performances vary 
and produce slightly, but meaningful different effects usually perceived by the 
hearers.
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agents of the context (intuitive truth conditions), and not those that 
derive only from the knowledge of the general conventions and rules 
of language.2
Perhaps, the best way to delimitate the foregoing concept is to 
contrast what it represents, first, with “interpretation” (by that I 
mean hermeneutic practices, the most common and the most so-
phisticated as well), clearly a reflexive and inferential activity, and 
second, with cases of communication when one does not master 
completely the language of the addressee. Then I present the distinc-
tion dispositional/occurrent understanding and two famous philo-
sophical programs: I see Davidson’s program as a hypothesis about 
the structure of dispositional understanding, while Gricean program 
provide an interesting view about utterance (occurrent) understand-
ing. I show that both programs are inadequate. I close the paper with 
a few suggestions on the status of semantic knowledge, on the im-
mediate object of SLU, and an attempt to defend the conjecture that 
spontaneous linguistic understanding is grounded on the more basic 
understanding of actions and situations.
1 A preliminary delimitation of the concept
A) Some historical milestones
As usual in contemporary philosophy, the idea is not radically new. 
SLU was a great concern in the tradition of ideational theory of lan-
guage, especially as developed by the most important proponent of 
that classical approach in the XVIIth century: Antoine Arnauld. He 
established such a contrast between the way most people, most of the 
time, understand utterances and judge the meaning of words, and 
the work done by hermeneutists. This way of judging spontaneously 
the meanings of words he called “sentiment,” something comparable 
to Chomsky’s speaker intuition, but not limited to syntax. It is, he 
said, the most universal and common way of judging almost every-
thing. It is also “the surest, the finest, and the subtlest.”
2 On intuitive truth conditions, see François Recanati, Truth-conditional Prag-
matics, Oxford, O.U.P., 2010; also his Literal Meaning, Cambridge, C.U.P., 2004.
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This is the way human beings assess almost all the variety of things 
in the world. We recognize at once that two very resembling persons 
are nonetheless different, without paying attention to details, to what 
is in the face of one that is not in the face of the other. The impression 
marks all this in the mind, without revealing distinctly the particular 
differences.3
Arnauld believed that this is the usual form of judgment we apply 
when we judge instantaneously (or “feel”) that two words with very 
similar meanings have nonetheless different senses or conditions of 
application. The sentiment is a basic discriminatory capacity; applied 
to semantics, it allows us to discern “at once the finest differences 
between expressions better than all the rules in the world.”4 The 
mind just “feels” differences that cannot be made explicit without 
difficulty. In these cases, as Michael Polanyi nicely once put it, “we 
can know more that we can tell”. Interestingly, Arnauld says that 
“the rules themselves are true only whenever they conform to the 
sentiment.”
Spontaneous understanding is the basis or starting point of any 
hermeneutic work. Arnauld contrasted this “sentiment” with the pig-
headedness of some hermeneutists (invariably his enemies, the Prot-
estants) who searched for hidden senses, sometimes a bit recherché, 
behind the words pronounced by ordinary people in ordinary cir-
cumstances.  For Arnauld & Nicole, to talk is to excite intentionally 
ideas in the mind of the hearer, or to cause intentionally a global 
impression in the mind of the hearer, and that impression is usually 
composed of ideas articulated in the sentence used, ideas inferred 
from the clues given by the speaker, and ideas neither articulated nor 
inferred (mimics, tone of voice, expressive character of gaze, etc.). 
So there is a clear distinction between the immediate understandings 
of utterances, that is, the global and complex impression received in 
a context of use, and the result of a discussion about what we should 
3 Antoine Arnauld & Pierre Nicole, [1669-1672], La Grande Perpétuité de la foi 
de l’Eglise catholique sur l’Eucharistie, [G.P.], publiée par l’Abbé M***, Paris, Im-
primerie de Migne, chez l’éditeur rue d’Amboise, Hors la barrière d’Enfer, 1841, 
Vol. 2, Book 1, p. 990. My translation. See also my paper (Leclerc, 2005). M. Po-
lanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1966/2009, 
first chapter, “Tacit knowing”, where Polanyi made very similar remarks.
4 Ibid, Vol. 2, Book II, chap. 1, p.122.
understand in the same context.
More recently, Wittgenstein changed the focus in his own work 
from the theory of meaning to the theory of understanding, and dis-
cussed at some length “immediate understanding” (unmittelbar Ver-
stehen), from the Big Typescript until the end of his life. As we know, 
linguistic understanding became a main concern in Wittgenstein’s 
last philosophy. In contrast, the Tractatus does not pay much attention 
to linguistic understanding, with the notable exception of T.4.024, 
which establishes for the first time an analytic connection between 
the notion of linguistic understanding and that of truth-conditions. 
In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein strives to show that 
understanding is not a state, an event, a process or an experience. As 
a matter of fact, there is no single experience (or state, process, etc.) 
to which linguistic understanding can be reduced. This is not to say 
that there are no experiences at all involved in the understanding of 
a sentence or an utterance. Michael Dummett insisted, rightly, that 
“we need an occurrent sense of ‘understand’…”5 Otherwise, the un-
derstanding of an utterance would be quite mysterious.
Still more recently, Burge drew a distinction between “compre-
hension” and “interpretation,” the first being basically non-reflexive 
and non-inferential:
Comprehension is understanding that is epistemically immediate, 
unreasoned, and non-inferential. First-person comprehension is the 
minimal understanding presupposed in any thinking, in beings that 
understand their thoughts at all.
[…] I include words, in a derivative sense, as things one can compre-
hend in the first-person way. One comprehends the words in one’s 
idiolect as one uses them. The comprehended words are the direct ex-
pression of thoughts one comprehends. They express one’s thoughts 
without mediation of further words or thoughts.
[…] Interpretation arises out of there being a question or issue about 
how to understand a candidate object of interpretation. Interpretation 
is always from the third person point of view. I conjecture that it is 
5 Dummett, M. (1993). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Cambridge (MA), Har-
vard University Press, p. 60; also on p. 103. For a discussion, see Guy Long-
worth, “A Plea for Understanding”, in S. Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in the Philosophy 
of Language. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009.
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always epistemically inferential.6
Interpretation is needed when something strange or surprising comes 
out, when there is a conflict or a disagreement as to the meaning of 
a sentence or of a stretch of a discourse. Interestingly, according to 
Burge, the first instance of understanding is the understanding of our 
own thoughts, and they are understood, mainly, in a non-inferential 
way. Of course, there are exceptions. After all, sometimes, people 
get confused; they don’t know exactly what they want, for instance. 
And there can be degrees of understanding, or an incomplete grasp-
ing of a proposition. One may discover that one’s belief that P has 
some unexpected presupposition or consequences. This corresponds 
to a deepening of our understanding. Thoughts readily expressible by 
linguistic means (full-fledged thoughts) and expressed by others are 
understood immediately when there is no need to interpret them.
B) Linguistic understanding in a language not fully mas-
tered
Now suppose you are a tourist visiting a country speaking a language 
you do not master very well. Setting aside segmentation problems, 
you can understand, at least on some occasions, what the natives 
mean, but the understanding of what they say exactly is a painful and 
frustrating process. You have to pay attention constantly at every 
word in every sentence; you have the impression that the natives 
speak very fast all the time; and to form a less than secure interpre-
tation of an utterance, you have to make a lot of inferences based 
on analytical hypotheses – to fill the gaps for the words you do not 
know yet – and on contextual clues. At night, you’re back to the 
hotel, usually with a headache. After a few weeks, you return to 
your homeland and speak with the members of your family. Here 
is the contrast: At home, you enjoy fluent, effortless experiences of 
linguistic understanding. Very much like perception, these experi-
ences are almost passive. You continuously get an “automatic,” fast 
and direct access to intuitive satisfaction conditions for any sentence 
6 Tyler Burge, “Comprehension and Interpretation”, in L.E. Hahn (ed.): The 
Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Chicago and La Salle, Open Court, 1999, 236-237.
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of any syntactic type. This is what I call “spontaneous linguistic un-
derstanding.”
2 Semantic knowledge
The analytic tradition has it that the understanding of a sentence is 
a kind of knowledge (knowledge of truth-conditions or satisfaction 
conditions).7 However, if that knowledge is propositional knowl-
edge, we can raise serious doubts on that traditional tenet. Is under-
standing a kind of knowledge at all? Some epistemological issues here 
are unavoidable.8 I believe there are experiences of understanding, 
even if these experiences are semantically irrelevant to determine 
the meaning of the word “understanding,” or even if none of these 
experiences could be correlated with something called “understand-
ing.” They are epistemologically important in order to distinguish 
linguistic understanding from the mere knowledge of the content of 
an utterance (What Is Said), and I believe they play an important role 
in the epistemology of testimony. SLU can be compare to perception 
on that score. I am allowed to testify in a court because I saw the 
murderer shooting the victim at midday, at an appropriate distance 
with my perfect vision, etc. In the same way, I am allowed to testify 
that, next door at the hotel, I heard a male voice in a tone of menace 
saying  “I’m gonna kill you, bitch!” and then a female voice scream-
ing “Help!”.  When the judge ask me, “Are you sure you heard just 
these words?” I can answer something like: “Well, the walls of the 
hotel are thin, the sounds was pretty distinct, and the accused speaks 
my mother tongue.” The experience of hearing the sounds and the 
experience of direct discourse recognition enable me to testify. The 
knowledge of what has been said (the content of an utterance) can 
also be obtained through a reliable translation, but understanding 
requires the autonomous exercise of conceptual abilities, the use of 
our own semantic knowledge.  So the kind of autonomous direct 
7 This has been challenged recently. See, Dean Pettit (2002), “Why Knowl-
edge is Unnecessary for Understanding Language”, Mind, Vol. 111, n. 443, July 
2002, 519-550.
8 Understanding is one of the main topics in the Epistemology of Language. 
See Alex Barber (ed.) (2003), Epistemology of Language, Oxford, O.U.P., 2003.
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access to content that characterizes understanding (in contrast with 
indirect access through translation) presupposes at least these expe-
riences.
If understanding is knowledge at all, what kind of knowledge is 
this? The Epistemic View takes understanding to be propositional 
knowledge of meaning. There are two steps leading to that conclu-
sion.9
1. A understands S iff A knows what S means;
2. A knows what S means iff A knows that S means m.
\    A understands S iff A knows that S means m.10
Step 2 is highly questionable.  According to the Epistemic View, 
knowledge of meaning is always propositional knowledge. If propo-
sitional knowledge of meaning is analyzed in terms of true justified 
belief (or any variation on that classical analysis, that is, one that in-
volves a belief), we should ask what kind of belief is that?  The basic 
axioms of a Davidsonian T-Theory do not qualify to be the content of 
a genuine belief. Disquotational axioms like
I. “Piaf ” refers to Piaf;
II. “Ella” refers to Ella;
or a compositional axiom of the form
III. “a is more famous than b” is true iff the denotation of “a” is 
more famous than the denotation of  “b”,
are not suited to be the content of a genuine belief, as Gareth Evans 
showed convincingly. A genuine belief can serve different projects. 
If I believe that the water in the bottle on my desk has been poisoned 
(Evans’ example), I can do different things on the basis of that be-
lief: committing suicide, killing someone by offering the water or 
by preparing a drink with that water, pouring the content of the 
9 See Dean Pettit (2002).
10 “A” stands for any agent of the context; “S” for any expression or sentence; 
and “m” for the meaning of S.
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bottle into the sink in order to prevent a tragedy, calling the police 
for investigating the case, etc. But what can I do with the belief that, 
say, “Lisbon” refers to Lisbon?  11  If the basic axioms of a T-Theory 
à la Davidson do not qualify as content for genuine belief, and if be-
lief is a necessary ingredient in any analysis of propositional knowl-
edge, then it seems that semantic knowledge cannot be propositional 
knowledge. Therefore, knowing what S means is not the same as 
knowing that S means m (where m can be a proposition, a concept, an 
idea, a function, a rule or an object).
Furthermore, propositional knowledge is “gettierable,” that is, it 
fails in Gettier cases. When a justified belief represents a contingent-
historical fact, it is always possible to devise a case à la Gettier for 
the corresponding knowledge. But this does not work for linguistic 
understanding.  Suppose that knowledge of meaning is propositional 
knowledge. Imagine you just immigrate in Brazil and start learning 
Portuguese with a closed group of friendly people. After a while, 
you talk good Portuguese fluently with these people. But they have 
enemies and these nasty, mischievous enemies of your new friends 
convince you, in English, that the Portuguese the friendly people 
taught you is all wrong; worst, they used false evidences that your 
friends misled you intentionally on most linguistic matters relative to 
Portuguese. Furious, you leave the community (the friendly people) 
believing that they played a trick on you and that you have good rea-
sons not to thrust what you have “learned” with them. You now be-
lieve you haven’t learned good Portuguese and you decided to start 
over learning by yourself in the street.  Surprisingly, however, you 
have the impression that you understand perfectly what any pedes-
trian you encounter randomly tells you; moreover, their behavior 
confirms your understanding. In such a predicament, it seems that 
firm propositional knowledge is not necessary for understanding. 
The impression that you are understanding already counts as under-
standing. Here is one of Pettit conclusions:
I went on to argue that understanding language does not even require 
belief. That is, to understand a bit of language with a certain  meaning, 
11 Gareth Evans, “Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge”, in S. Holtzmann & 
C. Leich (eds.) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, London, Routledge, 1981. Also in G. 
Evans, Collected Papers, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985/2002, 322-342.
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it is not necessary even to believe that it has that meaning. It is suffi-
cient, I have argued, that it seem to you to have that meaning, whether 
you believe it or not.12
There is some resemblance between Pettit’s conclusion and the senti-
ment described by Arnauld & Nicole, that spontaneous judgment on 
meaning on which the rules are based. Be that as it may, it is com-
monsensical that we know what we have learned (and not forgotten), 
and that natural languages are among the things we must learn. It 
is also obvious that in order to be able to understand a language, 
we must possess encyclopedic knowledge about the world, about 
the natural and social regularities. Linguistic conventions are social 
regularities. As it is hard to characterize satisfactorily the seman-
tic knowledge needed to talk and understand normally a language, I 
shall adopt, for the time being, a very modest approach. I shall avoid 
any intellectualistic view, including the epistemic view, and make 
the following, naïve presupposition: SLU presupposes a huge set of 
dispositions, some enabling discourse recognition, while others, ac-
tivated simultaneously, determine the contribution of sub-sentencial 
parts to the satisfaction conditions of illocutions of any type. By do-
ing this, I just follow uncompromisingly Evans’ suggestion:
I suggest that we construe the claim that someone tacitly knows a the-
ory of meaning as ascribing to that person a set of dispositions—one 
corresponding to each of the expressions for which the theory provides 
a distinct axiom.13
I think, however, that we must associate two dispositions to each ex-
pression. It is possible to recognize the token of a word as being the 
token of a type without knowing its meaning. Of course, Evans was 
interested only in semantic knowledge, but for those interested in 
SLU, discourse recognition is fundamental. The theory of meaning 
he has in mind is one that adopts the format advocated by Davidson 
in “Truth and Meaning” (1967), with basic axioms for each expres-
sion, singular terms and predicates as well, from which are derived 
theorems (the famous “T-sentences”) displaying the truth-conditions 
for each declarative sentence of the language. Interestingly, Davidson 
himself recognized that when he was speaking of “the theory a hear-
12 Pettit, op. cit., 548.
13 G. Evans, op. cit., p. 328.
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er has when he understands a speaker”, this was a mere façon de parler.
[…] I do not speak of implicit knowledge here or elsewhere: the point 
is not that speaker or hearer has a theory, but that they speak and un-
derstand in accord with a theory—a theory that is needed only when 
we want to describe their abilities and performance.14
That amounts to a kind of instrumentalism in theory of meaning. 
This is wise and prudent. But I think more can be said about the 
structure of dispositional understanding. I now turn to the distinction 
introduced by Michael Dummett between dispositional understanding 
and occurrent understanding. I shall defend that dispositional under-
standing must be relatively stable, while occurrent understanding is 
context-sensitive.15
3 Dispositional and occurrent understanding
While the theory of meaning has always been a main concern in ana-
lytic philosophy, the theory of linguistic understanding, strangely 
enough, did not receive the same attention.  But we already have at 
our disposal a few useful distinctions, and two important philosophi-
cal programs to start with.
As a first step, we have to distinguish two basic kinds of linguistic 
understanding. Firstly, the “occurrent understanding” of utterances; 
in that case what we understand is what the speaker means in the 
context of utterance. The understanding of utterances is not only 
the understanding of sentences-token; it is also and more basically 
the understanding of actions performed for such and such a primary 
reason in a highly specific context. Secondly, we also have a “disposi-
tional understanding” of sentences, expressions, bits of language; in 
that case, we understand what sentences mean, and they mean what 
they do in virtue of conventions, that is, social regularities of a cer-
tain type. The first kind of understanding clearly depends on the 
second kind of understanding. Quick occurrent understanding pre-
supposes the existence of a huge set of dispositions acquired along 
14 D. Davidson, “The Social Aspects of Language”, in Truth, Language and His-
tory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005, p.113.
15 For the distinction, see Michael Dummett, Origins of Analytical Philosophy, 
op. cit.
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the first years of a child’s life (in the case of a mother tongue). Seg-
mentation and discourse recognition would be impossible without 
this set of dispositions. This set represents the knowledge we have of 
a language (at least of our idiolect), that is, the abilities to speak and 
understand, to write and read. 16 Basically, this is the knowledge of 
sound patterns (phonological knowledge) and the knowledge of what 
these sound patterns are regularly used to mean (semantic knowl-
edge). Consequently, our concept of spontaneous linguistic under-
standing is tied to that of occurrent understanding. Dispositional 
understanding is not “spontaneous”. Occurrent understanding is the 
autonomous exercise of an ability that always takes place in a specific 
context of utterance.
Dispositional understanding (the understanding of language or 
bits of language) is the tacit knowledge of the sound pattern and 
meaning an expression has as a type. It is the knowledge a competent 
speaker-hearer brings with him/her in any new context of utter-
ance. There is an answer by “yes,” “no,” or “a little” to questions 
like: Do you know Japanese? Do you know Javanese? Do you know 
Spanish?  By answering “yes,” you are saying that you got through a 
process of learning, that you acquired and now possess a big set of 
dispositions that enables you to associate “automatically” senses to 
the characteristic sounds of a language. I think Austin’s concept of 
descriptive conventions is quite useful here. A descriptive convention 
correlates a word (a categorem) to kinds of things (objects, states of 
affairs, situations). Lexical meaning in natural language is specified 
by a “descriptive convention”. What we call “meaning,” in this sense, 
is abstracted from social regularities.  But the descriptive conven-
tions only specify kinds of objects, kinds of situations and states of 
affairs or facts. Take the word “coffee”. There is no such thing as 
“coffee-in-general”. The descriptive convention for “coffee” must in-
clude, mainly, coffee beans, coffee powder, and coffee in a liquid 
state.  Lexicographers have the choice between writing many differ-
ent dictionary entries for the same word (a bad choice), or just a few 
16 For an interesting suggestion as to the structure and working of these dis-
positions, see Gareth Evans, “Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge”, op. cit. 
For critiques and discussion of Evans’ ideas, see also Crispin Wright, “Theories 
of Meaning and Speakers’ Knowledge”, in Realism, Meaning and Truth. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1993, 204-238.
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entries, indicating how different meanings derive from a main “core 
meaning.” The second way of doing lexicography is certainly recom-
mendable. It follows Grice’s Razor in semantics: Do not multiply 
meanings beyond necessity, and keep semantics as simple as possible! 
For the word “coffee,” when it is used to refer to the color, this use is 
clearly derived, and the same holds for “a coffee” (a cup of coffee), a 
kind of metonymy. The “core meaning” first described in a diction-
ary is something like “the seeds of a tropical bush from which, once 
roasted and crushed, a black, bitter and stimulating drink is made by 
adding hot water”. Sometimes the stress is on the drink and not the 
seeds, but the whole information must be there. Determined by what 
Austin called “demonstrative conventions” (that correlate words and 
sentences to historical, real, specific objects and situations), related 
but slightly different semantic values are derived in context when 
“coffee,” for instance, is used in an utterance to refer to coffee in a 
specific state (fresh coffee, old bitter coffee, coffee beans, etc.).
Tacit knowledge of meaning is what feeds the experiences of un-
derstanding, but it is not itself an experience, at least not in the same 
sense as sensations, perceptions, emotions, imaginations or memo-
ries are said to be experiences (or parts of experiences). Tacit knowl-
edge of a meaning is a disposition.  These “automatic” sound-sense 
associations are practically independent of the will, like perception. 
As George Lakoff points out, it is impossible to follow the command: 
“Don’t think of an elephant!” 17 When we hear the word “elephant” 
we cannot help but thinking of an elephant, of a large animal with 
floppy ears and a trunk. We do not choose the meaning of the words 
we understand as we do not choose to see what we see when we 
open our eyes. Of course, there are exceptions, “local agreements” 
on meanings and stipulative definitions, but it is obvious that we can-
not do that massively and all the time. So, descriptive conventions, the 
object of dispositional understanding, must be relatively stable. Otherwise, 
it would be possible for everyone to develop something like a private 
language, so that, at the end of the day, our idiolects would be too 
divergent for the sake of communication.
Are there dispositional understandings of tokens produced on an 
17 See George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant! White River Junction (Ver-
mont), Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004.
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occasion? Well, suppose you open a text book of Basic English Gram-
mar and read a sentence given just as an example of a grammatically 
correct sentence, say “John and Mary are going to school by bus”. 
You do understand something, but this poor understanding of an iso-
lated sentence does not give you the knowledge of any specific situ-
ation, because the tokens of the words simply inherit the semantic 
properties of their corresponding types. No new and richer semantic 
values are contextually derived and the sentence, consequently, is 
not clearly truth-evaluable. The understanding we have of the sen-
tence certainly does not qualify as a case of spontaneous linguistic 
understanding. There are no intuitive truth conditions easily associ-
ated with the sentence. This is clearly not a serious and literal use 
of language. In semantics, since Frege, we all adopt the convention 
according to which the assessment of word meaning or a sentence 
meaning must proceed only on the supposition that the word or sen-
tence is used seriously and literally, and, I would like to add, as part of 
a whole discourse. The interpretation of isolated sentences, normally, 
is not much more than a simple conjecture. Sometimes a sentence 
is used seriously and literally but the result is not very convincing. 
Take the sentence “There is life on Mars” (Dummett’s example). If 
the understanding of a sentence is the knowledge of what is the case 
if it is true, what kind of knowledge do I have in such a case? 18 The 
mere disquotational truth conditions for that sentence (“There is life 
on Mars” is true iff there is life on Mars) are totally uninformative. 
An exobiologist would certainly have a different understanding from 
the rest of English speakers. Are there occurrent understanding of 
standing meaning (for expressions-type)? Well, it happens each time 
you take a dictionary, but once again, it does not qualify as “sponta-
neous.” 
Standing meaning, by definition, must be relatively stable. None-
theless, in natural languages, new uses of old words appear constant-
18 For a different opinion, see Guy Longworth, “A Plea for Understanding”, 
in Sawyer, S. (org.). New Waves in the Philosophy of Language. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2009, 138-163. As I said, cases of dispositional understanding of standing mean-
ing of expression-type, certainly do not qualify as “spontaneous.” Occurrent un-
derstanding of standing meaning emerge precisely when we do not understand 
the sentence used on a first reading; we have to stop, to think twice and to ana-
lyze its structure, check the lexical meaning, etc.
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ly. Take the word “here”. “Wait for me here!” usually means “around 
here”, not too far from the spot where you are right now, that is, 
where the utterance takes place. But nowadays, in many web pages, 
you find instructions saying: “Click here!”, and to follow the com-
mand, you have to click on the very token of the word “here”. This 
is a new (funny) use of the word, but no one ever had any problem 
in understanding it. Of course, the new use is related to the pre-
vious ones. Words in natural languages don’t have by convention a 
limited number of uses or possible understandings or senses, and 
our linguistic policy does not determine in advance all the correct 
understandings of a term.
The occurrent understanding of utterances usually involved tokens 
produced in the context of utterance. We always produce these to-
kens in a speciic situation. There is no such thing as coffee-in-general. 
The coffee we refer to is always fully determined, in a specific state 
(liquid, powder, or beans, etc.). Here the Austinian “demonstrative 
conventions” do the job, close the gap between the general and the 
specific, so to speak. A full semantic value for the token is derived in 
the context. Let me expand a little bit an interesting example given 
by J. M. Moravcsik.19 The word “walk” in the sentence “Jones had a 
walk” means different things if Jones is a healthy adult (she walked a 
few kilometers to stay in shape), or a toddler (she just gave her first 
steps in her whole life), or an elderly person in a hospital recovering 
from a serious disease (she walked painfully from his bed to the bath-
room and back), or an athlete that undergone a surgery in his knee 
(she will be back to her team soon), or if Jones is always seen running 
(by contrast, exceptionally, she walked!). In natural languages, most 
of the time, a sentence is correctly understood when it is understood 
differently in different contexts. The upshot here is that the spontaneous 
linguistic understanding of utterances in natural languages is context-sensi-
tive. 20 And the irst and immediate object of SLU is occasion meaning. It is 
useful to compare natural languages with the regimented languages 
19 See Julius Moravcsik (1998), Meaning, Creativity and the Partial Inscrutability 
of the Human Mind, Stanford, CSLI Publications, 1998.
20 That understanding in natural language is context-sensitive is a thesis devel-
oped at length by Charles Travis in Unshadowed Thought, Cambridge (MA), Har-
vard University Press, 2000. See also Occasion-Sensitivity, Oxford, O.U.P., 2008.
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used in sciences, where a sentence is correctly understood when all 
the members of the scientific community understand it in the same 
way. For that reason, ordinary language is unsuited for systematic 
theorizing, or for scientific investigation and communication. The 
betterment of scientific communication is precisely what justifies 
regimentation. In a regimented or ideal language, special (technical, 
theoretical) words and concepts are introduced through definitions, 
and to define is precisely to delimitate conditions of application.
Occurrent understanding of sentences proceeds, first, by iden-
tifying the derived semantic value of the sub-sentencial parts of the 
sentence; this always precedes any act of predication. The next step 
consists in identifying the act of predication, I mean, what is predi-
cated of what. This is the same as grasping a proposition. When the 
proposition grasped is a general one or a complex one, the identifica-
tion of the first and second order predication is required; otherwise, 
the argument must also be identified in case of atomic proposition of 
the form F(a). In case of relations, especially asymmetric relations, 
the order of predication is of course important. Predication (or func-
tional application) is the cement of propositions.  The identification 
of various constituents and structural elements looks like a complex 
process, but this is just a product of analysis.  When I see an old 
friend in a crowd, I do not pay any special attention to her eyebrows, 
chicks, hairs, the color of her eyes, etc. All this is familiar, and it is 
enough: I recognize her at once. The same holds for the spontane-
ous understanding of a sentence: if I know the words, and if the 
structure is not too complex, the proposition (or truth conditions) is 
grasped at once.
4 Davidson’s programme
How do we have a so quick access to the content of an utterance when 
the token produced is the token of a sentence never heard before? 
Davidson’s famous answer in 1967, before the qualifications added a 
few decades later, is that we must master somehow a compositional 
T-theory for the language we use. I see Davidson’s conception as an 
attempt to describe the structure of our dispositional understanding. 
The T-theory is a theory of meaning (and understanding) for that 
language, and he argued that the format of such a theory is analogous 
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to that of a formal system. First, we have a huge set of basic axioms 
specifying: a) the reference (meaning) of singular terms and b) com-
positional axioms for n-ary predicates; second, the T-sentences or 
theorems derived from the basic axioms and specifying the truth 
conditions for all the declarative sentences of the language.  For in-
stance, from the basic axioms I), II) and III) we can derive the fol-
lowing theorem or T-sentence:
IV. “Piaf is more famous than Ella” is true in English iff Piaf is 
more famous than Ella.
The theorem gives the truth conditions of the sentence-type men-
tioned, and explained how someone could understand that sentence 
on a first hearing.
There are a few worthy problems to be mentioned here, especially 
for those who believe that knowledge of meaning (as specified by the 
axioms) is propositional knowledge, and those who “psychologized” 
Davidson’s program in a cognitivist vein. 1) Truth conditions are not 
enough. As David Wiggins points out, when you try to pick up the 
right truth conditions of a sentence, say, “The Sun is behind cloud” 
(Wiggins’ example), you must already have an understanding of the 
sentence in order to stop the list of many other things you might put 
on the right side of the corresponding T-sentence: “The Sun is be-
hind cloud” is true in English iff the Sun is behind the cloud, and it is 
day time, the sun has risen, there are more people awake than asleep, 
etc. 21 Furthermore, we understand illocutionary acts, and not only 
propositional clause, that is, a pair composed of a force and a proposi-
tional content, and any strategy to reduce the non-declarative to the 
declarative fragment of a natural language faces problems, especially 
in the case of expressive illocutionary acts. 2) An informative and 
non-circular specification of our knowledge of meaning expressed 
by the basic axioms has still to be produced; without a mode of pre-
sentation for the meaning, it seems that that cannot be done (this is 
21 See David Wiggins, “Meaning and Truth Conditions: From Frege’s Grand 
Design to Davidson’s”, in B. Hale and C. Wright (Eds.), A Companion to the philoso-
phy of Language, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997, p. 7. For similar remarks, see Scott So-
ames, What Is Meaning?, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010, chapter 3.
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Stephen Schiffer’s mode of presentation problem).22 3) As we have 
seen, a genuine propositional attitude is one that may serve many 
purposes and interact with other attitudes, as Gareth Evans rightly 
observed. This is clearly not the case of the knowledge of meaning 
expressed by the basic axioms. So it is at least doubtful that the basic 
axioms express genuine propositional knowledge. Almost 20 years 
after “Truth and Meaning” (1967), Davidson acknowledged the fact 
that the mastering of a T-theory is not enough for the understand-
ing of an utterance and that its specification is always incomplete; an 
interpreter also needs a “passing theory”.23
5 Grice’s program
Grice’s program focuses on occurrent understanding, that is, the un-
derstanding of utterances. The understanding of an utterance takes 
place when the hearer (the audience) recognizes the speaker’s in-
tention to cause a certain effect precisely by the recognition of that 
intention. The whole process of identification (recognition) of speak-
er’s intention is regularly taken to be an inferential process. Grice’s 
program faces problems too. 1) It does not accommodate very well 
the conventional aspects of communication and understanding; 2) It 
does not cope quite well with situations of counter-suggestion, con-
fession and the anti-lying problem;24 3) Above all, it describes occur-
rent understanding mainly, if not exclusively, as an inferential pro-
cess, so that there is no special difference between the understanding 
people have when they are speaking their mother tongue, and the 
22 See S. Schiffer, “The Mode of Presentation Problem”, in C. Anthony An-
derson & J. Owens (Eds.), Propositional Attitudes. The Role of Content in Logic, Lan-
guage and Mind. Stanford, CSLI Publications, 1990, 249-268. Also, by the same 
author, “Knowledge of Meaning”, in A. Barber (Ed.), Epistemology of Language, 
Oxford, O.U.P., 2003, 303-324.
23 See D. Davidson, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, in Lepore, E. (ed.), 
Truth and Interpretation: Perspective on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell, 1986.
24 For an exposition of these problems, see Alex Barber, “Truth Conditions 
and Their Recognition”, in A. Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, op. cit, 367-
395.
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kind of understanding a tourist has in a foreign country. Moreover, 
Grice’s approach does not represent correctly the difference between 
the spontaneous linguistic understanding of ordinary people in ordi-
nary circumstances, and the work done by hermeneutists.  In other 
words, the Gricean program does not describe correctly occurrent, 
fluent, effortless understanding. For that reason, like Millikan, Re-
canati and others, I believe that understanding is better modeled as a 
kind of perception.25
6 Perception and inference: a digression
Sometimes the difference between perception and inference is not 
that clear and it seems that we have a mere difference of degree. You 
need to change your spectacles and go to consult your oculist. There 
are the letters projected on the wall; the first lines are easy, but the 
letters become smaller and smaller until you reach a point at which 
you are not anymore clearly perceiving, nor clearly inferring: Is it an 
“E” or an “F”? 
In Leclerc (2009, 267-268) I mention 
[…] a common distinction in the literature about two exclusive ways 
of representing communication and linguistic understanding: Firstly, 
there was the Code Model, sometimes called “the Expressive View”, 
associated with Aristotle’s De interpretatione and also to Port-Royal’s 
Grammaire générale et raisonnée. This is certainly and by far the most 
enduring and influential conception of human communication in the 
whole history of philosophy. […] The aim of any act of communication 
according to the Code Model is to share the same meanings. Second-
ly, there is the Inferential Model, sometimes called the “Convergence 
View,” initiated half a century ago by Grice and developed also by Sper-
ber & Wilson. Davidson (1986) can also be seen as a proponent of this 
view. Here, the measure of success in human communication is the 
correct identification of speaker’s meaning or intention through infer-
ential processes, or to converge on the same meanings and to make the 
same inferences.
That Code-Inference opposition in the theory of communication and 
understanding is one more idealized opposition in which no one fits, 
25 Ruth Millikan, Varieties of Meaning. The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures, Cambridge 
(MA), MIT Press, 2005; and Language: A Biological Model, Oxford, O.U.P., 2005. 
Also, François Recanati, “Does Linguistic Communication Rest on Inference?”, 
Mind & Language, Vol. 17, numbers1 and 2 February/April, 105–126, 2002.
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one more procrustean bed. Both models are clearly incomplete. SLU 
must accommodate short and fast inferences. The stock example is 
the sentence “She took the keys and opened the door”. We all un-
derstand (infer) that she opened the door with the keys, even if that 
component is not articulated in the sentence. A mother says to her 
son who is crying because of a very small cut on the tip of a finger: 
“Come on, you are not going to die” (Recanati’s example); the intui-
tive proposition (or truth conditions) expressed here is that the boy 
in not going to die because of the small cut, and not, of course, that the 
boy is immortal. Many cases of contextual “enrichment” (Recanati’s 
expression) are of this kind. The same holds for malapropisms. But 
not everything is inferred in linguistic understanding.
We have seen that there is an intuitive difference between know-
ing the content of an utterance, and understanding it. If a reliable 
translator tells me that an utterance in Russian means that Putin is 
wise, I am in a position to claim that I know the content of the utter-
ance, but certainly not in a position to claim that I understand the ut-
terance. SLU requires a strong degree of epistemic intimacy with the 
tokens produced in the context and the autonomous exercise of tacit 
semantic knowledge. To use a distinction made in Phenomenology 
and Gestalt psychology, in the perception of the tokens produced in 
the context of utterance, the subsidiary attention is directed to the 
sounds perceived (discourse recognition), but the focal attention is 
directed to the senses of the expressions, to the content of the utter-
ance. In the same way, the pianist’s focal attention is directed to the 
melody and the quality of her interpretation, not to the position of 
her fingers. Similarly, when we perceive objects around us, the focal 
attention is directed to the objects themselves and not to the shape, 
size or colors.
Grice’s program is based on Mindreading (the identification of 
speaker’s intention is certainly a form of Mindreading). But I don’t 
think that Mindreading is best reconstructed as a kind of inference 
by analogy. It can be reconstructed as a kind of perception too. This 
is how I understand Alvin Goldman’s simulation theory of Mind-
reading. Mindreading has been invoked a long time ago as a corner-
stone of language use by Antoine Arnauld, classified as a proponent 
of the Code Model. Here is a quote from the Great Arnauld:
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One cannot reflect, however little, on the nature of human language 
without recognizing that it is entirely grounded on that imperfect pen-
etration of the mind of the others. That is why, when speaking, there 
are many things we do not need to express.  (My translation)
We wouldn’t speak the way we do if our minds would be totally 
opaque to each other.
There is another analogy between perception and SLU. Percep-
tion is a dynamic process based on a retention-projection structure. 
We do not perceive all the sides of an object at once. On the basis of 
what we just perceived we project or anticipate the perception of the 
other sides. Sometimes we commit mistakes. We thought that we 
were seeing a house, but it is only a façade put there by the staff of a 
filmmaker. But perception is a self-correcting process. Mispercep-
tion is corrected by perception. SLU is also a dynamic process. Con-
versations usually involve turn-taking and sequences of utterances. 
Rarely do we have to understand isolated utterances. The utterances 
we just understood determine what Grice called in his famous Prin-
ciple of Cooperation “the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange in which you are engaged.” 26 They also help us to restrict 
the range of possible interpretations for the new utterances produced 
in the talk exchange and to project further possible developments in 
the conversation.
7 Conclusion: plans, scripts and situations 27
The approach I am trying to develop is not new. It is a bottom-top 
approach in which it is semantics that must answer to pragmatics, 
as Brandom once put it.  The approach is based on ideas that can be 
traced back to the works of Arnauld, Peirce, Wittgenstein, Austin 
and more recently Travis and Recanati. In Leclerc (2009, 271), I gave 
it the following wording:
26 Paul Grice, “Logic and Conversation”, in P. Grice, Studies in the Way of 
Words. Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1989, p. 26. 
27 Part of the material of this section has been published in Manuscrito, Vol. 32, 
nº1, jan-jun, 2009, Special Issue: Semantic Content and Communication. A. Leclerc, 
E. Perini-Santos & M. Ruffino (eds.). See my “Meanings, Actions and Agree-
ments”, in that issue, 249-288.
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Actions and practices are the roots of linguistic understanding. In a 
pragmatic approach, we start with actions, of which speech acts are 
important sub-species, and actions are what we interpret. Actions are 
performed for different reasons, and are parts of bigger plans. Words 
and sentences are seen and understood as instruments used in the performance of 
actions. My suggestion is that we should consider plans or scripts and 
not only actions, as the unit of investigation. I also suggest that the 
expectations of agents (speakers-hearers), and the correct identifica-
tion and understanding of these expectations, are especially important 
for the determination of the sense of the words used in an occasion. 
In other words: The root of any distinction in thought and in the 
sense of linguistic expressions is found in its sensible effects, in our 
practices, plans and activities. This principle I call the Principle of 
the Determination of Sense.
What makes this principle so important is the phenomenon of the 
plasticity or underdetermination of sense in ordinary language, the 
fact that different tokens of the same sentence-type may have dif-
ferent truth conditions in different contexts of use. On that score, 
Austin’s theory of truth accommodates that phenomenon much bet-
ter than Tarski’s.
SLU presupposes a great dose of “worldliness and reasonable-
ness”, as Travis (2000) used to say. We share the same world, as 
Davidson pointed out. However, taken at its face value, that does 
not take us very far. The knowledge of the world is very different 
from one person to the next. And the world we live in – not the one 
described by physics – is forever changing. The same could be said 
of the knowledge of our language (as the norm of a community). We 
know that social class, education and learning, scientific discipline, 
influences from good or bad neighborhood, etc. may contribute to 
create discrepancies among the idiolects of the people living in the 
same community (What we call “ordinary language” itself is chang-
ing all the time, even if you define it as the degree zero of “regimen-
tation”.)
But “our knowledge of the world” can be understood alternatively 
as something that comprehends, I still believe,
[…] all the knowhow, all the practices we learn just by growing up 
in a community, with almost everyone as a teacher, including social 
regularities like linguistic conventions, an especially important kind 
of social regularity. This is huge and widely shared among the members of the 
community. We do not agree or converge on meaning simply because 
we “grasp” somehow the same eternal “forms,” but rather because we 
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share a world in which we are integrated, and because we are worldly 
enough to see what to expect from each other. Our mutual linguistic 
understanding relies on that encyclopedic knowledge concerning how 
things are and how they are made, and on basic discriminatory ca-
pacities and abilities like mindreading and inferential ability. (Leclerc, 
2009, 279).
For that reason, I do not believe that SLU correspond to a module 
of the mind. It does not satisfy two basic conditions for modularity: 
informational encapsulation, and domain specificity.
Now I want to suggest an idea that cannot be fully developed 
here. Consider for one moment the internal accusative of the verb 
“understanding”. The list covers almost everything that is intel-
ligible. We understand sentences, languages, cultures, books, face 
expressions, persons, attitudes, expectations, arithmetical series, 
problems, strategies, musical phrases, paintings, narratives and situ-
ations, physical systems, mechanisms, and certainly much more. My 
suggestion is that “linguistic understanding is only a part of it, and 
not an autonomous (modular) one. Linguistic understanding relies on 
more primitive forms of understanding, specially the understanding of situ-
ations.” (Leclerc, 2009, 274).  It is not easy to say exactly what a 
situation is. A sentence-type describes a generic situation that may 
be found (or not) in the world. But we saw that the tokens of declara-
tive sentences are always produced in a very specific situation, where 
the demonstrative conventions anchor the constituents of the sen-
tence to specific, concrete objects, historical facts, etc. As a first ap-
proximation, I would say that a specific situation involves essentially 
agents with their expectations and plans, and how things are and could 
be. In ordinary language, an understanding of the specific situation 
(including the identification of expectations, intentions and plans 
through mindreading) is usually decisive for a correct understanding 
of the token produced in the context. I think Austin’s theory of truth 
captures very well that difference, with its two types of conventions 
(descriptive and demonstrative). Take a sentence (token) from the 
specific situation where it has been produced, and many possible 
different understandings immediately come to mind. For instance, 
Putnam’s example, “there is a lot of coffee on the table”, can be true 
in very different settings, where “the way things are” might differ 
drastically (if there is a big coffee pot on the table, or if there are 
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bags of coffee beans on the table, or if someone spilt an entire coffee 
cup on the table, etc. We understand differently tokens of the same 
sentence because we have an understanding of the way things are 
in the specific situation we are in. A sentence taken from a specific 
context of use may serve different purposes from the one for which 
it has been uttered.
Now, consider the following sentences:
(a) You are very much Paris.
(b) Give peace a chance!
(c) Pride has a city!
(d) The Cardinal Mazarin has sent here his hemispheres.
(e) John speaks fluently English.
The first three are literal “nonsenses”, but we do understand them 
easily. a) means that the addressee behaves very much like people do 
in Paris; b) means that we should try to create conditions for peace; 
c) that the people are proud of their city, and so are their servers in 
City Hall; d) is a malapropism. It really happened in Paris Parlia-
ment in the XVIIth century, but the deputy who uttered the sentence 
was immediately understood as saying: The Cardinal Mazarin has 
sent here his emissaries. e) is perceived as ungrammatical. We hear 
and understand easily a lot of ungrammatical sentences, especially 
from children.  These cases are marginal, of course, but they re-
veal something interesting for my purpose. SLU is understanding 
of utterances, of actions performed for such and such a reason, and 
its first and primary object is occasion meaning. Occasion meaning 
is the result of a pre-propositional “modulation” (Recanati’s expres-
sion) of standing meaning. The common use of language is a rule-
governed rational activity, and rationality is precisely an unlimited 
capacity to realize intentional adjustments in a huge diversity of con-
text. We revise our beliefs and plans constantly in the light of new 
information and evidence.  This is what we do when we speak, and 
we speak in order to be understood. When we understand enough 
of the situation we are in, including the expectations and plan of the 
speaker, the words we hear are taken to carry the occasion meaning 
that most relevantly may contribute to the success of speaker’s ac-
tions and plans at the moment of the utterance. It is that understand-
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ing of the specific situation that enables us to understand easily and 
spontaneously ungrammatical sentences and malapropisms. If SLU 
were a kind of unconscious word processing mechanism, our ability 
to understand utterances involving deviant sentences would be seri-
ously impaired.
André Leclerc
Federal University of Ceará-Fortaleza
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1 Introdução
Uma tese largamente difundida e aceite na comunidade musicológica 
é a de que os juízos de valor em música são fundamentalmente uma 
questão de gosto subjectivo moldado pelo contexto músico-cultu-
ral e pela tradição. Esta tese é principalmente reflectida nas análises 
de obras musicais, mas é facilmente transponível para o domínio da 
execução de tais obras, no qual ela consiste basicamente numa forma 
de pluralismo interpretativo, isto é, a ideia de que há várias interpre-
tações incompatíveis de cada obra igualmente correctas e (estetica-
mente) boas, não havendo uma interpretação que seja a única maxi-
mamente correcta e boa.1
Esta situação contrasta com duas práticas bem estabelecidas na 
cultura musical actual no domínio da música clássica da tradição oci-
dental: a dos concursos para intérpretes e a da crítica de execuções, 
quer ao vivo, quer gravadas. Neste último domínio, em particular, 
1 Um exemplo: “I would like [...] to propose an indefinite moratorium on 
equations of analysis and value judgement, and indeed more broadly on equations 
of academic research and aesthetic approval. [...] It seems to me that the idea of 
the musical academy acting as some kind of quality control, with musicologists or 
theorists issuing admission tickets to a canonic hall of fame, is way past its sell-
by date, and that the prerequisite for a more open-minded approach to musical 
culture than musicology has traditionally had is a more modest intellectual ambi-
tion: to register, to describe, to establish the facts as they are. [...] Of course, we 
cannot entirely eliminate our sense of what is good and bad from our professional 
work. But we can make a conscious attempt to moderate its influence” (Cook 
2003: 261).
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existe uma grande abundância de produção quotidiana de tipo mais 
ou menos jornalístico, evidentemente com níveis diferentes de com-
petência e exigência. Como todas as actividades críticas, esta supõe 
a crença nalgum grau de objectividade nos juízos de valor estético, 
sem o qual não faria sentido que o crítico, para além de descrever 
uma execução, se pronunciasse quanto ao seu valor. De modo ra-
zoavelmente compreensível, são muitos os musicólogos que encaram 
com grande desconfiança uma actividade que não só é quase sempre 
pouco académica e científica, como ainda para mais adopta, implícita 
ou explicitamente, critérios de objectividade ou monismo estético. 
Tal desconfiança explica a recepção fria e talvez um pouco paterna-
lista concedida por essa comunidade aos poucos estudos musicológi-
cos com credenciais académicas que tentam demonstrar, mediante a 
análise musical, que algumas escolhas interpretativas são melhores 
do que outras na medida em que se adequam melhor à obra a execu-
tar.2 Quanto aos concursos, eles são geralmente rejeitados, e não só 
por musicólogos, como eventos com um certo carácter circense, de 
interesse para a psicologia e a sociologia da música, nos quais pouco 
mais do que a habilidade técnica – e não o valor interpretativo - é 
apreciado e classificado.
Se afastarmos as razões de falta de competência, experiência, in-
formação, sensibilidade ou parcialidade que colocam a maioria dos 
críticos de execuções de obras musicais num patamar demasiado 
abaixo do representado pela fasquia do crítico ideal de Hume, põe-
se o problema: serão todas, ou pelo menos a grande maioria, das 
opções interpretativas, em última análise, igualmente defensáveis, 
sendo assim o seu valor estético ou artístico irremediavelmente rela-
tivo? Neste ensaio, e no seguimento de uma crítica anterior (Lopes 
2006) às posições relativistas de Jerrold Levinson (Levinson 1987), 
defenderei uma resposta negativa, sugerindo que, à semelhança do 
que é defendido por muitos acontecer nas artes em geral,3 há um 
2 Dois exemplos são Berry (1989) e Narmour (1988)
3 Esta tese pode ser lida como pressupondo que se está a tratar execuções 
musicais (produto) como obras de arte. No entanto, é possível limitarmo-nos 
ao pressuposto mais fraco e pacífico de que elas (acto e/ou produto) são, pelo 
menos, arte – parte da arte musical. Para uma boa defesa de ambas as ideias, ver 
Kivy 1995, 122 ss.
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espectro de objectividade ou universalidade na aceitação de juízos so-
bre o valor de execuções musicais, que vai de um extremo de objec-
tividade (quase) total ao da relatividade (muito provavelmente) total. 
Para essa defesa serão apresentados alguns exemplos de domínios da 
execução musical nos quais certas estratégias ou escolhas interpreta-
tivas são claramente preferíveis a outras, sendo que, se essas o são, 
outras o poderão ser também. Os exemplos pretendem ser válidos 
pelo menos para a música tonal-modal, embora a sua transposição 
para algumas outras linguagens musicais da tradição ocidental seja 
relativamente linear. Isto bastará para demonstrar a falsidade da tese 
mencionada no início, e apoiar uma forma de monismo ou objecti-
vismo molto moderato no campo da execução musical, alicerçado em 
princípios estéticos que, embora reconhecidos como suplantáveis ou 
fracos, no sentido de Sibley,4 são, ainda assim, princípios.
1.1 Textura e condução de vozes: polifonia versus melodia 
acompanhada
Uma distinção básica que abrange a maioria das obras da tradição 
ouvidas nas nossas salas de concerto diz respeito à textura da música. 
Por um lado, temos música que consiste numa voz principal, de ca-
rácter melódico, acompanhada por outras subordinadas, geralmente 
com ritmos e desenhos uniformes e relativamente simples, que as 
aglutinam entre si (usualmente em acordes, arpejados ou não) num 
plano de fundo e as distinguem da melodia. Um bom exemplo disso 
será uma secção de uma peça para piano do classicismo.
 W.A. Mozart: Início da Sonata em Dó maior K. 545
4 Sibley 1989
Por outro lado, temos as texturas polifónicas, em que as várias vozes 
gozam de grande independência nos planos rítmico e melódico, ainda 
que uma delas – por exemplo, a mais aguda – possa ser auditivamente 
seguida com maior facilidade. Para além disso, este tipo de textura 
articula-se muito frequentemente em função de temas (e contra-te-
mas ou respostas), geralmente enunciados na entrada de cada voz, 
e do contraste entre, por um lado, momentos mais marcados pela 
presença desses temas etc., e, por outro, episódios mais, ou com-
pletamente, livres. Um bom exemplo disso será uma fuga barroca.
J. S. Bach: Fuga 17 do Cravo Bem Temperado, Livro I
Dadas estas duas texturas contrastantes, parece evidente que a esco-
lha interpretativa que melhor as serve, e que é seguida por quase to-
dos os intérpretes e educadores, consiste em dar maior saliência à voz 
que tem um papel mais destacado em cada uma dessas texturas. As-
sim, na melodia acompanhada, a melodia deverá prevalecer durante 
a maior parte do tempo, enquanto na fuga são as várias entradas das 
vozes que serão destacadas enquanto enunciam o tema, diminuindo 
de seguida a atenção a elas dada (o contratema beneficiará geralmente 
de uma saliência moderada, estando o tema simultaneamente presen-
te noutra voz). Em geral, o destaque é gerido em função do material 
temático e da relação que a sua presença numa voz estabelece entre 
essa e as restantes vozes. Por exemplo, num stretto, em que as vozes 
entram com o tema começando na voz seguinte antes de a voz ante-
rior ter acabado de enunciar o tema completo, sugerindo a imagem 
de um “atropelo” com acumulação de tensão, teremos de moderar a 
saliência de uma voz antes de ela terminar o tema. Por outro lado, 
secções da música em que não é apresentado o tema (nem o contra-
tema) merecem menos destaque global.
É um facto que há regras específicas de cada contexto histórico-
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musical que se aplicam à execução das obras nele criadas em termos 
de textura. No entanto, elas indicam-nos o modo de efectivar a estra-
tégia interpretativa que é julgado adequado nesse contexto, e não que 
não deve haver distinção de relevância entre as vozes. Por exemplo, 
o modo mais óbvio de concretizar a hierarquia de vozes e/ou mate-
rial temático é através da dinâmica: uma voz será ouvida como mais 
importante se soar mais forte do que as restantes. Este não é contudo 
o único meio, embora seja o menos subtil e mais eficaz. Ora, certos 
instrumentos, como o cravo e o órgão, não permitem tocar com 
maior volume as diferentes vozes que são tocadas no mesmo tecla-
do. Contudo, a regra aplica-se aí também, com a diferença de que a 
saliência deverá ser realizada através da articulação (mais ligado ou 
mais destacado) e do rubato (pequenos atrasos ou acelerações). Por 
outro lado, o cravo, ou pelo menos alguns cravos, beneficiam tam-
bém de uma diferenciação tímbrica de registos dentro de um mesmo 
teclado que, de um modo subtil mas real para o ouvido experiente, 
contribui para a hierarquização das vozes na ausência do recurso da 
dinâmica. Aliás, o modelo da forma polifónica é, em grande parte do 
repertório, e certamente no anterior ao séc. XIX, a música vocal, e 
nesta é sempre possível, por recursos dinâmicos, agógicos, tímbricos 
e outros, conferir destaque à voz ou vozes desejadas.
Do mesmo modo, também no caso da textura de melodia acompa-
nhada há pelo menos uma escolha interpretativa – dar ou não relevo à 
melodia (principal) – que quase não é escolha alguma, na medida em 
que não o fazer seria visto como falta grave de musicalidade, ou mes-
mo incompreensão da natureza da obra musical ou do excerto em 
causa. Este carácter objectivo e artisticamente imperioso da atenção 
à melodia na textura em questão reforça pelo menos um monismo in-
terpretativo moderado, sendo contudo certamente compatível com 
o relativismo em outros aspectos relacionados. Assim, a importância 
da melodia tem de ser evidente, ainda que haja momentos em que 
faz sentido suavizá-la um pouco em proveito de algo musicalmente 
relevante a ocorrer simultaneamente numa melodia secundária ou 
mesmo na estrutura harmónica ou rítmica do acompanhamento. 
Além disso, diferentes intérpretes valorizarão de diferentes maneiras 
as melodias secundárias eventualmente formadas no seio do acom-
panhamento, de entre as quais devemos ainda distinguir as que mais 
claramente foram intencionadas como melodias de algum relevo pelo 
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compositor e aquelas que o próprio intérprete realmente descobre na 
textura. Finalmente, aqui como no caso da textura polifónica, o re-
pertório de meios musicais que é possível empregar na diferenciação 
e condução de vozes está mais ou menos objectivamente delimitado, 
mas as escolhas dentro desses limites fazem parte do domínio da li-
berdade artística do intérprete, com resultados por vezes mais, por 
vezes menos, difíceis de antever num raciocínio indutivo, i.e., mais 
ou menos regrados por princípios universalizáveis, tal como sucede 
com a escolha dos meios usados para realçar os temas ou para assina-
lar a diferença entre exposição e episódio numa fuga.
Repare-se que este tipo de escolha interpretativa está alicerçado 
em propriedades do conteúdo melódico e rítmico da própria músi-
ca – incluindo as características gerais que fazem de algo uma (boa) 
melodia tonal ou modal – e em realidades da nossa percepção au-
ditiva – não é possível ter sempre a mesma atenção auditiva a todas 
as vozes, ou pelo menos, não é desejável interpretá-las desse modo 
–, e não em padrões de gosto pessoal ou contextual. Todo o ouvin-
te competente deve ouvir como monótona, para além de confusa, 
uma execução que apresente a obra como desprovida de qualquer 
destaque e diversidade nos parâmetros referidos.5 Podemos então 
falar, parece, de um princípio consideravelmente geral que podería-
mos baptizar como “o que é interessante deve ser relevado”, de onde 
se derivam princípios mais específicos como o relativo à execução 
de música com as texturas que acabamos de analisar. A projecção 
da sinergia entre informação e diferenciação conseguida mediante a 
aplicação destes princípios mais específicos poderia ser interpretada, 
em termos dos cânones de Beardsley, como favorecendo um equilí-
brio entre variedade e unidade que resultará numa maior intensidade 
expressiva. Assim, não faria sentido alguém usar este tipo de diferen-
ciação, quando aplicado correctamente, i.e., às vozes correctas nos 
momentos correctos, como razão para justificar um juízo estético 
negativo sobre a execução em causa.
5 Tal opção pode ser uma virtude em casos como o de alguma música minimal 
repetitiva, e talvez em algumas obras neo-clássicas, mas trata-se evidentemente de 
excepções.
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1.2 Clarificação da textura orquestral
Outro princípio específico relativamente ao qual parece haver uma 
larga concordância entre críticos, senão mesmo unanimidade, entre 
músicos e críticos, é a de que uma execução de música de conjunto, 
com especial relevo para a orquestral, que consegue clarificar em 
grau elevado a textura, os timbres, as vozes polifónicas e suas grada-
ções dinâmicas, etc., é, ceteris paribus, uma melhor execução do que 
uma que não o consegue ou o consegue em grau inferior.
Para avaliarmos esta tese, convém situarmo-nos num segmento 
do repertório em que poderia parecer que tais qualidades são, não 
uma virtude, mas um defeito da execução. Tanto quanto me é dado 
ver, o melhor candidato seria, por exemplo, uma obra orquestral 
grandiosa, sombria e solene do romantismo tardio.6 Quando é que 
a clarificação das texturas seria uma falha na sua execução? Apenas, 
parece-me, se essa clarificação for inevitavelmente prejudicial a va-
lores importantes para o estilo em causa (por exemplo, a sensação 
de peso orquestral, especialmente nos graves, a grandiosidade e a 
acumulação/resolução de tensão nos clímaxes, o carácter vibrante 
e o vibrato propriamente dito) e não trouxer outros atributos ao ní-
vel dos elementos da textura que evidencia ao clarificar, que possam 
contrabalançar as perdas nos elementos importantes acima referidos. 
Assim sendo, esta excepção é de certo modo também ela dotada de 
regras, não estando completamente mergulhada em relativismo. De 
qualquer modo, em todos os outros casos, que são a grande maioria, 
parece absurdo afirmar que uma dada execução é pior pelo facto de 
clarificar a textura polifónica de uma obra – mesmo a de uma do 
repertório acima mencionado, sendo a dificuldade em obter nela tal 
clareza muitas vezes um factor de desafio aos intérpretes que lhes 
granjeia mérito adicional da parte da crítica, no caso de serem bem 
6 Para quem não possa passar sem um exemplo concreto, talvez a 8ª Sinfonia 
de Bruckner, ou a maior parte das passagens orquestrais do Crepúsculo dos Deuses, 
de Wagner. A sugestão da música orquestral do impressionismo francês poderia 
parecer ser também um terreno adequado para a colheita de contra-exemplos. 
No entanto, ele é menos propício do que é aparente, dada a preferência dos com-
positores franceses (especialmente Ravel) e dos seus intérpretes nativos por tex-
turas transparentes e pouco pastosas, e pela moderação nos tempi, como noutros 
parâmetros.
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sucedidos. Afirma-se, isso sim, que uma tal execução é má porque, 
à força de querer clarificar texturas, perde em características do tipo 
das acima referidas no repertório adequado e quando estas têm um 
peso elevado.7 Se tudo permanecer igual, porém, uma execução só 
poderá, em geral, ser melhor por obter essa clarificação, expondo à 
atenção do público mais detalhes composicionais interessantes que 
de outra forma permaneceriam obscurecidos. Com efeito, é até de-
fensável que mesmo nos casos em que a clarificação revele alguma 
superficialidade ou falta de sofisticação na textura de uma obra, a 
revelação seja ainda um mérito enquanto qualidade da execução, por 
nos permitir analisar e avaliar com mais informação e maior correc-
ção e justiça a obra executada.8
Um bom exemplo da quase universalidade deste tipo de prefe-
rência pode ser encontrado no sucesso do chamado movimento da 
“interpretação historicamente informada” (ou, no seu infeliz título 
original, felizmente evitado hoje em dia, movimento da “interpre-
tação autêntica”). A procura dos meios e estilos de execução que re-
pliquem as condições originais dos contextos de criação e estreia das 
obras teve certamente a seu favor muitos componentes de carácter 
ideológico.9 No entanto, com o passar do tempo e a perspectiva his-
tórica sobre o próprio movimento, podemos afirmar com segurança 
que as marcas características que ele nos trouxe de novo face ao pa-
radigma tardo-romântico – entre outras, texturas mais transparen-
tes, articulação mais pronunciada, maior relevo de tempos fortes no 
compasso, grande atenção ao texto cantado – não só foram acolhidas 
por praticamente todos os intérpretes desse reportório e pelo pú-
blico, passando a ser a norma, como inclusivamente transbordaram 
as fronteiras da música pré-romântica, tornando-se, algumas delas, 
exigências genéricas, ainda que naturalmente com maior incidência 
em certos repertórios do que noutros.
7 Uma possível excepção – mas apenas possível – será a de obras como algumas 
de Ligeti ou Penderecki num estilo geralmente apelidado de música de texturas.
8 Para um desenvolvimento e defesa da ideia de que há propriedades de valor 
positivo nas execuções de obras que não derivam directamente de propriedades, 
positivas ou não, das obras executadas, ver Lopes 2005.
9 Desenvolvo este e muitos outros aspectos do movimento em Lopes 2010, 
cap. 10.
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Não parece tratar-se somente de uma questão de gosto actual, 
uma vez que mesmo o público melómano (provavelmente) minori-
tário hoje em dia que aprecia as suas execuções das obras relevantes 
do romantismo tardio servidas com uma dose extra de peso orques-
tral, profundidade expressiva, timbres escuros e carácter sombrio, 
e o não tão minoritário grupo a quem desagrada a excessiva leveza 
e brancura de algumas vozes agudas típicas dos primeiros passos do 
movimento em causa, não deseja ver sacrificados a esses valores mais 
subjectivos os méritos mais universais, na dose certa, que o sucesso 
do movimento trouxe, por arrastamento, ao repertório em causa.10 
Na verdade, as vozes críticas em relação a alguns resultados do mo-
vimento, que não as motivadas apenas pela falta de hábito, erguem-se 
quase sempre contra o exagero nalgumas características e opções do 
mesmo que põem em causa o equilíbrio relativamente a outros va-
lores também eles consensuais.11 Mesmo a excepção mais evidente 
nesse sucesso dos instrumentos e práticas contextuais, a resistência 
à substituição do piano pelo fortepiano no repertório que vai do clas-
10 Peço a compreensão do leitor para esta aparentemente abusiva assunção da 
legitimidade para falar em nome dessa(s) minoria(s) com a confissão de que se 
houvesse uma estrutura institucional para tal sensibilidade em matéria de execu-
ção musical, eu seria provavelmente um dos seus membros fundadores.
11 A este título, refira-se como exemplo a nostalgia bastante compreensível pe-
las execuções da música sacra de Bach por intérpretes da antiga mainstream como 
Karl Richter, patente por exemplo nas páginas da revista de referência Gramophone 
(em especial, as assinadas pelo crítico da especialidade, Jonathan Freeman-At-
twood). Essa crítica às execuções “historicamente informadas” não se daria se não 
fossem as falhas de várias execuções desse tipo dos nossos tempos (mas sobretudo 
dos anos 80 e princípio de 90) em termos de expressividade na enunciação dos 
textos, que parece sacrificada à uniformidade e à segurança técnica mais ou me-
nos asséptica (para além de algum sentimento de banalização da arte, patente na 
ideologia do movimento inicial, que se pode materializar de modo infeliz nessas 
características, e em casos como a admissão ao estatuto de execução profissional 
de intérpretes que não estão à altura das exigências, em virtude da “especializa-
ção” ou de atractivos até certo ponto extra-musicais (caso de muitos contra-te-
nores substituindo meio-sopranos e contraltos bem mais seguros e competentes, 
graças à aura de historicidade da técnica do falsetista – cf. nota 9). Ou seja, não 
tem de haver incompatibilidade de princípio entre os valores da execução musical 
estabelecidos, como os da musicalidade e da expressividade, e a clareza de tex-
turas e articulação, etc., ainda que a harmonização entre essas duas “classes” de 
valores seja na prática difícil de conseguir (se é que o é de facto).
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sicismo até meados do séc. XIX, parece mostrar uma certa consis-
tência e selectividade saudável no acolhimento das “novidades” da 
“interpretação historicamente informada”, e até ser sintomática do 
que tenho vindo a expor. A menor aceitação pública do instrumento 
como alternativa ao piano moderno (não estou a falar do meio da 
musicologia histórica, naturalmente) mostra que não é desejável a 
clareza e leveza a qualquer preço, e que, para além de um som pou-
co consensual da parte do instrumento antigo, o facto é que a sua 
contraparte moderna consegue, quando apropriadamente tocado, 
proporcionar praticamente toda a clareza e contraste exigidos pelo 
repertório do fortepiano, com evidentes ganhos tímbricos, mecânicos 
e de paleta dinâmica. Assim, o saldo desta manutenção da preferên-
cia pelo piano é positivo, não indo no entanto realmente contra a 
desiderabilidade da maior clareza de texturas.
2 Projecção da estrutura formal
Uma conclusão a extrair da leitura da literatura crítica de melhor 
qualidade é a de que uma eficaz gestão das propriedades formais ou es-
truturais da obra, i.e., a capacidade de um intérprete para projectar 
na audição do público os elementos da forma da obra e as suas articu-
lações, é um dos principais méritos da execução de obras musicais. 
Um dos melhores exemplos da aplicação deste critério avaliativo é o 
domínio da gestão dos diferentes patamares de tensão e resolução, de 
modo a que o clímax principal de uma obra ou secção não seja nive-
lado com clímaxes secundários. Outro exemplo é o da chamada de 
atenção por parte do intérprete, na sua execução – e por meios diver-
sos (dinâmica, rubato, etc.) –, para momentos centrais na articulação 
de formas musicais, como a recapitulação numa forma-sonata ou a 
transição de uma variação para a seguinte.
Naturalmente, não é o caso que, em todas as obras de todos os 
géneros da história da música clássica ocidental, as componentes 
estruturais sejam igualmente relevantes, nem do ponto de vista da 
pura análise composicional, nem, sobretudo, da perspectiva das pos-
sibilidades (e do interesse artístico) da sua realização em execuções. 
Assim, será mais provável que um crítico apele a critérios desta ca-
tegoria na apreciação de uma execução de uma sinfonia de Bruckner 
do que na de um prelúdio de Chopin. Por outro lado, embora a com-
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ponente formal seja comparativamente tão importante na sinfonia 
como num moteto isorrítmico de Dufay, as limitações à projecção 
em execução no caso deste último são de uma natureza muito dife-
rente, razão pela qual o apelo crítico a tal projecção – se ele existe de 
todo – é também bastante diferente. Como seria de esperar, expres-
são e forma não são completamente dissociáveis, havendo relações 
evidentes entre o modo como ambas se manifestam em execuções. 
Para ver isso, basta considerar o facto de que um dos recursos mais 
fundamentais de que o intérprete dispõe para delinear e projectar 
para um público a estrutura de uma obra ou secção consiste precisa-
mente no doseamento da expressividade a aplicar a cada parâmetro, 
elemento ou evento musical.
Também aqui, parece-me, estamos na presença de um princípio 
– projectar a estrutura formal de uma obra – que só pode funcionar 
a favor do mérito de uma execução, ou, pelo menos, quase sempre fun-
ciona a favor desse mérito. Se duas execuções diferirem, grosso modo, 
“apenas” no facto de que uma projecta eficazmente essa estrutura e a 
outra não, será altamente provável que a que o faz será a melhor das 
duas. Trata-se, neste caso, e até de um modo mais evidente do que 
nos princípios anteriormente analisados, de um princípio que abona a 
favor do valor positivo da execução mesmo quando a estrutura formal 
da obra assim revelada não é dotada de grande interesse, sofisticação 
ou originalidade. Com efeito, pelo menos nas formas mais tradicio-
nais – sonata, rondó, canção, variação, etc. -, a forma deve ser do co-
nhecimento dos ouvintes experientes antes da escutarem uma nova 
obra, tratando-se antes de comparar o modo como um intérprete em 
particular projecta essa forma com o modo como outros o fazem, 
ou com o falhanço nessa projecção. Mais do que a aplicação de uma 
forma nova (ainda que isso possa ser o caso), o que importa do ponto 
de vista da forma musical estabelecida é compreender e apreciar o 
modo como o compositor tece o seu discurso musical em torno de 
um esqueleto pré-determinado. Mostrar isso ao público de um modo 
compatível com a musicalidade e a criatividade – ou mesmo poten-
ciado por estas qualidades – é uma virtude da execução musical.12
12 Não quero aqui ignorar o facto de que há discordância entre os musicólogos 
acerca da interpretação correcta da forma de algumas obras musicais do repertó-
rio, e logo, que ela existe entre os intérpretes dessas obras, pelo que o pluralismo 
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Se precisarmos de um princípio mais geral de onde este possa ser 
derivado, à semelhança do que fiz acima, poderíamos sugerir que a 
virtude artística servida pelo meio da projecção da estrutura formal é 
em geral o de que algo que guia correctamente o ouvinte na sua audi-
ção é sempre bem-vindo. Claro que, como muitos outros princípios, 
e talvez todos em estética, este conhece excepções e pode ser suplan-
tado por outros princípios quando não houver plena compatibilidade 
entre todos eles. Assim, uma execução em que o intérprete se esfor-
ce de tal modo nessa projecção que ponha em causa detalhes e efeitos 
importantes – por exemplo, à força de querer guiar o ouvinte para a 
identificação dos clímaxes mediante a subordinação de tudo o resto – 
poderá, em função do repertório, estilo, e outras considerações, ser 
uma execução menos boa do que uma em que a atenção ao detalhe 
acompanhe uma atenção não tão grande à estrutura. No entanto, 
como já referi, estas excepções só seriam perigosas para uma posição 
mais fortemente objectivista do que a moderada que aqui defendo.
3 A dicção na música vocal com texto
Um último e breve exemplo de propriedade de execuções cuja posse 
só pode ser usada como razão a favor do valor positivo da mesma 
é o da clareza na dicção do texto cantado. Seja em música para so-
listas ou para conjunto, serão extremamente raros os casos em que 
essa propriedade possa ser usada para fundamentar um juízo negativo 
acerca da execução. Na verdade, acontece por vezes que essa quali-
dade é incompatível com outras qualidades igualmente positivas do 
canto, como a beleza do timbre, a largueza do espectro de dinâmicas 
usadas, a consistência e uniformidade da voz, e, mais particularmen-
te, com o legato próprio de todo o canto tecnicamente educado na 
tradição em foco. Contudo, o facto contingente de que para alguns 
cantores é difícil, ou mesmo impossível, obter clareza na dicção do 
texto sem resultados pesadamente negativos no legato ou na emissão 
de notas agudas não deve ser usado como um argumento contra o 
interpretativo será o caso nestas situações (agradeço ao Prof. John Rink por me 
alertar para este ponto (em comentário pessoal)). Tudo o que necessito de afirmar 
é que, na maioria dos casos, a compreensão da forma é relativamente pacífica, 
i.e., interpretativamente monística.
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princípio estético geral de que uma execução vocal é melhor se, em 
adição aos méritos que já exibe, também o texto for correctamente 
enunciado e perceptível pelo público, e nunca é pior por isso. Tal 
dificuldade poderá, isso sim, ser um argumento a favor da neces-
sidade de aperfeiçoamento técnico da parte dos músicos em causa. 
Este princípio pode assim ser contado entre os princípios “fracos” ou 
suplantáveis conducentes ao maior valor estético ou artístico da exe-
cução musical, e talvez mesmo entre os menos fracos e suplantáveis 
de entre aqueles.13
4 Uma objecção respondida: circularidade?
Em conclusão, resta-nos considerar uma objecção pertinente à defesa 
do monismo moderado que apresentei. Consiste ela em detectar, nas 
expressões usadas para denotar as propriedades aqui referidas como 
sustentando esse monismo, um elemento de petição de princípio. 
Segundo a objecção, tais expressões contêm já aspectos valorativos 
de polaridade positiva. Assim, quando aqui se defende que as pro-
priedades (razoavelmente) objectivas ou puramente descritivas deno-
tadas por expressões tais como “clareza da polifonia/textura orques-
tral”, “saliência dinâmica das entradas do tema da fuga” ou “relevo 
expressivo da melodia (acompanhada)” só (ou quase só, ceteris paribus 
e garantido o repertório adequado) poderão contar como valorizan-
do positivamente as execuções que exibem tais propriedades, o opo-
nente diria que a conclusão já estava de algum modo contida nas pre-
missas, uma vez que, supostamente, só em virtude de uma avaliação 
positiva prévia se pode atribuir com correcção essas propriedades a 
execuções.
Contudo, não me parece que a objecção colha. Com efeito, qual 
das expressões da pequena lista acima contém um elemento indele-
velmente avaliativo? Clareza? Mas o predicado ‘claro’ atribuído, por 
exemplo, a uma voz (cantada), é puramente descritivo. Que Emma 
Kirkby tem uma voz clara e Jessye Norman tem uma voz escura são 
afirmações (metaforicamente, talvez, mas contextualmente con-
13 Observe-se que, sintomaticamente, a enunciação clara e perceptível do tex-
to parece ser reconhecida pelos críticos como uma virtude performativa mesmo 
quando esses críticos, ou o público, não dominam a língua do texto a ser cantado.
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sensualmente) verdadeiras que não comprometem ninguém que as 
afirme com juízos de valor – embora, dependendo das sensibilidades 
individuais, possam justificar que será provável que certos sujeitos 
apreciem mais uma dessas vozes de soprano do que a outra. Mais 
a propósito, ‘claro’ aplicado a uma textura musical parece ser tão 
puramente descritivo quanto a aplicação acima, sendo um facto con-
tingente que (praticamente) todos os ouvintes competentes apreciem 
uma maior clareza na textura (com as qualificações já referidas). Tal 
facto pode mudar no futuro, mas o meu objectivo não é evidente-
mente defender que é uma verdade conceptual ou analítica que cla-
rificar de uma textura em execução é melhor do que não o fazer, 
nem sequer que se trate de algum universal estético – embora isso 
não seja propriamente impossível. O mesmo é o caso relativamente 
a propriedades como as referidas pelas expressões ‘saliência’ – é algo 
ipso facto esteticamente bom só por ser saliente? – e ‘relevo expressi-
vo’ – nem todo o parâmetro musical afecta positivamente o valor de 
uma execução apenas porque lhe é dado relevo expressivo, e alguns 
contribuem mesmo negativamente se lhes for conferido tal relevo.14
A objecção poderá, não obstante, ter maior força se incidir sobre 
o princípio mais geral que enunciei como uma fonte de onde po-
deriam derivar pelo menos alguns dos princípios mais particulares 
acima, o princípio que afirma que o que é musicalmente interessan-
te na composição deve ser evidenciado em execução. O predicado 
‘interessante’ tem evidentemente uma carga valorativa. No entanto, 
creio que é possível mostrar que há critérios razoavelmente objecti-
vos e universais para identificar, dados os parâmetros relevantes, que 
eventos ou propriedades musicais são interessantes. De facto, trata-
se de algo que é aprendido desde cedo na educação musical, quer do 
ouvinte, quer do intérprete. A franja de relatividade na determinação 
do que é musicalmente interessante é real, mas não demasiado lar-
ga. Critérios objectivos, ou pelo menos largamente consensuais, para 
identificar graus de relevância musical de elementos como a presença 
de um cantus irmus, a existência de linhas melódicas dignas de aten-
ção no interior de uma textura ou a antecipação de um tema de uma 
secção climática numa secção anterior estão em geral disponíveis a 
14 Suponha-se, por exemplo, que um intérprete decide dar relevo dinâmico 
aos ritmos pontuados num Nocturno de Chopin.
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uma boa parte do público musicalmente educado e experiente em 
mais do que uma audição informada de cada obra, sem o prejuízo de 
que abordagens mais sofisticadas – musicológicas – possam revelar 
algumas qualificações a tal objectividade, mas apenas em alguns ca-
sos, não certamente na maioria.
António Lopes
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I - Introduction 
This paper offers a new interpretation for Wittgenstein`s treatment 
of mathematical identities.  As it is widely known, Wittgenstein`s 
mature philosophy of mathematics includes a general rejection of 
abstract objects. On the other hand, the traditional interpretation of 
mathematical identities involves precisely the idea of a single ab-
stract object – usually a number –named by both sides of an equa-
tion. We may follow (QUINE, 1960, p. 114) and take identity as a 
relation directly between terms or we may prefer Frege’s ideas and 
insist on its being mediated by senses (FREGE, 1977, p. 56). Either 
way, we normally take these statements as crucially involving an 
appeal to a single object as the referent of both relata, weather they 
are senses or terms. But if we completely let go the idea of this 
abstract pivot, how could we possibly make sense of such mathe-
matical statements? What would sentences such as “  be 
about, if they were not about numbers? 
 This is where the idea of back and forth correction comes in. We 
propose this terminology to refer to Wittgenstein’s notorious 
revamping of the traditional construal of (mathematical) identities. 
As we shall see, this new interpretation of equations also touches 
upon at least two other central elements of his philosophy of math-
ematics. The first element is his treatment of mathematical generali-
ty (and his rejection of quantifiers1). The second one is his handling 
 
1 It is perhaps important to remember here that Wittgenstein is not alone in 
this rejection of quantifiers. Skolem (SKÖLEM, 1952,, p. 120) also singles them 
BIBLID [0873-626X (2012) 34; p . 755-805
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of statements involving Infinity. Taken together, his treatment of 
mathematical identities, of generality and infinity, make up a large 
portion of Wittgenstein’s approach to mathematics, a proposal 
which is distinct both from the classical realistic proposal and from 
the constructive one, centered on the notion of potentiality.  
Most features of this alternative position regarding mathematics 
are still not widely known and thus his whole proposal remains 
unacknowledged by researchers on the foundations of mathematics 
at large.2 We believe this sad situation is in part due to the difficulty 
of dissociating Wittgenstein's ideas from his very idiosyncratic 
jargon, thus making them available to a wider audience, and in part 
due to our sheer lack of understanding of the key logical elements 
of that approach. 
Our article will be divided into three parts. We will begin by a 
general discussion of some other very general approaches to math-
ematical identities. Our goal will be a negative one. Throughout 
our paper we will use these other alternative handlings of identities 
in order to contrast them with Wittgenstein’s proposals. In the 
second part of our paper we will focus on Wittgenstein`s extensive 
analysis of a special type of mathematical identities, the ones involv-
ing recurring decimals. Two main ideas will be introduced here. The 
first one will be his critique of the elision dot`s notation. The second 
will be his insistence on the introduction of the syntactical opera-
tion of iterated copying on the right side of that kind of equation. We 
will dedicate the entire final section of our article to Wittgenstein`s 
treatment of mathematical identities as back and forth correction. This 
will involve a generalization of the treatment of recurring decimal’s 
identities to other kinds of mathematical identities. 
Before we move on to the main argument of the paper, a note 
on exegetical claims. Wittgenstein’s writing is very extended and 
varied. There is no agreement on just what he said (or implied), and 
when. Many times we don’t even know if he is the one doing the 
 
out as the key source of the fundamental “faults” afflicting classical 
mathematics. 
2 Despite important monographs on the theme, such as (WRIGHT, 1980), 
(SHANKER, 1987), (STENLUND, 1990), (FRASCOLLA, 1994) and 
(MARION, 2008). 
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talking, or his ever present interlocutor. Any bolder reconstruction 
such as the present one runs the risk of appearing to be more than 
just that: plain misattribution to him of views he never sustained. 
As we said before, our main objective is to try to view his philoso-
phy from without, offering as wide a perspective as possible of his 
work within the foundations of mathematics. To be able to do so 
with a little more freedom, we will follow an option that has be-
come common ever since Kripke wrote (KRIPKE, 1972).3 We will 
drop any substantial exegetical claims. We still try to offer (what 
we take to be) the appropriate quotes, but the reader is free to 
disregard them if he or she thinks they are not nearly enough to 
sustain our exegetical claims. 
The Operational Reading of Mathematical Identities 




If we lay aside all our mathematical and logical sophistications aside 
and, say, go back to an elementary school reading of such state-
ments, it appears natural to take these identities as being directed. 
We start from the left, by operating with the numbers  and  – we 
add them – and then we obtain, or produce, the result, in the right 
hand side of the equation, the number . In such a reading, the two 
sides of the equation are not on the same level. The interpretation is 
not “flat”. It has a (main) orientation: we start from the left side and 
generate the result on the right.  
 
 
This is the reading that is preserved, of course, in a recursive inter-





3 Cf. also (STENLUND, 1990, p. viii) 
 
we could even represent this operation as a sort of “short hand” for 









This way of viewing identities is precisely the one advocated by 
intuitionists such as Martin-Löf (MARTIN-LÖF, 1984, p. 71). In 
such readings, there is an intrinsical unbalance between the result, 
, and the initial left hand side expression, . This 
latter expression is not in canonical notation. The very idea of an 
“operation” is explained by appealing to the fundamental distinction 
of canonicity and non-canonicity (DUMMETT, 1991, p. 175; 
MARTIN-LÖF, 1987; PRAWITZ, 1977). We could even say that 
 denotes an number, but only because this non-canonical 
expression could be transformed into a canonical expression, the ex-
pression . This is the semantical intuitionist’s view of the 
notion of “number”. 4 
 Before we leave behind the constructive approach to arithmeti-
cal identities and move on to Frege’s ideas concerning such state-
ments, let us quickly draw our attention to one important ingredi-
ent of the constructive approach to mathematics, an aspect that laid 
somehow hidden in our seemly innocuous modal expression “could 
be transformed” (in the last sentence of our previous paragraph). The 
duty a semantical intuitionist expects this modal to perform is 
anything but trivial and innocuous, philosophically speaking. The 
problem is: any non canonical expression can succeed in denoting a 
number only by appealing to its “possible transformation” into a canoni-
cal expression of the form “ ”. It’s true that one can prove, 
 
4 We will only consider in this paper the contemporary type of intuitionism 
of Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf, usually known as “Semantical Intuition-
ism”. We will not discuss the classical intuitionism of, say, Brouwer. 
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within an intuitionistic system such as Martin-Löf’s, that these 
operations are “possible”.5 But, for numerical expressions involving 
“very large numbers” (say, as ), how possible is this posited 
possibility? 
The idea of having the very semantics of mathematics depend on 
these grossly idealized possibilities (the “impossible possibilities”) 
appears suddenly as philosophically fishy. One should not forget 
here also that the central argument for the intuitionistic assault on 
classical mathematics had to do precisely with criticisms regarding 
idealized possibilities such as these: 
The fact that quantification over an infinite totality shares so much in 
common with quantification over a finite one tempts us to overlook 
the crucial difference from the case in which we are quantifying over a 
finite totality which we can survey, namely that we do not have, even in 
principle a method of determining the truth-value of quantified state-
ment by carrying out a complete inspection of the elements of the domain 
and checking for each one, whether the predicate applies (DUMMETT, 
1977, p. 6).6    
Thus it should not come as a surprise that authors, such as Crispin 
Wright, should pointed out that “arguments essentially analogous to 
those which the mathematical Intuitionists … use to support their 
revisions of classical logic”  could now be redirected against the 
intuitionists themselves (WRIGHT, 1993, p. 107).7 We will come 
back to this point latter on. 
Frege’s “flat” reading of identities 
For a platonist such as Frege, a number is a number, not because we 
can prove it to be so (within some formal system), but because 
 
5 This is precisely the task of N-elimination rules in Martin-Löf’s system 
(MARTIN-LÖF, 1984, p. 71) 
6 My italics.  
7 For more extensive discussions of this point, cf. (MARION, 2008, p. Chap 
8; STENLUND, 1990, pp. 146-51) 
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mathematical reality is such. Numbers are abstract objects whose 
existence is conceptualized as being completely independent of any 
epistemological act such as a demonstration. Accordingly, in this 
classical reading of identities anticipated in the beginning of our 
paper,  is equal to  simply because both “ ” and “ ” 
name the same object. This naming relation is not tributary to any 
more fundamental operation, such as the successor function.  
As we know, Frege (and Russell) famously advocated a purely 
cardinal view of numbers as equivalence-classes generated by the 
equinumero-sity-relation (FREGE, 1964, p. 78). In sharp contrast 
to the ordinal approach latter favored by the intuitionists, any num-
ber such as the number  is not seen as the result of, say, there 




but as an enormous class of all “triples”.  
Thus, in contrast to the previous, constructive alternative we 
presented before, in the classical, fregean view, a mathematical 
identity is something completely “symmetrical”. There is no prior 
notion of a “result” (of an operation). “ ” names an abstract object 
in precisely the same way as “ ”. And since both of them 
happen to name the same abstract object, the statement (1) is true. 
 is “as much equal” to “ ” as vice-versa, there is not a more 
fundamental “direction” here.8 
Following (BAKER & HACKER, 1988, p. 22) I propose to call 
this classical view of identities “flat”. This is important because, as 
we will see, contrary to what one might have expected, even 
thought Wittgenstein does insist on introducing the notion of 
“operation”, his reading of identities is completely flat. More than 
that, as Backer and Hacker correctly pointed out, this “flat view” is 
characteristic not only of his interpretation of identities but of his 
 
8 We could of course insist that the name “ ” is simple and that “ ” is a 
complex name, but this would appeared to be system-dependent. We would still 
need some sort of “transcendent” or “metaphysical” notion of simplicity here to 
mark out the difference. 
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whole approach to mathematics, all the way from the Tractatus on 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1961, p. 6.127). This is but one of the funda-
mental differences between Wittgenstein and the constructivists.9  
One has to be careful here, thought. Wittgenstein reading of (1) 
is flat in the sense of its not being directed. But that does not mean 
that Wittgenstein endorses the classical “triangular” view of mathe-
matical identities (as true when both its side-names denote the same 





He never did accept the triangular construal. There are two notions 
of identity in the Tractatus. One of them is the “ontological”, it is 
asserted directly of objects, not of names or senses of objects. But this 
notion degenerates into mere self-identity,  
(WITTGENSTEIN, p. 5.5303). The other one is mere synonymity 
(WITTGENSTEIN, p. 6.2323). Neither of them, though, is the 
classical, “triangular” notion. In fact, as we’ve anticipated before, 
Wittgenstein all together rejected any idea of an “abstract object” 
(acting as pivot for identities). As we pointed out, for him mathe-
matical statements are not about any such “abstract entities”, such as 
numbers. And so, per force, his rendering of mathematical identities 
could not possibly be the classical one. 
II - Recurring Decimals 
Criticism of the elision dots` notation 
Following Wittgenstein, let us change our main example from the 
simple equation “ ” to something a little bit more com-




9 Another important difference is his rejection of any notion of “in principle 
possibility” and accordingly of any idea of “potential infinity”. 
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The reason for Wittgenstein focusing on these (rather plain) math-
ematical identities is quite apparent. In (2) we have pretty much the 
first (and simplest) example of statement involving infinity in our 
elementary mathematical education. In a typical strategy for him, 
the philosopher finds here a thoroughly perspicuous example on 
which to focus his investigation. In examples such as this, he has all 
the key elements of some general problem he is interested in with-
out any inessential technical complexities. As we will see, in the 
case of recurring decimals, these ingredients include mathematical 
identities and abstract objects, generality and of course, infinity.10 
The first element Wittgenstein is interested in his surprisingly 
long and elaborate discussions on recurring decimals11 is of course the 
elision dots’ notation. This is a theme that absorbed him thorough out 
his matured philosophy of mathematics. We find several examples 
of this in his intermediary masterwork, the Big Typescript: 
What does one see “1, 1+1, 1+1+1, ...” as? 
As an inexact form of expression. The dots are like additional numer-
als, but ones that are indistinct. As if one stopped writing down nu-
merals because to be sure one can’t write them all down. , but as if 
they were all there in a kind of box.  
The dots in “1 + 1 + 1 + 1 ....” are nothing but four little dots: a sign 
for which it must be possible to state certain rules. (Namely, the same 
rules as for the sign “etc, ad inf.”) This sign does imitate an enumera-
tion in a way, but is isn’t an enumeration. And that most likely the 
rules that apply to it agree up to a point, but not completely, with 
thoes that apply to an enumeration. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, pp. 
260, 257-8) 
Even as late as in the Philosophical Investigations we find him saying: 
 
10 The infinity ingredient becomes apparent if we recast (2) as  
.  
We will talk about the generality component later. 
11 Cf. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1975, pp. 223-34), (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, pp. 466-7), 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1979, pp. 183-6) and (WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, pp. 122-30) 
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We should distinguish between the "and so on" which is, and the "and 
so on" which is not, an abbreviated notation. "And so on ad inf." is 
not such an abbreviation. The fact that we cannot write down all the 
digits of p is not a human shortcoming, as mathematicians sometimes 
think. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005a, pp. § 208, p 71) 
Wittgenstein’s worries about the elision dot’s notation are clearly 
semantical. In his words, this notation “imitates an enumeration”, 
but it is clearly not one. It’s rules agree to a list only “up to a point”. 
So, what are exactly the rules that govern it? To understand better 
Wittgenstein’s point here it is best to go back to Frege’s ideas on 
identity statements (and also to Kripke’s ideas about “non-standard” 
continuation of infinite series). To anticipate a little, Wittgenstein 
complains that the identity such as (2) is ill formed! But let us follow 
his arguments step by step. 
 “ ” is an identity. So, according to (FREGE, 
1977, p. 43) one should find nominal expressions on both sides of 
the relational predicate “ ”. “ ” is surely a fregean name 
(albeit a composed one), but what about “ ”? Is “ ” 
a singular term? Once again invoking Frege, we could say: if 
“ ” is to function as a singular term, it has to succeed in 
denoting one and only one object. According to Frege, existence, the 
first requirement for a nominal expression is not so essential. In a 
famous passage of On Sense and Reference, he is notoriously willing to 
accept “Odysseus” as a name, even though it has no reference 
(FREGE, 1977, p. 62). But as to the second requirement, unicity of 
denotation, he was never willing to relax it. If a referring expres-
sion is to function as a singular term, it has to denote at most one single 
object. 
 It is Frege’s second, more crucial requirement, that, according 
to Wittgenstein, “ ” is not capable of satisfying. To see this 
one has only to consider some “non-standard” possible continua-
tions for “ ” (KRIPKE, 1972, p. 16). The standard continu-
ation would, of course, be “ ”. But, what about 
alternative continuations such as “ ” or 
“ ”? Which of them is the (correct?) continua-
tion of “ ”? This is important when we consider the follow-
ing identities:  
763







Would all these statements be true? All of them simultaneously true 





Wittgenstein’s worries are clear: “ ” could not possibly be a 
singular term, a numeral, just because if there were such a term, it 
would (ambiguously) denote a infinitude of different numbers! In fact the 
most reasonable course would be simply to abandon the idea of 
“ ” as a singular term. According to this later option, 
“ ” would not be a numeral, “ ” would be a general 
term! It’s meaning could be elucidated as something like: 
 
“any infinite decimal fraction beginning by the digits ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘4’” 
 
Of course if we were to reclassify ” as a general term, 
another difficulty would soon come up. What would a general term 
be doing flanking an identity statement such as (2)? Once again we 
are back against fregean requirements. What would be the truth 
conditions of these (“strange”) identities? As we anticipated before 
Wittgenstein concludes that we should simply discard all such 
statements as being ill-formed.  
The elision dot notation has elude us with its idea of some “addi-
tional, hidden digits” hiding in the infinite continuation of “ ” 
which would fix the correct intended denotation, finally transform-
ing it into a singular term, a numeral. The philosopher writes: 
The incorrect conception of the word “infinite”, and of the role of “in-
finite expansions” in the arithmetic of the real numbers, seduces us 
into thinking that there is a uniform notation for irrational numbers 
(namely the notation of the infinite extension, e.g. of infinite decimal 
fractions) (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, p. 498) 
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Thus, the passage we quoted above, from the Philosophical Investiga-
tions: “We should distinguish between the "and so on" which is, and the 
"and so on" which is not, an abbreviated notation.” “ ” is not an 
abbreviated notation. It is not even a numeral. And, as we will see, 
we should reject “ ” as a numeral, not because of any 
epistemological qualms about infinity, such as the Constructivist’s, 
but merely due to semantical requirements, the necessity of clearly 
maintaining the distinction between general and singular terms! 
The missing operation 
Let us return to our discussion of identities involving recurring 
decimals, of an identity such as (2) . There is an 
obvious remedy for our difficulty: we are here dealing with a recur-
ring decimal. There is a cycle involved. So in this case we could use 
this cycle to finally fix our notation and obtain a singular term.12 
There are many ways to do that. A particularly simple one is the 




For Wittgenstein, differently from statements such as (2), (2’) is 
obviously well formed. But just as in these analysis’ books that 
employ the cycle dot notation, it is very important for him, as it is 
for them , to point out that numerals 
such as  have very different mathematical properties 
than those of ordinary numerals such as “ ”. A well 




12 Any mathematician is bound to be worried. Our “remedy” has clear revi-
sionary implications here. How would we deal with all the other (much more 
“important”) cases? Wittgenstein’s proposals are clearly revisionary, there is no 
doubt about that. They do not “leave mathematics as it is”. But let us stay calm and 
follow his proposals step by step. There are many further elements that have to 
be drawn into our scenario.   
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Wittgenstein stresses the differences in the “grammars” of these 
different kinds of numbers: 
The confusion in the conception of the “actual infinite” arises from the 
unclear concept of “irrational number”, that is, form the fact that con-
structs that are logically quite different are called “irrational numbers” 
without any clear limits being given to the concept. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, p. 496) 
The discovery of the periodicity is really the construction of a new 
symbol and a new calculus.  
1/3 = “ ” is not the same kind of thing as 
“1/2 = 0.5”;  
“ ” is not the result of a division (quotient) in the same sense as 
0.375. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, p. 446) 
One can say of the sign “  that it is not an abbreviation. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, pp. 446, 451) 
So, even though for him, say, “ ” is perfectly all right, 
it is a very different type of statement from “ ”. But 
what would exactly be this difference? How in his opinion should we 
construe the demarcation between these two identities? Wittgen-
stein’s answer to this question is once again surprising. As an initial 
bold approximation, we could say that he basically claims that 
“ ” is a singular statement whether “ ” is a 
general one! At (2005, pg. 472), for example, we find him compar-
ing many alternative notations for a recurring identity such as 
“ ” to general statements such as addition’s associative 
law! A little before that he writes: 
On the other hand the generality of this rule [
] is none other than that of the periodic division  . 
That means that nothing in the rule is left open or is in need of com-
pletion or the like. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, p. 469) 
Even thought extravagant, Wittgenstein’s line of reasoning here is 
not very difficult to follow. One of the alternative notations he 





(2005, pg. 471) 
 
But these are “partial” results. How could we express, employing 
Wittgenstein’s new notation, what was meant in a “non-partial” 
statement such as “ ” or “ ”? In 
the latter case, the left side of our equation would of course simply 
be 
 
But what about the new right side of (2)? What should we write 
down? 
 
According to Wittgenstein13, our difficulty is a consequence of an 
oversight. We have missed an operation hidden on the right side of a 
statement such as (2). The “hidden operation” the philosopher has in 
mind here would be of course the operation of repetition. In the case 




the operation of “repeating the string of digits ‘142857’ n times”.  
 
If we use now the symbol “” for “concatenation”, we could finally 
obtain the desired general term which should occupy the right side of 
(2): 
 
   
 
We could finally complete our rewriting of (2) as: 
 
(2’’)    
 
13 Or our reconstruction of it 
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Just as Wittgenstein said, in (2’’) we now surely have a very different 
statement from a singular enunciation such as “‘ ”. And 
just as he said, we can now clearly see the use of variables, just like 
as in the statement “ ”. They are both 
general statements. 
From a traditional perspective, it would seem that we would on-
ly have to make one final logical gadgetry explicit, the universal 
quantifier. The variable “ ” is of course free in (2’). if we link it, we 
would get: 
 
(3)     
 
Would that be it? Would (3) be a completely acceptable version of 
the ordinary “ ”, even for finicky Wittgenstein? 
Was that all he had to say about (the rather plain) recurring deci-
mals?  
As anyone that is familiar with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
mathematics would have guessed, the philosopher would still not be 
satisfied. Should we take the universal quantifier in (3) classically or, 
say, intuitionistically? Should we understand (3) as: 
 




(3’’)    ? 
 
These differences do matter, of course. If we accept the classic 
calculus and it’s law of interdefinability of the existential, (3’) would 
turn out to be equivalent to: 
 
(3’)    
 
Not so, of course, if we understand intuitionistically the quantifier.  
How should we understand the generality involved here? Are these 
the only two options available? Would there be a third alternative 
to construe that generality? Following Wittgenstein lead, Dummett 
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has always emphasized the idea that those logical options run very 
deep: they involve very basic questions regarding the very semantics 
of mathematical statements. 
The answer to the question how it is possible to call a basic logical law 
in doubt is that, underlying the disagreement about logic there is a yet 
more fundamental disagreement about the correct model of meaning, 
that is, about what we should regard as constituting an understanding 
of the statement. (DUMMETT, 1991, p. 17) 
Decisions on the rules of logic concerning mathematical statements 
should be derived from much more general decisions about their 
semantical interpretation. In other words, we are back to the 
problem of how to interpret identities and, more generally, how to 
interpret mathematical statements. Questions about what do they 
really assert, what should we take as being their content, their con-
nection to “reality”, etc. We are thrown right into deep philosophi-
cal water; there is no escaping from that. 
III – Mathematical Facts 
As we’ve said before, this paper’s main objective is to present 
Wittgenstein treatment of mathematical identities as back and forth 
correction. But before we finally do that, though, we will have to 
quickly review some central elements of the classical and the intui-
tionistic philosophical construal of mathematical statements in 
general. These will be important because, by way of contrast, we 
hope it will end up shedding light on Wittgenstein’s proposals. 
 We will start from a very general interpretational principle 
about mathematical statements over which the classicists and the 
intuitionists are in agreement. For both these approaches mathematical 
statements are true. And they both understand this “being true” as 
some sort of correspondence: a statement is true because there is 
something in reality that makes it true. As we will see, classicists and 
even intuitionists accept the idea of “mathematical facts” habiting some 
“abstract mathematical reality”. It is the (existence) of these facts that 
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turn our mathematical propositions into true mathematical state-
ments.  
A classical handling of recurring decimal’s identities 
The idea that truth of mathematical statements is somehow a conse-
quence of the existence of “mathematical facts” (in some “platonic 
realm”) is usually taken as the distinctive trait of the classical, 
platonistic approach. This is not a good characterization of the 
classical position though. As we already anticipated, it would as-
similate contemporary intuitionism into the classical camp. This is 
particularly clear if we take into account the recent proposals, made 
by Dummett and Prawitz, for distinguishing “warrant assertability” 
from “truth”. But let’s not anticipate too much and begin step by 
step with the classical approach.  
Let us consider once more the algebraic version for a recurring 
decimal’s equation we attributed to Wittgenstein, with its two 
operations, division and repetition: 
 
(2’’)    
 
In it we have two “unary operations”: the operation of “dividing 
 to the  decimal place”, , and the opera-
tion of “repeating the digits   times”, 
. The key mathematical content of (2’’) 
would depend on the fact that, for all decimal places, these two 
operations coincide. 
For a classicist, both these operations should be understood as 
functions, i.e., as (infinite) sets of ordered pairs (of natural numbers). 
So, according to classical set theory, even if we accept Wittgen-
stein’s proposal (2’’), we would still understand it classically as two 
different names denoting one and the same mathematical object. Ac-
cording to this approach, this “key mathematical fact” behind (2’’) 












Wittgenstein’s reading of a recurring decimal’s identity, with its 
two operations, is not the usual one, of course. One doesn’t nor-
mally understand identities involving recurring decimals as general 





Thus, in a more ordinary reading of these identities, recurrence 
would not even be mentioned, we would only have an operation on 
the right hand side of the equation and an infinitary object on the 
left, the “result”.  
Thus, differently from Wittgenstein, recurrence would not be 
taken as part of the very semantical characterization of “ , 
but as a property of some divisions. If we understand the operation 




we could then take “repetition” as the property of that set. More 








Her we would be talking about an (abstract) object, the “operation 
”, and would be asserting of that object that it really obeys a 6-
cycle. This would be the “mathematical fact” involved . It is because 
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the infinite object “ ” really has the property of recurrence that 
(4’) happens to be a true mathematical statement. 
Intuitionistic mathematical facts 
Contrary to a rather common misconception, the adherence to the 
correspondence theory of mathematical truth, to the idea of mathemati-
cal facts, is not characteristic only  of the classical approach. From 
the very beginning in 1959, in his famous article Truth, Dummett 
has emphasized a similar intuition: 
…the correspondence theory expresses one important feature of the 
concept of truth which is not expressed by the law “it is true that p if 
and only if p” …: that a statement is true only if there is something in 
the world in virtue of which it is true. (DUMMETT, 1978, p. 14) apud 
(MARTIN-LÖF, 1995)  
Mathematical statements are descriptive. They record (when true) 
mathematical facts, aspects of a purely mathematical reality. And of 
course it is this fundamental representational property that distin-
guishes true mathematical statements from false ones. Dummett calls 
this philosophical proposal, the idea of correspondence, principle 
“Principle C”. 
 Several years later, in another famous article from 1976, What is 
a Theory of Meaning II?, Dummett better qualifies his adherence to 
correspondence. He concedes that, taken in isolation, Principle C is 
rather “empty” and adds that its main role is to “settle on the appro-
priate notion of truth for various types of statements”:  
In general, we can learn something by applying the principle C to a 
specific type of statement only when we have already decided some-
thing about the sort of thing in virtue of which a statement of that type 
can be true; (DUMMETT, 1993, p. 53) 
So, in the case of mathematics, it becomes natural to ask what type 
of “facts” should we take to be behind the truth of mathematical 
statements. What kind of entity should we elect as the truth-makers 
of mathematical propositions? For a long while, the official intui-
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tionistic answer to this question was the very well known and 
direct: 
Intuitionistically, truth of a proposition is analyzed as existence of a 
proof; a proposition is true if there exists a proof of it. (MARTIN-
LÖF, 1991, p. 141)  
Very recently though, in the late nineteennities, there was a dra-
matic shift in the way the leading intuitionists answered this ques-
tion with two different proposals, made by Dummett (DUMMETT, 
1998) and by Prawitz (PRAWITZ, 1998), for a distinction between 
the notions of “warrented assertion” (i.e., possession of a proof) and 
“mathematical truth”. For both Prawitz and Dummett, the “mathemat-
ical fact” that turns intuitionistic statements into true mathematical 
propositions should not be taken to be the simple existence of a proof 
anymore, but “something else”. They agreed that the existence of the 
proof would only assure us that this fact exists, but should not be 
understood as coinciding with it (PRAWITZ, 1998, p. 46). Still, 
they diverged on what this “something else” should be.  
The recent shift on what the intuitionists regard as the truth 
maker of propositions should not come as a surprise. It was already 
concealed in the simplicity of the previous formula: “truth is the 
existence of  a proof”. All we would have to do is to ask the intuition-
ist about the concept of existence being employed in that formula. 
Are we talking about “concrete existence”, “concrete possession of a 
proof”, or merely its “existence in principle”? As it is well known, if 
we pressed on the point, the initial simplicity of the formula would 
give away to much finer distinctions. The intuitionists work with 
two different notions of proof, canonical and non-canonical proofs14. And 
it turns out that the role played by notion of “existence” regarding 
these two kinds of proof is also different.  
The notion of existence pertaining to a canonical proof is the 
hardcore notion of “concrete empirical existence”. But in the case of a 
non-canonical proof, the situation is different. A non-canonical proof 
 
14 Dummett also calls them “proofs” and “demonstrations” (DUMMETT, 
1991, p. 177). 
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expresses only existence “in principle”. As we already anticipated above, 
a proof like that enunciates “the possibility of obtaining a canonical 
proof” from it. So a non canonical proof is really only a method 
that, if it were applied, could generate the desired canonical proof 
(PRAWITZ, 1977, pp. 22, 26; MARTIN-LÖF, 1987, p. 413). In 
other words, it asserts that that possibility really exists, guaranteed by 
the (concrete) existence of an intensional object, the method.  
The central notion of “proof” is thus clearly that of a canonical 
proof.15 It is the existence of those proofs as syntactical events that 
could be identified with “mathematical truths”. But Intuitionism 
does not restrict itself to that notion of proof 
…It is not true, even Intuitionistically that the condition of asserting a 
sentence is that we know a proof of it in this sense [the canonical 
sense]. (PRAWITZ, 1977, p. 21) 
To be able to rise above the recording of trivial mathematical 
identities, Intuitionism is force to include also a second notion of 
proof, that of a non-canonical demonstration. So, our question now 
is: what would be the truth-maker for this second type of proof, 
non-canonical proofs?  
There are two possible answers here. We could chose the meth-
od, which indirectly ensures the possibility in principle of obtaining 
the desired canonical object. Or more directly, we could elect the 
(existence of) the very in principle possibility. Dummett recommends 
the method as truth-maker of mathematical propositions. 
(DUMMETT, 1998, p. 123)16 Prawitz, on the other hand, insists 
that that notion of “method” would still be temporal: it is restricted 
to the methods contemporarily at our disposal. So he proposes to go 
further and accept a stronger, atemporal notion, of “potential existence 
of a proof” (and of a method). (PRAWITZ, 1998, p. 48). Future 
 
15 In the case of natural numbers, for example, the canonical notation for 
them has some very important properties: “ ” both  denotes the number  
but also concretely instantiates six successors, “ ”. 
16 It is important to notice that this notion of method should not be identified 
with the classical notion of computability on pains of an infinite regress 
(PRAWITZ, 1998). It has to be taken as primitive.  
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(presently unknown) methods and canonical proofs would have a 
“potential existence”, even today! Either way we have abstract 
realm populated by “intensional objects”, “methods”, in the case of 
Dummett, or populated by “potentialities”, in the case of Prawitz. 
We won’t go into to the problems these proposals may have. 
Even the more sober one, advocated by Dummett, seems strange at 
times. For example, we do have a method for calculating Pi’s 
decimal places. But we haven’t calculated them all. What should an 
intuitionist say about these uncalculated decimal places (even if he 
sides with Dummett)? We would have to say that they exist “in some 
sense”, for their existence is guaranteed by that method. But we 
don’t really have them, because we haven’t calculated that far (and 
never will, for some of these decimal places). So, what should we 
answer here? What about the decimal places not only as yet uncal-
culated, but so enormous that it would take, say, the number of 
seconds since the big band to calculate? Should we still insist that 
they exist because they “could be reached”? What kind of “capability” 
would that be? Here we seem to be flirting again with the danger-
ous concept of an “impossible possibility”. 
Let us see now Dummett’s handling of this problem. We do 
have a method for calculating Pi, so his answer could not be really 
much different from: 
It seems that we ought to interpose between the platonist and the con-
structivist picture [a reference to Wittgenstein] an intermediate pic-
ture, say, of objects springing into being in response to our probing. 
We do not make the objects but must accept them as we find them 
(this corresponds to the proof imposing itself on us); but they were 
not already there for our statements to be true of false of before we 
carried out the investigations which brought them into being. 
(DUMMETT, 1978, p. 185) 
But shouldn’t we still ask: what crucial difference could there be 
between saying (with the platonist) that these objects do exist, and 
Dummett’s insistence on the notion of objects “springing into being in 
response to probing”? Wouldn’t that be just a play of words or should 
we take his proposal more seriously? But if we do, should we also 
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accept, say, some kind of “berkelean cake” that would “spring into 
being” every time we open our refrigerator door? 
 “Two facts” idea 
In the last section we’ve seen that both the classical and the intui-
tionist accept a notion of “mathematical facts”. By accepting this 
notion, it becomes natural for both cases do understand the idea of 
“applied mathematics” as instantiation. An application of mathematics 
would be an instantiation of an abstract mathematical structure (form) 
onto, say, a physical one. The details of how this instantiation would 
take place are different though for classicists and intuitionists. The 
very truth makers involved are distinct. 
Let us take first the better known classical approach. In Analysis, 
for example, we have the purely abstract concept of real numbers. 
And there are also many mathematical facts about them. We can then 
geometrically apply this theory by using the famous picture of the 
real numbers as points on a line. Through this picture, numbers be-
come names of positions along a geometrical line. And we can further 
take this line as, say, a concrete dimension of a physical extension. 
Our numbers become then names of concrete positions in space. And, 
of course, mathematical facts about these numbers become physical 
facts about this (concrete) space.  
How would an intuitionist view the idea of applied mathematics? 
The key point here is the idea that intuitionistic mathematics is 
made, not of propositions, but of judgments. And judgments are acts. 
(MARTIN-LÖF, 1987, p. 417) This is why it is so natural for an 
intuitionist to view programs executed by computers as the very embod-
iment of mathematics (MARTIN-LÖF, 1979, pp. 5-6). Still, even 
in the case of computers, we should differentiate the abstract program 
a computer is supposed to be executing from the concrete machine in 
front of us. But then, when would we say that the machine is really 
executing a particular (abstract) program? Well, a program is a 
specification of how that equipment is supposed to behave, if it is to 
instantiate that algorithm. In other words, we say that the machine 
is really following that program when the space of possible concrete 
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behaviors of the machine exactly reproduces the abstract space of 
behaviors prescribed by it.  
Once again, we have the idea of an application as an instantiation. 
The abstract program is instantiated onto the concrete machine. And, 
just as before, we can distinguish two kinds of facts in this application. 
We have the “mathematical fact”, that that method produces that 
result. And we have the “physical fact” that that concrete equipment 
in front of us is (really) following that specification, that the mathe-
matical facts prescribed by the program are really being instantiated 
by the behavior of that machine.17 
Wittgenstein was always critical of the “two facts idea”. In a lec-
ture in 1939 he directly says: 
It is not the case that there are two facts – the physical fact that if one 
counts the squares [of a rectangle 36 squares long and 21 squares wide] 
one gets 756 and the mathematical fact that 21 times 36 equals 756. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 39)  
Not only Wittgenstein refuses the idea of abstract mathematical 
objects, such as the numbers and sets as proposed by the classic but, 
more importantly, he refuses also the intuitionist postulation of 
“abstract possibilities” as opposed to “real, physical possibilities”. 
We imagine possible structures and impossible ones, and we distin-
guish both from real structures. Is seems as though in mathematics we 
showed what structures are conceivable, imaginable, not real. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, pp. 145-6) 
He was always critical of the idea of abstract mathematical possibilities 
as “shadows” of concrete, real possibilities. 
We say, for example, that a machine has (possesses) such-and-such pos-
sibilities of movement; we speak of the ideally rigid machine which can 
 
17 In the end, Prawitz seems to have the right intuition. The truth maker  for 
intuitionist mathematics appears to be the notion of possibility. It would be odd to 
say that the possibility exists because the method exists. It seems more natural to 
say that the method really works because it describes something really possible (an 
“effective” way of generating that result). 
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only move in such-and-such a way.– What is this possibility of move-
ment? It is not the movement, but it does not seem to be the mere phys-
ical conditions for moving either …The possibility of a movement is, 
rather, a shadow of reality. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 86)  
The difficulty here is to defend oneself against the thought that possibility is a 
kind of shadow of reality. 
It is one of the most deep-rooted mistakes of philosophy to see possibility as a 
shadow of reality. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, pp. 258,259) 
Real, Logical and in principle possibilities 
We have here a key point that neatly differentiates Wittgenstein’s 
and both the classical and the intuitionist’s approaches. For both these 
latter approaches, besides the modal notion of real possibility (under-
stood counterfactually as situations that might happen to occur), we 
should accept other modal notions. As we’ve seen, in the case of the 
intuitionist, we have the notion of “in principle possibility”. An “in 
principle possibility” would be a kind of “second level possibility”: a 
possible existence of a real possibility. 
The classicist postulates a third notion of possibility, as distinct 
from both the intuitionist, in principle, one and from real possibility. 
It is the notion of a “classical logical-mathematical possibility”. The 
contrast between this notion and the intuitionist’s in principle one 
becomes apparent when we consider mathematical possibilities that 
not only happen not to describe real possibilities but never could, even 
“theoretically”. As Charles Parsons has pointed out years ago, this is  
precisely a novelty within Cantorian Set Theory: 
It is only when higher infinities of Cantorian set theory are introduced 
that mathematical objects must violate the conditions of 
representability in concrete terms. … If the “physically possible” is 
what can in some sense be realized in space and time, then structures 
of sufficiently high cardinality … are not physically possible. 
(PARSONS, 1983, p. 191)  
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No wonder the intuitionists were so critical of Cantor’s mathemati-
cal hierarchy of infinitudes. Beyond a certain level18, not only are 
those mathematical structures happen contingently to be non-
instantiable (even considering “theoretical” possibilities), but are 
actually necessarily non-instantiable. 
The neat differentiation between Wittgenstein and both the in-
tuitionists and the classicists becomes clear when we consider the 
fact that the philosopher refuses, not only the stronger classical 
modality, but even the second level, in principle, notion advocated by 
the intuitionists. 
There is a feeling: “There can’t be actuality and possibility in mathe-
matics. Everything is on one level. And in fact, is in a certain sense ac-
tual”. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, p. 495) 
As Raymond Bradley has suggested in his series of equations be-
tween key semantical, modal and subjective notions, all the way from 
the Tractatus Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be generally character-
ized by the refusal of any notion of “abstract possibilities” as distinct from 
“real” ones. For him, the three notions 
 
(Real) possibility   =   In principle possibility   =  Logical possibility 
 
should always coincide! (BRADLEY, 1992, p. 34) 
Non-descriptive Mathematics and Predication 
Besides these modal intuitions, Wittgenstein has two parallel theses 
regarding the semantics of mathematical statements. The first one is 
that, contrary to the idea of correspondence suggested by both the 
classicists and the intuitionists, for him mathematics does not describe 
any reality.19  
 
18 Parsons suggests . (PARSONS, 1983, p. 191) 
19 It can be traced of course all the way to the famous Grundgedanke of the 
Tractatus. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1961, p. 4.032)  
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In mathematics everything is algorithm, nothing meaning; even when it 
seems there’s meaning, because we appear to be speaking about math-
ematical things in words. What we’re really doing in that case is simply 
constructing an algorithm with those words. (Big Typescript. pg. 494) 
I am trying to say something like this: even if the proved mathematical 
proposition seems to point to a reality outside itself, still it is only the 
expression of acceptance of a new measure (of reality). (RFM, 162) 
This is a very early insight of Wittgenstein’s. It is already clearly 
present in the famous grund gedanke of the Tractatus.  
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1961, p. 4.032). Empirical, contingent proposi-
tions describe. Necessary statements such as logical laws, mathematics 
or even philosophy do not describe anything, but prescribe. 
For Wittgenstein, the confusion between these two “grammars” 
is a very common, deeply rooted and extremely pernicious mistake 
among philosophers and mathematicians. He is always adverting 
against the idea of approximating empirical and mathematical state-
ments: 
The confusions in these matters are entirely attributable to treating 
mathematics as a kind of natural science.  
Nothing is more disastrous to philosophical understanding than the 
notion of proof and experience as two different – yet still comparable 
– methods of verification. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, pp. 429,419) 
Mathematicians, when they begin to philosophize, always make the mis-
take of overlooking the difference in function between mathematical 
propositions and non-mathematical propositions.  
These discussions have had one point: to show the essential difference 
between the uses of mathematical propositions and the uses of non-
mathematical propositions which seem exactly analogous to them. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 111) 
He goes as far as denying that the notions of truth and falsity should 
be applied to mathematical statements: 
The terms “sense” and “nonsense”, rather than the terms “true” and 
“false”, bring out the relation of mathematical propositions to non-
mathematical propositions. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1979, p. 152) 
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Not surprisingly, the big differences in semantical function Wittgen-
stein sees between empirical and mathematical statements determine 
for him parallel fundamental distinctions in the very grammatical 
structure of these assertions. In fact, the philosopher denies that 
predication can be at all present in mathematical statements. One 
again, the textual evidence is very forceful: 
Is 2 + 2 = 4 a proposition about 2 and about 4? Compare this proposi-
tion with “There are no other men in this room than Jack an John”.  
...if “There are two men here” is taken to be about 2, then it is mis-
leading to say 2 + 2 = 4 is about 2; for it is “about” it in a different 
sense. (Lectures 1934-35, pg. 155) 
...a mathematical proposition is not about  its constituents in the sense 
in which “The sofa is in this room” is about the sofa. . (LFM, Lectures 1939 
XXVI, pg. 254) 
...mathematical propositions do not treat of numbers. Whereas a 
proposition like “There are three windows in this room” does treat of 
the number 3. (LFM, Lectures 1939 XXVI, pg. 250) 
 
Suppose I say “Prince has blue trousers”; that is a proposition about 
trousers. (....) 
What about “two”? “2 + 2 = 4” – but this isn’t about 2; it is grammati-
cal. 
Turing:  Isn’t it merely a question of how one extends the use of the 
word “about”? 
Wittgenstein: That is a most important mistake. – Of course you can 
say mathematical propositions are about numbers. But if you do, you 
are almost sure to be in a muddle. (LFM, Lectures 1939 XXVI, pg. 251) 
IV – Back and Forth Correction 
The Metalinguistic Component 
We have dedicated the entire part III of our article to review some 
very general traits on how classicists and intuitionists construe the 
semantics of mathematical statements and their application, say, to 
physics. We’ve seen that both these schools propose nothing less 
than a bifurcation of the notion of reality in two. Aside from  the 
concrete, empirical reality, we would also have an abstract, logical-
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mathematical one. Once this bifurcation is effected, we can then 
explain mathematical truth as the existence of the appropriate facts 
within the abstract realm. On the other hand, application of mathe-
matics is construed as instantiation. There is a isomorphism between 
some aspect of empirical reality and some mathematical structure. 
Through this isomorphism, names of mathematical objects (numer-
als, for example) become also names of empirical entities (say, 
extensions). And thus mathematical facts concerning these objects 
are nicely transferred to that part of empirical reality. 
As we’ve seen, Wittgenstein was very critical of the “two facts” 
idea. He rejected altogether any notion of a mathematical abstract 
reality, even if this reality was to be populated only by abstract 
potentialities. For him, mathematical statements neither talk about, 
nor answer to any abstract realm, no matter how this realm might 
happen to be construed. In fact, he goes as far as denying the very 
applicability of predication (and of the notion of “truth”) to mathemat-
ical statements! Mathematics simply does not talk about anything.  
If mathematical statements do not talk about anything, how is 
their semantics to be understood? If, say, “ ” is not a 
statement about numbers, nor any other abstract objects, not even about 
abstract possibilities (of obtaining some canonical form), what is it 
about then?!  What semantical role would Wittgenstein accepts for 
mathematics? What do mathematical statements assert? After all, in 
order to have any meaning, it appears that they are bound to assert 
something…about something else. This is where the notion of “back 
and forth” correction comes in. There are two elements involved in 
this notion. The first, and most important one, is the metalinguistic 
element. The second one is the normative and deontic component. Let us 
begin with the metalinguistic component.  
As in the case of so many of Wittgenstein’s key ideas, this one is 
also derived from Frege. In his Grundlagen der Arithmetik, we find 
this very striking passage by the German philosopher: 
It is true that at first sight the proposition “All whales are mammals” 
seems to be not about concepts but about animals; but if we ask which 
animal then are we speaking of, we are unable to point any one in par-
ticular. Even supposing a whale is before us, our proposition still does 
not state anything about it. We cannot infer form it that the animal 
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before us is a mammal without the additional premise that it is a 
whale, as to which our proposition says nothing. (FREGE, 1978, p. 
60) 
The image of an immense whale laying directly before us is extrava-
gant. And when we say “All whales are animals” we do seem to be 
talking about whales (saying that they are mammals). This is what 
traditional logic (and ordinary grammars) has always taught us, ever 
since Aristotle. And there is that enormous animal in front of us. 
But Frege refuses the idea that the rule “All whales are animals” does 
in any way talk about those concrete creatures. As we know, his 
strange proposal was that the statement assertes something about a 
complex concept instead, the concept “
”, saying about that concept that it is universally valid. 
This is Frege’s famous idea of “second order predication”: general 
statements do not talk directly about empirical reality, but only estab-
lish connections between concepts. 
We know that for Frege, even though statements like “All whales 
are animals” did not talk about empirical reality, they did talk about an 
“alternative abstract reality”. In fact, Frege is famous for having gone 
as far as fully accepting the idea of a “third realm” (FREGE, 1977a, p. 
17), an independent abstract reality in which these conceptual 
connections actually “were the case”. As we’ve seen, Wittgenstein 
could not accept this idea of a bifurcation of reality into realms. But 
there was something in Frege’s proposal that interested him. This 
was the idea of a “second order connection” of the rules vis-à-vis empiri-
cal reality. Mathematical statements did not talk directly about 
reality, but only establish metalinguistic rules (Frege’s “connections”) 
for meaningful employment of these words (Frege’s “concepts”) in 
empirical contexts: 
One might also put it crudely by saying that mathematical propositions 
containing a certain symbol are rules for the use of that symbol, and 
that these symbols can then be used in non-mathematical statements. 
LFM, lecture III, pg. 33 
To sum up, I have tried to show that the connection between a math-
ematical proposition and its application is roughly that between a rule 
of expression and the expression itself in use.  (WITTGENSTEIN, 
1976, pp. 33, 47) 
The important point to be stressed here is that on Wittgenstein’s 
hands Frege’s second order predication becomes fully metalinguistic. 
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To the despair of his famous interlocutor, he is always introducing 
the operator “call” in all his formulations of mathematical state-
ments 
“This is what we do when we perform the process which we call “mul-
tiplication”. 144 is what we call “the right result”. 
 Supposing we do a multiplication: the use of this is that we aren’t 
willing to recognize a rule of multiplication unless it can be got in a 
particular way. For instance, we do not accept the rule that 1500  
169 = 18. We should not call that a multiplication. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, pp. 97, 106)20 
Differently from the philosopher, his interlocutor wants to leave 
mere metalinguistic description behind and go back to the idea of 
truth, good old answerability to a mathematical reality. 
“Is that supposed to mean that it is equally correct whichever way a 
person counts, and that anybody can count as he pleases?” - We should 
presumably not call it “counting” if everyone said the numbers one af-
ter the other anyhow.  
“Then according to you everybody could continue the series as he 
likes; and so infer anyhow!” In that case we shan’t call it “continuing 
the series” and also presumably not “inference”. (WITTGENSTEIN, 
1983, pp. 37, 80) 
Wittgenstein’s answers – “..we should presumably not call it “count-
ing…”, “…in that case we shan’t call it ‘continuing the series’ and also 
presumably not ‘inference’” – are precisely meant to reintroduce the 
dreaded metalinguistic point of view, blocking the idea of any “answer-
ability to an abstract reality”, the recovery of a “descriptive con-
tent”. 
The Normative Component and Disqualifying Criteria 
The second element in Wittgenstein’s idea of back and forth correction 
is now immediate. If there is to be no remaining “descriptive content” 
 
20 My italics 
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in Wittgenstein’s notion of “rule”, then we are left with a purely 
normative connection. As usual, Wittgenstein is ready to follow this 
idea wherever it might lead. He goes as far as proposing:  
Suppose we look at mathematical propositions as commandments, and 
even utter them as such? "Let  be ."  
Can we imagine all mathematical propositions expressed in the imper-
ative? For example: "Let  be ". (WITTGENSTEIN, 
1983, pp. 271, 276) 
Mathematics doesn’t describe anything. It does not talk about ideal, 
abstract entities. It is purely prescriptive. It prescribes criteria for 
the correct usage of certain terms such as “line”, “angle”, in ordinary 
empirical situations, what Wittgenstein calls “grammatical rules”: 
Geometry isn’t the science (natural science) of geometric planes, lines 
and points, as opposed, say, to some other science whose subject mat-
ter is gross physical lines, strips, surfaces, etc. and that states their 
properties. The connection between geometry and propositions of 
practical life, which are about strips, color boundaries, edges and cor-
ners, etc. doesn’t consist in geometry’s speaking of things similar to 
what these propositions speak of, although geometry speaks about ide-
al edges and corners, etc.; rather, it consists in the connection be-
tween these propositions and their grammar. Applied geometry is the 
grammar of statements about spatial objects. (WITTGENSTEIN, 
2005, p. 391) 
The best way to regard these “rules” is to take them, not as positive 
determinations, but as negative ones, as constraints on empirical state-
ments. In other words, it is best to regard them as establishing 
criteria for disqualification of empirical claims. Let us take a simple 
example. Suppose we consider the usual geometric procedure for 
bisecting an angle with a compass. Does it make sense to say that an 
“ideally executed” instance of that procedure would have the “proper-
ty” of generating two equal angles (but rough empirical operations 
would just “approximate” that abstract ideal)? No, not for Wittgen-
stein. According to him, the “mathematical content” of that tech-
nique is a connection between certain procedures and the concept “equal 
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angles”. This connection is then used to judge (and maybe discard) 
empirical allegations. 
If I regard construction as my criterion, I can by no means check the 
division of angles by measurement. The case is much rather this: if 
measuring yields a difference, I shall say, the compass is faulty, that 
was not a straight line, etc. For construction is now my standard ac-
cording to which I judge the quality of a measurement. (WAISMANN, 
1979, p. 205) 
Other geometrical examples of rules from his intermediary period 
are: 
The proposition “corresponding angles are equal” means that if they 
aren’t found to be equal when measured I will declare the measure-
ment incorrect; and the “sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees” 
means that if it doesn’t turn out to be 180 degrees when they are 
measured I will assume there has been a mistake in the measurement. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 2005, p. 391) 
Back to recurring decimal’s identities 
We now have all the elements at our disposal to finally complete 
our discussion of Wittgenstein’s favorite example of a mathematical 
identity, the ones involving recurring decimals. Let us then go back 
to where we left our discussion of those identities, to the new 
version proposed by the philosopher in which the two operations of 
division and repetition are clearly brought forward.  
 
(2’’)    
 
So, how should we then interpret this general equation according to 
Wittgenstein? Not so with the help with the usual quantifiers, being 
them intuitionistic or classic, but as back and forth correction. In other 
words, we are going to employ both the metalinguistic component 
introduced by the expression “Whatever one calls…’, and the norma-
tive component introduced by the expression “one must..”. The 





Whatever one calls 
“the result of the operation dividing to the  decimal place” 
one must also call 
“the result of the operation of writing “ ,” and of repeating 
“ ” through  places, 
and vice versa 
 
Wittgenstein is very explicit about both these components in his 
later discussions on recurring decimals. Let us start with the norma-
tive component. In his Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics in 
1939 he writes: 
Here I am adopting a new criterion for seeing whether I divide this 
properly - and that is what is marked by the word “must”. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 129) 
For Wittgenstein, the mathematical advance involved in the notion 
of “recurring decimals” is best viewed as mutation of our language. We 
find ourselves adopting new criteria for old words. 
We actually have in  a new symbol.  is a new operation and has 
the result in a different sense than . (AWL, p 211) 
Before our “language mutation” we could actually detect the repetition 
of some digits. But we lacked altogether the concept of “recursion”. 
If we follow the rules as we do follow them, being prepared as we are, 
then this is what will always happen [the recursion]. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 129) 
After the linguistic mutation, we have a new normative criterion, 
expressed by a “timeless must”, a rule: 
Then later he takes recurrence as the criterion: “it must hap-
pen”.(Timeless “must’) (WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 129) 
Wittgenstein is not always completely careful in his usage of the 
two words, “repetition” and “recurrence”. In the second quote 
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above about the linguistic situation before the language mutation, 
he uses “recursion” to refer to the repetition of digits one could detect 
even before the adoption of the new concept of recurring deci-
mals.21 But even with these minor terminological oscillations, the 
distinction between recursion and repetition is clearly emphasized:  
Periodicity does not mean the same as several repetitions of the same 
number or numbers, but makes a new calculus. (WITTGENSTEIN, 
1979, p. 187)  
Similarly with “[ I ] believe it will recur”. (...) You might believe in 
two totally different things. The phrase is misleading: "will recur" as 
normally used is a mathematical phrase. It is not a temporal expres-
sion; it doesn't mean "will recur [repeat] with most people” or "will 
recur [repeat] in half an hour" or anything like that. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 124) 
The connection between “repeating” and “dividing” and 
new kinds of errors 
Let us now focus our attention to the second component in the idea 
of back and forth correction, the metalinguistic connection between 
the notion of “repeating” and that of “dividing”. Here the importance 
of Wittgenstein insistence on a “hidden operation”, the “geomet-
rical” operation of “repeating a pattern”, becomes clear: 
The question of recurrence is then a strictly geometrical question: the 
man will be persuaded that if the repeats this pattern here, there must 
be the same numeral repeated (A new criterion that he has done so-and-
so) (WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 130) 
The new rule connects the two concepts, using one as correcting 
criteria for the other. Wittgenstein’s proposal is best visualized by 
an imaginary experimental psychology like procedure involving two 
subjects, A and B. We ask A to perform the division , let us 
say, all the way up to  decimal places (we can imagine him 
 
21 This may have to of course do with the origin of the text: a transcription 
of his lectures. 
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using a Turing machine tape for that). And we ask B to execute the 
operation of writing “ ” and then repeating the digits  
through  extra places (he can also do that in a squared tape). The 
idea is that we can use the comparison of the two tapes as a way of 
checking if the two orders were correctly executed. Any mismatch 
between them would be an indication of a misapplication of (at 
least) one of the procedures.  
It is important to notice that the correcting routine can go ei-
ther way. Normally, if we’ve noticed a mismatch between the 
tapes, it would be reasonable to expect a mistake in A’s execution 
of the command (the one that was carrying out the division). This is 
due to the fact that his operation is much more error prone than the 
other. But, if the two tapes happen to be off by, say, only one place 
and present otherwise identical patterns, such as in: 
 
 
… 1 4 2 8 5 7 1 4 2 8 
 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 
 
 
… 4 2 8 5 7 1 4 2 8 5 
 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 
 
it would be reasonable to expect a mistake by B (the one carrying 
out the repetition). This would be because in the case of the divi-
sion, of course, a mistake in one quotient digit would clearly dis-
rupt the entire recurring pattern (and we could even end up halting 
at the end of the process).  
Wittgenstein is again very conscious of symmetrical character 
metalinguistic dependence asserted. In his Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics he writes: 
Suppose that when we worked out a division and it did not lead to the 
same result  as the copying of its period. That might arise e.g. from 
our altering our tables, without our being aware of it. (Though it 
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might also arise from our copying in a different way) 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 263) 
It is important to stress this point because, as we anticipated before, 
it indicates a very significant connection between him and Frege. 
Even though Wittgenstein is very far from the triangular construal 
of mathematical identities and its idea of an “abstract object” (being 
denoted by both sides of the equation), his reading of 
 is completely flat. The correction he proposes can go 
either way (although it might go one way more often than the 
other). The paring of the two concepts puts them on the same level, 
each one as furnishing correcting criteria of the other. 
There is a second, very important point to be emphasized here. 
Each new rule introduces new kinds of mistakes. Before the rule con-
necting the two operations, one could err the execution of the 
division , say, because one of the partial quotients was 
wrong. After the introduction of the new rule, one could claim that 
the operation was not actually performed, not because one had any 
local mistake one could spot, but merely because, say, a digit ” 
had showed up within that expansion. It is an essential element in 
Wittgenstein’s view of mathematics that each new proof, each new 
conceptual connection, establishes new possibilities of error, new 
ways of disqualifying allegations that, say, such as such operations 
were performed.  
Each side operation taken in isolation  
In the last section we have introduced an imaginary situation in 
which two subjects, A and B, executed two operations, repeating 
and dividing, which were connected by a prescription, a rule. It is 
important to emphasize the purely normative, metalinguistic con-
nection between the rule and those empirical operations. For 
Wittgenstein, a mathematical rule is completely impersonal and 
atemporal.22 It does not talk about any specific empirical operations 
 




performed by particular computing agents (“that computer on my 
desk top”) on any specific occasions (“this morning”). In fact, as 
we’ve seen before, rules do not talk about anything. They merely lay 
criteria that are used to disqualify empirical claims, allegations that, 
say, such and such an operation was actually performed by some 
agent in some determinate situation. 
Wittgenstein is quite forceful about both the atemporal and the 
impersonal character of rules. He writes: 
Questions of fact always involve time; mathematical facts or proposi-
tions do not. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1979, p. 184) 
”The 100 apples in this box consist of 50 and 50” - here the non-
temporal character of “consist” is important. For it doesn’t mean that 
now, or just for a time, they consist of 50 and 50. (WITTGENSTEIN, 
1983, p. 74) 
In mathematics we have propositions which contain the same symbols 
as, for example, “Write down the integral of...”, etc., with the differ-
ence that when we have a mathematical proposition time doesn’t en-
ter into it and in the other it does. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 34) 
Regarding the impersonal trait, contrary to any communitarist 
reading of rules, Wittgenstein writes: 
“The rule, applied to these numbers, yields those” might mean: the 
expression of the rule, applied to a human being, makes him produce 
those numbers from these. One feels, quite rightly, that that would 
not be a mathematical proposition. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 228) 
"But mathematical truth is independent of whether human beings 
know it or not!"--Certainly, the propositions "Human beings believe 
that twice two is four" and "Twice two is four" do not mean the 
same. The latter is a mathematical proposition; the other, if it makes 
sense at all, may perhaps mean: human beings have arrived at the 
mathematical proposition. The two propositions have entirely differ-
ent uses. (WITTGENSTEIN, 2005a, pp. 192-3) 
Even if an agent has executed an operation for the first time, for 
example, a computer spitting out a new place in Pi’s decimal ex-
pansion, it’s results can be taken atemporally, that is, if this “new 
rule” is ever used to “judge proceedings”: 
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In a calculation I surely wanted from the beginning to know what the 
result was going to be; that was what I was interested in. I am, after 
all, curious about the result. Not, however, as what I am going to say, 
but as what I ought to say. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 195)  
The importance of stressing the impersonal and atemporal character 
of rules comes out very clearly if we consider the shift that takes 
place when we focus on one of the two operations paired by the rule 
considered in isolation from the other. Let us take, for example, the 
operation . If Wittgenstein accepts a notion of a 
“connecting rule”, above and beyond any actual practice of human 
(and electronic) agents, does he also accepts the notion of an abstract 
operation as a mathematical entity distinct from any particular empiri-
cal implementation? In other words, does he accepts the notion of 
“function” (and that of an “algorithm”) as an abstract specification of a 
“purely mathematical” procedure? 
Once again, Wittgenstein’s proposal is extravagant. His answer 
is a resounding: No! One can have a rule prescribing converse 
correctibility of pairs of concepts (such as repeating and dividing). 
And this pairing is laid down both atemporally and impersonally. 
But that doesn’t mean that we can now, say, “detach” the concept 
of “division” from that rule and talk about an “abstract” version of 
that operation. We do have the rule 
 
   
 
and this rule prescribes atemporally and impersonally. But for him 
it does not make sense to talk about an “atemporal” and “imperson-
al” entity represented by each side of that equation taken in isola-
tion. In other words, it does not make sense to talk about some 





We use the expression: “the steps are determined by the formula...”. 
How is it used? - We may perhaps refer to the fact that people are 
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brought up by their education (training) so to use the formula y = x2, that 
they all work out the same value for y when they substitute the same 
number for x.  
The way the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken. 
What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? Presumably 
the way we always use it, the way we were taught to use it. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, pp. 35, 36)23 
It is here that the communitarist element in his thinking forcefully 
comes in. To the despair of the mathematician, Wittgenstein insists 
introducing “people” and the “way they are trained” (“nowadays”) in 
his discussion of what would normally be taken as a “purely mathe-
matical” operation.  
This is not, of course, what his interlocutor has in mind. The 
mathematician wants to talk about an abstract concept of a “function”, 
not a behavior of concrete, calculating agents. Instead of the purely 
normative, metalinguistic connection (between “what one calls repeat-
ing and what one calls dividing”) the mathematician wants to intro-
duce back a descriptive component. Even if we accept Wittgenstein’s 
introduction of a second operation within the recurring decimal’s 
identity, we are still talking about computational procedures, division 
and repetition. And so, according to the interlocutor, we have two 
independent algorithms that fix the values of their infinite expansions 
quite independently of each other (contrary to what the philosopher 
claims). It so happens that both these algorithms do generate (ab-
stractly) the same mathematical function.  
Above and beyond any metalinguistic converse correctibility ad-
vocated by Wittgenstein, his interlocutor’ retorts that this is pre-
cisely the content being asserted by that equation. One has two 
abstract operations, two algorithms. And the identity merely registers a 
mathematical fact, the fact that these two algorithms do describe one 
and the same mathematical function. In other words, the same inten-
tional object, a function, is “in fact” denoted by both sides of that 
identity statement. This is what is being asserted by that statement 
and this is what Wittgenstein should accept. Back and forth 
correctibility is at best a consequence of that prior mathematical fact.  
 
23 My italics 
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Wittgenstein’s rejection of the notion of function in 
extension 
The reintroduction of a descriptive component and the classical, trian-
gular construal of the identity, pointing to an “abstract object”, is of 
course precisely what Wittgenstein is advising us to avoid. But let us 
continue following the interlocutor’s suggestions. Consider a 
computer like description of the algorithm for  
such as, say: 
 
n = 1; 
Quon = 1  7; 
Remn = 1 – (Quon  7); 
while  (Remn  0) 
  {  
  Quon+1 =  (10  Remn)  7;  
  Remn+1 =   (10  Remn) –  (Quon  7); 
  n = n + 1;  
  }    
Print (“Quo1.Quo2 … Quon”);  
 
Why shouldn’t we say that this description fixes the algorithm 
“Division of ” (quite apart from any connection to any repeti-
tion)? After all, if we do “run it” in a computer, the digits that do 
come out will be “ ”. Why can’t we say that this 
procedure “determines ahead an infinite sequence of values of that 
abstract operation”, that it “establishes” all digits of that (recurring) 
expansion quite apart from any actual implementation of it by a 
concrete computer (or human being)? Wittgenstein writes: 
We have then a rule for dividing, expressed in algebraic or general 
terms,-and we have also examples. One feels inclined to say, "But sure-
ly the rule points into infinity-flies ahead of you – determines long be-
fore you get there what you ought to do." "Determines" – in that it 
leads you to do so-and-so. But this is a mythical idea of a rule –flying 




Here I should first of all like to say: your idea was that that act of 
meaning the order had in its own way already traversed all those steps: 
that when you meant it your mind as it were flew ahead and took all 
the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one. Thus you 
were inclined to use such expressions as: "The steps are really already 
taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought." And 
it seemed as if they were in some unique way predetermined, antici-
pated--as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality. 
(WITTGENSTEIN, 1993, p. 64) 
The philosopher refuses any idea of an operation “operated by no one 
in no particular time”. Wittgenstein calls this a “mythical idea of a 
rule”. He does accept, say, a rule connecting division and repeating, 
of course. And he accepts this connection as being completely 
independent of any empirical operations by concrete calculating 
agents, it is not tributary to any (empirical) reality. But he thinks it 
is a fundamental mistake when we move on from a atemporal and 
impersonal view of rules to an atemporal and impersonal (i.e., 
“abstract”) view of concepts and operations. In short: Wittgenstein 
rejects nothing less than the very concept of a function in extension! 
We won’t be able to go into the complexities involved in Witt-
genstein’s negative to such basic classical concept. We will have to 
leave that for a future paper entirely dedicated to that. Besides, this 
would take us to far from our main objective here, the positive 
presentation of his treatment of mathematical identities. Here we 
will only be able to quickly sketch the main elements of that argu-
ment, as applied to our favorite example, the division . As we 
will see, the key element of Wittgenstein’s argument against the 
notion of function can be found in Kripke’s famous Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private Language and his idea of a “non-standard metalinguistic 
interpretation” of normal ordinary functions (KRIPKE, 1972, pp. 16, 
note 12).  
Let us go back to the idea of back and forth correction. When we 
presented Wittgenstein’s proposal, we emphasized the idea that 
each new rule introduces new possibilities of error, new senses in which 
one can disqualify empirical claims (regarding some operations, say). 
As examples, we gave both the employment of division as correcting 
criteria for repetition (in the case when the two sequence of digits 
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are off by one tape’s box) and repetition as criteria for division (when 
we discard a “result” because it contains, say, a  as one of the 
partial quotients). According to the philosopher, all these possibili-
ties of mistake are part of the “language mutation” engendered by the 
new metalinguistic pairing of the two operations. And that much is 
essential to his conception of a “language mutation”: some utterances 
that (before) could describe possible proceedings are now discarded off 
hand. We have new criteria for meaningfulness of such claims. And 
new possibilities of error. 
With this idea in mind, let us now entertain for a while the in-
terlocutor’s triangular view of the equation  
  
   
 
As we’ve seen, for him both sides of that identity denote one and 




the “very mathematical fact being registered by that identity”. So let 
us accept all that. Let us introduce, with him, a third entity, the 
“extension” (alongside with the two previous operations). According 
to our interlocutor, we would now have two “mathematical opera-
tions”, the two “algorithms”, and a “infinitary object”, the extension 
“ ”. 
Let us look to our situation from the point of view of Wittgen-
stein, now. For him, the introduction of this “infinitary object” would 
represent the acceptance of new correcting criteria for the two previous 
operations. This “mysterious object” could function now as a kind of 
“Paris’ standard meter” for the two other operations. We could even 
introduce a new procedure: the operation of “copying an initial 
section of that (infinitary) prototype”. This would then introduce a third 
source of criteria for the other two procedures. We would have two 
new rules, a rule connecting the division and that “extension”, and a 
similar one connecting the repetition and the “infinitary object”. And, 
as the philosopher emphasizes, the acceptance of these “new rules” 
would represent a language mutation in which it would then make 
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sense to talk about new kinds of mistakes, new criteria for the disquali-
fication of claims regarding empirical operations.   
Let us take, for example, the operation of division. Before the 
introduction of the “new object”, if we wanted to claim someone was 
mistaken in his execution of the division  we would have to 
present him, either with a section of his calculus in which his partial 
operations were flawed, or, using the connection with the cycle 
“ ”, point to him a section of his result that did not followed 
that pattern. With the new “infinitary object” though, it would 
suddenly make sense to accuse him of error, not because of any 
internal mistake in the division, or of an external mistake identified 
by the pattern “ ”, but because his result diverged from the 
(infinite) sequence of numbers stored within the mysterious infinitary stand-
ard  
 
We would now have three interconnected operations: the division 
, the repetition  and the copying of some initial seg-
ment of that infinite standard. But, differently from the other two, 
this “third operation” involved an “abstract” standard “not accessible in 
its entirety” by anyone, in no “empirical length of time” (however long 
that may be). It would be a “guiding criteria” that would always be 
“partially beyond” the reach of any agent in any given empirical situa-
tion. 
This is precisely where Kripke’s skeptical doubts come in. With 
the introduction of this “permanently, partially elusive object” we have 
left our guards wide open to bizarre hypotheses such as those we 
find in (KRIPKE, 1972, p. 9). If this “Paris functional standard” 
makes sense, then it suddenly appears possible some kind of a 
strange “undetected Babel”. What if half of the world’s population has 
always employed one “division’s prototype” and the other half em-
ployed a second prototype, but we haven’t discovered the discrepan-
cy because we haven’t calculated that far? If each of us has some 
“function in extension”, some “Division prototype” fixing ahead all 
decimals of our “infinite expansion”, how do we know that our 
“complete standard” is the same as our neighbors’? What if the as yet 
“unsurveyed continuations” diverge beyond certain section? 
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The idea is very similar to skepticism about, say, our neighbor’s 
“internal sensation of green”. In both cases we have an unreachable 
standard. In the case of the private sensation, the standard is unreacha-
ble by anyone save the first person. In the case of the “infinite 
expansion object”, the standard is not (“completely”) reachable by 
anyone. Both constructs open ourselves up to strange forms of 
skepticism. Wittgenstein writes: 
The essential thing about private experience is really not that each per-
son possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether oth-
er people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus 
be possible--though unverifiable--that one section of mankind had one 
sensation of red and another section another. (WITTGENSTEIN, 
2005a, p. 81) 
As we have said before, every new criterion introduces new possi-
bilities of mistake. According to Wittgenstein (and Kripke), the 
price we would have to pay for the introduction of our “mysterious 
standard”, i.e., the notion of function in extension, would be nothing 
less than the wild endanger of all communicational possibilities. 
Kripke’s lugubrious conclusions heralds precisely this scenario: 
Of course, ultimately, if the skeptic is right, the concepts of meaning 
and intending one function rather than another will make no sense.  
…if this is correct, there can of course be no fact about which func-
tion I meant. (Rules and Private language, 13)  
There can be no such a thing as meaning anything by any word. … any 
present intention could be interpret so as to accord with anything we 
may choose to.  
What can be said on behalf of four ordinary attributions of meaningful 
language to ourselves and to others? Has not the incredible and self-
defeating conclusion, that all language is meaningless, already been 
drawn? (KRIPKE, 1972, pp. 13, 54, 71) 
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The generalization of the idea of back and forth correction 
Our rejection of the expression “ ” as a singular term lead us 
to introduce a variable and a further operation of repetition, obtain-
ing the general identity statement 
 
   
 
What about a singular identity statements such as our previous 
 
  ? 
 
How would Wittgenstein deal with these statements?  
The philosopher’s final generalization of the notion of back and 
forth correction was slow to come to him. A mature, more stable 
view of the semantics of “rules” is only achieved in his final years, 
few years after his intermediary period represented by the Big 
Typescript.24 But with the final explicit introduction of what we’ve 
called the “metalinguistic component” in his interpretation of identi-
ties, Wittgenstein is able to provide an uniform treatment of all 
these cases.  
About the addition “ ” he writes: 
The proof is now our model of correctly counting 200 apples and 200 
apples together: that is to say, it defines a new concept: “the counting 
of 200 and 200 objects together”. Or, as we could also say: “a new cri-
terion for nothing’s been lost or added. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 
161) 
Multiplications such as “ ” and “ ” 
are equally interpreted as back and forth corrections: 
The fact that I have 25 x 25 nuts can be verified by my counting 625 
nuts, but it can also be discovered in another way which is closer to 
the form of expression “25 x 25”. And of course it is in the linking of 
 
24 For a extremely careful treatment of this development, cf. (FRASCOLLA, 
1994, p. Chap 2) 
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these two ways of determining a number that one point of multiplying 
lies. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 357) 
Multiplication could be defined by an empirical criterion. If you have 
 rows of soldiers,  in each row, the result by multiplication will 
be the same as by adding.  – One feels inclined to say that if he reaches 
a different result from such-and-such, then he cannot mean the same 
by the signs as we ordinarily mean by them. "If ' ' means the same, 
then  must have this result." (WITTGENSTEIN, 1976, p. 
80) 
In all these cases we have a pairing of two different operations. “Whatev-
er is taken” as the result of the operation “counting  nuts” (a 
certain pile of nuts) is linked to “whatever is taken” as the result of the 
operation “counting  and  and then multiplying”. For Witt-
genstein, this “pairing” is nothing less than the “point of multiplying”! 
The metalinguistic component is clearly introduced by the philoso-
pher: “If ' ' means the same, then  must have this result”. 
 Wittgenstein clearly differentiates between empirical propositions 
(involving agents and intervals of time) and (metalinguistic) rules. 
These latter do not talk about the world, about physical events, but 
merely lay criteria for the acceptability of such reports. Let us take 
the operation of “gathering  and  apples on a table”. If we are 
talking about an actual event (“in reality”), about that specific “gather-
ing” executed by someone at some particular occasion, then according to 
Wittgenstein we are doing an “experiment”. If this operation is done 
“as we usually do it”, then we could even expect to count  apples 
on the table (if this latter “counting” is done as we usually do it). 
Put two apples on a bare table, see that no one comes near them and 
nothing shakes the table; now put another two apples on the table; 
now count the apples that are there. You have made an experiment; 
the result of the counting is probably 4. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 
51) 
This is not what rules such as “ ” and “ ” say. As any 
other rules, these do not talk about empirical situations, but merely lay 
norms, criterions for reports (on events involving such operations, as “count-
ing” and “adding”): 
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If we put 3 things by 2 things, that may yield various counts of things. 
But we see as a norm the procedure that 3 things and 2 things make 5 
things. See, this is how it looks when they make 5. (WITTGENSTEIN, 
1983, p. 310) 
It is not supposed to be an empirical proposition that the rule leads 
from 4 to 5, the this, the result, must be taken as the criterion for 
one’s having gone by the rule. (WITTGENSTEIN, 1983, p. 319) 
The number “ ” should not be understood as being defined out of 
the number “ ” (by the abstract “successor function”). We have a 
flat pairing of two concepts: “counting  and ‘ ’ and gathering” and 
“counting ‘ ’”. The first concept can function as much as correcting 
criteria for the second as the second towards the first.  
 Just as in the case of the recurring decimals, the atemporality and 
impersonality of the rule applies only to the “complete” statement: 
“ . If we take but one side of that pairing and inquire, 
say, “what it is to count ?”, the answer would be: “to do what one 
‘normally does’ in those situations”, what we “normally call ’”: 
'If I have five, then I have three and two.' –– But how do I know that I 
have five? ––Well, if it looks like this: | | | | |. (WITTGENSTEIN, 
1983, p. 61)  
Wittgenstein’s interlocutor is outraged. He misses the idea of a 
“mathematical operation” that fixes ahead the “correct” way of count-
ing”, quite independently of any empirical agent in any specific 
situation. In other words, he misses the idea of a “function”. 
 Once again, we can resort to Frege on Wittgenstein’ behalf, to 
German philosopher’s idea of numerical attributions being “second 
order predications”: 
While looking at one and the same external phenomenon, I can say 
with equal truth both "It is a copse" and "It is five trees", or both 
"Here are four companies" and "Here are 500 men". Now, what 
changes here from one judgment to the other is neither any individual 
object, nor the whole, the agglomeration of them, but rather my ter-
minology. … This suggests as the answer … that the content of a 
statement of number is an assertion about a concept. (FREGE, 1978, 
p. 59) 
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Nothing in reality is “ ”. Even the dashes “|  |  |  |  |” in Wittgen-
stein passage could be seen as, say, an enormous number of “ink 
molecules”, or an even greater number of atoms. Just as in the case of 
Frege’s whale above, numbers do not talk (directly) about reality. 
Or, as Wittgenstein would say, they can talk about reality, but in 
this case there is nothing mathematical about them. The idea of a 
“correct, atemporal and impersonal, way to count” is just a “mythical idea” 
that should be laid aside. 
Connections between Wittgenstein’s ideas and 
contemporary Mathematics and Philosophy 
We have presented, in broad brushstrokes, Wittgenstein’s treat-
ment of mathematical identities. But before we end this paper, let 
us quickly register what we believe are important connections 
between this treatment and more contemporary mathematical and 
philosophical literature.  
The first link we would like to propose is mathematical, with 
the Theory of Categories of Mac Lane and Lawvere. Just as in 
Wittgenstein’s case, the set theoretic concept of a function in extension 
is displaced by the metalinguistic concept of a morphism. For a catego-
ry theorist, the best way to construe mathematical statements 
seems not so much to view them as talking about an ontology of 
(abstract) mathematical objects, but to step back and regard them 
from a metalinguistic perspective. His morphisms are not exactly 
functions (i.e., sets of pairs of objects), but establish metalinguistic 
invariants over structures. And just as in Wittgenstein’s case, 
identity is somehow explained as isomorphism (back and forth 
morphisms). 
The second and final connection we would like to propose is 
philosophical, with Quine’s Thesis of the indeterminacy of Reference 
(QUINE, 1969, pp. Essays 1, 2) and his later concept of an “observa-
tional categorical” (QUINE, 1992, p. § 4). Right from the start, in 
his famous thought experiment of a linguist trying to recuperate a 
native’s language, its lexicon and its grammar, we are invited by 
Quine to adopt a metalinguistic perspective. And, somewhat remi-
niscent of what happens in the theory of categories, his goal was to 
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distinguish contents which remain invariant under radical translations 
and ones that fail to do so. (QUINE, 1960, p. § 7). Once again the 
result of this investigation is a skepticism towards the notion of 
“object”: according to him, this semantical notion does not seem to 
be “stable” under radical translations (QUINE, 1960, p. § 12). At 
first, Quine’s attention seemed to be directed to the negative thesis, 
the ones about the indeterminacy of reference (and of translation), 
but in his final years the philosopher proposed the more positive 
idea of an observational categorical. Again what we have is a kind of 
semantical connection between two concepts: “whenever this, that” 
(QUINE, 1992, p. 10). And again this is equated with the sole 
content which really remains invariant over remappings: 
Translations does enjoy reasonable determinacy up through observa-
tional categorical and into logical connectives. Thus one could make a 
stab at the interlinguistic equating of empirical content even in radical 
translation. (QUINE, 1992, p. 52) 
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1 Proper contexts
Frege (1918-1919) famously makes a caveat concerning his doctrine 
of sense and reference: there are some special expressions like ‘here’, 
‘today’ and ‘that’, that cannot by themselves express senses (and, 
therefore, cannot have references). Something else is necessary, 
namely, the extra-linguistic context in which the particular tokens 
of words of this kind occur. Therefore, in order to grasp the sense 
(and, therefore, the reference) expressed by an utterance containing 
some of these expressions in a particular context we need to know 
some facts about the latter (e.g., the place where a particular token of 
‘here’ occurs, the day when a particular token of ‘today’ occurs, the 
demonstration that accompanies a particular token of ‘that’, etc.).
These expressions are what we nowadays call indexicals, and al-
though several philosophers now reject Frege’s thesis that they have 
a (Fregean) sense in a context, almost everyone retains the spirit of 
Frege’s remark that the semantic value of indexicals (i.e., their refer-
ence or extension) depends on the context of occurrence. Moreover, 
almost everyone takes the semantic value of an indexical to be some 
element present in the context of occurrence (the day of occurrence, 
in the case of ‘today’, the utterer, in the case of ‘I’, the location, in 
the case of ‘here’, etc.). Different indexicals take different elements 
of the context of utterance (the agent, the location, the time, the ad-
dressee, etc.) as semantic value. And the semantic behavior of each 
indexical is governed by a rule or function that assigns a particular 
semantic value to each context of utterance. Following Kaplan, most 
philosophers call this function the character of the indexical, and the 
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semantic value assigned by the character in a particular context is 
called the content of the indexical in that context. The character is 
the same in all contexts, but the content might change.
Kaplan presented his theory of the semantic behavior of indexi-
cals in his classical “Demonstratives” (Kaplan 1989), and his theory 
was widely accepted, to the point of becoming a kind of established 
view for quite a long time. One of Kaplan’s thesis is that, broadly 
speaking, there are two sorts of indexicals: those that normally re-
quire an accompanying demonstration (typically a pointing) when 
placed in a context, and those that do not require such a demonstra-
tion. The first kind of expressions Kaplan calls demonstratives, and 
the second he calls pure indexicals. Examples of demonstratives are 
‘this’, ‘that’, ‘he’, ‘there’, etc. (a demonstration is needed to make 
clear which of the objects in the context the speaker has in mind as 
the demonstratum); some examples of pure indexicals are ‘I’, ‘now’, 
‘here’, ‘today’, etc. (no demonstration is required).
According to Kaplan’s theory, pure indexicals have a special 
property: if they occur in a context c, they are guaranteed to have 
a semantic value simply in virtue of the constitutive elements of c, 
i.e., the speaker, the location, the time of utterance and the possible 
world in which c occur. This depends, of course, on what we take a 
context of utterance to be. In Kaplan’s work we find a highly techni-
cal (and somewhat simplified) notion: a context includes an agent, 
a location, a time, and a possible world1 (i.e., a world in which the 
utterance takes place). One important feature of Kaplan’s notion of 
context is that its constitutive elements are always those of the pro-
duction of the utterance (i.e., the agent of the context is the agent 
that produces2 the utterance, the place of the context is the place of 
1 For this reason, we should probably consider ‘actual’ as a pure indexical as 
well: it has the possible world of the context of utterance as semantic value.
2 As Perry (1997, pp. 592-3) notices, although utterances generally involve 
tokens, they are not always identical with the act of producing  them. The agent 
of an  utterance is not necessarily the one that produces the (written or spoken) 
token. In the same way, the location and time of the utterance is not necessarily 
the location and time in which the token is produced. The same token  might be 
used in several different occasions (or by several different agents) to produce dif-
ferent utterances. For instance, someone might use a note ‘Will be back soon’, 
written by someone else, and  leave it at the door of his office at different times 
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utterance, the time of the context is the time of the utterance, etc.)
If we think of contexts as combinations of constitutive elements 
(a time, a location, an agent and a possible world), we can raise the 
question of which of these combinations are admissible for utteranc-
es. Any combination of agents, locations, times and possible worlds 
is admissible? If the agent, the location, the time, and the possible 
world of the context are those in which the utterance is produced, 
then there seems to be a restriction on admissible contexts, since not 
just any combination of these elements are appropriate contexts for 
utterances. E.g., a context in which the agent is not at the location or 
at the time in which the utterance takes place. Thinking about these 
odd combinations of elements, Kaplan famously advocates their ex-
clusion from the class of admissible contexts and a restriction to what 
he calls proper contexts:
What has gone wrong? We have ignored the special relationship be-
tween ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’. Here is a proposed correction. Let the 
class of indices be narrowed to include only the proper ones-namely, 
those <w, x, p, t> such that in the world w, x is located at p at the 
time t. Such a move may have been intended originally since improper 
indices are like impossible worlds; no such context could exist and thus 
there is no interest in evaluating the extensions of expressions with 
respect to them. (Kaplan 1989, p. 509)
One of the efects of this restriction is that some sentences like
(1) I am here now.
come out true in any context, for in any proper context, the agent 
of the utterance is at the location of the utterance at the time of the 
utterance. (Only in improper contexts the agent might not be at the 
place or time of the utterance; but improper contexts are rendered 
irrelevant by the restriction.) A sentence that yields a true proposi-
tion in any context is a logical truth, according to Kaplan’s defini-
tion. 
Something interesting about (1) is that, although it is logically 
true, the proposition it expresses in a context is not a necessary truth. 
If (1) is uttered by me in Lisbon on July 9th 2010, it expresses the true 
proposition that M.R. is in Lisbon on July 9th 2010, but the latter is 
of course only contingently true. (Maybe there are other sentences 
to make different utterances.
that are not logically true by the standard definition, but that come 
out as logically true if only proper contexts are allowed.) Something 
important in Kaplan’s approach is that, by restricting the contexts to 
proper context, the context that is taken together with a sentence in 
order to produce a proposition is always the one of the production of 
the utterance. Therefore, the restriction to proper contexts implies 
that the semantic value taken by pure indexicals will be elements of 
the context in which the utterance occurs.
In this paper I’ll be referring to this as Kaplan’s view, but of course 
Kaplan is not the only one who thinks along these lines. I call it this 
way because Kaplan was one who clearly saw the alternatives, and 
explicitly and deliberately restricts contexts of utterances to prop-
er contexts. Other influential philosophers like Montague, Lewis, 
Prior and Perry, to mention a few, also think that the semantic value 
of indexicals are taken from the context (or index) of the utterance.
Despite its intuitive appeal, Kaplan’s view on this topic was chal-
lenged by some philosophers of language, based on the presentation 
of equally intuitive cases of utterances recorded or written in one 
context, but meant to be read (or decoded) in another context, i.e., 
at a different time, or at a different location, or uttered by a dif-
ferent agent. Most notably, Predelli (2005) argues that we are in 
many important ways free to shape the context adequate to repre-
sent an utterance, and there is no commitment either to the agent 
that produces the utterance, or the time or location in which the 
utterance takes place, or even to the possible world in which it takes 
place. In this paper, I shall first review these objections. Then I shall 
argue that these examples can be more naturally accommodated 
within Kaplan’s theory by sharply distinguishing between a theory 
of semantic content from a theory of speech acts: Kaplan’s approach 
yields an explanation of the semantic content of an utterance (which 
might be false) and a pragmatic theory (including, among other ele-
ments, Grice’s pragmatics of implicatures) yields an explanation of 
how speakers can transform this semantic content into another (pos-
sibly true) content. 
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2 The puzzle
The phenomenon that I want to focus now, and that is sometimes 
regarded as an exception to Kaplan’s theory, was first mentioned in 
print by Kaplan himself in a footnote (Kaplan 1989, p. 491, footnote 
12), in which he notices that, in recorded messages for later repro-
duction, we find a use of ‘now’ that doesn’t seem like a case pure 
indexical. E.g., the spoken message
(2) I am not here now.
recorded in an answering machine, and meant to be reproduced at 
different times. In cases like this, according the semantic value of 
‘now’ doesn’t seem to be the time in which the message is encoded 
(recorded or written), but rather the time in which the message is 
decoded (listened to or read).
I shall call deferred those written or recorded utterances employ-
ing ‘now’ or other pure indexicals that are meant to be read or lis-
tened to at a different time, place, etc. from that of the writing or 
recording. I mean deferred in a very broad sense (and not just in 
the temporal sense), i.e., an utterance is deferred if it is encoded in 
one context, but meant to be decoded in another context that dif-
fers from the original one in an aspect that is semantically relevant 
for some pure indexical employed in it. Deferred utterances seem 
to present a puzzle for Kaplan’s theory: ‘here’ and ‘now’ are pure 
indexicals and, as such, must take as semantic values the place and 
time of the context in which the utterance is produced. However, 
this does not correspond to be the intuitive understanding of (2). 
How can one account for the intuitive understanding of (2) and also 
preserve the purely indexical nature of ‘here’ and ‘now’?
Following a suggestion made by Donnellan, Kaplan briefly men-
tions in the same footnote the possibility of there being two differ-
ent forms of ‘now’ in natural language: one that takes as reference 
the time when the utterance is produced, and the other that takes 
the time when the utterance is decoded. Let’s represent both uses 
of ‘now’. Suppose that (2) is recorded at t
0
, and is decoded (i.e., 
heard or read) at t
1
. The first use of ‘now’ takes t
0
 as semantic value. 
The utterance is false (and under this reading, it cannot come out 
true). But the second use of ‘now’ takes t
1
 as semantic value, and (2) 
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might be true (e.g., if the speaker is not at the place in which (2) is 
played or read in t
2
).3 However they may differ, both uses seem to 
have something in common, i.e., they do not need an accompanying 
demonstration. They automatically take some constitutive element 
of the context as semantic value (the time of recording or the time 
of decoding). So there is a sense in which they are both pure indexi-
cal uses. For brevity, I will refer to these uses as purely indexical-c 
(which takes the coding time as semantic value) and purely indexical-
d (which takes the decoding time as semantic value), respectively.
Kaplan also mentions possible demonstrative uses of ‘here’ (be-
sides the purely indexical use). One can, e.g., point at a location in 
a map, and say
(3) In two weeks I will be here.
I suppose that we could have something similar for ‘now’. E.g., sup-
pose that in a history lecture videotaped for future exhibitions, there 
is a line in the blackboard representing the chronological order of the 
events of the Second World War, and the teacher indicates a point of 
the line and says
(4) Only now the US enters the war.
In this use, ‘now’ requires an accompanying demonstration (different 
demonstrations of the line yielding different semantic values). This 
use is different from pure indexical-c and pure indexical-d above, in 
that simply mentioning the word ‘now’ won’t do. A pure indexical-c 
reading of ‘now’ would have (4) saying that at the time of the video-
taping the US entered the war, which is most likely false (supposing 
that it was videotaped long after 1941). And a pure indexical-d read-
ing would have (4) saying that at the time in which the tape is played 
the US entered the war, which is also false. In this intended use of 
‘now’, the demonstration is required.
One could think that the recognition of a demonstrative use of 
‘here’ and ‘now’ would solve the puzzle, i.e., ‘here’ and ‘now’ nor-
mally work as pure indexicals, but in deferred utterances they have 
a demonstrative use. However, as Sidelle (1991) notices, demonstra-
3 Multiple uses of (2) at times t2, t3, etc., presumably would pick t2, t3, etc., 
as semantic values.
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tive occurrences of ‘here’ can, in principle, be replaced by ‘there’. 
(Maybe something similar can be said for the demonstrative use of 
‘now’, i.e., that it is replaceable by ‘then’.) In the case of recorded 
messages, however, it does not seem right to replace (2) by
(5) I am not there now.
Therefore, what we have in the case of a recorded message is, in 
general, not a demonstrative use of ‘here’ (or now). In other words, 
the problem represented by utterances of (2) does not depend on the 
attribution of a strictly pure indexical working to ‘here’ and ‘now’. 
That is to say, even if we admit of non-indexical (demonstrative) uses 
of ‘here’ and ‘now’, the puzzle still remains.
3 Some alternatives
There are three amendments to Kaplan’s theory that I want to con-
sider here. None of them seems to me to be adequate, for different 
reasons. The first amendment is suggested by Sidelle (1991) as a solu-
tion to what he calls “The Answering Machine Paradox”. According 
to this view, there might be (and in (2) we have such a case) what 
Sidelle he calls deferred utterance (he uses the term in a different way 
than I do)4, i.e., utterances in which the agent is not at the place or 
at the time when it occurs. Therefore, according to his view, it is not 
necessary for the agent of an utterance to be at the place (or time) 
of the utterance. According to Sidelle’s proposal, when the agent 
records the message, he is not making an utterance at that point; he 
is merely arranging things so that an utterance (or maybe many of 
them) will be made later, at the time when someone calls the agent’s 
machine (and the agent supposedly won’t be there at the time when 
the utterance takes place). This seems to imply the denial of one of 
the principles behind the puzzle, which I will call Principle L:
(L) The utterer is always located at the time and place of the ut-
4 It will become clearer in the last Section of this paper that Siddele’s use of 
the term differ from mine in a subtle but important way. He means that no ut-
terance is actually made when the utterer encodes it, but only when the listener 
(or reader) decodes it. I mean that an utterance (the same one) is made in both 
contexts.
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terance.
(L) appears intuitively correct, and it is certainly part of the motiva-
tion for Kaplan’s restriction of contexts to proper ones. But Sidelle 
thinks that it should be rejected, and he offers two reasons for this, 
none of them very compelling in my view. The first reason deals 
with (L) itself. According to Sidelle,
[A]ll (or at least, almost all) of the sorts of utterance situations we are 
familiar with involve a speaker’s being located at the place of his utter-
ance. The general claim here [L] would just be an extrapolation which 
is perhaps not very imaginative- one, in particular, which did not focus 
very clearly or much on answering-machines or scraps of paper left on 
kitchen tables (1991, p. 534)
Sidelle’s claim seems to involve some circularity; for it challenges our 
right to extent to messages left on answering machines and scraps of 
paper left on the kitchen the same account that is provided for nor-
mal utterances. This presupposes that in the latter cases, we do have 
something deeply different going on. But this has to be explained 
independently, that is to say, we need some independent reason for 
believing that cases like this are an exception. It is not enough to 
raise the vague and general doubt concerning our right to assimilate 
the latter cases to the former ones. Sidelle’s second reason for aban-
doning (L) is more general, and challenges the broader claim that an 
agent must be located at the place where the action occurs:
[W]e at least allow ourselves to talk in ways which don’ t accord with 
this general claim. For instance, after putting some clothes in a wash-
ing machine, I might run into someone at the supermarket and tell 
them that I ‘m doing my laundry (now). It would be most unusual for 
them to say that I can’t be, since I’m not currently located by a washing 
machine. (1991, p. 534)
I think that examples like this bring very little support to Sidelle’s 
claim; it seems clear to me that in the envisaged situation, ‘I am doing 
my laundry’ means that I am in middle of a somewhat complex pro-
cess, which involves running to the washing machine every now and 
then to perform some actions that do require my presence there, and 
sometimes require (or allow for) my presence at the supermarket, 
e.g., to buy some more laundry soap. The same with ‘I am finishing 
my PH.D. at UCLA’: the fact that I am not physically on campus all 
the time hardly shows that I might perform an action that takes place 
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at UCLA without being there. The proper description of my action 
is that I am in a process which involves several different kinds of ac-
tions, each one of them requiring my presence, sometimes on the 
UCLA campus, sometimes at home (reading and writing). To sum 
up: in cases like those that Sidelle has in mind as counter-example to 
the broader thesis that underlies (L), i.e., in which the agent does not 
seem to be at the place where the action takes place, what most likely 
is going on is that the action is being misdescribed.
The second amendment is proposed, among others, by Colter-
john and MacIntosh (1987), who suggest that pure indexicals occur-
ring in deferred utterances like (2) contain a sort of “proxy finger” 
indicating the time and the location in which the message is decod-
ed.  In the same spirit, Smith (1989) proposes a view according to 
which indexicals might have multiple characters, sometimes work-
ing as pure indexicals, sometimes working as demonstratives, and 
sometimes working as neither of them. For instance, the ‘now’ in 
(4) is not working according to an indexical or demonstrative rule 
for him, but according to what he calls the “historically emphatic” 
rule. (I suppose that he means by that the role of capturing a cer-
tain time that is contextually relevant, and different from the time 
of utterance.) Smith sees a kind of “super-rule” or what he calls a 
“metacharacter” governing the use of an indexical, that associates to 
that indexical the character appropriate to each context.
As Predelli points out (2005, pp. 48-9), there are some prob-
lems with this kind of proposal. First, regarding Colterjohn and Ma-
cIntosh’s suggestion, the proxy finger is supposed to demonstrate 
whichever place the note is read (or listened to), but clearly many 
such places are not the ones that the utterer had in mind (and cer-
tainly not what the reader understands by reading the note). E.g., 
if (2) in a written note is carried by the wind and ends up in my 
neighbor’s house, and if someone finds the note and reads it there he 
should, according to this proposal, understand that ‘here’ means my 
neighbor’s house, which doesn’t seem right. Second, as Predelli also 
correctly points out, Smith’s metacharacters remain a rather mys-
terious semantic entities, and appealing to them looks rather like a 
strategy for masking the arbitrariness of characters changing from 
context to context. The character of an indexical is normally sup-
posed to be a simple rule that, at least in principle, encodes once and 
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for all the semantic value that it should have in all different contexts. 
But it is hard to see anything like a general rule corresponding to 
the metacharacter, especially if, as a result of new devices like the 
answering machine, there are new characters that an indexical might 
have that were not foreseen.
I follow Predelli in considering the alternatives to Kaplan’s view 
reviewed so far as unsatisfactory. For the rest of this section I will 
consider the amendment proposed by Predelli himself, and I will 
argue that it is unsatisfactory as well. His proposal is, in a way, more 
“conservative” than the previous ones, since it preserves the spirit of 
Kaplan’s original approach, but at the cost of adopting a very liberal 
view on the notion of the intended index of an utterance. According 
to this proposal, indexicals always take their semantic value from 
an index together with which they are to be interpreted. “Index” is 
a technical notion, and it resembles Kaplan’s notion of context: an 
index typically includes an agent, a location, a time, and a possible 
world. In Kaplan’s view, as we saw, the context is always the one in 
which the utterance takes place, i.e., the agent, location, time and 
possible world in which the utterance is produced. I’ll refer to the in-
dex formed by the agent, location, etc., of the utterance as the index 
of utterance. According to Predelli, whenever a speaker’s utterance 
includes an indexical expression, a correct interpretation of the ut-
terance must recognize that there is an intended index together with 
which the indexical should be taken into account, and the intended 
index might be different from the index of utterance. And he thinks 
that this explains many utterances that are intuitively true, but that 
would be false if taken according to Kaplan’s original view. E.g., 
when telling someone a story involving three fictional characters A, 
B and C, and a fictional murder, I might say
(6) A thought all the time that B was the murderer, but actually 
C was the one who did it.
Now what is the semantic value of ‘actually’ in (6)? The real actual 
world? If so, my utterance is certainly false, for C is not a murderer 
in the actual world. Predelli thinks that it is natural to take the se-
mantic value of ‘actually’ as being the world of the story. The same 
happens, e.g., in a history class about Napoleon’s fate in Waterloo, 
when the teacher, trying to present Napoleon’s situation in a dra-
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matic way, speaks in the first person:
(7) What should I do now?
What is the semantic value of ‘I’ and ‘now’ here? If we take the in-
dex of utterance as the relevant one, the ‘I’ refers to the teacher, 
and ‘now’ to the time of the class. However, it is clear that the 
teacher was trying to say something about Napoleon in June 18th, 
1815. Hence, according to Predelli, in order to correctly represent 
the intended utterance, we should rather take as index one that has 
Napoleon as agent and June 18th, 1815 as time. This is the one that 
the speaker had in mind in making the utterance, and the hearer can 
only understand the utterance if he realizes that.
In the example of the answering machine, the speaker, when re-
cording the message, has in mind a certain index against which the 
message should be decoded, or, better, a set of indexes (i.e., any fu-
ture instant in which the agent is not at home). The listener, in order 
to understand what the speaker said, has to grasp what the intended 
index is (supposedly, the time is the one of the phone call).
I do not find the alternative view here presented quite convincing. 
Most of the examples can be seen either as cases of anaphora (i.e., in 
the case of ‘actually’ in (6), it can be seen as anaphoric on the pos-
sible world described at the beginning of the report (the fictional 
world)), or cases in which we can plausibly see the original utterance 
as false but pragmatically implying a true one. (I will elaborate the 
latter point in the last section.) But the main obstacle for abandon-
ing the restriction to proper contexts comes from considerations 
concerning the very special epistemic roles that beliefs described by 
pure indexicals seem to have, i.e., beliefs that one express using ‘I’, 
‘here’ and ‘now’ (and possibly ‘actual’). I can only offer here a very 
brief sketch of the considerations that are relevant in this connection, 
since a full account would require a much deeper incursion into the 
philosophy of mind. On the one hand, there seems to be a deep and 
somehow fundamental relation between the epistemic states that are 
expressed using pure indexicals, i.e., between those states of mind 
corresponding to beliefs regarding who one is, where one is, and 
when it is. This is, as we recall, Kaplan’s main motivation for placing 
the restriction to proper contexts: he wanted to capture a connec-
tion between the semantic rules of ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’ (and perhaps 
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‘actual’). The proposed revision seems to ignore, or at least to dra-
matically play down the relevance of this connection. On the other 
hand, the beliefs in question seem to play a very special role in one’s 
total cognitive state, and are central for the believer’s orientation in 
the world as a person and as an agent. This is part of Perry’s point in 
calling “locating beliefs” those concerning where one is, when it is, 
and who one is (Perry 1979). Beliefs of this sort place the believer in 
a special state of mind and have motivational force that other (non-
indexical) beliefs do not seem to have. Suggestions such as Predelli’s, 
in which we are largely free to chose the context that better suits 
an utterance seems to miss (or at least to diminish to the point of 
rendering them irrelevant) the important epistemic and motivational 
force that these indexicals seem to have.
Maybe a better strategy, one that preserves the important epis-
temic roles and connections between locating beliefs would be to 
leave them and their contexts where they are, and look for variations 
in the pragmatic implications that people may draw from a proposi-
tion expressed using indexicals. There certainly is a role to be played 
by the speaker’s intention in recording (2) or in uttering ‘I will in-
vade Russia’ (in a history class). But maybe a better way of account-
ing for this intention is not to take the speaker’s intention as playing 
a semantic role, but a post-semantic role5, i.e., once every semantic value 
is fixed, one still has to read somehow the speaker’s intention in or-
der to draw the right conclusion from the semantically expressed 
proposition.
4 Back to Kaplan’s original view
In this section I will sketch my proposal for dealing with deferred ut-
terances, which holds on to Kaplan’s idea that the semantic value of 
indexicals are always taken from the context in which the utterance 
is produced, and which I will call the natural view.6 It is, therefore, 
5 I am using Perry’s terminology (Perry 1998).
6 Predelli calls it the “simple minded view”. This designation is clearly biased, 
and it is hard to believe that the great founders of formal semantics would have 
been really simple minded at any point.
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somewhat more “conservative” than Predelli’s.7
Utterances like (2) are systematically false, but I see a divorce 
between what is semantically expressed by (2), and what the caller 
learns (i.e., a true proposition) when he hears (2). Here is a sort of 
consideration that, I think, supports this point of view. There seems 
to be a difference in our understanding of (2) recorded in an answer-
ing machine while it is being actually used as an answering machine, 
and when it is not being so used anymore. Imagine the situation in 
which there is an old recording of (2) as a greeting message left over 
30 years ago by John in his old answering machine. But he has passed 
away some years ago, and that machine is no longer in use for an-
swering phone calls since his widow bought a new and modern ma-
chine and recorded her own new greeting message. But the widow 
likes to play the old recording sometimes anyway just to hear her late 
husband’s voice and remember the old happy days. It doesn’t seem 
that, in this situation, the widow will take the playing of (2) as a 
true utterance made by the recorder, since the husband is not there 
anymore.
What happened? Why is it that the same message was apparently 
taken to be true during the many years that it was in use in the old 
machine(while John was alive) and now is no longer taken to be true, 
but is rather seen as a souvenir of John’s life? (What the widow will 
probably think is that the recording was made at a certain place and 
at a certain moment in the past, and that John was certainly saying 
something false when he recorded (2), but which was used for the pur-
pose of communicating true propositions for many years. What I think is 
going on here is that the semantic content of (2) is always the same, 
during the years of use and now, i.e., that John was not at the time 
and place when the recording took place, which is certainly false. 
But the false proposition was used (during the useful lifetime of the 
answering machine as an answering machine) to convey many true 
propositions, i.e., that John wasn’t home whenever someone tried to 
7 I should remark  that, as mentioned before, this proposal is not apparently 
the one that Kaplan himself favors in the footnote where he raises the problem 
(1989, p. 491, footnote 12). Although his remarks are very brief and no systemat-
ic theory for deferred utterances is elaborated in them, Kaplan seems inclined to 
see a pure indexical in written and recorded messages as being actually ambigu-
ous between what I called in Section II a pure indexical-c and a pure indexical-d.
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reach him during his absence. That is to say, what was decisive for 
taking (2) as conveying a true or a false proposition was not the se-
mantic value of (2) itself, but the purpose for which it was employed 
(heard or read). In other words, what was essential was not the se-
mantic value of (2) but, as we may call, the speech act for which it 
was used as a vehicle.
The same consideration could be raised concerning Smith’s many 
character view, and in particular Colterjohn and MacIntosh’s for-
mulation of it. According to the latter authors, the note containing 
the indexical ‘now’ or ‘here’ works as a sort of “proxy finger” that 
indicates the place where the note is (or the time in which it is read). 
But suppose that we read the note a very long time after it was writ-
ten (say, the note is exposed in a museum together with someone’s 
writings and personal belongings). We don’t take the ‘here’ or the 
‘now’ in the note to refer to the museum or the present time; we see 
it rather as a biographical information about someone’s life.
Someone thinking along the lines of Predelli’s proposal could re-
ply that, in this situation of reading or listening the message long 
after it was produced (and we do not take the indexical to refer to the 
place or time in which the message is read or listened), what happens 
is simply that the person who recorded or wrote it had some appro-
priate index (or a collection of appropriate indexes) in mind, and we 
are able to recognize that the present index is not one of them. But is 
this really so? The person who left the message in the machine seems 
to have in mind any future moment in which someone calls and she 
is not at home. Is there an intended time limit for the future indexes? 
The time limit is certainly a pragmatic matter; but this does not nec-
essarily have to do with the proposition semantically expressed by 
the note. In order to know this proposition, we need some informa-
tion regarding the situation in which it was written or recorded. 
But even if we do not exactly know what the original proposition 
was (e.g., that John was not at home at the time when the message 
was recorded, which is presumably false), we are able to derive, by 
pragmatic rules, the proposition that really matters in the present 
situation, i.e., that John is not home right now, at the time when we 
are calling him.
Something analogous can be said for another example discussed 
in the literature and normally presented as a counter-example to Ka-
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plan’s thesis. The example is:
(8) I exist.
According to Kaplan’s theory, all occurrences of (8) are true because 
in every proper context the agent must exist, although the truth it 
expresses is, of course, a contingent one. This renders all occur-
rences of
(9) I no longer exist.
false. However, according to some critics (e.g., Predelli (2005, pp. 
45-6)), true instances of (9) might occur, e.g., as part of one’s will 
(meant to be read after the agent of the utterance has died).
Now, intuitively, if (9) is part of one’s will, and if it is read short 
after one’s death, it might be taken as conveying something true 
(e.g., if it is something like ‘I no longer exist; since I have no liv-
ing relatives, please donate all my money to charity’.). But suppose 
(9) appears in a will exposed in a museum of someone that died a 
thousand years ago. In this situation, I think it is less natural to take 
(9) as expressing something true. We tend to take (9) in this situa-
tion rather as a document about one’s life, i.e., about what he did or 
thought many centuries ago. Again: what happened? If (9) expressed 
a true proposition right after the agent’s death, it should continue to 
express a true proposition at any future time, but we hardly (or much 
less naturally) take it that way. What I think is going on is that when 
we look at one’s will right after his death, and again many centuries 
later, what changes is the purpose of reading (9), and therefore the 
kind of proposition that we might pragmatically infer from one and 
the same (false) proposition expressed by (9), i.e., that that man did 
not exist at the time when the will was written.
If this is correct, Kaplan’s original view and the corresponding 
restriction to proper contexts does not need to be revised. There is 
certainly something correct in the following complaint that Predelli 
formulates against Kaplan’s view:
It follows from the Simple-Minded View […] that ‘I am not here now’ 
may never be uttered/written truly. But this clashes with our intuition 
that there are true instances of ‘I am not here now’, written on a scrap 
of paper or reproduced by a recording device. An analogous difficulty 
is raised by utterances of ‘I exist (now)’. Given the thesis that ‘I’ and 
‘now’ refer to the utterer and the time of utterance, together with [the 
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thesis that] a speaker exists at the time of utterance (or inscription), it 
follows that ‘I exist (now)’ may not be uttered or written falsely. But 
this conclusion is also at odds with our intuitions concerning certain 
instances of written notes and recorded messages. For instance, ‘I do 
not exist any longer’ may well occur truly as part of one’s will. (2005, 
pp. 45-6)
Predelli (and other critics) are right in that there is a clash with our 
intuition at some point, but the diagnosis proposed is, in my view, 
misleading. What we need to do is simply to recognize that the se-
mantically expressed proposition might be taken for different pur-
poses in different contexts, and therefore the pragmatically inferred 
proposition will be different. We might have the same false proposi-
tion expressed many times and in different contexts by reproducing 
the vehicle (note or recording) of the original utterance, but each 
time a different (and maybe true) proposition is inferred.8
Marco Ruffino
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1 A diferença entre ser F e ser claramente F e o uso do ope-
rador «claramente» para resolver o sorites
Pode uma coisa ser de uma certa maneira sem ser claramente dessa 
maneira? Não parece difícil encontrar exemplos de casos que suge-
rem que essa é uma possibilidade que, em geral, estamos dispostos 
a aceitar. Um predicado vago tem, ou pelo menos pode ter, casos de 
fronteira: objectos a respeito dos quais não é claro se o predicado se 
lhes aplica ou não aplica. Perante um caso de fronteira de um predi-
cado vago «F», se nos for perguntado «Isto é F?», a reacção típica é de 
hesitação: não sabemos o que responder, tanto «Sim» como «Não» 
parecem respostas possíveis ou legítimas e, no entanto, nenhuma de-
las parece ter justificação suficiente. Os exemplos tradicionais são 
«É isto um monte?», «Este homem é careca?» ou «Esta catedral é 
velha?», mas podemos também pensar em casos como «Foi esta ac-
ção corajosa?», «Este indivíduo é meu amigo?» ou «Este advogado é 
competente?». Mas, por vezes, se a pergunta for reformulada para 
«É claramente F?», a hesitação pode desaparecer e dar lugar a uma 
confiante resposta negativa: «Não, claramente F, não é». Nesses casos, 
rejeitamos a descrição da coisa como «claramente F», ao mesmo tem-
po que hesitamos a respeito da sua descrição como «F». É plausível 
interpretar este género de reacção como reveladora de uma predis-
posição geral para admitirmos que uma coisa que não é claramente F 
pode, no entanto, ser F.
A admissão dessa possibilidade vai a par com a ideia de que, em 
geral, é preciso mais para ser claramente F do que para ser F. E que, 
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por isso, é natural esperar que haja menos coisas claramente F do que 
coisas F (numa série sorítica, por exemplo). E, se considerarmos que 
o advérbio «claramente» é iterável, será também natural esperarmos 
que haja ainda menos coisas claramente claramente F do que coisas 
claramente F, e assim por diante.
E, no entanto, pensadores importantes no estudo da vagueza 
(como Michael Dummett, Kit Fine, Rosanna Keefe, Roy Sorensen e 
outros) têm estado de acordo em julgarem que as coisas não podem 
ter uma propriedade sem terem claramente essa propriedade. Estará 
este seu acordo bem fundado?
Na medida em que assenta na diferença entre ser-F e ser-claramen-
te-F, a resposta à questão que estou a colocar depende crucialmente 
do significado da palavra «claramente». Alguns filósofos queixam-se 
que esta palavra tem um significado obscuro. Mas, por outro lado, 
há teorias que tentam representá-la por meio de um operador frásico 
∆  que, num sistema formalizado, recebe uma semântica específica e 
para o qual são propostas regras de inferência especiais.
A queixa quanto à obscuridade do operador «claramente» pode 
conduzir a que se repudie o seu uso numa teorização séria a respeito 
da vagueza. Há, no entanto, razões aparentemente fortes para justi-
ficar a necessidade de um tal operador. Uma razão que se destaca é a 
necessidade que temos do operador para resolver – de uma maneira 
bastante standard na filosofia contemporânea – o paradoxo de sori-
tes. Passemos em revista, de um modo breve, o raciocínio para esse 
efeito.
É comum dizer-se que o que origina o sorites é o problema da 
vagueza: o paradoxo explora a vagueza de certos predicados como 
«monte», «careca», «alto» ou «velho», mostrando que, pelo menos 
aparentemente, essa vagueza nos conduz a contradições. Mas em que 
é que consiste essa vagueza e como é que ela conduz ao paradoxo? 
Quer dizer: qual é a característica que os predicados envolvidos têm 
que podemos identificar como a sua vagueza e que seria responsável 
pela incoerência que o paradoxo revela? A resposta habitual a esta 
pergunta é a de que essa característica é a que está representada na 
chamada premissa indutiva do sorites canónico, uma premissa que diz, 
por exemplo, que se uma pessoa não é velha quando já passaram n 
segundos desde que nasceu, então ela também não é velha depois 
de terem passado n+1 segundos. Dizer que «velha» é um predicado 
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vago equivaleria a dizer que este princípio é verdadeiro: um só se-
gundo não pode fazer a diferença entre uma pessoa não-velha e uma 
pessoa velha. Isto seria a vagueza. Quanto à incoerência, ela torna-
-se manifesta se observarmos que, obviamente, uma pessoa velha se 
tornou velha ao ter vivido um certo número, grande mas finito, de 
segundos: ora, não é possível que tenha havido uma transição nessa 
série, mas que a transição não tenha ocorrido em nenhum ponto da 
série (dado que a série não é mais do que uma sucessão de pontos).
Uma saída standard para o problema consiste então em dizer que, 
neste raciocínio que nos conduz da vagueza até à contradição1, onde 
nos enganámos foi ao aceitarmos a premissa indutiva do argumento, 
concordando que um só segundo nunca pode fazer a diferença entre 
não-velho e velho. Embora esta afirmação nos tenha parecido ao iní-
cio muitíssimo plausível, o que é facto é que o argumento mostrou 
que ela não pode estar certa. Como disse Crispin Wright, devemos 
encarar o argumento sorítico como uma reductio ad absurdum daquela 
premissa2.
Até este ponto, muitos filósofos estão de acordo. Daqui em dian-
te, porém, começam tipicamente a discordar a respeito de diversas 
questões subsequentes, como por exemplo: Devemos negar aquela 
premissa? Devemos considerar que ela é falsa ou devemos permane-
cer agnósticos acerca dela? Como se explica a forte tendência natural 
que temos para acreditar nela?
Menos polémica parece ser a questão de saber como é que a pre-
missa deve ser revista, qual é o princípio que deve substituí-la. Re-
corde-se que começámos por aceitar a premissa porque pensávamos 
que ela seria a expressão adequada da vagueza do predicado. Se isso 
não é assim, como é então? Uma proposta bastante comum é a de 
dizer que aquilo a que o reconhecimento da vagueza de «velha» nos 
obriga é a aceitar este princípio ligeiramente modificado: se uma pes-
soa claramente não é velha quando já passaram n segundos desde que 
nasceu, então ela também não é claramente velha quando já passaram n+1 
1 A contradição é entre o reconhecimento intuitivo de que uma pessoa com 
90 anos (o que é um pouco mais do que 2840 milhões de segundos) é velha e a 
conclusão do raciocínio sorítico segundo a qual ela não é velha.
2 Wright (1987) 234. Ver também Fine (1975) 139 («In fact, on the super-
truth view, the second premiss is false.»).
segundos. Não é entre não-velha e velha, mas sim entre claramente-não-
-velha e claramente-velha, que um só segundo nunca pode ser suficiente 
para fazer a diferença. «What the [...] paradox brings out», escreveu 
Wright, «is that, when dealing with vague expressions, it is essential 
to have the expressive resources afforded by an operator expressing 
deiniteness or determinacy»3.
É evidente que este género de solução do sorites coloca muito 
peso sobre esta noção de ser claramente de uma certa maneira. De 
acordo com esta perspectiva, o uso desta noção faz toda a diferença 
entre o pensamento de que a vagueza é intrinsecamente incoeren-
te e o pensamento de que a vagueza não é paradoxal em si mesma. 
Um filósofo que adopte esta perspectiva encontra-se sob uma pressão 
muito forte para que diga algo de iluminador acerca do significado de 
«claramente» e acerca da diferença entre ser velho e ser claramente 
velho. Ele parece ser a pessoa certa a quem perguntar: pode uma 
coisa ser de uma maneira sem ser claramente dessa maneira?
2 Ideias centrais da teoria supervalorativista da vagueza
O supervalorativismo fornece uma interessante semântica formal 
para linguagens vagas, no contexto da qual a questão que coloquei 
pode ser analisada de um modo mais rigoroso. Tomá-la-ei como re-
ferência. Nesta secção, farei uma apresentação preliminar das prin-
cipais ideias e do programa filosófico que orienta o sistema formal 
supervalorativista – para que, na secção seguinte, possamos analisar 
o seu reflexo sobre o problema que nos interessa.
Tipicamente, o supervalorativismo toma a vagueza como um fenó-
meno semântico, que pode afectar qualquer categoria de expressões 
de uma linguagem, mas que, de modo paradigmático, se manifesta 
nalguns dos seus predicados. Um predicado vago é um predicado 
cujo significado é deficiente no seguinte sentido: as suas condições 
de aplicação são tais que, para certos objectos, a totalidade dos fac-
3 Wright (1987) 229. Com o operador de clareza podemos também dizer (sem 
ascensão semântica, na própria linguagem-objecto) que a é um caso de fronteira 
de F, assim: ¬∆Fa  ¬∆¬Fa. E podemos expressar o fenómeno da vagueza de 
ordem superior, dizendo que a é um caso de fronteira de um caso de fronteira de 
F ou, de modo equivalente, que a é um caso de fronteira de claramente-F, assim: 
¬∆∆Fa  ¬∆¬∆Fa.
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tos relevantes a seu respeito não determina se elas se encontram ou 
não encontram cumpridas. Face a esta indeterminação, o superva-
lorativismo considera que, se um tal predicado for atribuído a um 
desses objectos, a frase declarativa resultante poderá não ser verda-
deira nem falsa. O princípio da bivalência é, por isso, rejeitado. Mas 
a indeterminação característica dos predicados vagos não termina 
aqui, nesta admissão de que, para certos objectos, o predicado nem 
é verdadeiro nem é falso deles. Além disso, é também indetermina-
do que objectos são esses. O predicado é claramente verdadeiro de 
alguns objectos (pertencentes à sua extensão) e é claramente falso de 
alguns outros objectos (pertencentes à sua anti-extensão) e não é nem 
uma coisa nem outra de outros objectos ainda (os casos de fronteira, 
pertencentes à sua penumbra), mas é indeterminado onde é que uns 
terminam e os outros começam. É por isso difícil falar da extensão 
de um predicado vago, pelo menos da maneira como esta noção cos-
tuma ser entendida, na teoria dos modelos clássica, como um conjun-
to. Pois não há nenhuma vagueza na noção de conjunto. A identidade 
de um conjunto é constituída, extensionalmente, pelos objectos que 
são seus membros – de tal modo que, se não estiverem definidos os 
objectos que lhe pertencem, não está dado nenhum conjunto. Para li-
dar com este problema, a ideia-chave do supervalorativismo consiste 
em atribuir a cada predicado vago, em vez de uma extensão definida, 
um leque de extensões possíveis. Estas extensões possíveis corres-
pondem a maneiras aceitáveis de tornar o predicado preciso, ou seja, 
correspondem a precisões aceitáveis do predicado. Estas precisões são 
aceitáveis na medida em que são compatíveis com o significado do 
predicado e com os factos extra-linguísticos4. Nenhuma delas tem 
qualquer privilégio sobre as outras. Alguns objectos são tais que o 
predicado é verdadeiro deles numas precisões e falso noutras5. Mas 
haverá objectos dos quais o predicado é verdadeiro em todas as preci-
4 O leitor perspicaz já terá inferido que «aceitável» é aqui um predicado vago 
da metalinguagem. Caso contrário, o «leque de extensões possíveis» seria um 
conjunto de conjuntos e estaria determinado, para cada objecto, se pertence ou 
não pertence a algum desses conjuntos (ou a todos ou a nenhum).
5 Registe-se o pressuposto de que as precisões tornam o predicado completa-
mente preciso, sem casos de fronteira. Ou seja, nesta versão da teoria, as precisões 
são interpretações clássicas, bivalentes.
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sões – e aí dizemos que o predicado é super-verdadeiro desses objectos; 
de outros objectos, o predicado será super-falso, quer dizer, falso em 
todas as precisões. E a tese fundamental do supervalorativismo é a de 
que, para uma linguagem com predicados vagos, a noção adequada 
de verdade é esta noção definida de super-verdade, ou verdade em 
todas as precisões, entendidas como maneiras aceitáveis de tornar a 
linguagem precisa.
Um dos pontos fortes do supervalorativismo é a sua promessa de 
conciliar a existência de falhas de valor de verdade com o respeito 
pelas chamadas «conexões de penumbra» e pelas verdades daí re-
sultantes. Este termo foi cunhado por Kit Fine (1975) para referir a 
existência de relações lógicas entre expressões vagas. Suponhamos 
que um certo livro tem uma cor uniforme, mas que está na fronteira 
entre o verde e o azul. Em certas precisões o livro conta como verde, 
noutras conta como azul. Mas não há nenhuma precisão aceitável em 
que o livro possa ser simultaneamente verde e azul. Quer dizer, a 
conjunção «o livro é verde e azul» é falsa, apesar de ser composta por 
sub-frases que são ambas indefinidas. Por outro lado, reconhecemos 
a disjunção «o livro é verde ou azul» como verdadeira, porque em 
cada maneira aceitável de precisar os predicados o livro cairá sempre 
na extensão de um ou na do outro. E se houver um segundo livro, si-
tuado na mesma fronteira cromática, mas ligeiramente mais azulado 
que o primeiro, reconheceremos como verdadeira a condicional «se 
o primeiro livro é azul, então o segundo livro é azul». O supervalo-
rativismo atribui grande importância a estas verdades de penumbra. 
A primeira lição que retira delas é que, por causa das conexões exis-
tentes entre eles, os predicados de uma linguagem não podem ser 
precisados um a um, mas têm de sê-lo sempre em conjunto. Cada 
precisão é uma precisão da linguagem como um todo. Além disso, 
para ser aceitável, uma precisão tem de respeitar ou de ser fiel aos 
significados originais da linguagem vaga. Por exemplo, se António 
for um caso claro de um homem velho, nenhuma precisão de «velho» 
será aceitável se nela a frase «António é velho» não for verdadeira. 
O mesmo vale para as verdades de penumbra: elas correspondem a 
condições que as precisões da linguagem têm de respeitar para serem 
aceitáveis. Pois uma precisão em que um livro ligeiramente mais azu-
lado do que um livro azul não fosse azul estaria a violar o significado 
original da palavra «azul». E o mesmo aconteceria com uma precisão 
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na qual um livro (todo) azul fosse também (todo) verde.
Uma outra lição que o supervalorativismo retira das verdades de 
penumbra é que elas mostram que, numa linguagem vaga, as conec-
tivas proposicionais funcionam de uma maneira que é incompatível 
com a ideia – que é central na semântica da lógica clássica – de que 
elas expressam funções de verdade. Quando se abandona a bivalência 
e se admite que algumas frases atómicas podem ser semanticamente 
indefinidas, precisamos de alguma maneira alternativa para lidar com 
os compostos lógicos que as incluem. Para esse efeito existem pro-
postas de novas tabelas de verdade que estendem as bem conhecidas 
tabelas da lógica clássica para um terceiro valor, além do verdadeiro 
e do falso (como, por exemplo, as chamadas tabelas fortes de Klee-
ne). O supervalorativismo alega que as conexões de penumbra mos-
tram que nenhuma tabela dessas pode ser correcta, pois diferentes 
compostos, cujos elementos têm os mesmos valores, podem receber 
valores diferentes. Para verificar isso, basta comparar os exemplos 
anteriores com estes: «o livro é verde ou interessante» (supondo que 
ele também é um caso de fronteira de um livro interessante) e «se 
o segundo livro é azul, então o primeiro livro é azul» (invertendo a 
ordem das frases componentes); apesar de terem a mesma forma e 
componentes com o mesmo valor, estas frases não são verdadeiras. 
Precisamos, portanto, de uma semântica não-verofuncional para as 
constantes lógicas, que seja compatível com o reconhecimento das 
verdades (e das falsidades) de penumbra. A solução proposta pelo 
supervalorativismo consiste em começar por avaliar as frases – ató-
micas e moleculares – em cada uma das precisões (como estas são 
interpretações clássicas, podemos usar as velhas tabelas bivalentes) e, 
depois, definir cada frase como (i) super-verdadeira, (ii) super-falsa 
ou (iii) indeterminada consoante ela seja (i) verdadeira em todas as 
precisões, (ii) falsa em todas as precisões ou (iii) verdadeira numas 
precisões e falsa noutras. Uma disjunção como «o livro é verde ou in-
teressante» será verdadeira nalgumas precisões (a saber, nas precisões 
em que o livro caia na extensão de «verde» ou caia na extensão de 
«interessante») e falsa noutras (a saber, nas precisões em que o livro 
seja azul e desinteressante) e, por isso, é indeterminada. Já a disjun-
ção «o livro é verde ou azul» será verdadeira em todas as precisões 
(pois, devido à conexão entre os dois predicados, numas precisões o 
livro será verde mas não azul, noutras será azul mas não verde e em 
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nenhuma será nem verde nem azul) e, por isso, será reconhecida pela 
semântica como super-verdadeira.
O supervalorativismo também fornece uma resposta interessante 
à questão de saber qual é a lógica correcta para os raciocínios que 
efectuamos numa linguagem vaga. A lógica clássica foi desenvolvi-
da com o objectivo de formalizar o raciocínio matemático. Os seus 
fundadores pretendiam construir um modelo formal daquilo que, de 
modo informal, julgavam ser o raciocínio matemático correcto (e 
neste seu juízo informal enfrentaram a oposição dos intuicionistas, 
para quem há formas não-construtivas de raciocínio matemático que 
não devem ser aceites como correctas). Mas na linguagem matemá-
tica não existe vagueza (ou, pelo menos, assim parece). Por isso, não 
temos à partida nenhuma garantia de que a lógica clássica seja uma ló-
gica apropriada para linguagens vagas. O argumento do sorites (que 
informalmente reconhecemos como válido) é válido na lógica clássi-
ca, mas isso por si só significa pouco. Pois ele poderá igualmente ser 
válido noutras lógicas, não-clássicas (por exemplo, ele também é vá-
lido na lógica intuicionista). No entanto, não devemos menosprezar 
as dificuldades envolvidas em abandonar a lógica clássica. Trata-se de 
uma lógica simples mas poderosa, que é bem conhecida, para a qual 
existem sistemas dedutivos (como a dedução natural) comprovada-
mente correctos e completos; e, como sabemos, é a lógica da mate-
mática clássica e, também por essa via, de toda a ciência moderna (ou 
de quase toda). Além disso, se vamos discutir uma possível mudança 
de lógica, que lógica é que vamos usar nessa discussão?
Perante isto, uma teoria que prometa esclarecer o funcionamento 
de uma linguagem vaga e fazê-lo de uma maneira que permita pre-
servar a lógica clássica poderá ser particularmente bem-vinda. E, de 
certo modo, é isso (ou quase) o que o supervalorativismo promete. 
A semântica que propõe não coincide, nem é compatível, com a se-
mântica da lógica clássica – basta notar que a bivalência é rejeitada. 
Mas esta semântica não-clássica, se não acrescentarmos nenhuma 
constante lógica nova à linguagem, acaba por validar todas as regras 
de inferência da lógica clássica. Os modelos da semântica superva-
lorativista têm uma estrutura diferente dos modelos clássicos e as 
fórmulas da linguagem formal são avaliadas nesses modelos com um 
de três valores – super-verdadeiras, super-falsas ou indeterminadas. 
Um argumento é então definido como válido (a sua conclusão é uma 
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consequência semântica das premissas) quando é preservador da su-
per-verdade em todos os modelos supervalorativistas. Acontece que 
esta noção de validade (e a relação de consequência que lhe subjaz) 
coincide em extensão com a noção de validade da lógica clássica: são 
exactamente os mesmos argumentos que são declarados válidos por 
uma e por outra (e as respectivas classes de verdades lógicas tam-
bém coincidem). Isto é assim porque a super-verdade (aquilo que um 
argumento válido tem de preservar) foi definida como verdade em 
todas as precisões; e as precisões que compõem um modelo super-
valorativista mais não são do que modelos clássicos (com o mesmo 
domínio). Um argumento preserva a super-verdade nos modelos su-
pervalorativistas se e somente se ele preserva a verdade nos modelos 
clássicos.
Esta conservação da lógica clássica tem algumas consequências 
importantes com que o supervalorativismo tem de lidar. Uma delas 
é forçar-nos a afirmar a negação da premissa indutiva do argumento 
sorítico (uma vez que esta premissa, juntamente com uma outra que 
é totalmente insuspeita, conduz a uma conclusão manifestamente 
falsa). Ora, na lógica clássica, essa negação é equivalente à seguinte 
frase existencial: Existe um número n tal que António não é velho com n 
segundos de idade e António é velho com n+1 segundos de idade. Ao afir-
marmos isto parece que estamos a afirmar que há, na vida de Antó-
nio, um segundo muito especial, com a passagem do qual ele muda 
subitamente de não-velho para velho. O filósofo supervalorativista 
tem de dar-nos uma justificação satisfatória para o facto de fazer esta 
afirmação – e esta é uma das suas tarefas mais difíceis6. Várias vias de 
justificação têm sido tentadas. Uma delas aponta para o facto de que, 
embora aquela frase existencial seja verdadeira (i.e., super-verdadei-
ra, nos termos do supervalorativista), ela não tem nenhuma instância 
que seja (super-)verdadeira, quer dizer, não há nenhum número j re-
ferido por um termo «k» tal que a frase «António não é velho com k 
segundos de idade e António é velho com k+1 segundos de idade» seja 
(super-)verdadeira. De facto, na semântica supervalorativista, uma 
afirmação existencial x Fx pode ser verdadeira sem que nenhuma 
das suas instâncias o seja (e, de modo análogo, uma disjunção pode 
6 Veja-se a discussão deste aspecto em Keefe (2000) 183 e ss., confrontando 
com Williamson (1994) 153-154.
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ser verdadeira sem que nenhum dos seus membros seja verdadeiro). 
Isso acontece quando todas as precisões têm um objecto que satisfaz 
Fx, mas, porque esse objecto muda de umas precisões para as outras, 
não há nenhum que satisfaça Fx em todas as precisões. Alguns autores 
objectam que isto não é uma leitura aceitável do quantificador exis-
tencial. Quando alguém afirma que existe um objecto que é F, uma 
reacção natural é perguntarmos «Qual?»; mas, a esta pergunta, o 
supervalorativista responde-nos dizendo que não é nenhum em par-
ticular. Há situações em que sabemos (por via inferencial) que existe 
um F, mas somos incapazes de identificar um objecto específico que 
seja F. A explicação normal para essas situações é o carácter limitado 
do nosso conhecimento. Mas a incapacidade que o supervalorativista 
aqui nos atribui não é devida à ignorância. Não há ignorância, neste 
caso, porque o que ele diz é que não há aqui nenhum facto para ser 
conhecido. Não há nenhum objecto para o qual o significado das pa-
lavras e os factos extra-linguísticos juntos determinem que ele seja F. 
No entanto, alegadamente, em certos casos, esses mesmos significa-
dos e factos determinam que existe um F.
Uma outra consequência importante da conservação da lógica 
clássica para o supervalorativismo é o abandono do princípio desci-
tativo da verdade. Para a sua noção privilegiada de verdade – que é a 
noção de super-verdade, definida como verdade em todas as precisões 
–, não vale o princípio que diz que devemos aceitar todas as frases 
com a mesma forma que esta: «A neve é branca» é (super-)verdadeira se 
e somente se a neve é branca. Pois, para o supervalorativismo, apesar de 
António ser um caso de fronteira de homem velho, é verdade que ele 
ou é velho ou não é velho. Mas, se ele é velho, segue-se pelo princípio 
descitativo que a frase «António é velho» é verdadeira. E se ele não 
é velho, segue-se pelo princípio descitativo (e pela definição de fal-
sidade como verdade da negação) que «António é velho» é falsa. Te-
ríamos então de concluir que «António é velho» ou é verdadeira ou é 
falsa, apesar de o supervalorativista pretender que ela não é nem uma 
coisa nem a outra. O princípio descitativo forçaria o supervalorati-
vista a aceitar a bivalência; e, por isso, ele rejeita-o. A sua semântica 
está de acordo com esta rejeição. Pois, nas precisões em que António 
conta como velho, a condicional «Se António é velho, então a frase 
“António é velho” é super-verdadeira» tem antecedente verdadeira e 
consequente falsa (uma vez que há outras precisões em que ele conta 
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como não-velho); ora, uma condicional que é falsa nalgumas preci-
sões nunca poderá ser aceite como super-verdadeira.
A conservação da lógica clássica tem, como podemos ver, cus-
tos elevados para o supervalorativista. Além disso, é algo que ele 
não pode manter completamente, ou até ao fim. Pois, como vimos 
na secção anterior, ele precisa de dotar a linguagem de meios para 
expressar a noção de ser claramente de uma certa maneira; e fá-lo 
adoptando um operador ∆, gramaticalmente análogo à negação, que 
se prefixa a qualquer fórmula X para gerar uma fórmula ∆X. O su-
pervalorativista encara este operador como uma maneira de repre-
sentar, na linguagem-objecto, a noção metalinguística de super-ver-
dade7. Afirmar ∆Fa é, para ele, uma maneira de traduzir a afirmação 
metalinguística de que «Fa» é super-verdadeira, ou de que a cai na 
extensão de «F» em todas as precisões, ou de que a é um caso cla-
ro de «F». Na semântica formal, o operador ∆ é tratado como uma 
nova constante lógica, cujas condições de verdade estão de acordo 
com esse entendimento intuitivo do seu significado. Na linguagem 
original, uma fórmula X é super-verdadeira quando é verdadeira em 
todas as precisões. Então, na linguagem enriquecida, diremos que, 
em cada precisão (de um modelo), ∆X é verdadeira se e somente se X 
é verdadeira em todas as precisões (desse modelo).
Com estas condições de verdade, podemos observar que, para 
todo o modelo M, se uma fórmula ∆X é super-verdadeira em M, en-
tão X é igualmente super-verdadeira em M; e, conversamente, se X 
é super-verdadeira em M, então X é verdadeira em todas as precisões 
de M e, por isso, ∆X também é verdadeira em todas essas preci-
sões, pelo que ∆X é super-verdadeira em M. Nesta semântica, X e 
∆X implicam-se mutuamente. No entanto, apesar desta implicação 
recíproca, ∆ não é um operador redundante e X e ∆X não são substi-
tuíveis uma pela outra salva veritate em todos os contextos; pois, por 
exemplo, ¬∆X pode ser super-verdadeira sem que ¬X o seja (isso 
acontece nos modelos em que X é indeterminada). Mas, então, temos 
que X implica ∆X, mas ¬∆X não implica ¬X, contrariamente ao que 
diz a regra da contraposição da lógica clássica (viz., se uma fórmula Y 
se infere de X e de certas premissas e suposições, então ¬X pode 
7 Como se trata de um operador, e não de um predicado, ele não permite 
gerar frases mentirosas (que afirmam a sua própria não-verdade).
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inferir-se de ¬Y e dessas premissas e suposições). Além disso, apesar 
de X implicar ∆X, há modelos nos quais a condicional X  ∆X não é 
super-verdadeira. Mas uma das regras da lógica clássica (a introdução 
da condicional) diz precisamente que, se inferimos Y a partir de X e 
de certas premissas e suposições, podemos inferir a condicional (X 
 Y) a partir dessas premissas e suposições. Isto mostra que, com a 
adição do operador ∆, a semântica supervalorativista deixou de con-
servar a lógica clássica: há novas relações de consequência (pois as 
inferências de ∆X para X e vice-versa não são classicamente válidas) e 
há relações de consequência clássica que se perdem (em argumentos 
que envolvem o uso do novo operador).
Além da contraposição e da introdução da condicional, há mais 
duas regras fundamentais da lógica clássica que falham nesta semân-
tica supervalorativista enriquecida com o operador de clareza: a eli-
minação da disjunção e a introdução da negação (ou reductio ad absurdum)8. 
Como contra-exemplo da primeira, temos que (∆X  ∆¬X) se segue 
de X e também se segue de ¬X, mas não se segue de (X  ¬X). 
Como contra-exemplo da segunda, temos que, apesar de (X  ¬∆X) 
ter como consequência a contradição (∆X  ¬∆X), a negação ¬(X 
 ¬∆X) (que é equivalente a X  ∆X) não é super-verdadeira em 
todos os modelos.
Estes contra-exemplos de regras dedutivas clássicas que são cen-
trais nos nossos hábitos de raciocínio devem fazer-nos parar para 
pensar. É verdade que, à luz da semântica supervalorativista, estas 
formas de raciocínio não são válidas. Mas estará o problema nas for-
mas de raciocínio ou estará ele antes na própria semântica formal 
apresentada? Quando estamos a avaliar o supervalorativismo enquan-
to teoria da vagueza, não pode ser a sua semântica formal a ditar 
quais são os raciocínios que contam como correctos. A nossa ava-
liação intuitiva de raciocínios com termos vagos precisa de ser jus-
tificada independentemente do sistema formal. A este nível, não há 
substituto para a discussão filosófica.
8 Cf. Williamson (1994) 151-2.
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3 A tese supervalorativista da incompatibilidade entre X e 
¬∆X em discussão
Depois desta breve revisão dos principais traços da semântica super-
valorativista para uma linguagem de primeira ordem com predicados 
vagos, e da sua lógica, regresso à minha questão principal de saber se 
uma coisa pode ser de uma maneira sem ser claramente dessa manei-
ra – e à resposta negativa que a teoria supervalorativista standard lhe 
dá. De facto, de acordo com esta teoria, para toda a frase declarativa 
X, seria incoerente afirmar ao mesmo tempo «X» e «Não é o caso 
que claramente X». Por outras palavras, o supervalorativista julga 
que, por razões lógicas, nenhuma frase que tenha a forma «X e não 
é o caso que claramente X» (como, por exemplo, a frase «António é 
velho, mas não é claramente velho») pode ser verdadeira. Poderemos 
chamar a isto a tese da incompatibilidade9. E agora a questão é: por que 
razão deveríamos aceitar esta tese?
A tese da incompatibilidade está bem reflectida na semântica for-
mal supervalorativista. Pois, suponhamos (para reductio) que há um 
modelo M no qual (X  ¬∆X) é super-verdadeira. Então, (X  ¬∆X) 
é verdadeira em todas as precisões de M. Pelas regras da conjunção 
e da negação, isso implica que (i) X é verdadeira em todas as preci-
sões de M e que (ii) ∆X é falsa em todas as precisões de M. Mas (i) 
satisfaz as condições de verdade de ∆X (quer dizer, se X é verdadeira 
em todas as precisões, então ∆X é também verdadeira em todas as 
precisões), contradizendo (ii). Concluímos então que não há nenhum 
modelo no qual (X  ¬∆X) seja super-verdadeira. Esta conformidade 
da semântica com a tese da incompatibilidade é o que seria de espe-
rar. Neste contexto, ela não serve de justificação para a tese, pois o 
que queremos avaliar é se esta semântica formal fornece um modelo 
adequado de como funciona uma linguagem vaga.
Uma coisa que o supervalorativista poderia estar tentado a apre-
sentar como razão para rejeitarmos a possibilidade de X e ¬∆X serem 
9 Wright (2010) chama-lhe “o Princípio de Dummett”: “We can call Dum-
mett’s Principle the thesis that there are no truthful instances of the conjunctive 
form: P but not definitely P. As will emerge later, there is actually considerable 
pressure against the principle” (524n3). A possibilidade de rejeitar este princípio 
é considerada na p. 540.
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conjuntamente verdadeiras é que, de (X  ¬∆X), segue-se uma con-
tradição10: adoptando tal conjunção como premissa, podemos derivar 
∆X e também ¬∆X. Mas é evidente que ele deriva esta contradição 
usando uma regra de introdução do operador ∆ que o autoriza, a par-
tir de X (apoiada, talvez, em certas premissas e suposições), a derivar 
∆X (apoiada nessas mesmas premissas e suposições). Mas aceitar esta 
regra equivale a julgar que não é possível que X seja verdadeira e ∆X 
não o seja – e isto implica aceitar a tese da incompatibilidade. A regra 
e a tese são solidárias e não podem justificar-se uma à outra.
Haverá razões independentes para aceitar esta regra de introdu-
ção do operador ∆? Kit Fine (2008: 120) tenta fornecer uma jus-
tificação para ela. Primeiro, ele estabelece uma conexão entre as 
noções de incompatibilidade e de compromisso (entendidas ambas 
num «sentido conceptual amplo»): a asserção de diversas proposições é 
conjuntamente incompatível se e somente se essa asserção nos compromete com 
uma contradição. Em seguida, coloca a questão de saber se esta relação 
de compromisso está de acordo com a regra de introdução de ∆:
«[...] in asserting (or in being prepared to assert) a proposition P, am 
I thereby committed to its being definitely the case? Surely I am. For 
the relevant notion of definiteness is one in which it is cognate with the 
notion of a borderline case. To say that x is definitely F in the relevant 
sense is to say that it is F and not a borderline case of F. But now the 
assertion that a man is bald, let us say, will surely commit one to his not 
being a borderline case of a bald man. For how could one sensibly assert 
that a given man is bald and yet not thereby be willing to deny that he is 
a borderline case of a bald man? Given that this is so, it will then follow 
directly from the above equivalence that the man is definitely bald; and 
the rule of D-Introduction will have been vindicated.»
A via mais habitual é explicarmos a noção de caso de fronteira em 
termos da noção de clareza, dizendo que x é um caso de fronteira 
de F se e somente se x nem é claramente F nem é claramente não-F. 
Neste trecho, Fine apresenta as coisas pela ordem inversa: toma a 
noção de caso de fronteira como previamente compreendida e usa-a 
10 Williamson (1994) 152: «the inference from ‘p and not definitely p’ to 
‘Definitely p’ is globally valid, as is that from the same premise to ‘Not definitely 
p’». Fine (2008) 113: «The assertion that a given proposition is not definitely the 
case is [...] presumably incompatible with asserting that it is the case, since their 
joint assertion would commit one to the contradiction that it is definitely the case 
and not definitely the case.»
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para fornecer uma análise de ser claramente F como consistindo em ser 
F e não um caso de fronteira de F. Até aqui, não há nenhum problema. O 
problema começa quando, em seguida, a esta análise, Fine acrescenta 
uma tese substantiva, segundo a qual, de «x é F», se segue que «x não 
é um caso de fronteira de F». É evidente que as duas coisas juntas – a 
análise e a tese – são suficientes para justificar a regra de introdução 
de ∆. Pois, se «x é F» implica «x não é um caso de fronteira de F», 
então «x é F» também implica «x é F e x não é um caso de fronteira de 
F»; e, pela análise, esta última equivale a «x é claramente F».
Mas, nesta tentativa de justificação da regra, é notório que Fine 
não nos dá nenhuma razão para apoiar a sua tese de que «x é F» tem 
como consequência «x não é um caso de fronteira de F». A relação 
desta tese com a tese da incompatibilidade é muito estreita. Pois se 
x fosse um caso de fronteira de F, ¬∆Fx seria verdadeira. Mas, ao 
propor aquela tese, Fine está a dizer que a verdade de «x é F» é in-
compatível com a verdade de «x é um caso de fronteira de F» e, por 
isso, incompatível também com a verdade de ¬∆Fx. Mas Fine sim-
plesmente supõe que isto é assim, sem apresentar justificação. Aliás, 
parece típico dos defensores da tese da incompatibilidade chegarem 
a este ponto da discussão sem argumentos, como estes exemplos tes-
temunham:
«... the assertion that a man is bald, let us say, will surely commit one 
to his not being a borderline case of a bald man. For how could one 
sensibly assert that a given man is bald and yet not thereby be willing to 
deny that he is a borderline case of a bald man? Given that this is so...» 
(Fine 2008: 120)
«We may hold that no sentence can be true without being determi-
nately true. For how can a be F without being determinately F? Dp and 
p will then be true in exactly the same situations.» (Keefe 2000: 27)
«I have heard it argued that the introduction of such an operator can 
serve no point since there is no apparent way whereby a statement 
could be true without being definitely so. That is undeniable [...].» 
(Wright 1987: 229)11
Dada esta ausência de argumentos, poderíamos tentar nós argumen-
tar contra a tese de Fine do seguinte modo. Se de «x é F» se segue «x 
11 Mas, como assinalámos na nota 9, Crispin Wright dispõe-se a considerar a 
possibilidade de negar o «inegável» em Wright (2010: 540).
837Ser de Uma Maneira sem Ser Claramente dessa Maneira
não é um caso de fronteira de F», então de «x não é F» seguir-se-ia «x 
não é um caso de fronteira de não-F». Mas não há nenhuma diferença 
relevante entre ser um caso de fronteira de F e sê-lo de não-F: qual-
quer caso de fronteira a respeito de F é-o tanto de F como de não-F. E 
uma vez que o supervalorativista aceita que, para todo o x, x é F ou x 
não é F, isso implicaria que não existe realmente vagueza: para todo 
o x, x não é um caso de fronteira de F ou x não é um caso de frontei-
ra de não-F; mas como não há diferença conceptual relevante entre 
estas duas coisas, isso equivaleria a dizer que, quanto à classificação 
das coisas como F ou não-F, não há casos de fronteira. A tese de Fine, 
juntamente com a aceitação do terceiro excluído, conduz à negação 
da vagueza.
Contra este argumento, o supervalorativista objectaria que, se 
uma mesma coisa se segue de «x é F» e de «x não é F», isso não ga-
rante que ela se siga da disjunção «x é F ou x não é F». Ou seja, ele 
diria que o nosso argumento não é válido, uma vez que usa a regra 
da eliminação da disjunção precisamente num daqueles casos em que 
a semântica diz que ela não é correcta12. Para o supervalorativista, 
como já vimos, há disjunções verdadeiras sem nenhum disjunto ver-
dadeiro. Por isso, ele considera que, quando partimos de uma disjun-
ção e consideramos o caso em que um disjunto é verdadeiro e depois 
o caso em que o outro disjunto é verdadeiro, não considerámos todos 
os casos possíveis. Por isso, o que se segue daqueles dois casos pode 
não se seguir da disjunção, pois pode não se seguir do «terceiro caso» 
(em que nenhum dos disjuntos é verdadeiro).
Julgo que devemos resistir a esta objecção. Comparemo-la com 
este exemplo apresentado por Shapiro (2006: 82): um pai promete 
aos seus filhos que, no próximo domingo, se o tempo estiver bom 
irão ao futebol e, se o tempo não estiver bom, irão ao cinema. Os 
filhos ficam encantados porque tanto gostam de uma coisa como de 
outra e, por isso, concluem que vão ter um domingo óptimo. Mas 
chega domingo, o tempo está na fronteira entre bom e não-bom, e 
o pai usa isso como justificação para não fazerem nada. Não deverão 
os filhos sentir-se enganados e protestar que o prometido não foi 
cumprido? Claro que sim. O facto de o tempo se encontrar indefi-
12 Veja-se o contra-exemplo a esta regra apresentado no final da secção ante-
rior.
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nido, nem claramente bom nem claramente não bom, significa que 
a família pode decidir como quiser, de qualquer das duas maneiras 
– mas eles têm de escolher uma delas. As promessas feitas não permi-
tem a opção de não escolher. A situação seria diferente se a segunda 
promessa tivesse antes sido «se estiver a chover, iremos ao cinema». 
Mas, do modo como foram feitas («se o tempo estiver bom, ... e, se 
não estiver bom, ...»), as promessas cobriram todos os casos possíveis 
e, por isso, os filhos têm garantido que, se elas forem cumpridas, irão 
fazer algo de que gostam.
Shapiro usa o exemplo para discutir a semântica de condicionais 
com antecedentes vagos e consequentes precisos, mas o que aqui so-
bretudo me interessa é considerar o que acontece quando a família, 
para que o prometido seja cumprido, escolhe uma das vias. Supo-
nhamos que, apesar de o tempo estar na fronteira entre bom e não-
-bom, eles decidem contá-lo como bom e vão ao futebol. Esta deci-
são, que é permitida pelos factos meteorológicos e pelo significado 
da expressão «tempo bom», não elimina a indefinição do tempo que 
foi inicialmente observada e consensualmente aceite pelos membros 
da família, quer dizer, mesmo depois da decisão tomada, o tempo (se 
não mudar) continua a estar na fronteira entre bom e não-bom. Mas, 
à luz da decisão tomada, ou no contexto por ela criado, será correcto 
dizer que o tempo está bom (e por isso eles vão ao futebol), embora 
não esteja claramente bom.
A objecção supervalorativista ao nosso argumento, ao apelar para 
um alegado «terceiro caso» em que nenhum dos disjuntos – nem «x é 
F» nem «x não é F» – é verdadeiro, assemelha-se bastante à estratégia 
usada pelo pai para tentar escapar ao que havia prometido. Mas não 
existe «terceiro caso». O que há são diversas maneiras igualmente 
admissíveis de estabelecer a divisão entre os dois casos possíveis – o 
positivo e o negativo. E, quando dizemos que elas são «igualmen-
te admissíveis», estamos implicitamente a reconhecer que os casos de 
fronteira tanto podem ser classificados como positivos como podem ser 
classificados como negativos – o que é diferente de dizer que eles não 
são positivos nem negativos. E quando um caso de fronteira é classi-
ficado (por exemplo) como positivo, ele não deixa por isso de ser um 
caso de fronteira. O que está mal no argumento, por conseguinte, 
não é o uso da eliminação da disjunção (também chamada «demons-
tração por casos»), mas sim a suposição de que de «x (não) é F» se 
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segue logicamente que x não é um caso de fronteira.
Mas o que é seguir-se logicamente? Poderia argumentar-se que 
esta suposição é aceitável se interpretarmos a relação de consequên-
cia lógica do modo como o supervalorativista o faz, quando define a 
validade dedutiva como preservação da super-verdade. Pois se, quan-
do raciocino a partir de «x é F», o que estou a supor é que «x é F» 
é super-verdadeira, então é natural que conclua daí que x não é um 
caso de fronteira (e o mesmo se diria para «x não é F»). Mas o que 
isto mostra é que temos boas razões para não aceitarmos a defini-
ção supervalorativista de validade. Quando, ao raciocinarmos numa 
linguagem vaga, estabelecemos uma premissa ou propomos uma su-
posição, para procurarmos que consequências se seguem daí, nem 
sempre queremos saber o que teria de ser o caso se a premissa ou 
suposição fosse super-verdadeira. Por vezes raciocinamos a partir de 
frases vagas (como «O tempo está bom», «António é velho», etc.) 
e queremos saber o que se segue delas tal como são, e não o que 
se seguiria se elas fossem super-verdadeiras. Talvez devamos então 
manter-nos fiéis à noção clássica de validade como preservação da 
verdade e rejeitar a identificação supervalorativista da verdade com 
a super-verdade. Diríamos que a super-verdade é uma das maneiras 
possíveis que uma frase tem de ser verdadeira – e certamente a me-
lhor ou a mais estrita –, mas não é a única. Há frases que são verda-
deiras sem serem super-verdadeiras. Se, no caminho para o jogo de 
futebol, um dos membros da família afirmar que o tempo está bom, 
ele não estará a violar a norma que diz que só devemos afirmar o que 
é verdade. No entanto, naquele contexto, «O tempo está bom» não 
é uma frase super-verdadeira.
Poderíamos recorrer aqui à noção de frase «suficientemente ver-
dadeira» proposta por David Lewis (1979: 244-5). Nas suas breves 
observações sobre vagueza, Lewis mostra-se favorável ao método das 
supervalorações. Se Fred é um caso de fronteira de homem careca, 
a frase «Fred é careca» será verdadeira ou será falsa dependendo de 
onde colocarmos a linha divisória entre carecas e não-carecas. Exis-
tem diversas maneiras igualmente razoáveis de traçar essa linha e, 
uma vez que não há nada no nosso uso da linguagem que seleccione 
uma delas em detrimento das outras, devemos considerá-las todas, 
observando então que «If a sentence is true over the entire range, 
true no matter how we draw the line, surely we are entitled to treat 
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it simply as true». E, em seguida, Lewis escreve:
«But also we treat a sentence more or less as if it is simply true, if it is 
true over a large enough part of the range of delineations of its vague-
ness. (For short: if it is true enough.) If a sentence is true enough (ac-
cording to our beliefs) we are willing to assert it, assent to it without 
qualification, file it away among our stocks of beliefs, and so forth. [...] 
When is a sentence true enough? Which are the ‘large enough’ parts of 
the range of delineations of its vagueness? This is itself a vague matter. 
More important for our present purposes, it is something that depends 
on context. What is true enough on one occasion is not true enough 
on another. The standards of precision in force are different from one 
conversation to another, and may change in the course of a single con-
versation. Austin’s “France is hexagonal” is a good example of a sen-
tence that is true enough for many contexts, but not true enough for 
many others. Under low standards of precision it is acceptable. Raise 
the standards and it loses its acceptability.»
Esta parece ser uma visão bastante fiel de como realmente usamos 
uma linguagem vaga. Lewis concorda que a norma da asserção não 
está ligada à super-verdade. Sem violar a norma, também podemos 
afirmar frases que são suficientemente verdadeiras (num contexto) 
sem serem super-verdadeiras (nesse contexto). Além disso, as obser-
vações de Lewis apontam para uma possibilidade que, para os objec-
tivos da presente discussão, é especialmente importante: é que o uso 
das supervalorações talvez não tenha de transportar consigo a tese da 
incompatibilidade entre ser F e não ser claramente F.
É um facto que a teoria supervalorativista standard inclui a tese 
da incompatibilidade. Vimos já que o supervalorativista não costuma 
perder muito tempo a procurar razões que a justifiquem. Ela parece-
-lhe simplesmente evidente. Vimos também que podemos desenvol-
ver algumas linhas de argumentação contra a tese da incompatibili-
dade e que as objecções supervalorativistas que se lhes opõem podem 
ser rebatidas. Para terminar esta discussão, tentaremos agora mos-
trar que há uma incoerência no próprio supervalorativismo, no modo 
como articula a aceitação da tese da incompatibilidade com a tese de 
que a verdade é super-verdade e com a definição de super-verdade 
como verdade em todas as precisões admissíveis da linguagem (enri-
quecida com o operador «claramente»).
Comecemos com um aspecto do supervalorativismo que foi re-
centemente apontado por Delia Fara. Pensemos nalguma frase com 
a seguinte forma lógica: (p  ¬∆p). Como sabemos, não há nenhum 
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modelo supervalorativista no qual esta frase seja verdadeira (isto é, 
super-verdadeira). Pelas mesmas razões, uma frase que tenha a for-
ma (¬p  ¬∆¬p) também não será verdadeira em nenhum modelo 
supervalorativista. Formemos então a disjunção destas duas frases e 
designemo-la por «DF». Podemos provar que, para todo o modelo 
supervalorativista M, se p é indeterminada em M, então DF é (su-
per-)verdadeira em M. Isto é assim, porque, uma vez que p e ¬p 
são ambas indeterminadas em M, tanto ¬∆p como ¬∆¬p são super-
-verdadeiras, ou seja, verdadeiras em todas as precisões de M13; en-
tão, nas precisões em que p é verdadeira, o primeiro disjunto de DF 
é verdadeiro e, nas precisões em que p é falsa, o segundo disjunto 
de DF é verdadeiro – tendo como resultado que DF é verdadeira em 
todas as precisões e, por isso, super-verdadeira em M. DF é um dos 
casos de disjunção verdadeira sem nenhum disjunto verdadeiro que 
são característicos da semântica supervalorativista. A explicação ha-
bitual para esta anomalia é que ela resulta daquilo a que Fine chama 
«deslocações de valor de verdade» (truth-value shifts): o disjunto que 
torna a frase verdadeira desloca-se de umas precisões para as outras 
de tal maneira que, em qualquer precisão, há sempre um deles que 
é verdadeiro, mas nenhum disjunto é verdadeiro em todas as pre-
13 Neste ponto do raciocínio, estamos a aplicar as condições de verdade ha-
bitualmente atribuídas a ∆, as quais são análogas às que, no sistema S5 da lógica 
modal, se atribuem ao operador de necessidade: p é verdadeira num mundo 
possível se e somente se p é verdadeira em todos os mundos possíveis; e ∆p é ver-
dadeira numa precisão se e somente se p é verdadeira em todas as precisões. Daqui 
resulta que ∆p terá sempre o mesmo valor em todas as precisões de cada modelo: 
∆p ou é verdadeira em todas as precisões (super-verdadeira) ou é falsa em todas as 
precisões (super-falsa), o que faz de ∆ uma noção precisa e bivalente. Estas condi-
ções de verdade atribuídas a ∆ parecerão inadequadas se, por causa da vagueza de 
ordem superior, considerarmos que «claramente velho», «claramente claramente 
velho», etc., também podem ter casos de fronteira – o que deveria requerer mo-
delos em que ∆p, ∆∆p, etc., fossem indeterminadas. Para superar este problema, 
Williamson (1994: 158) propõe a introdução de uma relação de admissibilidade 
entre precisões (em que cada precisão determinaria quais as precisões que, do seu 
ponto de vista, são admissíveis), sujeita a certas condições. Keefe (2000: 209-11) 
discute e rejeita a proposta, considerando que ∆ serve para captar a vagueza de 
primeira ordem, mas não a sua própria vagueza (para isso, precisaríamos de novos 
recursos expressivos). Alguns autores pensam que a chamada «vagueza de ordem 
superior» não é um fenómeno real. Neste trabalho, limitamos a nossa atenção à 
vagueza de primeira ordem.
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cisões. Essa é a explicação geral. Mas, quando se aplica a DF, essa 
explicação torna-se estranha, porque, em DF, os disjuntos são ambos 
frases que, de acordo com a semântica supervalorativista, nunca pode-
riam ser verdadeiras. Como diz Fara, o supervalorativista parece pensar 
que «the disjunction of two impossibilities can be true» (2010: 378).
Enquanto Fara foca a sua atenção no comportamento da disjun-
ção, o que nos interessa aqui é sobretudo apontar o fenómeno sub-
jacente que DF traz à luz e que é, muito simplesmente, o seguinte: 
existem modelos supervalorativistas nos quais frases com a forma 
(p  ¬∆p), que supostamente nunca poderiam ser verdadeiras, são 
verdadeiras nalgumas precisões. Há uma incoerência no modo como o 
supervalorativista lida com estas «impossibilidades». A incompatibi-
lidade entre ser de uma maneira e não ser claramente dessa maneira 
é uma tese filosófica básica aceite pelo supervalorativista. E ele pode 
alegar que a sua adesão a essa tese está suficientemente representada 
no sistema formal que propõe. Pois o sistema define uma classe de 
modelos e não existe, nessa classe, nenhum modelo no qual uma fra-
se com a forma (p  ¬∆p) seja super-verdadeira. Mais do que isso, o 
supervalorativista pode alegar que a tese que sustenta não é apenas 
formulável na metateoria. Ela também pode ser expressa, na própria 
linguagem formal do sistema, como ¬∆(p  ¬∆p). E ¬∆(p  ¬∆p) é 
uma verdade lógica do sistema supervalorativista (super-verdadeira em 
todos os modelos). Mas, por outro lado, em forte contraste com tudo 
o que o supervalorativista nos acaba de dizer, também podemos ob-
servar que existem modelos supervalorativistas que têm precisões nas 
quais frases com a forma (p  ¬∆p) são verdadeiras. Ora, se estas frases 
nunca podem ser verdadeiras e se cada precisão corresponde a «uma 
maneira aceitável de tornar a linguagem precisa» (Keefe 2000: 162), 
nenhuma precisão deveria avaliá-las como verdadeiras.
As precisões do sistema supervalorativista são interpretações da 
linguagem vaga – que, como é habitual na teoria dos modelos, in-
cluem um domínio de objectos, uma função que atribui valores às 
expressões não-lógicas da linguagem e uma valoração das suas frases, 
simples e compostas. O que significa dizer que essas interpretações 
têm de ser aceitáveis (ou legítimas, ou admissíveis)? Uma possibilida-
de é considerar que as interpretações aceitáveis são aquelas que são 
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consistentes com as regras semânticas da linguagem14. Por exemplo, 
se há uma regra semântica como «qualquer pessoa mais alta do que 
uma pessoa alta é também alta», não será aceitável uma interpretação 
que torne o predicado «alta» preciso de um modo tal que pessoas 
com 1,83m contem como altas, mas pessoas com 1,86m não con-
tem como altas. De modo análogo, a regra «nenhuma pessoa alta é 
também baixa» também exclui como ilegítimas interpretações que 
não sejam consistentes com ela, ou seja, exclui interpretações que 
tornem precisos os predicados «alta» e «baixa» de um modo que faça 
sobrepor as suas extensões. Keefe (2000: 162) dá estes exemplos 
como ilustrações daquilo a que Fine chama «conexões de penumbra» 
e, efectivamente, um dos traços característicos do supervalorativis-
mo é a ideia de que as interpretações de uma linguagem vaga têm 
de respeitar as conexões de penumbra nela existentes: «Penumbral 
truths are true in all admissible specifications», afirma Keefe (2000: 
204). E, segundo Fine, «what distinguishes th[e] operation [of mak-
ing more precise] from a mere change in meaning is that it preserves 
truth-value» (1975: 129). Se uma frase tem um valor de verdade an-
tes de qualquer vagueza começar a ser reduzida, ela tem de man-
ter esse valor em todas as interpretações que tornam a linguagem 
mais precisa: «sentences that are unproblematically true (false) be-
fore precisification should stay true (false) afterwards» (Keefe 2000: 
162)15. O que dizer então da frase «Nenhuma pessoa é velha sem o 
14 Williamson (1994: 158): «Supervaluationists often regard admissibility as 
consistency with the semantic rules of the language. If the rules decide a case, 
then an admissible interpretation decides it in the same way; it may decide a case 
when they do not.» Uma vez que a consistência é uma questão de lógica, parece 
que este critério faria da admissibilidade uma noção precisa – e isso seria proble-
mático em face da vagueza de ordem superior. Williamson diz que poderíamos 
pensar antes num critério que fosse ele próprio vago: «Admissibility might be 
conceived as a matter of reasonableness. An interpretation is reasonable if it does 
not license misuses of the language (from the standpoint of an ordinary under-
standing of it).»
15 No entanto, Keefe admite que «conexão de penumbra» não é uma noção 
precisa: «there may be vagueness over whether certain sentences qualify as pen-
umbral connections» (204-5). E, noutra passagem (a propósito da premissa in-
dutiva do sorites), chega a advogar uma atitude reformista a respeito do que nos 
parecem ser conexões de penumbra: «we cannot straightforwardly read off cases of 
penumbral truths from our unreformed intuitions, for the sorites paradox induc-
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ser claramente»?
Dada a sua adesão à tese da incompatibilidade, julgo que o su-
pervalorativista deveria contar a incompatibilidade entre «António 
é velho» e «António não é claramente velho» como uma conexão 
de penumbra e contar a frase «Nenhuma pessoa é velha sem o ser 
claramente» como uma verdade de penumbra. Aquela incompatibili-
dade ocupa, na sua teoria, um lugar muito mais central do que, por 
exemplo, a incompatibilidade entre «António é alto» e «António é 
baixo» (e, como vimos, uma precisão da linguagem na qual estas 
frases fossem ambas verdadeiras seria considerada inaceitável). En-
quanto esta última resulta da relação entre os significados (vagos) 
de dois predicados não-lógicos, aquela incompatibilidade resulta da 
relação entre os significados (precisos ou também vagos?) de expres-
sões a que o supervalorativista reconhece o estatuto de expressões 
lógicas, ou seja, é uma incompatibilidade entre formas lógicas (entre 
«_____ é +++++» e «_____ não é claramente +++++»). Nes-
sa medida, assemelha-se mais à incompatibilidade entre «António é 
alto» e «António não é alto» (e, neste caso, são as próprias regras de 
valoração das frases, as quais são fixas e comuns a todas as precisões 
de todos os modelos, que garantem que estas duas frases nunca se-
rão ambas verdadeiras em nenhuma precisão). Mesmo que não lhe 
queira chamar «conexão de penumbra» (devido ao carácter lógico das 
expressões essencialmente envolvidas), o supervalorativista deveria 
querer que a incompatibilidade entre «António é velho» e «António 
não é claramente velho» fosse respeitada pelas interpretações acei-
táveis da linguagem – e que a verdade de «Nenhuma pessoa é velha 
sem o ser claramente» fosse preservada em todas as precisões. Mas, 
no seu sistema, há precisões nas quais aquelas duas frases são conjun-
tamente verdadeiras e esta última frase é falsa. Estas precisões não 
podem ser excluídas impondo restrições adicionais sobre a admissi-
bilidade das precisões, porque elas são criadas pela própria estrutura 
lógica do sistema, tal como foi concebido. No entanto, à luz do modo 
como o próprio supervalorativista compreende a relação entre «ser 
tive premise would then count as a penumbral truth [...]. We cannot start with 
all sentences that are intuitively true (both atomic predications and compound 
sentences) and then construct the structure of specifications so as to respect all 
these truths by ensuring they are true on all specifications» (183n14).
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velho» e «ser claramente velho», essas precisões não podem ser vis-
tas como interpretações legítimas da linguagem, consistentes com 
as suas regras semânticas ou que respeitam os seus significados. Nos 
termos de Williamson, trata-se de interpretações que permitem usos 
incorrectos da linguagem.
O supervalorativista poderia tentar defender a sua posição conce-
dendo que a incompatibilidade entre «António é velho» e «António 
não é claramente velho» não é respeitada por cada uma das precisões 
da semântica, mas sublinhando que todos os modelos (globalmente 
considerados) a respeitam. Pois, nos modelos em que «António é ve-
lho» é super-verdadeira ou super-falsa, a conjunção «António é velho 
mas não é claramente velho» é sempre super-falsa; e, nos modelos 
em que «António é velho» é indeterminada (os quais representam 
situações em que António é um caso de fronteira), aquela conjunção 
é também indeterminada. É verdade que, nestes últimos, para que a 
conjunção seja indeterminada, ela tem de ser falsa numas precisões 
e verdadeira noutras; por isso, tem de haver precisões nas quais ela 
é verdadeira – mas isso não tem qualquer significado, é apenas um 
artefacto do sistema, que não representa nada a respeito do uso cor-
recto da linguagem. É neste sentido que Shapiro (2006: 69) escreve: 
«For the supervaluationist, completely sharp interpretations are only 
a technical device used to define super-truth. They need not cor-
respond to actual or even possible uses of the predicates.» E Keefe 
(2000: 190) concorda: «it is the quantification over all precisifica-
tions that captures the meaning of the natural language predicates; 
the individual precisifications need not.» Mais do que isso, Keefe 
parece conceder que, tomadas individualmente, algumas precisões 
podem corresponder ao que seriam usos incorrectos da linguagem: 
«if [...] a valuation of a language must respect all its meanings, then 
precisifications should not be called valuations of [a] vague language. 
But precisifications can still contribute to determining the correct 
valuation without each being a correct valuation in this sense» (190).
Esta linha de defesa envolve um abandono do modo como antes se 
caracterizou a noção de admissibilidade, a qual é usada para definir o 
conjunto de precisões (interpretações admissíveis) que são elementos 
de um modelo supervalorativista. Pois, enquanto antes se disse que as 
interpretações admissíveis seriam aquelas que respeitam as verdades 
de penumbra (mesmo tendo em conta a vagueza desta noção), agora 
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já estamos a admitir que as interpretações individuais podem não as 
respeitar: «we can deny that meaning is preserved through precisi-
fication. [...] what matters is respecting truths of meaning in the su-
pervaluationary model as a whole» (Keefe 2000: 190n18). Com este 
recuo instrumentalista, o método das supervalorações perde grande 
parte da sua atractividade. Se as precisões individuais não correspon-
dem a possíveis usos correctos da linguagem, mas são apenas «um 
dispositivo técnico», algo que se passa dentro de uma «caixa preta» 
e que só nos deve interessar pelos resultados que produz, então, para 
começar, devemos deixar de usar os conceitos de verdadeiro e de falso 
para falar do que se passa dentro dessa caixa. E se, quantificando 
sobre os elementos no interior da caixa, obtivéssemos, ao nível dos 
modelos, representações correctas da linguagem, que respeitassem 
as suas «verdades de significado», gostaríamos ainda assim de saber 
porque é que isso acontece. Se as frases que um modelo determina 
como super-verdadeiras e como super-falsas coincidissem com as fra-
ses que, num contexto de uso, são realmente verdadeiras e falsas, isto 
é, se a super-verdade fosse um modelo adequado da verdade, deveria 
haver uma explicação para isso – e uma explicação iluminadora do 
modo como funciona uma linguagem vaga. Em todo o caso, não pa-
rece que o supervalorativista deva estar satisfeito com os resultados 
produzidos pelo seu sistema de precisões. Pois ele considera que uma 
frase como «Ninguém é velho sem o ser claramente» é verdadeira 
em virtude do seu significado, mas o sistema produz modelos (com 
casos de fronteira de pessoa velha no seu domínio) nos quais ela não 
é super-verdadeira.
4 Observações finais
Concluo que a resposta negativa dada pelo supervalorativismo à per-
gunta que lancei não é convincente. O supervalorativismo não tem 
uma boa justificação para essa resposta e vimos, pelo contrário, que 
a sua adesão à tese da incompatibilidade está envolvida em diversas 
dificuldades, que revelam aspectos da teoria que falam em seu des-
favor. Não retiro daqui nenhum juízo conclusivo a respeito do valor 
que se deve atribuir à abordagem supervalorativista do fenómeno da 
vagueza (a qual me continua a parecer, nos seus traços essenciais, 
uma abordagem interessante). Mas julgo que temos boas razões para 
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favorecer antes uma resposta positiva à pergunta inicial, ou seja, para 
considerar que coisas que não são claramente de uma maneira po-
dem, no entanto, em certos contextos, ser correctamente classifica-
das como coisas que são dessa maneira – e que é permissível afirmar 
que elas o são, sem que com isso deixe de ser verdade que elas não 
são claramente como as estamos a classificar. Dito de outro modo, 
temos boas razões para considerar que, numa linguagem vaga, há fra-
ses que, afirmadas em certos contextos, são verdadeiras, embora não 
sejam claramente (ou determinadamente) verdadeiras – frases que, 
como diz Lewis, para os padrões de precisão aceites num contexto 
conversacional, são suicientemente verdadeiras, mas não mais do que 
isso. É uma questão em aberto a de saber se a abordagem supervalo-
rativista é adaptável a esta perspectiva de um modo que possa ser des-
crito, usando a conhecida expressão de Tarski, como «formalmente 
correcto e materialmente adequado»16.
No final da sua monografia, Keefe (2000: 215) recorda as céle-
bres palavras de Aristóteles (que Tarski costumava citar em apoio do 
esquema descitativo): «Dizer daquilo que é que não é, ou daquilo que 
não é que é, é falso; enquanto dizer daquilo que é que é, ou daquilo 
que não é que não é, é verdadeiro.» Keefe pensa que, ao dizer isto, 
Aristóteles não cobriu todos os casos possíveis e, por isso, pergun-
ta (por exemplo) como é que classificaríamos o «dizer, daquilo que 
indeterminadamente é, que é». A minha resposta seria: há situações 
em que isso também é verdadeiro.17
Ricardo Santos
Universidade de Évora e LanCog Group
16 McGee e McLaughlin (1995) e Shapiro (2006) trabalham nessa direcção.
17 Este trabalho foi realizado no âmbito do projecto de investigação Paradoxos: 
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no Seminário de Filosofia Analítica da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de 
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In opposition to the traditional conception of scientific laws as uni-
versal and exceptionless generalizations that hold everywhere and 
throughout all times, some philosophers of science have proposed 
the idea of a ceteris paribus law (CP law), i.e., a law that is true “all 
else being equal”, in the sense that it can admit of exceptions because 
of the influence of interfering factors. The legitimacy of CP laws has 
divided the philosophical community. Some argue that all scientific 
laws are CP laws, others argue that CP laws are simply unacceptable, 
and a third group claims that science contains both CP laws (in the 
so-called special sciences) and strict laws (in basic physics).
The debate on CP laws has important implications for our under-
standing of the human sciences, because if we accept the existence 
of laws in sciences like psychology or sociology, these laws, far from 
being strict, should be CP laws. Furthermore, if we could estab-
lish some differences between CP laws in the human and the natural 
sciences, such a difference could help us to understand the relation 
between these two scientific domains.
In what follows, I will first discuss the concept of CP law and 
present some proponents of such laws (1). In order to explore the 
significance of this debate for the human sciences, I will discuss Da-
vidson’s and Fodor’s stance on the status of CP laws in the human 
sciences (2). After these introductory sections, I will argue that in 
the human sciences it is much more difficult, not only in practice, 
but also in principle, to cope with interfering factors and to refine 
ceteris paribus clauses (3). Against hermeneutic and strict naturalistic 
perspectives, I propose an account of the human sciences that rec-
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ognizes the methodological role of both generalizations and rational-
ity assumptions; in particular, I will stress the need for interpreta-
tive/hermeneutic methods to control the vagueness of ceteris paribus 
clauses (4).
1
A fundamental problem in the philosophy of the human sciences con-
sists in the existence or possibility of laws in these sciences. Because 
of the complexity of the factors that can influence human behav-
iour, generalizations in psychology and sociology, for instance, have 
a somewhat fragile status, especially when they are couched in an in-
tentional vocabulary. Predictions based on such generalizations may 
well fail, and it is for this reason that the idea of CP laws, understood 
as laws that admit of exceptions, becomes relevant for understanding 
the human sciences.1
A CP law describes real tendencies or causal powers, but it ide-
alizes the phenomena to be explained and abstracts them from the 
possible interference of factors that lie beyond its scope. It is in this 
sense that CP laws admit of exceptions and can be contrasted with 
strict laws. According to the traditional conception, scientific laws 
are universally valid, empirically confirmable and counterfactual-
supporting generalizations. They can be either strict or statistic, but 
in both cases they are conceived as exceptionless. A CP law, on the 
other hand, is a generalization that is true “all else being equal”, i.e., 
exceptions are possible because of the interference of an indefinite 
number of factors that cannot be specified in advance.
The idea of CP laws is, of course, controversial. In the first place, 
these laws seem to be vacuous. Let us consider the following for-
mulation of a law with a ceteris paribus clause: “All As are Bs, except 
when they are not”. This is a caricature of a CP law, but it points to 
a real problem with CP laws, its apparent vacuity. Closely related to 
this objection is the charge of vagueness. CP laws are true all else be-
ing equal. But what is exactly “all else” (ceteris)? And what is the exact 
1 Ceteris paribus laws have already been labelled as soft laws (cf. Horgan/Tien-
son 1996), and they are, as such, appropriate candidates for the role of laws of the 
so-called soft sciences.
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meaning of “being equal” (paribus) in a particular context? If CP laws 
lack determinate truth conditions, advocates of truth-conditional 
theories of meaning can doubt that they have meaning.
Last, but not least, CP laws seem to evade the requirements of 
testability or falsifiability. The idea that laws may have exceptions 
because of the interference of unexpected factors threatens to im-
munize them against empirical refutation; it allows the scientist to 
hold a law in the light of recalcitrant evidence by introducing ad hoc 
hypotheses.2
However, and according to their proponents, CP laws are legiti-
mate. To begin with, there are many scientific generalizations that 
have exceptions but are considered as genuine laws; Boyle’s law and 
the law of supply and demand are two good examples. The support-
ers of CP laws also claim that, in order to study a very complex 
world, science has inevitably to appeal to abstractions and idealiza-
tions. CP laws belong to these idealizations; they single out causal 
tendencies that, far from operating in isolation, interact with many 
other causal tendencies. Since events result from a combination of 
causes, a real tendency may be overridden by other causal forces, 
and this would entitle us to introduce ceteris paribus clauses in law-
statements.
Carl Hempel’s reflections on the role of provisos was a major 
source of inspiration for supporters of CP laws. He claimed that 
Newton’s law of gravitation involves certain assumptions and can 
lead to inaccurate predictions if, for instance, non-gravitational forc-
es interfere with gravitational ones. As a result, predictions based 
on Newton’s law are true, provided that no significant external forces 
(gravitational or non-gravitational ones) affect a planetary system. 
Since an indefinite number of forces may act on the planets, the pro-
viso seems to have an open-ended character similar to ceteris paribus 
clauses. For this reason, some authors attributed to Hempel the the-
sis that even the fundamental laws of physics contain ceteris paribus 
2 In the words of Roberts (2004: 162): “hedged regularities cannot be discov-
ered by science, because they are not empirically testable. The hedge functions 
as an ‘escape clause’ that allows any hypothesized hedged regularity to escape 
empirical refutation: Whenever you discover a counterexample, claim that there 
has been an interference of some kind, so that the case is outside the scope of the 
hypothesis and does not falsify it”.
clauses (cf., e.g., Fodor 1991). This interpretation of Hempel’s con-
ception of provisos is, however, dubious. Earman and Roberts (1999: 
442-446) have argued, in my view persuasively, that the conditions 
of the Hempelian provisos are not relative to the truth of law state-
ments, but only to the validity of the application of a theory. This 
point distinguishes his provisos from current accounts of ceteris pa-
ribus clauses.
Another important voice in the debate on CP laws is Nancy Cart-
wright. She was known for a long time as a supporter of CP laws 
because of her opposition to a Humean understanding of laws as reg-
ularities and her thesis that scientific laws should be understood in 
the “language of powers, capacities or natures and related concepts such 
as interfere, inhibit, facilitate, and trigger” (Cartwright 2002: 150). She 
has, indeed, claimed that scientific laws are CP laws in the sense that 
“they hold only relative to the successful repeated operation of a no-
mological machine” (Cartwright 1997: 66). By nomological machine 
she understands a set of capacities that cause in a stable environment 
the regularities that are described by scientific laws. Nomological 
machines are also described in her work as the object of scientific 
models.3
Fodor (1991) and Pietroski/Rey (1995) represent another influ-
ential defence of CP laws. In spite of some differences, their accounts 
of CP laws share some common assumptions, namely that scientific 
explanations rely on laws and that strict laws must be exceptionless. 
Since many scientific generalizations admit of exceptions, they claim 
that for a given CP law there is a condition that, when realized, elim-
inates exceptions. Fodor calls such a condition a “completer”. The 
combination of a CP law with the corresponding completer amounts 
to a strict or exceptionless law. In the case of Pietrosky and Rey, 
CP laws are considered genuine laws if prediction failures can be 
explained by a fact that has an independent explanatory role. More 
precisely, an exception to a scientific law is legitimate if we can in-
dicate an interfering factor and if this factor can be explained on the 
3 More recently, Cartwright has distanced herself from CP laws, but the point 
is apparently terminological; she does not agree with characterizations of CP laws 
as laws that neither can be stated in precise and closed form nor entail strict or 
statistical regularities (cf. Cartwright 2002: 149). At any rate, she remains faith-
ful to an understanding of laws in terms of powers and capacities.
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basis of an independent theory. This condition allows us to prevent 
ad hoc manoeuvres in science. Pietroski and Rey illustrate this point 
in the following metaphorical terms:
But there need be no intrinsic problem about ineliminable CP-clauses. 
Briefly, we claim that such clauses are cheques written on the bank of 
independent theories, their substance and warrant deriving from the 
substance and warrant of those theories, which determine whether the 
cheque can be cashed.” (Pietroski/Rey 1995: 82)
This approach has the advantage of defending CP laws from the 
charge of vacuity without trying to give determinate truth condi-
tions to them.
At a more methodological level, there are some elaborate at-
tempts to establish the legitimacy of CP laws. A case in point is Har-
old Kincaid. In chapter 3 of his Philosophical Foundations of the Social 
Sciences, he claims that, appearances notwithstanding, CP laws are 
serious and testable laws. It would be inappropriate in this context 
to delve into his reflections on the testability problem, but one can 
highlight some of his main points. He stresses, for instance, that real 
situations fit sometimes scientific idealizations, and in these cases 
CP laws become clearly testable. Furthermore, exceptions can be 
often explained away by reference to well-established laws or causal 
mechanisms, and successive refinements may increase the accuracy 
of the predictions. Kincaid also stresses that CP laws may predict 
novel facts and support counterfactuals.
He cites in this context the work of the sociologist Jeffrey Paige 
on the relations between agrarian structure and political behaviour 
as an example of good social science that offers us lawlike gener-
alizations (Kincaid 1996: 70-80). By gathering the relevant evi-
dence, Paige formulated a set of interesting generalizations that do 
not express strict regularities, but have other traits of the traditional 
conception of law; they are, namely, empirically confirmable and 
counterfactual-supporting. Here are some examples of these gener-
alizations:
1. Plantation systems (where owners depend on capital and 
workers on wages) encourage collective action and labor re-
forms.
2. Commercial hacienda systems (where both owners and cul-
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tivators get their income from land) favour agrarian revolts.
3. Large estate systems (where owners get their income from 
the land and cultivators from wages) tend to lead to revolu-
tionary movements.
Paige was able to confront these generalizations with the available 
data and concluded that they hold generally. The generalizations in-
clude, of course, ceteris paribus clauses, but one of the merits of his 
work consists precisely in showing how a researcher can refine the 
ceteris paribus clauses by considering the relevant interfering factors 
and by explaining their influence on the causal tendencies expressed 
by the generalizations. For instance, he shows how contagion effects 
(the increased probability of an event on the basis of previous oc-
currences of similar events) and the action of urban political parties 
influence the political behaviour of cultivators.
What can we conclude from the preceding considerations? It 
would be too ambitious to try to settle here the intricate debate on 
the legitimacy of CP laws.4 For the purposes of the present article, 
it is sufficient to clarify the concept of CP law, to understand the 
motivation behind it, to evaluate the significance of scientific gen-
eralizations with ceteris paribus clauses and to compare their status in 
the natural and in the human sciences. In fact, even if one refuses to 
accept CP laws as genuine laws, one may well accept that there are 
many scientific generalizations that admit of exceptions, but are test-
able and important for science.5
As we have seen, many respectable lawlike statements must in-
evitably idealize phenomena that, in the real world, are the result of 
very complex causal interactions that cannot be grasped by unquali-
fied universal statements. Lawlike generalizations typically describe 
4 For a good survey on the main accounts of CP laws and their difficulties, see 
Earman/Roberts 1999.
5 A case in point is Jim Woodward, who denies the existence of CP laws, but 
accepts the corresponding generalizations: “While I reject the idea that general-
izations found in the special sciences are ceteris paribus laws, I fully agree that 
many of those generalizations are ‘scientifically legitimate’, that they are testable 
and in fact strongly supported by evidence […]. My claim is that construing those 
generalizations as ceteris paribus laws is the wrong way to defend their usefulness 
and legitimacy” (Woodward 2002: 306).
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a causal tendency, but a tendency that interacts in the real world 
with other tendencies. This lends to generalizations with ceteris pa-
ribus clauses a prima facie legitimacy. However, we should keep in 
mind that the existence of ceteris paribus clauses weakens a nomologi-
cal statement and may undermine its explanatory power.
2
In order to evaluate the significance of CP laws for the human scienc-
es it is convenient to consider the work of Davidson and Fodor in this 
context. Both of them accept the existence of CP laws in the special 
sciences, but evaluate differently their role in the human sciences. 
Davidson argued in a series of influential papers that there are no 
strict psychological laws. By strict law he understands the traditional 
conception of law as a non-accidental generalization, characterized 
by being empirically confirmable and by supporting counterfactuals. 
Intentional psychology produces many useful generalizations, but, 
according to Davidson, they are not strict laws; far from being ex-
ceptionless, they are vulnerable to the interference of an indefinite 
number of factors that cannot be specified in advance.
His defence of the Principle of the Anomalism of the Mental is 
based on a rejection of psychophysical laws. The basic point behind 
psychophysical anomalism is the claim that the vocabularies of phys-
ics and psychology are incommensurable:
There are no strict psychophysical laws because of the disparate com-
mitments of the mental and physical schemes. It is a feature of physical 
reality that physical change can be explained by laws that connect it 
with other changes and conditions physically described. It is a feature 
of the mental that the attribution of mental phenomena must be re-
sponsible to the background of reasons, beliefs, and intentions of the 
individual. (Davidson 1980: 222)
According to Davidson, the gap between the vocabularies of physics 
and psychology results from the holistic and normative character of 
the psychological domain. The content of mental states is partly de-
termined by their reciprocal relations and its interpretation is based 
on rationality assumptions:
Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power of a theory of be-
haviour forces us to bring more and more of the whole system of the 
agent’s beliefs and motives directly into account. But in inferring this 
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system from the evidence, we necessarily impose conditions of coher-
ence, rationality, and consistency. These conditions have no echo in 
physical theory, which is why we can look for no more than rough cor-
relations between psychological and physical phenomena” (Davidson 
1980: 231)
Another key point of the Davidsonian defence of the anomalism of 
the mental departs from the idea that a strict or exceptionless law 
requires a closed domain, like the domain of physics. In order to ex-
plain physical phenomena we do not need to accommodate the pos-
sible interference of non-physical causes; on the contrary, physicists 
and philosophers of science endorse the principle of the causal closure 
of physics. But the psychological domain is clearly not closed. Psy-
chological phenomena are exposed to the action of non-psychological 
causes; biological, chemical and physical factors. For this reason, we 
cannot formulate a psychological theory that provides a complete 
coverage of the psychological domain. Psychological anomalism, the 
thesis that there are no strict laws describing correlations between 
psychological phenomena, can be presented as a consequence of the 
conjunction of psychophysical anomalism and the claim that the psy-
chological domain is not closed (cf. Davidson 1980: 224).
Davidson is aware that scientific laws may admit exceptions, but 
he claims that in the natural sciences it is possible, in principle, to re-
fine and improve laws in order to eliminate exceptions. Psychologi-
cal generalizations are not refinable in this sense. Thus, in “Psychol-
ogy as Philosophy” he clearly dismisses the possibility of strict laws 
dealing with beliefs and desires, the kind of laws that could ground 
intentional explanations of the human behaviour. In his perspective, 
it is hopeless to expect laws of the type “whenever a man has such-
and-such beliefs and desires and such-and-such further conditions 
are satisfied, he will act in such-and such a way” (Davidson 1980: 
233). He claims that:
What is needed in the case of action, if we are to predict on the basis 
of beliefs and desires, is a quantitative calculus that brings all relevant 
beliefs and desires into the picture. There is no hope of refining the 
simple pattern of explanation on the basis of reasons into such a calcu-
lus. (Davidson 1980: 233)
The lack of precision of psychological laws cannot be explained in 
the same way that we explain the lack of precision of some natural 
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scientific laws; the laws involved in meteorological explanations and 
forecasts, for instance. The problem with psychological generaliza-
tions does not consist simply in the complexity of the factors that 
intervene in the human behaviour. Meteorological forecasts are ad-
mittedly fallible because of the complexity of meteorological phe-
nomena, and earthquakes, according to the current status of seis-
mology, cannot be predicted. Serious laws may have ceteris paribus 
clauses in order to accommodate the possible interference of factors 
that generate exceptions to them, but Davidson thinks that there 
is, at any rate, an important distinction between the ceteris paribus 
clauses of natural scientific laws and the corresponding clauses in pu-
tative psychological laws. In the former case, but not in the latter, it 
is possible, in principle, “to determine in advance whether or not the 
conditions of application are satisfied” (Davidson 1980: 233). This 
claim should be understood in the light of Davidson’s holistic and 
normative conception of the psychological domain. Because different 
individuals have different sets of beliefs and desires, generalizations 
couched in an intentional vocabulary express mere tendencies and 
cannot aspire to the degree of precision that characterizes natural 
scientific laws. Furthermore, any attempt to explain and predict ac-
tions on the basis of beliefs and desires must rely, according to Da-
vidson’s Principle of Charity, on rationality assumptions, and these 
assumptions are not rigid; there are different ways to rationalize an 
agent’s behaviour.
Davidson’s defence of psychological anomalism is based on im-
portant insights, but is not satisfactorily developed in his work. In 
particular, he does not clarify the key notion of ceteris paribus law, al-
though he appeals to laws of this kind, namely when he argues for the 
causal efficacy of mental events. In “Thinking Causes”, Davidson ap-
peals to non-strict laws in order to save his anomalous monism from 
the charge of epiphenomenalism. In fact, according to Davidson’s 
principle that causal relations are covered by laws, he seems to be 
forced to appeal to psychophysical laws if he wants to attribute causal 
powers to mental states, but since strict laws cannot be couched in 
a mental vocabulary, laws that correlate mental events with physical 
events should be non-strict laws. A further advantage of these laws 
consists in the fact that they do not entail a physical reduction of the 
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mental. 6 Non-strict laws have, according to Davidson, the merit 
of explaining the causal efficacy of the mental while avoiding at the 
same time the threat of reductionism.
Fodor claimed, in opposition to Davidson, that the status of psy-
chological generalizations does not differ from the status of many 
other laws in the natural sciences. Fodor concedes that intentional 
laws are non-strict laws, but does not think that this point raises a 
particular epistemological problem for psychology, because sciences 
like biology, meteorology or geology rely also on non-strict laws. 
Nomological generalizations in the so-called special sciences admit 
of exceptions, because of the presence of interfering factors that can-
not be taken into account in the formulation of the law, but it is 
usually possible to explain exceptions to a law in the vocabulary of 
another, more basic sciences. In the case of psychology, exceptions 
to generalizations could be explained with the resources of sciences 
like neurology or biochemistry:
Exceptions to the generalizations of a special science are typically in-
explicable from the point of view of (that is, in the vocabulary of) that 
science. That’s one of the things that make it a special science. But, of 
course, it may it may nevertheless be perfectly possible to explain the 
exceptions in the vocabulary of some other science. (Fodor 1987: 6)
Fodor argues that the same holds for commonsense psychology; the 
ceteris paribus clauses of its generalizations are “ineliminable from the 
point of view of its proprietary conceptual resources”, but “can be 
discharged in the vocabulary of some lower-level science” (Fodor 
1987: 6).
3
Against Fodor, I argue that there are significant differences between 
psychological generalizations and laws of natural science. CP laws are 
prima facie legitimate because of the existence of interference effects 
6 Davidson was sensitive, in his context, to Kim’s following objection: “The 
trouble is that once we begin talking about correlations and dependencies be-
tween specific psychological and physical properties, we are in effect talking 
about psycho-physical laws, and these laws raise the spectre of unwanted physical 
reductionism. Where there are psycho-physical laws, there is always the threat, 
or promise, of psycho-physical reduction.” (Kim 1993: 278-9).
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between different causal factors, but we must distinguish between 
two different types of interferences. The first type is what I will call 
external interference, and it is present whenever an exception to a gen-
eralization is caused by factors that belong to another domain, which 
is covered by another theory or science. It is dubious that this kind of 
interference has the same form in psychology and in natural sciences 
like biology or geology. In fact, psychological generalizations cannot 
be linked to, say, neurology in the same way that biological process-
es, for instance, can be linked to chemical processes. Psychological 
entities are partly constituted, as Davidson argued, on the basis of 
rationality assumptions and normative principles, and this sets them 
apart from the world of natural phenomena. By studying the chemi-
cal basis of a biological phenomenon one may understand it better, 
but neurological studies do not contribute to our understanding of 
reasons. McDowell’s distinction between the “space of reasons” and 
the “realm of laws” may clarify this point. Those who argue that 
the relation between psychology and the corresponding lower-level 
theories (such as biology or chemistry) is analogous to the relation 
between higher-level and lower-level theories in the natural sciences 
neglect the fact that in the former case we are in presence of two 
different forms of intelligibility; in the latter case, we are dealing 
with different levels in the same domain (the “realm of law”). This 
means that in psychology and other human sciences the phenomena 
of external interference are much more difficult to handle (not only 
in practice, but also in principle).
The second form of interference, internal interference, occurs when 
the interfering factors belong to the theoretical domain of the gen-
eralization. In this regard, there is an important difference between 
psychology (as well as other human sciences) and the natural sci-
ences. In the latter sciences, there are no in-principle obstacles to 
a gradual refinement of ceteris paribus clauses and to a formulation 
of laws that are exceptionless in their own domain, but there are 
good reasons to think that the same does not hold for laws involv-
ing intentional notions. Any generalization in terms of beliefs and 
desires is always threatened by the interference of competing beliefs 
and desires in a way that challenges any theoretical approach. Two 
arguments can be invoked in this context. In the first place, and as-
suming as true a holistic account of the psychological realm, the fact 
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that the content of mental states is determined by their location in a 
network of propositional attitudes and that different interpretations 
may determine differently the content of beliefs, desires or inten-
tions makes it impossible to fix all the variables involved in intention-
al explanations. In the second place, John McDowell’s reflections on 
the uncodifiability of human rationality and, in particular, his thesis 
that human actions cannot be explained in terms of deductions from 
a definite set of universal principles also undermine the possibility of 
explaining human action on the basis of a nomological system.7 The 
uncodifiability thesis is quite plausible in the light of the serious dif-
ficulties that we face when we try to apply abstract, universal prin-
ciples to concrete, particular cases. On the one hand, the vagueness 
and generality of principles contrast with the uncontrollable diver-
sity of particular situations that defies any set of abstract rules. As a 
result, it is often possible to arrive at different conclusions departing 
from the same principle. On the other hand, there are also cases 
where equally valuable principles may contradict one another. Now, 
if an agent cannot act on the basis of a precise set of universal prin-
ciples, the psychologist or sociologist cannot, a fortiori, explain her 
action in the form of deductions from universal principles or laws. 
As a result, generalizations couched in an intentional vocabulary do 
not support accurate predictions.
We can now raise the following question: does the explanation 
of human action involve ceteris paribus laws? It is not easy to answer 
this question, because putative ceteris paribus laws have, in the human 
sciences, an indefinite status; they are a borderline case between, on 
the one hand, non-scientific rules of thumb or rough generalizations, 
useful in our everyday practices, and, on the other hand, the laws of 
the natural sciences.
We could say that the concept of law is a “family-resemblance” 
concept in the sense that it identifies different kinds of lawlike gen-
eralizations without being able to reduce them to a well-defined set 
of defining characteristics. First, there are exceptionless laws. Some 
argue, as we have seen, that even the most basic laws of physics are 
not exceptionless; for instance, magnetic forces may create excep-
tions to the law of gravitation. However, and since apparent excep-
7 See also Child 1993.
Rui Silva862
tions to physical laws may be explained away with the help of other 
physical laws, we may consider the fundamental laws of physics as 
exceptionless. Second, there are the non-strict laws of the natural 
special sciences. Third, there are laws of the human special sciences 
which are not couched in an intentional vocabulary. They are vulner-
able to forms of interference that are typical of the human sciences; 
for instance, ethical or cultural norms may interfere with well-estab-
lished economic laws. Fourth, there are generalizations couched in 
an intentional vocabulary; they are such a pale echo of the basic laws 
of physics that it becomes disputable to call them laws. Their excep-
tions are ineliminable because there is not a theory able to deal with 
the effects of internal interference.
4
Now we must address a further problem: by claiming that the sta-
tus of scientific generalizations is not the same in the natural and in 
the human sciences, are we not contributing to a devaluation of the 
human sciences and returning to an old-fashioned methodological 
dualism in the realm of science? The answer, as we shall see, is no.
According to the position defended in this article, the explana-
tion of human action is based to a large extent on rationality assump-
tions. When we want to understand an action, we want typically to 
understand the reasons that motivated the action, and a mere refer-
ence to behavioural regularities is not enough. Human actions are, 
in most cases, the result of deliberations. It would be quite odd for 
an agent to take decisions on the basis of her previous behaviour and 
respective regularities; for the same reason, the explanation of hu-
man action cannot abstract totally from the deliberative process that 
originated a particular action. If our decisions and our self-under-
standing require the adoption of a deliberator’s stance, we cannot 
explain satisfactorily the human action relying only on observable 
regularities.8
However, one must also recognize that generalizations play an 
important role in the human sciences. In opposition to strict natural-
istic perspectives that downplay the role of rationality assumptions 
8 For an elaboration of this point, see Kim 1998.
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in the explanation of human action and hermeneutic approaches that 
neglect the role of generalizations, we should attempt to articulate 
rationality assumptions and generalizations in the human sciences.
A prominent supporter of the so-called “simulation theory” in 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, Robert Gordon, offers 
us a good example of such an articulation. The simulation theory is 
an account of our folk-psychological ability to explain and predict 
an agent’s behaviour on the basis of an intentional vocabulary that 
includes notions like ‘belief’, ‘desire’ or ‘intention’. According to 
a particular view of folk psychology, the so-called “theory-theory”, 
folk psychology is a protoscientific theory, to the extent that it re-
lies on generalizations that, by establishing correlations between 
thoughts and actions, allow us to predict human behaviour. Simu-
lationists dispute the idea that our folk-psychological ability to ex-
plain, interpret and predict human behaviour is based on theoretical 
knowledge. Several objections may be addressed to the theory-the-
ory. For instance, it is often argued that it is implausible to attribute 
the relevant theoretical knowledge to small children who are quite 
good at explaining and predicting actions. The idea that the explana-
tion of human action follows universally shared principles is also con-
troversial. For our purposes, however, the most significant objection 
against theory theory is based on the vagueness of the putative laws 
of folk psychology. As Goldman (1995) and Gordon (1995) point 
out, the laws of folk psychology are condemned to be vague because 
of the presence of ceteris paribus clauses. In fact, the number of in-
terfering factors that can undermine predictions made on the basis 
of folk-psychological generalizations is so high that the explanatory 
relevance of such generalizations becomes questionable. As an alter-
native, simulation theorists claim that we should use ourselves as 
models for the interpretation of an agent; the proposal is to interpret 
other minds by projecting our emotions, motivations and deliberat-
ing processes.
In this context, Gordon’s suggestion that the vagueness of ceter-
is paribus clauses cab be corrected through the method of empathy 
or simulation is particularly relevant. He rightly points out that by 
transposing ourselves into other people we can have access to reasons 
or factors that can interfere with established regularities, enabling us 
to explain and predict exceptions to reliable generalizations.
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How does one know how to recognize atypical situations or to expand 
the ceteris paribus clause? An answer is ready at hand. As long as one 
applies these generalizations in the context of practical simulation, the un-
specifiable constraints on one’s own practical reasoning would enable 
one to delimit the application of these rules. This gives one something 
to start with: as one learns more about others, of course, one learns 
how to modify these constraints in applying generalizations to them. 
(Gordon 1995: 67)
The same point can be made with the help of another distinguished 
supporter of simulation theory, Jane Heal (2003: 45-62). She rightly 
points out that the epistemic status of a belief depends on its relations 
with other, relevant beliefs. As a result, the interpretation of an agent 
requires sensitivity to the beliefs that an agent considers relevant to a 
given belief. But how can we identify the relevant beliefs? Certainly 
not by theory-building, because there is not a theory of relevance. In 
order to identify relevant beliefs, we have to rely on our own judge-
ments of relevance and to interpret the agent on the basis of such 
judgements.
This appeal to simulation theory may seem to be incoherent with 
the Davidsonian premises that I presented above. Simulationists 
ground our mindreading abilities in psychological mechanisms, and 
a Davidsonian approach to the interpretation and explanation of hu-
man action is based, on the contrary, on rationality assumptions or in 
the famous Principle of Charity, according to which the interpreta-
tion of other agents must necessarily obey to presuppositions of truth 
and rationality.
However, the method of empathy or simulation is not incom-
patible with the Principle of Charity. In its initial formulations, the 
requirement of charity seemed to be a strong normative principle, 
based on an idealized assumption of truth and rationality in the in-
terpretation of other people’s utterances and actions. However, Da-
vidson’s later reflections on the Principle of Charity make it clear 
that the principle combines norms of rationality with considerations 
of psychological plausibility. The main point is not to maximize truth 
and rationality, but to avoid the attribution of unexplainable errors. 
Simulation may involve rationality assumptions to the extent that it 
reconstitutes the deliberative process of the interpretee; and char-
ity is not a purely normative principle, because it can accommodate 
psychological intuitions.
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1 Introduction
The notion of truth in virtue of meaning has played a prominent role 
in the moderate empiricist account of the a priori. The central tenet 
of empiricism is the claim that sense experience is the only source 
of knowledge about the world. However, moderate empiricists also 
maintain that the way we know certain truths (viz., a priori truths) 
is different from the way we know empirical truths. In order to con-
ciliate both these claims, empiricists try to show that a priori knowl-
edge, though genuine enough in its own terms, is less substantial, 
less world-involving than knowledge acquired through experience 
– the notion of analyticity is used for such a purpose. But the notion 
of analyticity has been understood in many different ways, some of 
them unsuitable to be used in an account of the a priori, others more 
suitable.1 This is not to say that these notions do not have anything in 
common. There is (or seems to be) a certain semantic phenomenon 
that they all endeavour to capture. Whether this phenomenon is real 
or merely apparent, or whether we manage to capture it with some 
notion of analyticity is not something I will explore here. My only 
purpose is to discuss a notion of analyticity that has played a promi-
nent role in the moderate empiricist account of the a priori; namely 
the notion of truth in virtue of meaning – the so-called metaphysical 
notion of analyticity.2 Here is how A. J. Ayer characterizes this notion 
of analyticity:
1 See Swinburne 1975 for a survey of some of such notions.
2 The distinction between metaphysical and epistemological notions of analy-
ticity has been introduced by Boghossian (1997).
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I think that we can preserve the logical import of Kant’s distinction 
between analytic and synthetic propositions, while avoiding the confu-
sions which mar his actual account of it, if we say that a proposition 
is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the 
symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by 
the facts of experience. (1946: 33)
If there is such a thing as truth in virtue of meanings alone, and if 
a priori knowledge is merely knowledge of analytic truths (in this 
sense), the possibility of a priori knowledge becomes less mysteri-
ous: a priori knowledge is merely knowledge of semantic facts (or of 
conceptual relations between our concepts), and hence purportedly 
not as substantial or world-involving as empirical knowledge.
However, the metaphysical notion of analyticity has been under a 
cloud of suspicion ever since Quine (1951)3 famously attacked its in-
telligibility. Such an attack has been reinforced by Boghossian (1997) 
and more recently by Williamson (2007). Nonetheless, the notion is 
still used in many philosophical circles. My aim is to reinforce this 
sceptical stance. The paper will proceed as follows. I start by briefly 
motivating the metaphysical notion of analyticity as well as the main 
reason to reject it. After this I consider the case of logical truths. I ar-
gue that the fact that logical truths are true under all interpretations 
that preserve their logical form does not in any way provide a reason 
to think that they are made true by their meanings alone, or that 
they are somehow less substantial than empirical truths. I then move 
on to paradigmatic cases of analytic truths, the so-called conceptual 
truths, to conclude that no reason has been given to regard them as 
true in virtue of meanings alone, and a fortiori, as less substantial or 
world-involving than empirical truths. I then consider and reject the 
claim that the analytic/synthetic distinction should instead be re-
garded as a distinction between two types of truth. I claim that if we 
are to make sense of the metaphysical notion of analyticity we have 
to have a less literal understanding of the notion of truth in virtue of 
meanings alone. I provide such an understanding by drawing from 
two-dimensionalist approaches to semantics, and I propose a new 
definition of analyticity according to which a statement expresses 
an analytic truth iff it remains true no matter how the actual world 
turns out to be. I argue that though perfectly intelligible, it is not 
3 See also Quine (1935) and (1954).
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clear whether this notion captures any distinctive semantic phenom-
enon deserving of the name ‘analyticity’, and that even if it does, this 
in no way shows that analytic truths are somehow less substantial or 
cognitively demanding than a posteriori truths – as most empiricists 
have taken them to be.
2 Truth and meaning
In this section I outline the main reason to reject the metaphysical 
notion of analyticity. But before we proceed let us star by briefly 
motivating the notion. According to the metaphysical notion of ana-
lyticity a statement is analytic if and only if it is true in virtue of its 
meaning alone. First, let us agree to put semantic scepticism aside. 
Despite Quine’s stance regarding meaning, I will assume, for the 
sake of the argument, that statements have meanings and that they 
express contents or propositions. Let us now take the following two 
statements:
(1) Brutus killed Caesar or Brutus did not kill Caesar.
(2) Snow is white or snow is not white.
Whatever is responsible for the truth of (1) seems to be what is 
also responsible for the truth of (2). Since the only things that both 
statements have in common are the logical words ‘or’ and ‘not’, it 
is tempting to claim that the truth of such statements depends en-
tirely on the meaning of those words. Thus, we could claim that such 
statements are clear cases of analytic statements in the metaphysical 
sense: they are both true in virtue of their meaning alone.
Now let us take the following statements:
(3) Bachelors are unmarried.
(4) Vixens are female foxes.
These statements are also thought to be true in virtue of their mean-
ing alone, but the reason for this is slightly different from the one 
above. In this case, these statements are thought to be definitional 
in nature in the sense of giving the meaning of a certain word. (3) is 
supposed to give us the meaning of ‘bachelor’, and (4) the meaning 
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of ‘vixen’. But if such statements only determine meanings, then it 
seems that they are in virtue of their meaning alone.
Now, the main reason to question the intelligibility of the meta-
physical notion of analyticity is the fact that it seems to go against a 
central truism regarding the relation between truth and meaning. 
This truism can be stated as follows: for every statement S, S is true 
if and only if (i) S means that p (or expresses the content that p) and 
(ii) p is the case. We may call this the Tarskian Truism.4 It is this appar-
ent clash with the Tarskian truism – hereafter (TT) for short – that 
led Quine to claim that ‘(...) it is nonsense, and the root of much non-
sense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component 
in the truth of any individual statement’ (1951: 42). Meanings seem 
necessary for the truth of a statement. For instance, the statement 
‘Snow is white’ is true, but if instead of expressing the content that 
snow is white it expressed the content that snow is blue, it would 
have been false. The problem here is with the claim that meanings 
alone make statements true. To say that the statement ‘Snow is white’ 
is true in virtue of saying that snow is white is just part of the expla-
nation. For this statement to be true it also has to be the case that 
snow is white. The truth of a statement is a function of its meaning 
and the way the world is. Meanings do not seem to make things 
what they are, statements only express propositions that hold or not 
depending on the way things are. However, according to the meta-
physical notion of analyticity, the way things are seems irrelevant to 
the truth of analytic statements. That is, the truth of such statements 
seems to be exclusively determined by what they express and inde-
pendently of the things they express being or not the case. But, as 
Boghossian nicely puts it: ‘How could the mere fact that S means that 
p make it the case that S is true? Doesn’t it also have to be the case 
that p?’ (Boghossian 1997: 335).
Despite this apparent clash with (TT), many still hold that there 
is nothing objectionable with this notion of analyticity. Those who 
maintain it are thus left with two options: either (i) reject (TT) or 
(ii) interpret the notion of truth in virtue of meaning in a way that 
does not violate (TT). I will assume that option (i) is not viable: 
without some independent and principled way of rejecting (TT) such 
4 This is what Boghossian (1997) calls the ‘meaning-fact truism’.
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an option should be regarded as a non-starter. We are thus left with 
option (ii) if we want to defend the intelligibility of the metaphysical 
notion of analyticity. The question now is whether there is a way of 
making sense of this notion that does not violate (TT). My aim in the 
following sections is to explore such ways. I will argue that none is 
forthcoming.
3 Logical truths
Let us consider again statements (1) and (2) above. As we saw, (1) 
and (2) seem to be true in virtue of the same thing, namely, the 
meaning of the logical words ‘or’ and ‘not’. But if they are both true 
in virtue of the meaning of the logical words, does it follow that 
both statements are about the same thing, namely the meaning of 
‘or’ and ‘not’? Remember that according to (TT), a statement S is 
true iff (i) S means that p (or expresses the content that p) and (ii) p 
is the case. But if both statements (1) and (2) are true in virtue of the 
same fact: the meaning of ‘or’ and ‘not’, then they should express the 
same proposition or content (the p must be the same). However, they 
are about different things – (1) is about Brutus and Caesar and (2) 
is about snow – and thus cannot express the same proposition (the 
same p). To claim that they are true in virtue of the same thing – viz. 
the meaning of the logical words – seems to be in clear violation of 
(TT); and we have agreed to rule out any attempt to make sense of 
the metaphysical notion of analyticity that violates (TT).
To make this point a bit more vivid, let us consider the following 
Portuguese statement:
(2’)  Ou a neve é branca ou a neve não é branca.
This statement has the same meaning as (2) above, and it would be 
plainly wrong to translate it as having the same meaning as (1). In 
this case, statements (2) and (2’) are clearly true in virtue of the 
same thing, for they express the same content (the same p), and p is 
the case. But since (1) expresses a different proposition or content 
from the one expressed by (2) and (2’), it cannot be true in virtue of 
the same p obtaining, on pain of violating (TT).
At this point, a natural move to support the claim that logical 
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truths are true in virtue of their meaning alone would be to ap-
peal to the standard model-theoretic account of logical truth as truth 
under all interpretations that preserve logical form. We could then 
agree that (1) and (2) have different meanings, and maintain that 
what makes them true is the very same fact: the meaning of the logi-
cal words alone.
However, the fact that some truths are true under all interpreta-
tions that preserve their logical form does not show that what makes 
them true is the meaning of the logical words as opposed to the 
world.5 For, as we saw, (1) and (2) have different meanings, thus ex-
pressing different contents, and so, by (TT), must be true in virtue 
of those contents obtaining.6 Moreover, the fact that statements like 
(1) and (2) both share the following logical form,
(*) P or not P7
provides no reason to think that what makes then true is their logical 
form as opposed to the world. After all, logical forms can also tell us 
something about the world. For example, (*) could tell us that the 
world cannot be such that things could happen and not happen at the 
same time, or that we could have a certain fact and not have it at the 
same time. In this way we could claim that logical forms, somehow, 
represent the logical structure of the world.
To make this point vivid, take the following statement:
(5) Schrödinger’s cat is dead or is not dead.
5 See Williamson 2007:64 for a similar claim.
6 This is not to say that we cannot have different statements with different 
contents being true in virtue of the same thing. For example, the statements 
‘Snow is blue or water is H
2
O’ and ‘Snow is green or water is H
2
O’ express dif-
ferent propositions, but are both true in virtue of the same thing: water being 
H
2
O. But this is no counter-example to my claim, for they are still true in virtue 
of their contents obtaining.
7 Notice that we cannot say that what is true in virtue of its meaning alone is 
the general schema (*) rather than its instances, for (*) is not a statement and thus 
does not have a meaning.
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It is because (5) says something about the world that it poses a prob-
lem for our interpretation of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, 
(5) is also an instance of (*), and so something that would be true, 
according to the metaphysical notion of analyticity, in virtue of its 
meaning alone. And if it were true in virtue of its meaning alone 
we would not even consider what it says about Schrödinger’s cat to 
determine its truth. Its truth would immediately follow from the 
meaning of its logical words. This is not, of course, to say that (5) 
could be false. We still think (or at least most of us) that (5) must 
be true. But this is not because of the meaning of its logical words, 
but rather because its logical form mirrors a certain modal struc-
ture of the world. Or consider Graham Priest’s dialetheism8 — i.e., 
the view that there are true contradictions. Priest appeals to several 
examples to argue that some statements of the form ‘Q and not-Q’ 
might be true. The intelligibility of his arguments crucially depends 
on the fact that the truth or falsity of logical statements is not entirely 
determined by the meaning of the logical words, but rather depends 
on the uniform assignment of meaning to each word in a statement 
in a given context. The fact that some truths are true under all in-
terpretation (or false under all interpretation) that preserves their 
logical form does not show that what makes them true (or false) is 
the meaning of the logical words as opposed to the world.  
Moreover, as Williamson 2007:64 notes, from the perspective of 
compositional semantics synthetic truths such as,
(6) Kripke is a philosopher or Kripke is not a man.
are true in the same way as logical truths like (1) and (2) are. Name-
ly, they are true because one of the disjuncts is true. So, if a state-
ment like (1) were truth in virtue of the meaning of its logical words 
alone, so would (6). But (6) is clearly not true in virtue of the mean-
ing of its logical words alone. Thus, (1) is also not true in virtue of 
the meaning of its logical words alone. What makes us think that 
it is true in virtue of its meaning alone is the fact that, contrary to 
(6), (1) expresses a necessary truth. But the fact that a statement ex-
presses a logically necessary truth in no way entails that it is true in 
8 See, e.g., Priest 1998.
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virtue of its meaning alone.9 Statements that express a logically nec-
essary truth (in the narrow sense) are statements that are true under 
all interpretations that preserve their logical form, and if this latter 
property cannot be used to elucidate the notion of truth in virtue of 
meaning alone, neither can the former.
What makes a statement true or false is what the statement is 
about. Or to use Aristotle’s famous dictum about truth: ‘to say of 
what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say 
of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.’ Statements 
(1), (2), (5) and (6) are clearly about different things. Thus, they have 
different truth conditions. Their truth must, therefore, depend on 
whether such conditions are met. All statements are true, when they 
are, because their truth conditions are satisfied. And such truth con-
ditions result from a uniform assignment of meaning to each word 
in the statement in a given context. Logical truths are no different 
in this respect. The only difference is that logical truths are true 
under all interpretations that preserve their logical form. But this in 
no way means that they are true in virtue of the meaning of the logi-
cal words alone. Such truths are as much about the extra-linguistic 
world as any other truth – or at least as any other truth that is not 
explicitly semantic in nature.
Despite Quine being credit as the first to reject the metaphysical 
notion of analyticity, Bertrand Russell had already objected to a sim-
ilar notion. In Russell’s time the focus was not so much on meanings 
but rather on truths of thought, but the intuition was the very same 
– which is also the intuition present in Hume’s distinction between 
‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact’. The way Russell expresses 
his concern about this divide neatly illustrates the upshot so far:
The belief in the law of contradiction is a belief about things, not about 
thoughts. It is not, e.g., the belief that if we think a certain tree is a 
beech, we cannot at the same time think that it is not a beech; it is the 
belief that if a tree is a beech, it cannot at the same time be not a beech. 
9 The claim that necessary truths were true in virtue of their meaning alone 
was endorsed by the logical positivists, and rejected by Quine. But the logical 
positivists did not have independent means to show why this was so. The only 
reasons given to support such a claim result from their account of the a priori as 
knowledge of analytic truths, and of their subsequent identification of the con-
cept of a priority with that of necessity.
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(…) and although belief in the law of contradiction is a thought, the law 
of contradiction itself is not a thought, but a fact concerning things in 
the world. (Russell 1912: 50)
4 Conceptual truths
What about the paradigmatic examples of analytic truths, the so-
called conceptual truths, like ‘All bachelors are unmarried’, are such 
statements true in virtue of their meaning alone? The argument here 
seems to be even more straightforward than the argument regarding 
logical truths. If the statement ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is about 
bachelors and the property of being unmarried, how can it be true in 
virtue of its meaning alone?
Consider the following sentences:
(7) All bachelors are unmarried.
(8) All bachelors are healthy.
According to the metaphysical notion of analyticity, (7) is true in vir-
tue of its meaning alone, and (8) is true in virtue of both its meaning 
and the world (assuming that it is true). In both statements the word 
‘bachelors’ refers to bachelors, and not to the meaning of ‘bachelors’ 
(whatever that might be). And it is because the word ‘bachelor’ re-
fers to bachelors that (7) is about bachelors. But, by (TT), for (8) to 
be true in virtue of its meaning alone, the statement could not be 
about bachelors but about the meaning of ‘bachelors’. A statement in 
a context is about whatever its constituent terms refer to in that con-
text. But there is no relevant difference that would make ‘bachelors’ 
refer to bachelors in (8) and to the meaning of ‘bachelor’ (whatever 
that might be) in (7). But if (7) is about the fact that bachelors are 
unmarried, such a fact, no matter how trivial it might be, must be 
what makes it true.
Now contrast (7) with:
(9) ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ means that all bachelors are 
unmarried.
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If (7) were true in virtue of its meaning alone, the very same fact 
that made (7) true would made (9) true. But contrary to (7), (9) 
expresses a semantic truth, and thus must be about a different thing. 
But if these statements are about different things, by (TT), they can-
not be true in virtue of the same thing, namely the meaning of ‘All 
bachelors are unmarried’. Therefore, (7) cannot be true in virtue of 
its meaning alone.
I submit that if there is no other way of making sense of the met-
aphysical notion of analyticity such a notion should be rejected as 
incoherent. In the next section we will look at another way of under-
standing the metaphysical notion of analyticity.
5 Types of truth
A possible way of understanding the metaphysical notion of analytic-
ity would be to claim that the notion of truth in virtue of meaning 
alone is not so much about the truth-makers of analytic statements 
— meanings as opposed to ‘the facts’ — but about a special type of 
truth. In this way, claiming that analytic statements are true in vir-
tue of their meaning alone and synthetic statements true in virtue of 
the facts is to be understood as a claim regarding two different types 
of truth. So the question that we have to face now is whether there is 
such a thing as analytic truth and synthetic truth.
Williamson 2007:54-8 has presented a simple and very compel-
ling argument to show why there cannot be two distinct types of 
truth.
Williamson’s argument goes roughly as follows. If there were two 
distinct senses of truth, how could we determine the truth-value of, 
for example, a conditional in which the antecedent and the conse-
quent were both synthetic truths? We could say that in such cases 
the statement that would result from this application would also be 
synthetic and so true in the synthetic sense. But consider the follow-
ing statements:10
(10) Barbara is a barrister.
(11) Barbara is a lawyer.
10 I am using Williamson 2007 own examples.
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(10) and (11) are clear examples of synthetic truths, if true. Now 
imagine that Barbara is in fact a barrister, and consider the following 
conditional:
(12) If Barbara is a barrister, then Barbara is a lawyer.
If there are analytic truths, (12) should be one of them — ‘bar-
rister’ means a lawyer with special qualifications. However, (12) is 
composed of two synthetic truths. Does this mean that whenever 
we have a conditional with a synthetic truth for the antecedent and 
a synthetic truth for the consequent the result is an analytic truth? 
This is clearly false, as can be easily illustrated:
(13) If Barbara is a barrister, then Barbara is married.
What this shows is that if there are two senses of ‘true’ it would be 
impossible to work out the truth-table for something as simple as 
the material conditional. Whether a conditional is analytically true 
or synthetically true is not a function of its parts being analytically 
true or synthetically true. The best we could do is to claim that the 
material conditional would be analytically or synthetically true. But 
this would defeat the whole idea of distinct notions of truth. That is, 
we would in effect be claiming that there is such a thing as absolute 
truth. 
As Williamson 2007 also shows, we would have the same prob-
lem when considering the notion of truth-preservation. Valid argu-
ments preserve truth from premise(s) to conclusion. But if there are 
two distinct notions of truth, what type of truth is preserved? For 
example, we could have a valid argument with a synthetically true 
premise and an analytically true conclusion like the following:
 Snow is white.
 Snow is white or snow is not white.
It thus seems that we have once more failed to make sense of the 
metaphysical notion of analyticity. Is there any other way of making 
sense of this notion? In the next section I will consider one last idea.
879Metaphysical Analyticity
6 Analyticity and two-dimensionalism
Let me tentatively suggest a final way of making sense of the meta-
physical notion of analyticity.11 The two-dimensional framework ap-
proach to semantics has been understood and used in many differ-
ent ways, but there are some intuitions that seem common to all of 
them.12 One such intuition is the following:
(…) the truth value of an utterance will depend on facts in two dif-
ferent ways: first, the facts determine what is said; second, the facts 
determine whether what is said is true. (Stalnaker 2006: 295)
By accepting that the facts also determine whether what a statement 
says is true, the two-dimensional theorist embrace (TT), as they 
should. The claim that non-semantic facts also determine what is 
said is the one that I would like to focus on. Let us see if this could be 
used to make sense of the metaphysical notion of analyticity.
If we think of a possible world as a complete description of the 
facts, Stalnaker’s quotation above might be understood as referring 
to the two possible roles a possible world might play: that of (i) de-
termining what is said; and that of (ii) determining whether what is 
said is true. Now, a world that plays the role of determining what is 
said is considered to be the actual world. A world that is not actual is 
considered as counterfactual. The actual world is normally understood 
as ‘our world’ — that is, the way things are. And what determines 
the truth-value of a statement is the way things are. But there are 
ways things could have turned out so that what is true might have 
been false.
Consider the following example of a statement that expresses a 
contingent truth:
(P) Plato is the author of The Republic.
11 I am grateful to David Papineau for pressing me to think about how the 
two-dimensional account could be used to make sense of the metaphysical notion 
of analyticity.
12 It is not my purpose here to articulate and defend any two-dimensional 
approach, only to see if we can use some of its ideas to give a coherent account 
of the metaphysical notion of analyticity. For a discussion of the different inter-
pretations of the two-dimensional semantics apparatus, see Stalnaker 2006 and 
Chalmers 2006.
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By prefixing (P) with the ‘Actually’ operator we get the following 
statement:
(PA) Actually Plato is the author of The Republic.
The resulting sentence, (PA), now expresses a necessary truth – it 
is true at every possible world in which Plato is the author of The Re-
public at the actual world. This is the standard way of understanding 
the ‘Actually’ operator.
But it seems that there is a sense in which (PA) is not really neces-
sary, that there is something contingent about it. This is the intuition 
that the two-dimensional theorists want to capture, namely that ‘it 
is a contingent matter which possible world is actual’ (Davies 2006: 
143). Had a different possible world been actual (PA) could have ex-
pressed a falsehood. If another world in which Plato is not a philoso-
pher had been actual, (PA) would have been false.
Now consider the statement,
(W) Water is H
2
O. 
Following Kripke 1980 and Putnam 1975 we can claim that (W) ex-
presses a necessary truth, because ‘water’ and ‘H
2
O’ both refer rig-
idly to the same substance. However, had a different possible world 
been actual, (W) could have been false. For example, if instead of 
Earth we had Twin-Earth playing the role of the actual world, then 
‘Water’ would rigidly refer to that watery stuff that plays the water-
role on Twin Earth. ‘Water’ would then rigidly refer to XYZ, and 
(W) would have been false. So with Twin-Earth playing the role of 
the actual world, (W) is false.
Now consider the statement,
(WW)  Water is water.
Contrary to (W), this statement (WW) is true no matter what 
world is considered as the actual world. For, even if we had Twin 
Earth playing the role of the actual world, it would still be true that 
water is water — for XYZ is XYZ.
Corresponding to these two ways of understanding what is said 
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are said to be two distinct dimensions: on one dimension we have 
(A) different worlds considered as actual determining what is said; 
and on the other we have (C) different worlds considered as coun-
terfactual determining what is said. Dimension (C) corresponds to 
what David Chalmers calls ‘secondary intension’, and dimension (A) 
corresponds to he calls ‘primary intension’.13
Let us now see if this apparatus could help us make sense of the 
metaphysical notion of analyticity.
According to the metaphysical notion of analyticity a statement 
is true if and only if it is true in virtue of its meaning alone. We saw 
that two-dimensionalism embraces (TT): a statement S is true iff S 
means that p and p. However, if some statements are true no matter 
what world is considered actual, then, it might be claimed, they are 
somehow true in virtue of their meaning alone. After all, if a state-
ment is true regardless of how the world happens to be (regardless of 
which facts obtain), it seems that it is in some sense true in virtue of 
its meaning alone (though not literally so).
I submit a slightly modified version of the traditional metaphysi-
cal notion of analyticity, one that seems similar in spirit but without 
its shortcomings. Here is such a notion:
A statement is analytic (in the metaphysical sense) if and only if 
it is true at a world w regardless of whichever world is labelled as 
the actual world.
In the useful terminology of Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone 
1980, analytic statements have, thus, the property of being Fixedly 
Actually true.
Since a necessary truth, in the standard sense, is one that holds 
at all possible worlds, we might think that all necessary propositions 
are analytic in this metaphysical sense of analyticity, and, thus, that 
(W) is analytic, rendering this definition of analyticity unsuitable. 
However, this is not so. Statement (W) is not fixedly actually true: 
it does not hold at the actual world, regardless of whichever world is 
labelled as the actual world. But (WW) is fixedly actually true, and 
so analytic – and a priori –, as it should.
We could then claim that the only statements that are analytic in 
13 See, e. g., Chalmers 2006.
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this new metaphysical sense of analyticity are those that are know-
able a priori.14 Truths of mathematics and logic are all true in respect 
to the actual world, whichever world is labelled as actual. The same 
can be said of the paradigmatic examples of analytic truths, the so-
called conceptual truths. So, so far, so good.
Now, if an analytic statement in this metaphysical sense is one 
that is true no matter how the world turns out to be, it might seem 
that they do not impose any constraints on the world, and that is 
why we can know them to be true without having to look at the 
world – that is, a priori. Synthetic truths, on the other hand, do 
impose constraints on the world, and so they are somehow more 
world-demanding than analytic ones. It thus seem that we have fi-
nally found a robust enough notion of analyticity to be used in the 
empiricist account of the a priori. In the next section we will see why 
this is not so.
6.1 Is this new notion any good?
The first worry I would like to consider regarding this revised notion 
of metaphysical analyticity is whether it truly captures some special 
semantic phenomenon deserving of the label ‘analyticity’.
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a semantic distinction. The 
analytic statements, in the metaphysical sense, are the ones that are 
said to be true for semantic reasons alone, the synthetic statements 
the ones that are true for non-semantic reasons – they are supposed 
to be true in virtue of extra-linguistic facts, for they express, in Hu-
mean terms, ‘matters of fact’. Now, according to this revised notion 
of analyticity, analytic statements hold (when they do) in virtue of 
the facts, just as any other statement does. The difference is that they 
are true at every possible world considered as actual. Given this, one 
could claim that these statements are such that their meaning some-
how guarantees their truth, and hence that they are, to a certain ex-
tent, true in virtue of meaning (though not in a literal sense). How-
14 Peacocke 2004 claims that all propositions that are knowable a priori — 
those that are ‘contentually a priori’ in his terminology — are fixedly actually 
true. Notice, however, that Peacocke strongly rejects the metaphysical notion of 
analyticity as spurious.
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ever, this is not clearly so. The property that a statement has of being 
true no matter how the actual world turns out to be does not seem 
to be a purely semantic property, as the property of truth in virtue 
of meaning clearly is. It seems that if the phenomenon at stake in this 
new notion of analyticity were semantic, the same would be true of 
synthetic statements. Analytic statements are true no matter how the 
actual world turns out to be; and synthetic statements are not true no 
matter how the actual world turns out to be. But both statements are 
true in virtue of their disquotational truth conditions obtaining. The 
difference is that analytic statements, in this sense, will always have 
their truth conditions fulfilled and synthetic statements will have 
them only sometimes fulfilled. But then what is at stake here is a dis-
tinct type of necessity, rather than a distinct type of analyticity. And 
in fact, the ‘Fixedly Actually’ operator was introduced by Davies & 
Humberstone 1980 to express a different notion of necessity, what 
was called ‘deep necessity’ as opposed to ‘superficial necessity’, and 
not a notion of analyticity. The fact that a statement always manages 
to have their disquotational truth-conditions fulfilled does not show 
that the phenomenon behind it is merely semantic.
A second worry closely related to this one concerns the role that 
this purportedly metaphysical notion of analyticity can play in the 
empiricist account of the a priori. A priori knowledge is knowledge 
that is, in some suitable sense, independent of the subject’s sense ex-
perience. If possible, the a priori has the puzzling feature of provid-
ing us with knowledge about the world without causally relating us 
to it. The moderate empiricist way out of this puzzle is to claim that a 
priori knowledge, thought genuine enough in its own terms, is some-
how less substantial or less world-involving than a posteriori knowl-
edge. A priori knowledge is then said to be merely knowledge of 
analytic truths, and analytic truths understood as semantic in nature, 
as true in virtue of meaning alone, and so less substantial and cogni-
tively demanding than synthetic truths. The problem, as we saw, is 
that understood literally, we have to agree with Quine and reject this 
notion of analyticity. But understood less literally, as statements that 
are true no matter what world plays the role of the actual world, it is 
not at all clear that the notion can do the job the empiricists need it 
to do. For example, mathematical truths are true regardless of how 
the actual world turns out to be. But this fact does not provide any 
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reason to regard these truths as somehow less substantial than truths 
that do not hold fixedly actually, unless we already had independent 
reasons to think that all truths that hold fixedly actually are not sub-
stantial, or that mathematical truths are not substantial. Moreover, if 
we had independent reasons to think that mathematical truths were 
less substantial than empirical truths, or that truths that hold fixedly 
actually were less substantial than those that don’t, what would be 
doing the explanatory work would be such reasons themselves, and 
not this revised notion of metaphysical analyticity.
The dialectic so far is pretty straightforward. Either this pur-
ported notion of analyticity fails to capture a semantic phenomenon 
deserving of the name ‘analyticity’ or if it does capture it, it fails to 
do the explanatory job it was supposed to do. In either case, it should 
be rejected. This is not to say that the notion of fixedly actually true 
is irrelevant or philosophical uninteresting, quite the contrary. My 
only contention is in taking it as capturing a metaphysical notion of 
analyticity that could be used in an account of the a priori.
It is also worth noting that the identification of the notion of the a 
priori with this purportedly metaphysical notion of analyticity could 
lead us to prejudge some important questions. For example, some-
one could claim that the truth expressed by the statement ‘I exist’ is 
not a priori, say, because to know to exist I need to resort to some 
sort of introspective thought process that seems too analogous to 
sensory experience for it to be regarded as an a priori source of justi-
fication. But, if we were to identify the a priori with this purportedly 
metaphysical notion of analyticity, instead of addressing the question 
of whether we can know to exist through some a priori source of 
justification, we would claim that since this is fixedly actually true 
it must be a priori. But surely this is not the right way to go about 
determining the epistemic status of a statement.
For example, Chalmers takes ‘I exist’ to express an a posteriori 
truth. However, it is fixedly actually true, and so, it should count as 
a priori on this approach:
If S
2
 is ‘I exist’, then any utterance of the same expression with the 
same meaning will be true, so S
2
 has a necessary linguistic and se-
mantic contextual intension [it holds Fixedly Actually]. But (somewhat 
controversially) S
2
 is a posteriori, justifiable only on the basis of experi-
ence. […] All these cases are counterexamples to the Core Thesis [the 
thesis that identifies what is Fixedly Actually true with the a priori]. 
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All of them are a posteriori and cognitively significant, and many of 
them seem to be as cognitively significant as paradigmatic expressions 
of empirical knowledge. (Chalmers 2006: 70)
My concern here is not so much with whether we should count ‘I 
exist’ as expressing an a priori truth — for I think that it does. My 
concern here is with what two-dimensionalism has to offer as an 
explanation of the a priori. The aim is to explain the a priori. We 
do that by claiming that what is a priori is analytic in the sense of 
holding fixedly actually. We are then faced with what seems to be 
a counter-example, something that we take to be knowable a pos-
teriori but that is fixedly actually true. We then go on to adjust the 
theory in order to get a notion of analyticity that is coextensive with 
the notion of the a priori. Such an adjustment shows that we are us-
ing the a priori to test our notion of analyticity. And this is exactly 
the contrary of what we should be doing if the aim were to explain 
the a priori with the analytic.
Furthermore, it is not clear that we always know the proposition 
expressed by a statement that is fixedly actually true. For example, 
what is it that we know when we know that we exist? The statement 
‘I exist’ is true at every possible world, no matter what world plays 
the role of the actual world. But what I know when I know that I, 
myself, exists is not something that holds fixedly actually true. If I 
am right about this, this means that the identification of the a priori 
with this purported notion of analyticity is not only problematic but 
false, as there are things that hold fixedly actually that are not know-
able a priori. Of course, one could claim that all a priori truths are 
fixedly actually true – and that might well be true – but we would 
also need the converse to hold.15 That is, we would need all truths 
that hold fixedly actually to be knowable a priori for this notion to be 
coextensive with the a priori, as any purported notion of analyticity 
needs to be.
15 See, for example, Peacocke 2004, who claims that all a priori truths are 
necessary in this special sense, though not necessary in the metaphysical sense.
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7 Conclusion
I have explored several ways of making sense of the notion of truth in 
virtue of meaning (i.e., the metaphysical notion of analyticity); I ar-
gued that understood literally, the notion should be rejected. I then 
purposed a less literal way of understanding it. However, though in 
perfectly good order, it is not clear that this purported new notion 
of metaphysical analyticity captures a purely semantic phenomenon 
deserving of the label ‘analyticity’. And even if it does, it does not do 
the explanatory work required by the moderate empiricists. So, even 
if this new notion does capture a purely semantic phenomenon, this 
is not the kind of phenomenon that the metaphysical notion of ana-
lyticity is supposed to capture. Therefore, in either case, we should 
follow Quine in his repudiation of the metaphysical notion of analy-
ticity. This notion might well be the last dogma of empiricism.16
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1 Introduction
It is part of an old folklore that logic should not have existential theo-
rems or existential validities. One should not prove in pure logic the 
existence of anything whatsoever; nothing could be proved by means 
of logic alone to necessarily exist. Whatever exists might not exist. 
This standpoint has been expressed by several philosophers from dif-
ferent traditions, such as Hume, Kant, Orenstein and Quine.1
We now set the stage by examining some issues. Our main ques-
tion is: “Do we actually have existential theorems in logic?” Two 
possible attitudes towards this question are as follows.
1 See for instance, Hume’s Dialogue on Natural Religion [Hum92] (Part IX, 
189), the introduction to Kant/Jäsche [Kan92], Orenstein [Ore73] (p. 62) and 
Quine [Qui54].
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• A desideratum: logic should not have any existential theo-
rems.
• A fact: logic does not have any existential theorems.
An intuitive explanation for these attitudes can be roughly as follows. 
Consider an existential assertion, such as “there exist borogroves”, 
or “something is a borogrove”. Such an assertion may perhaps be de-
rived from some hypotheses. But, could it be proved, from no hy-
pothesis whatsoever? In this context, one has absolutely no idea about 
what ‘borogrove’ is supposed to mean.2 So, one can appeal only to 
logical principles. How would such a proof look like? Here, the prob-
lem seems to stem from the fact that we do not know what ‘boro-
grove’ is supposed to mean. How can one establish some property of 
something whose meaning is unknown? Well, actually we can: we 
do know that “something is a borogrove or a non-borogrove”. One 
might contend that this assertion is not really about borogroves: it 
expresses a general fact.
The above attitudes towards existential theorems in logic lead to 
the following slogans concerning (First-order) Logic.
1. No existential conclusion without (perhaps alternative) wit-
nesses.
2. No existential conclusion without universal explanation.
Crudely formulated as above, the preceding attitudes and slogans 
are clearly misplaced and false: first-order logic does have existential 
theorems. Our slogans seem to originate from the absence of exis-
tential commitments in logic. Well, in a sense, logic does make the 
following commitments.3
2 Note that a definition of ‘borogrove’ or other elucidations will not be of 
much help here. First, they would be counted as hypotheses. Second, if one ex-
plains ‘borogroves’ as, say, “those things that are nimsy”, one is bringing ‘nimsy’ 
into the picture, and we are back to the same question.
3 These commitments are incorporated in the introduction rule for the exis-
tential quantifier.
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(Cnst) One usually assumes that constant symbols denote elements 
of the universe; so the existential sentence  is valid.4 
(Fnc) Similarly, function symbols represent total functions on the 
universe; so the existential sentence  is valid.
Now, consider First-order Predicate Logic with no constants or func-
tions. One may perhaps still detect an existential commitment in the 
fact that Logic usually considers only nonempty universes. Even if 
the existence of any particular object is contingent, it is necessary 
that something exists. The laws of logic are abstract in the sense that 
they do not presuppose particular objects, but they are not abstract 
in the sense that they do not presuppose objects. This commitment 
renders valid the existential sentence .5 Under this modest 
existential commitment the slogan we propose is: Pure Logic cannot 
establish existence unless unavoidable.6
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 considers the 
simple case of predicate logic without equality. Section 3 examines 
the case of predicate logic with equality. Section 4 extends these 
considerations to the case of universal hypotheses (as axioms). In 
Section 5, we briefly consider the addition of existential hypotheses. 
Finally, in Section 6, we summarize our results, commenting on 
them as well as on some possible extensions.
2 Predicate logic without equality
We now examine the case of predicate logic without equality. 
We begin with some simple examples of valid and non-valid sen-
tences.
4 An assertion like “Pegasus is a winged horse” may be paraphrased as “some-
thing identical to Pegasus is a winged horse”. Also, “Aristotle is Greek” yields 
“There are Greeks”.
5 It is this modest commitment that allows one to infer  from , e.g. 
“Every natural is non-negative” yields “Some natural is non-negative”.
6 The easy road to avoid existential theorems is, of course, to allow empty 
domains: with empty universes, one would have no existential validity. In in this 
paper, we take the hard road: even if empty domains are not excluded, predicate 
logic should not have any existential theorems.
1. Given a unary predicate (symbol) , consider the ma-
trix  . In this case, the existential sentence 
 is valid, and so is the universal sentence 
 valid.
2. Now, given yet another unary predicate (symbol) , consider 
the matrix . In this case, the existential sentence 
 is non-valid, and so is the universal sentence 
 non-valid.
These two examples illustrate the following situations.
1. For the matrix , we have:
2. For the matrix , we have:
These situations may suggest a simple, albeit tentative, explanation. 
Now, let us examine some other examples of valid and non-valid 
sentences.
Given a unary predicate (symbol) , consider the ma-
trix . In this case, notice that the existential sen-
tence  is still valid, but the universal sentence 
 not valid. There is, however, a way out: the vari-
ant versions. We will then have the following situation:
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These two variants are valid, due to the disjunct ; they 
have the matrix
 
Now, given a binary predicate (symbol) , consider the matrix 
. In this case, neither the existential sentence  nor the uni-
versal sentence  is valid. The situation with their variant 
versions is as follows:
Now, the disjuncts  and  are non-valid, and so is non-valid 
the matrix
Let us summarize the ideas seen in our examples.
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• Given a matrix, , we may have the existential sentence 
 valid and the universal sentence  
not valid.
• The examples suggest some simple syntactical transforma-
tions as follows.
(SM) The singular matrix , obtained from the original 
matrix  by replacing every variable by .
(VM) The variant matrix , obtained by weaken-
ing the original matrix  by the singular disjunct .
One can see that the variant matrix follows from the original one:
Our examples seem to suggest the following conjectures.
1. Weakening does not affect existential sentence:
2. Propositional reduction for existential validity:
3.  Tautological variant matrix gives universal variant valid:
4. Universal variant yields existential sentence:
P. Veloso, L. C. Pereira, H. Haeusler894
We now examine these four conjectures.
1. The equivalence between  and 
 is easy to see (by the rules for  and 
).
2. The idea is considering single-element structures (see below). 
3. The assertion follows (by -introductions: if  then 
).
4. The assertion follows from the first assertion (since ).
Let us take a closer look at the propositional reduction for existential 
theorems. There are two ways to establish this reduction, by singu-
larization.7
• For classical logic, we consider single-element structures. In 
such a structure, there are no actual quantifiers:  
holds iff  holds for the single element iff  
holds.
• Also, one can show that a predicate-logic proof of  
may be reduced to a propositional proof  of  fol-
lowed by -introductions:
Indeed, we can transform a predicate-logic derivation  to a propo-
sitional derivation  by singularizing it. If we replace every vari-
able by  and erase all quantifiers, we transform both  and 
 to . So, connective rules remain unaffected and 
likewise for the absurdity rules. The quantifiers rules become repeti-
7 Such singular translations appear in the litterature, e.g. “réduction de genre 
un” [Cha79 , p.119-123]. They are often used to establish the relative consistency 
of predicate logic with respect to propositional logic [End72 , p.59].
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tions, except for -elimination, which reduces to derivation gluing. 
In detail:
• For the quantifier introduction rules, we have:
 
• For the elimination of , we have:
• For the elimination of , we have:
We then have the following proof transformation:
We thus have the following characterizations for the provable exis-
tential sentences in Classical, Intuitionistic or Minimal Logics with-
out equality .
Theorem 2.1. The following assertions are equivalent for a matrix .
(P
1
ES) the existential sentence is provable in predicate logic: .
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(P
1
EV) The existential variant is a theorem: .
(P
0
SM) The singular matrix is provable in propositional logic: .
(P
1
UV) The universal variant is a theorem: .
Thus, the existential sentences , without equal-
ity, that are provable in predicate logic are exactly those having both:
• a universal explanation
( ),
• witnesses ( ).
3 Predicate logic with equality
We now examine the case of predicate logic with equality. 
We begin with some simple examples of valid and non-valid sen-
tences.
1. First, consider the matrix . In this case, the existential 
sentence  is valid, and so is the universal sentence 
 
valid. 
2. Next, consider the matrix . Then, the existential sen-
tence  is non-valid, and so is the universal sentence 
 non-valid. 
3. Finally, consider the matrix . In this case, the existen-
tial sentence  is valid, but the universal sentence 
 is not valid. Now, the universal variant is the sen-
tence , which is valid.
So, the situation is much as before. For a propositional explanation, 
one must take into account the special nature of the equality sign:  
is to interpreted as identity. So, it has some properties embodied in 
the rules and axioms for equality.
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The corresponding -singular matrices are as follows.
Thus, except for the case of reflexivity, the singular case is trivial. 
We may now provide propositional explanations for the above 
three examples. The situation is as follows:
1. the matrix  is the equality axiom ;
2. the matrix  is not derivable from the equality axiom 
;
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3. the matrix  has singulary version , which is (deriv-
able from) .
We thus have the following characterizations for provable existential 
sentences in Classical, Intuitionistic or Minimal Logics with equality 
 (cf. Theorem 2.1).
Theorem 3.1. The following assertions are equivalent for a matrix .
(P
1
ES) The existential sentence is provable in predicate logic: .
(P
1
EV)  The existential variant is a theorem: .
(D
0




UV) The universal variant is a theorem: .
The argument is much as in Section 2. The only difference lies in the 
propositional reduction.8 It now becomes as follows:
So, a predicate-logic proof of  now has the following 
form:
8 Alternatively, one can simplify the singular matrix  to  by 
replacing each occurrence of  by . Then, the propositional reduction be-
comes .
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4 Universal axioms
We now turn to the case of universal axioms as hypotheses. 
We begin with simple examples of propositional reduction. Giv-
en the matrices  and , their singular versions are  
and , respectively.
• Assume that the matrices do not have equality and that we 
have a propositional derivation  of  from . We 
then have a predicate-logic derivation  as follows:
Hence, .
• For the case with equality, assume that we have a proposi-
tional derivation  of  from  and . We then 
have a predicate-logic derivation  as follows:
Hence, .
Thus, we can see that:
• the propositional derivability of singular matrices 
,
• yields the predicate-logic derivability 
.
The converse can be seen by propositional reduction (cf. Section 2). 
If we replace every variable by  and erase all quantifiers, we trans-
form derivations:
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So, a derivation of 
 
from  has the follow-
ing form:
Now, let the singular  translation of a set  of universal sen-
tences be the set consisting of their singular  matrices: 
.9
We then have the following characterizations for existential con-
sequences of universal sentences in Classical, Intuitionistic or Mini-
mal Logics with equality  (cf. Theorem 3.1).
Theorem 4.1. Given a set  of universal sentences, the following assertions 













SM) The singular matrix is derivable in propositional logic from  and 
singular  translation of .
(D
1
UV) The universal variant is derivable in predicate logic from the set  of 
universal sentences: .
9 The axioms for equality (cf. Section 3) form a set  of universal sentences. 
Note that  is equivalent to .
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5 Existential hypotheses
We now briefly consider the addition of existential axioms as hy-
potheses.
We begin with a simple examples to introduce the ideas. Given a 
binary relation , one may represent the fact that  is related to  via 
 by an arrow pointing from  to : . Now, let us call an ele-
ment cyclic when there is an arrow from it to itself: . Also, call 
an element bicyclic when there is a path of length 2 from it to itself: 
, for some . Let us use  and  for the sets of cyclic and 
bicyclic elements, respectively.
From the existence of cyclic elements, one can establish the ex-
istence of bicyclic elements, i.e.  yields . One can argue 
as follows. Since there exists cyclic elements, we have some . 
Now, as , we have ; so we also have the path 
, whence . This argument actually establishes , which is 
sufficient.10
We claim that establishing such inclusion is the only way to pro-
ceed. The intuitive idea is that, for all we know, the assumed cyclic 
element  may be the only element of the universe. More precise-
ly, consider unary predicates  and . If , the we 
claim that the inclusion  is valid. Indeed, other-
wise, one would have a structure  where  fails, i.e., for some 
 but . Now, consider the sub-structure , with 
universe . In this structure , we have  but , so 
 but .
Now, let us examine some examples of existential consequences 
of existential hypotheses (without equality, for simplicity). 




ES) Consider the predicate-logic derivability 
.
Here, the assumption is ; so there is some element in , call it 
. Much as above, for all we know,  may very well be the only element 
10 This kind of argument appears often in Algebra: from the existence of 
(right) neuters, one establishes the existence of idempotents, by showing that 
every (right) neuter is an idempotent.
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of the universe. As we wish to have , we must have . This 




M) We have the propositional-logic derivability of matrices: 
.
This propositional reduction leads to the universal explanation.
(P
1
UC) The universal matrix connection is a theorem: 
.












For a another example, consider the existential sentences 
 and , as well as a set  of universal sentences.
(D
1
ES) Consider the predicate-logic derivability:
 
Now, the assumption is  . So, there is some pair of elements, say 
 and , in . Much as above, for all we know,  and  might very well 
be the only elements of the universe.11 As we wish to have , we 
must have  or  . This leads to the propositional reduction, 
giving  and  as (alternative) witnesses for .
(D
0
M) We have the propositional-logic derivability of matrices:
This propositional reduction leads to the universal explanation.
(D
1
UC) We have the universal consequence connecting the ma-
trices:
11 Recall that we have no constants or functions.
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For the case with equality, to obtain the propositional reduction it 
suffices to add the appropriate reflexivity axioms.
Theorem 5.1. The following assertions are equivalent for existential sentences 






M) Propositional-logic derivability of matrices:
(D
1
UC) Predicate-logic derivability of the universal matrix connection:
The method for constructing the propositional reduction and the 
universal connection should be clear by now. We consider distinct 
existentially quantified variables (by resorting to alphabetical vari-
ants, if necessary), which gives the witnesses. Then, the existential 
hypotheses give their matrices. For the existential conclusion, we 
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replace each one of its variables by the witnesses. For instance, con-
sider the predicate-logic derivability
Its universal connection is as follows:
We can extend these ideas to the existential formulas derivable from 
universal formulas. For the case with equality we have the following 
characterization.
Theorem 5.2. The following assertions are equivalent for matrices  
and  and a set  of universal sentences.
(D
1
S) Predicate-logic derivability of sentences:
(D
1
F) Predicate-logic derivability of formulas:
(D
0
M) Propositional-logic derivability of matrices:
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(D
1
UC) Predicate-logic derivability of the universal matrix connection:
6 Conclusion
We now review our results, commenting on them and on some pos-
sible extensions. 
Our aim in this paper has been to provide some substance and 
evidence for the idea that logic should not have existential theorems, 
by showing that existence in First-order Logic satisfies two general 
principles:
1. no existential conclusion without (perhaps alternative) wit-
nesses, and
2. no existential conclusion without universal explanation.
This aim has been attained through several theorems relating exis-
tential validities to universal validities and propositional reducts. 
First, we review the relationships established here regarding ex-
istential derivability (not excluding empty universes). Here  is a set 
of universal sentences. 
(UH) Existential sentences derivable from universal sentences 
can be characterized by derivability of the corresponding univer-
sal variants.
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(EH) Existential sentences derivable from existential sentences 
can be characterized by derivability of the corresponding univer-
sal connections.
(EH1) Single existential hypothesis: the universal connection 
from hypothesis to conclusion provides a witness.12
(EH1) Two existential hypotheses: the universal connection from 
hypotheses to conclusion provides alternative witnesses. 
We can characterize the first-order derivability
by means of the connection (for Minimal, Intuitionistic and Classical 
Logic)
12 For instance, from the existence of angels one can derive the existence of 
gods iff one can prove that every angel is a god.
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For the case of Classical Logic, we have a stronger characterization 
by means of alternative connections.13 
For sentences and formulas, we can summarize these results as 
follows.
(ES) An existential sentence  gives rise to a universal sentence 
, so that
Thus, we have our first general principle:
no existential conclusion without (perhaps alternative) witnesses.
(EF) For the case of an existential sentence  together with uni-
versal formulas  , we have a simple quantifier-free formula 
, such that
Thus, we have our second general principle:
no existential conclusion without universal explanation.
We now comment on these results and on some possible extensions. 
True, one could argue that all these results are limited in an im-
portant sense: they are obtained for a pure first order language, i.e., 
for a first order language without constant and function symbols. As 
mentioned in the introduction, given constant and function symbols, 
unless we assume some form of partiality, there is no way to avoid 
two typical existential validities, namely:
13 For instance, from the existence of angels and demons one can derive the 
existence of gods iff one can prove that every angel is a god or every demon is a 
god.
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A possible answer to this kind of criticism can be formulated as fol-
lows.
• The language of pure logic is really that of first-order logic 
without constant and function symbols.
• The above existential validities should be viewed – rather 
than as theorems of logic – as mere expressions of two gen-
eral semantical desiderata:
names must denote and functions must be total.
Although some of the results obtained in this paper can be extended 
to a first-order language with constant and function symbols, we 
think it is appropriate to bear in mind here the final version of our 
slogan: Pure Logic cannot establish existence unless unavoidable. 
As future work in this connection, we would like to mention two 
other analogous slogans we are now examining, namely the follow-
ing ones.
• There are no necessary existential properties.
• There are no necessary possibilities.
The extension of some of the main results of this paper to proper-
ties/relations and modalities could very well provide an interesting 
starting point towards a systematic treatment for the general issue of 
existence in logic.
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